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The Contested Terrain of Butte, Montana: Social Landscapes of Risk and 
Resiliency (357 pp.)
Chairperson: Janet L. Finn
This thesis examines some understandings of public health threats posed by 
contamination in Butte, Montana, which is part of the country's largest 
Superfund site. The public outcry that has been recorded in other contaminated 
communities, such as Woburn, MA and Love Canal, NY, has not materialized in 
Butte. To explain the reasons for what federal and local officials have deemed 
local "apathy," this analysis uses a theoretical framework of environmental 
sociology, an interdisciplinary theory that links political economy and local 
culture, as well as tensions between global economic integration and local 
subsistence.
People construct their social identities and relationships within context of their 
physical and social environments, and these social constructions of landscape 
entail an ongoing relationship with the natural, built, and modified physical 
environment. The shift from the physical environment as the familiar 
background of "home" to one of contamination entails renegotiations of 
relationships with the land which often involve political disagreements, as well 
as differing discursive frameworks for understanding "the environment." This 
analysis points to multiple, and often conflicting, landscapes operating in Butte 
which have been marginalized by technocratic definitions of "contamination," 
"risk," and "participation." The analysis argues that the technocratic ahistorical 
perspective does not consider the lessons learned from years of community 
interaction with the Anaconda Mining Company. Also unconsidered is the real 
possibility that local history is the locus of community resistance, a way of telling 
a story very different from that told by the Anaconda Company and captive press 
in the past, and by the federal government and ARCO, which purchased the 
Anaconda Company properties, in the present. The tension between the 
meanings of local history and contamination have been unexplored. This 
analysis also points to shortcomings in the risk assessment process and to public 
health information that has not been made available to Butte's people, and 
argues that this lack of information relegates both local knowledge and 
community medical problems to personal "troubles " rather than a social 
problem. It further indicates shortcomings in proposed "institutional controls,"' 
developed to protect residents from hazardous waste that will remain when 
cleanup activities are completed.
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INTRODUCTION
Butte, Montana has gained national fame as T h e  Richest Hill on Earth," 
"The Gibralter of Unionism," and the largest Superfund site in the country.
In published accounts to date, the larger-than-life history of the famed copper 
mining town has been told as the story of corporation versus labor, 
corporation versus state, imm igrant versus industrialized America, man 
versus nature, and miner versus death (Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone, 1995; 
Malone et al, 1993; Emmons, 1900; Writers' Program of the WPA, 1943). It is 
also, as anthropologist Janet Finn (1995)1 reports, a story of community as 
imagined by the Anaconda Company which, through its control of economic, 
political, and social structures, created and manipulated symbols of 
community for popular consumption. And it is a story of how the people of 
Butte, the consumers of that manufactured community, internalized, 
elaborated upon, fought against, and created their own notions of community 
to which they then gave their loyalty (Finn, 1995).
It is all that; it is also a story of how the powerful forces of capitalism and a 
belief in human mastery of the land shaped both the physical landscape of 
Butte and the social constructions of landscape through which Butte's people 
perceived and interacted with that dramatically altered landscape. Like the 
restless earthquake-prone land they mined, the social constructions of 
landscape of Butte's people changed through time. This analysis tells a story 
of socially-constructed landscapes — past and present. It is a story of silences 
and seeming contradictions within fractures and faults, tremors, dark tunnels 
in dangerous ground, contested ground.
In 1986 the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) designated
1
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Butte a Superfund site. Agency investigation has uncovered 66 contaminants 
in Butte's soil, air, and water. Yet there has been no organized public outcry 
from Butte residents about potential health impacts of the staggering list of 
toxics. This analysis seeks to explain why the public health outcry that has 
erupted at other Superfund sites, such as Love Canal, NY (Greider, 1992) and 
Woburn, MA (Brown, 1991; DiPema, 1985). EPA employees in Butte 
(Weinstock, 7/31/95; Fitzgerald, 7/31/95) and county health personnel 
(Dennehey, 9/21/95) have charged Butte's people with apathy; this analysis 
argues that this may not be the case. This analysis presents other possible, 
historically-grounded explanations for the apparent lack of public support for 
the Citizens' Technical Environmental Committee, the only local 
environmental activist group in Butte. In developing these alternative 
explanations, the analysis argues for broader definitions of participation and 
resistance than used under federal Superfund law. Consideration of broader 
definitions leads to a different understanding of past and present social 
landscapes and unearths a story of competing value systems, some operating 
aboveground; some underground. It discovers many Buttes, often 
contradictory. I start with the landscape I first saw in autum n 1994.
WELCOME TO BUTTE
An artist might have preserved the November night when the snow geese 
arrived in Butte as a Christmas card illustration. In the lower left foreground 
of the card, the large body of water in the Berkeley Pit would shine deep slate 
blue against the backdrop of the craggy snow-covered peaks of the East Ridge. 
In the upper right hand corner, atop the mountains, the illuminated statue of 
Our Lady of the Rockies, arms open, would gleam a white welcome. In the
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left upper corner, the shimmering silvery V-shape of the arriving geese 
would stand out in sharp contrast to the midnight blue Montana sky. The 
same artist may have been too stunned to paint the scene when the sun rose.
The following morning 342 snow geese were dead. Most of the lifeless 
birds, their white feathers stained rust from the metals in the Berkeley Pit, 
floated limply on the water; a few of the geese had managed to fly away, some 
flew almost 26 miles to Anaconda, before succumbing. Autopsies performed 
on the geese have yielded conflicting results. Tests conducted at Colorado 
State University for the owner of the Pit, the Atlantic Richfield Corporation 
(ARCO), suggested the birds died as the result of ingesting a wheat fungus. 
Tests conducted at the University of Wyoming and Montana State University 
for the State of Montana gave very different results, indicating the "caustic 
materials caused lesions on the skin, while high concentrations of heavy 
metals damaged some inner organs (Missoulian, Dec. 7, 1995)." University of 
Wyoming veterinary pathologist Beth Williams described damage to the 
tested "birds’ esophagus and trachea as severe...This is the most dramatic I've 
ever seen (Missoulian, Dec. 7,1995)." If Wilhams is correct the deaths of the 
geese were ghastly, the equivalent of a human being ingesting lye and 
suffering excruciating pain as the caustic substance ate through his gastro­
intestinal tract.
The Berkeley Pit, a gaping 1,789-foot deep brown and gray tiered vestige of 
open pit mining which covers 80 acres is part of a cluster of federal Superfund 
sites in Butte, Montana. Since 1982 when ARCO discontinued mining 
operations and shut off the deep level pumps, every day an estimated five 
million gallons of rusty colored toxic water seep into the pit through some 
3,500 miles of underground mine tunnels, raising the water level in the pit by
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two feet each month (USEPA, 1993). There is no technology known that can 
permanently remediate the vast toxic lake which is polluted by aluminum, 
arsenic, cadmium, copper, iron, lead, sulfate and zinc; the best solution 
available is to pum p and treat the water which flows into the pit in 
perpetuity. If the poisoned water rises to a level at which it meets the 
groundwater, public health risks would increase dramatically and the impact 
on the local aquatic ecosystem would be "catastrophic in both nature and 
extent" (USEPA, 1993: section 7.4). The contamination would follow SUver 
Bow Creek into the Clark Fork River, then into the Columbia River Basin.
The Clark Fork is Montana's largest river, carrying nearly twice the 
flow of the Missouri or the Yellowstone. It runs northwestward for 320 
miles and supplies over 90 percent of the flow into Lake Pend Oreille, 
Idaho's largest lake. The Pend Oreille River drains the lake and flows 
into the Columbia River in Washington. Besides their critical 
importance for irrigation and drinking water. Lake Pend Oreille, the 
Pend Oreille River and the Clark Fork support a struggling tourism 
and recreation industry (Nielsen, 1988:7).
As a graduate student in the Environmental Studies program at the 
University of Montana, I first saw Butte in September 1994. As a reporter and 
editor for newspapers in the Northeast I had covered Superfund sites but that 
experience did not prepare me for the physical reality of Butte. I had never 
seen a mining landscape, a shocking conglomeration of vast excavated areas, 
towering piles of debris, uprooted boulders, and barren earth.
I was equally astonished to learn from Butte environmental activist Mary 
Kay Craig that there was no public outcry about health concerns resulting 
from the contamination of soil, air, surface and ground water (Craig, 9/14/94). 
The contaminated communities I had covered as a reporter had very vocal
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groups working to connect the illnesses they saw in their communities to 
exposure to industrial poisons. I had read of similar concerned groups in 
other contaminated communities — Woburn, Massachusetts (Brown, 1991) 
and Love Canal, New York (Greider, 1992). This thesis is the result of my 
attempt to explain why there is no similar action in Butte, where a published 
health study (Moore and Luoma, 1990) has indicated environmental illness 
may be a real cause for concern.
Jim Robbins (1994) reports that the Moore-Luoma 1990 study of 3,000 U.S. 
counties between 1959 and 1972 showed that Silver Bow County, where Butte 
is located, was among 100 counties with the highest death rates for people 
aged 35 to 74, and, in another study, Butte had the highest mortality ratio for 
any county in the nation in 1950-51 and 1959-61, and the fifth highest in 1%9- 
71. Robbins also reports that a National Cancer Institute study of the average 
mortality rate from lung, trachea, and bronchial cancer showed that in 
Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, and North Dakota, the rate was 25 per 100,000 
people, plus or minus four percent; in Silver Bow County and neighboring 
Deer Lodge County, where Anaconda, the home to smelting operations, is 
located, the rate was twice that (J. Robbins, 1994). In search of answers for this 
lack of public health outcry, I began to traverse Butte’s terrain — above 
ground and below.
Above ground, Butte is startling to a newcomer. Turquoise banners 
proudly proclaim the historic uptown district which clings to the steep incline 
of Butte Hill. They flutter from street lights that illuminate rows of rundown 
brick and stone buildings. Tom-up vacant lots interspersed with the eclectic 
architecture on every block bring to mind a punchdrunk prize-fighter's 
rebellious gap-toothed grin. An occasional restored building only serves to
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reinforce the general seediness of a town down on its luck. Hundred-foot 
metal gallows frames strewn across Butte Hill pierce the thin mountain air, a 
testament to Butte's mining past.
Butte and mining are synonymous. This is important. Mining fathered 
Butte. Historians, mostly male (Malone, 1995; Malone et al, 1993; Toole, 1959, 
1972; Emmons, 1990) have presented Butte as the locus of workingmen's 
struggles. The histories tell how working men dug out their livelihoods in 
the form of ore from the depths of Butte Hill. They teU how the Copper 
Kings and later, the Anaconda Mining Company, turned that ore into vast 
fortunes. The relationship between Butte laborers and the land was 
predicated on the extraction and exploitation of natural resources in the earth. 
The scarred and torn up landscape of Butte which was barely discernible 
through the miasma of smelter smoke at the turn of the century (Emmons, 
1990) was a sign of the immigrant laborers' ability to sustain themselves and 
their families. The histories indicate that the ravaged earth allowed the 
laborer to regard himself as a contributing member of American society, it 
was the source of his self-esteem. And the Anaconda Company, purchased by 
ARCO in 1977, was the source of economic security (Emmons, 1990). The 
female voices of Butte in these male histories is muted — when it exists at all.
On Main Street and Broadway, the red-brick Hennessey Building where 
the Anaconda Company conducted its day-to-day business, still stands. Here 
"the Company " carved an empire out of the vast copper deposits in the 
depths of "the Richest Hill on Earth " and burrowed a niche in the history of 
Butte, the state of Montana, and, ultimately, the national and global economy. 
Although "the Company " has been gone more than a decade, the Hennessey 
building is still a well-maintained large presence. Less visible, but likely more
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important, the lessons learned from years of interaction with the Company 
may be present in the way in which Butte residents perceive their landscape 
and frame their futures today.
Walk a few blocks south to Park Street and turn west toward Montana 
Tech, the former School of Mines. Small eccentric homes built by miners, 
who expressed their visions of domesticity and comfort w ith turrets and 
splashes of leaded glass, line both sides of the street.
"Old Butte" is a study in architectural ingenuity. The brick and clapboard 
houses, built barely a hand’s w idth apart, reflect the personality and 
creativity of their working class owners. The gingerbread trims, odd 
turrets, occasional stained glass window, and often hodge-podge melding 
of material and design tell the stories of life-long labours and lives beyond 
the reach of corporate dictates. They stand in sharp contrast to the rows of 
tract houses subsidized by the company in more recent times when the 
search for copper meant the destruction of old neighborhoods. (Firm, 
1994:18)
Up the Park Street hill at the entrance to Montana Tech the statue of 
Marcus Daly, one of the original owners and the most legendary symbol of 
the Anaconda Mining Company, looks down at the d ty  he helped to build, 
the city that abruptly stops at the Berkeley Pit. Here and there a green lawn or 
lilac bush conquers a patch of barren soil.
This is Butte. The Black Heart of Montana. Ugly. Raw. Captive to its 
mining past. A major part of the country's largest Superfund site. Proud. 
Economically depressed. Working class. Resonating with the histories of 
immigrant men and women who, like my great-great-grandparents, fled their 
European homes with few skills and a fervent belief in possibilities. Defiantly 
alive.
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Butte is a constant flow of people daily researching their family histories at 
the Silver Bow Archives on Quartz Street. It is the AFL-CIO office in 
Walkerville. It is a bright green T-shirt that proclaims, "Friends don't let 
friends go to Butte on St. Patrick's Day." It is a carpenter w ith a Ph.D. in 
philosophy. It is the Helsinki Bar and Steam Baths where every March 16 the 
Firms crown St. Urho who drove the grasshoppers out of Finland. It is the 90- 
foot high statue of Our Lady of the Rockies, a frail flash of white hope atop the 
massive gray mountains that frame the Berkeley Pit. It is Sunday morning 
breakfast at the M&M. It is a home on Platinum Street that has foregone the 
usual picket fence for rails and mining cars filled with ore.
And this is Butte. Two eight-foot high bookcases in the Butte 
Environmental Protection Agency office filled with neatly bound white 
plastic-covered looseleaf notebooks, some four inches thick. These notebooks 
document the legacy of the Company's mining operations — contamination 
that has spread out from Butte to an area roughly equal to one-fifth of the 
state of Rhode Island (J. Robbins, 1994). Four risk assessments examine the 
possible environmental and public health impacts of a contemporary witch's 
brew containing lead, arsenic, cadmium, and carcinogenic volatile organic 
chemicals. Soil, air, and water are contaminated.
Because of its purchase of the company in 1977, ARCO now casts a long 
shadow over Butte from its local headquarters in nearby Anaconda. As a 
potentially responsible party under federal Superfund law, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency is mandating that ARCO finance much of 
the cleanup of Butte.
Below ground, in the 3,500 miles of mine tunnels, are the forces — 
geologic, political, and economic — that brought Butte to life and shaped the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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physical and cultural character of the place in the process. During my 
research I often felt myself stumbling about in the labyrinth of tunnels, 
puzzled by intersections, wondering which tunnel to take, what level to crawl 
through, surprised by sudden shafts of light. I found the silences of blocked 
tunnels, the dead ends of caved-in shafts, and the persistence of water, drips 
and flows, creating new formations in the earth. At times I felt lost in this 
unfamiliar landscape, and overwhelmed by my own ignorance as an outsider. 
Stumbling about, I was directed by my own inner landscape, which has been 
shaped by an Eastern Irish immigrant working class culture, my experiences 
as a reporter, my love for the land, and, although I cannot say just where or 
how it surfaces, my gender. Despite my best efforts to attain objectivity, the 
forces of my own landscape will tend to overlay my research. My hopes for 
objectivity are also impeded by the deep fascination, respect, and affection I 
have developed for the place and its people.
The Butte I have found is contradictory, tough, gritty, and toxic. It is home 
to roughly 33,000 people who daily grapple with the results of this 130-year 
history -  people who walk on contaminated soils, breathe fouled air, and 
bathe, wash dishes and drink polluted water. They are survivors, people with 
their own histories and voices, their own concepts of quality of life, which 
have not been heard. Theirs are complicated stories woven from the past and 
present, the private and public, and the individual and social. I believe their 
stories are important for what Butte can tell us about ourselves and our 
relationship to the land.
STUDY QUESTIONS
The overriding question is why Butte seems so different than other
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Superfund sites. Is the public apathetic? From this point, a number of other 
questions arose. What is considered participation and why is participation 
considered in the terms established under the federal Superfund law? What 
is resistance? Does resistance necessarily have to be overt, such as public 
dem onstrations?
Digging deeper, what is contamination? Is it, as the EPA indicates in risk 
assessments, a chronology of individual contaminants and a summing up of 
those contaminants to determine possible public health risks? Does 
contamination have other meanings, and are those possible other meanings 
more compelling than the actual physical characteristics of the contaminants 
themselves in shaping people's beliefs about health threats?
How has the contamination been presented to the people of Butte? Why 
has it been presented as it has? Do the people of Butte have adequate 
information, and, if they do not, why?
The ultimate question may be: What does it mean when the entire 
history of a community, its sole reason for being, is intimately tied to current 
notions of contamination?
METHODOLOGY
Data collection involved both secondary and primary source material. 
Secondary source material included government documents, local newspaper 
articles, county archival information, and literature, which will be discussed 
in the literature review. Individual interviews constitute the primary 
resource; in addition, 1 attended two meetings of government officials, Butte 
and Anaconda residents and Sandy Stash, ARCO's representative.
For the official characterization of risk and the extent of environmental
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degradation the study relies upon EPA risk assessments, the state of Montana 
Natural Resource Damage Claim, and Butte-Silver Bow government 
agreements with the EPA and ARCO related to lead contamination and the 
development of institutional controls to ensure protection from 
contamination that will remain after the cleanup. Federal government 
census reports provided additional information about education and 
employment breakdowns.
To determine how the contamination and cleanup have been presented to 
the public, I turned to the Butte daily newspaper, the Montana Standard, 
coverage. The examination of coverage seemed especially important because 
the public does not attend public hearings and information sessions 
(Weinstock, 7/31/95; Dennehey, 9/21 /95; Crain, 9/21/95; Fitzgerald, 7/31/95) 
nor does it seek information from the country public health department 
(Dennehey, 9/21/95) or the local EPA office (Weinstock, 7/31/95; Fitzgerald. 
7/31/95). Additionally, people interviewed referred only to newspaper 
coverage (with one exception (Ray, 10/24/95), who said that information 
provided on local cable television was usually erroneous). Therefore, I 
concluded that the newspaper is a primary source of information for the 
majority of Butte residents.
I selected the period from January 1,1990 through December 31,1993 to 
examine the environmental coverage for a number of reasons. First, because 
during this period, many of the risk assessments that are a routine part of 
newspaper coverage were produced, for example, the Final Preliminary 
Baseline Risk Assessment for Lower Area One, October 25, 1991; Revised 
Final Baseline Risk Assessment for the Montana Pole NPL Site, February 10, 
1993; and Draft Baseline Risk Assessment for the Mine Flooding Operable
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Unit, December 15, 1993. Second, the EPA opened its Butte office in late 1989 
which made agency representatives and records easily accessible to Butte 
people. Third, Sara Weinstock, the EPA remedial project manager, was kind 
enough to share her file of every environmentally-oriented story run by the 
paper since the local EPA office opened. As will be indicated by referencing in 
the study, newspaper coverage for certain specific events was also checked, a 
task made easier by the Johnson Chronology in the Butte-SÜver Bow 
archives.
Primary health data, which were difficult to access, came from two sources: 
Emergency Medical Services records from the former Butte-Silver Bow 
Hospital which were available in the Butte-Silver Bow archives; and 
Montana Area Health Education Center publications. Reasons for the 
minimal amount of information from the Montana Departm ent of Health 
and Montana Tumor Registry will be discussed later in the public health 
section of the thesis.
Interviews were conducted with federal, state, and local officials to identify 
both those territories they claimed and the perspective each brought to the 
cleanup. Butte-Silver Bow Chief Executive Jack Lynch declined to be 
interviewed but did submit written replies to the questions I asked of all Butte 
people interviewed. Members of the Citizens’ Technical Environmental 
Committee, which functions through a federal EPA Technical Assistance 
Grant (TAG) and is the only consistent source of environmental citizen 
action in Butte, also agreed to be interviewed. To obtain the perspective of 
organized labor and history, I interviewed Marilyn Maney of the AFL-CIO; for 
the historical perspective, I interviewed Mark Reavis, the county historical
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13
officer, and Ellen Crain, director of the Butte-Silver Bow archives. Although 
Kathy Hadley, one of the founders of Citizens for Labor and Environmental 
Justice, does not live in Butte, I interviewed her because this new group is 
merging labor and cleanup issues, and because, as one of the founders of the 
Clark Fork Coalition, she has been involved in the cleanup since the 
Superfund designation, John T. Shea provided the perspective of both a 
lifelong worker of the Anaconda Company and current member of the Butte 
ARCO retirees club. Because the local newspaper presented the cleanup from 
the perspective of local business and economic boosterism, I did not find it 
necessary to interview a representative from the Chamber of Commerce to 
capture this perspective.
The questions asked were designed to determine if, among these few 
people interviewed, the landscapes of people who spent their childhoods in 
Butte differed from those of non-natives or late comers; if landscapes of non­
natives were altered with length of residence in Butte and, conversely, if 
natives who spent time away from Butte returned with an altered sense of 
landscape. A series of questions focused on perceptions of public health 
an d /o r illness in Butte, and possible connections between the contamination 
and illness. Another series related to issues of trust in county, state, and 
federal officials. Those interviewed were also asked what they believed 
would improve life in Butte, whether they believed it was possible to change 
conditions, and, if they believed they could not affect change, to identify the 
impediment. Additional questions related to whether the Superfund 
designation had affected local property values, and to determine support for 
future mining in Butte and in the state of Montana. The limited scope of
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these questions was broadened by many interviewees who were kind enough 
to expand on the themes under discussion. A list of questions asked is 
included in the appendix.
ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
A social landscape can represent a collective local history, for example, the 
mining landscape as representative of economic security, economic 
development and corporate profits, or as the history of Butte, or as a 
composite of all these things. It can also represent a threat, for example, the 
EPA classification of Butte as a Superfund site. The social landscape concept is 
useful for a number of reasons. First, it keeps the focus of the study upon the 
interactions between the land and the institutions and individuals working 
and living in Butte. Second, the metaphor of a social landscape has the scope 
to ground competing visions in the actual physical reality of Butte. And 
third, it provides an organizational framework for the thesis. Following this 
introduction, the thesis is organized into chapters, each dealing with a 
particular type or types of social landscapes.
In Chapter 1, the theoretical landscape, which shapes the questions asked 
and the nature of analysis brought to bear, is laid out. A literature review 
section outlines the work, the majority of which is sociological, done in 
contam inated communities.
In Chapter 2, the history of Butte is presented as The Contested Terrain of 
Butte. Here the development of Butte and the Anaconda Mining Company 
are explored within the local, state, national and international political 
economy. The historical arenas of conflict between labor and management, 
corporation and state, local, state and federal governments, are grounded in
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the changing physical reality of Butte. Historical material is derived from the 
work of local, state and corporate historians (Emmons, 1990; Malone, 1995; 
Malone et al, 1993; Toole, 1959, 1972; Marcossen, 1957; W. Robbins, 1994) as 
well as from oral histories available at Butte-Silver Bow archives. More 
contemporary history is garnered from interviews, newspaper stories and 
ARCO's (the Atlantic Richfield Corporation) Superfund publication.
Chapter 3, Superfund and Risk; The limited landscape of technocratic 
discourse, examines the operative assumptions and conflicts inherent in the 
federal Superfund law and considers the nature and limitations both of 
bureaucracy and technocracy. This section also considers the implications of 
the privileged discourse of science and the way in which that privileging has 
usurped local knowledge.
Chapter 4, Local Newspaper Coverage: The Standardized landscape, 
analyzes four years of local newspaper coverage of issues related to 
contamination, examining quantitative and qualitative coverage as well as 
seeking the messages given about the meaning of the contamination.
Chapter 5, Public Health: Subterranean landscapes, considers the historical 
politicizing of public health issues, the local knowledge which contradicts 
health information disseminated by the EPA, and the quality of present 
health data. Serious shortcomings, both in information presented and 
scientific information actually available, are indicated.
Chapter 6, The Social Landscapes: Diverse terrains, examines the social 
landscapes of people interviewed. The chapter considers the different 
landscapes of non-natives and natives, and draws from the history of Butte to 
indicate the threads from the past which have become woven into the 
present.
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Chapter 7, "Conclusion: Community and landscapes of change," looks at 
the contested visions of Butte and considers the potential for social change, as 
well as possible courses of action, including lay epidemiology, that could 
empower Butte's people. Because Butte does not exist in a vacuum, this 
section examines the tension inherent between Montana as the "Treasure 
State" and the "Last Best Place," as expressed in proposals for both expansions 
of existing mines and new mines and an initiative to strengthen water quality 
standards related to mining. Finally, the chapter considers both the 
relationship of Butte and Montana to the international economy and the 
implications of that relationship.
1 Finn's doctoral dissertation compares the differences in community which 
were consciously fostered by the Anaconda Company in Butte, Montana and 
Chuquicamata, Chile. Because of the limited scope of this thesis, I will focus 
upon her findings in Butte only. However, my neglect of her Chilean data does 
not adequqtely convey the authority of Finn's work.
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A number of theoretical frameworks, or models, each of which entails its 
own set of assumptions, questions, and approaches to interpretation, directed 
the way in which I set about answering the questions I raised in the previous 
section. The overarching model, into which the others are nested, was 
developed by environmental sociologists William R. Catton, Jr. and Riley E. 
Dunlap (1980). They coined the term New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) to 
reflect a growing awareness among sociologists that humans and their 
activities are not exempt from ecological constraints. My use of NEP entails 
four assumptions (Catton and Dunlap, 1980:34):
1. Although human beings have exceptional characteristics, among them 
culture and technology, they are simultaneously one of many species that are 
independently involved in the global system;
2. Human affairs are influenced by intricate linkages of cause, effect, and 
feedback within ecological systems, as well as social and cultural factors, so it 
is possible for hum an actions to lead to unintended consequences;
3. Humans live in and depend upon a finite biophysical environment 
which imposes potent physical and biological restraints on human affairs; 
and
4. Although the inventiveness of humans and the powers derived from 
that inventiveness may temporarily seem to deter physical and biological 
restraints, ecological laws cannot be repealed.
Implicit in this paradigm is a tension between human use and the 
maintenance of the land. Use of this model in Butte will entail consideration 
of four broad areas: 1. past and present interactions of people with the land; 2.
17
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the unintended consequences of environmental degradation in the form of 
contaminated soils, air, and water; 3. the impacts of the contamination upon 
the peoples' ability to live on and use the land; and 4. consideration of the 
role that the development of technology has played in rnining operations, in 
current attempts at cleanup, and in shaping peoples' perceptions of health 
issues. Because these interactions, consequences, impacts, and technological 
developments occur within context of a local, state, national and 
international political economy, I am also employing a model called regional 
political ecology developed by Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield (1987).
The regional political ecology model places the issue of land degradation in 
the social arena, and focuses attention on the political and economic processes 
that shape the use of the land (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). This model 
looks at particulars of the place study and then moves to analysis of the local, 
regional, national and international political economy as it affects decisions 
made about local use. Although this model is associated with Third-World 
studies, it is useful in Montana, which has been portrayed by historians 
(Toole, 1959,1972; W. Robbins, 1994) as a resource colony for Eastern and 
West Coast financial interests. As such, the issues of absentee land owners, 
decisions based upon considerations other than local interests, and the notion 
of who bears the costs associated with environmental change, which are 
common themes in Third-W orld research (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; 
Bryant, 1992; Feet and Watts, 1993), are relevant to the study of Butte,
Montana. The conceptualization of Montana as a resource colony implicitly 
involves the notion of conflict between local and outside interests which is 
borne out in many histories of Butte and Montana (Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone 
et al, 1993; Malone, 1995; Emmons, 1990; W. Robbins, 1994).
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Geographers Richard Peet and Michael Watts (1993) suggest that the 
political ecology framework be supplemented with consideration of power, 
the role of the state, and differences in discourse and culture. Because land 
management decisions are made within a context of private (m the case of 
Butte, corporate) interests and public interests, the thesis will continually 
refer to assumptions embedded in the structures that shape social 
organizations and relationships on both private and public levels. Although 
the concept of "structure" is difficult to define, I am using a definition offered 
by sociologist William Sewell (1992):
Structures, then, are sets of mutually sustaining schemas and resources 
that empower and constrain social action and that tend to be 
reproduced by social action. But their reproduction is never automatic. 
Structures are at risk, at least to some extent, in all of the social 
encounters they shape — because structures are multiple and 
intersecting, because schemas are transposable, and because resources 
are polysémie [numerous] and accumulate unpredictably (Sewell,
1992:2).
Because no culture is monolithic and because the cultural schema will 
intersect with individual schemas, there are also tensions involved in the 
concept of schemas. An individual schema consists of a person's 
temperament and personality, as well as beliefs and attitudes resulting from 
such things as family, social status, ethnic, religious and neighborhood 
values, the type of and duration of education, and workplace experiences. A 
cultured schema may incorporate social status, ethnic groups, religions, and 
class issues into the broader notion of "American values."
In a capitalistic structure, resources tend to be unequally distributed which 
makes challenging existing structures difficult for actors w ith minimal
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resources. Where environmental concerns surface, laws and government 
policies tend to serve as an arena in which unresolved conflict is acted out 
(Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994; Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991). In other words, it is 
possible to consider the political economy of capitalism as the primary (but 
not sole) structure of influence in environmental affairs in the United States.
Structures are dual in that they are both the medium and outcome of 
human action; as such, they are not deterministic. They can both inhibit and 
encourage human agency, the opportunity for people to act independently of 
the structure (Sewell, 1992). Any consideration of structure and human 
agency leads directly to the concept of power. I am working with a definition 
of power structure developed by sociologist Dennis Wenger (1978):
The patterned differentials between individuals, groups and 
organizations in access to both authoritative and non-authoritative 
sources of social power. In this context, social power refers to the ability 
of a system component to actualize its interests, whether intentionally 
or unintentionally within the context of asymmetrical control of 
various social resources or the reputation for such control. These 
differentials in social power combine with those in prestige and 
economic status to form the community's system of stratification 
(Wenger, 1978:22).
The use of this definition in Butte will allow consideration of a broad range 
and multitude of points of power, those that exist in institutional 
relationships as well as "everyday forms of resistance (Dirks et al, 1994:5)." 
Sewell’s use of "intentionally or unintentionally," as well as "various social 
resources, " provides for consideration of areas, such as the passionate love 
of many Butte natives for their local history (Reavis, 11/29/95), as a possible
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source of resistance. Equally important, it allows space to speculate upon the 
way themes of conflict in Butte — labor/m anagement, public/private, 
acquiescence/resistance, government/citizens; governm ent/corporation; and 
corporation/culture (Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone et al, 1976; Malone, 1995; 
Emmons, 1990; Finn, 1995) — may have been internalized in both the culture 
at large and in individuals. Further, Sewell’s use of the phrase "to actualize 
its interests" is loose enough to apply toward developing an understanding of 
the lack of public outcry (Weinstock, 7/31/95; Fitzgerald, 7/31/95; Craig, 
7/30/95) and participation in cleanup-related activities (Weinstock, 7/31/95; 
Fitzgerald, 7/31/95; Craig, 7/30/95; Dennehey, 9/21/95) as expressions of 
different priorities (Maney, 9/22/95).
The notion of discourse, which can be considered as another structure 
(Peet and Watts, 1993), is helpful when looking at the relationship between 
government agencies and residents:
A 'discourse' is a particular area of language use related to a certain set 
of institutions and expressing a particular standpoint. Concerned with 
a given range of objects, it emphasizes some concepts at the expense of 
others (Peet and Watts, 1993:228).
To this definition, I add "clusters of non-verbal practices, as these create 
and maintain distinctions and identities (Creenough and Tsing, 1994:95)."
Knowledge of the environment...is socially constructed in 
environmental practices, and it is the practical significance of 
knowledge that makes it already political. The intertwining of 
knowledge and practice become particularly obvious where multiple 
frameworks for describing and using a single terrain are in 
com petition.
Discourse creates objects of environmental knowledge and agendas 
for environmental action. For example, nature is made and unmade.
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claimed and unclaimed, through the production and deployment of 
property rights discourses. Political disagreements about how to live in 
nature — e.g., those that divide local farmers and national officials, or 
those that divide environmental activists and tim ber company 
spokesmen — involve divergent discursive frameworks for 
understanding the environment’ (Creenough and Tsing, 1994:95).
Different discursive frameworks may result from different understandings 
or assumptions of the meanings of concepts under discussion (Connolly, 
1993). The result of this are numerous "essentially contestible concepts 
(Connolly, 1993:10)." Many of these contestible concepts occur in the use of 
words such as politics or democracy or participation in which a number of 
other concepts are nested, e.g., within any notion of politics, democracy or 
participation there are assumptions about freedom or individual rights, also 
contestible concepts. Political scientist William Connolly (1993:14) refers to 
these nested concepts, which are open to a variety of interpretations, as 
"cluster concepts."
...We often find that various people jointly employing such a cluster 
concept weight the importance of shared criteria differently; they might 
also interpret the meaning of particular criteria jointly accepted in 
subtly different ways; and some persons might find it advantageous to 
add new criteria to, or drop old criteria from, the established list, while 
other groups object to such moves...When one or more of these 
conditions prevail we have the makings of a conceptual dispute. Such 
disputes have undeniably arisen in contemporary life over the concept 
of poli tics...Contests persist over the proper interpretation of the partly 
shared idea of politics, and we might say that its very characteristic as a 
cluster concept provides the space within which such contests emerge 
(Connolly, 1993:14-15).
Often, in the analysis of the discourse of different groups, one group 
emerges as dominant (Peet and Watts, 1993; Edelstein, 1988; Merchant, 1993;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
Schrader-Frechette, 1991). In these instances, the discourse of the dominant 
group contains claims to superiority, which privileges the dominant group’s 
discourse by portraying the discourse of less dominant groups as inferior or 
non-legitimate. In the United States, the dominant discourse, often referred 
to as technocratic discourse, is based on scientific claims to objectivity and 
rationality (Peet and Watts, 1993; Edelstein, 1988; Merchant, 1992; Schrader- 
Frechette, 1991).
Inherent in technocratic discourse are assumptions that: 1. nature is 
composed of particles of matter (atomism); 2. the universe is a natural order;
3. knowledge and information can be abstracted from the natural world 
(removal of historical context); 4. problems can be analyzed in parts 
(reductionism); and 5. sense data are discrete (Merchant, 1992). When these 
assumptions, as incorporated into the scientific method, are applied to real 
world situations, as is the case with risk assessment, the practitioners of the 
method claim that resulting decisions are objective, rational, and value-free 
(Merchant, 1992; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988). However, these 
claims are increasingly being questioned (Merchant, 1992; Schrader-Frechette, 
1991; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992; Brown, 1991). Analysis of the dominant 
group's claims to a superior rationality often reveals that "reason, in a word, 
is ideological (Peet and Watts, 1993:229)."
The use of the word "ideological " implies that there is no one superior 
understanding or rationality; rather, there are groups and individuals who 
share a range of concepts but share them imperfectly and incompletely 
(Connolly, 1993:6)." The process of adjustment, extension, resolution, 
accommodation, and transcendence of differences in these imperfectly and
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incompletely shared concepts provides "the space for political interaction 
(Connolly, 1993:6)."
The language of politics is not a neutral medium that conveys ideas 
independently formed; it is an institutionalized structure of meanings 
that channels political thought and action in certain directions...
By the terms of political discourse...! refer first to the vocabulary 
currently employed in political thought and action; second, to the ways 
in which the meanings conventionally embodied in that vocabulary 
set the frame for political reflection by establishing criteria to be met 
before an event or act can be said to fall within the ambit of a given 
concept; and third, to the judgments or commitments that are 
conventionally sanctioned when these criteria are met (Connolly, 
1993:1-2).
However, the space in which political interaction is allowed can be 
constrained when the dominant ideology is used to repress an d /o r subvert 
less privileged discourse and, in so doing, discounts the local base of 
knowledge (Connolly, 1993; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Peet and 
Watts, 1993; Merchant, 1992; Greider, 1992; Bagdikian, 1990). There are 
"connections between rationality, truth, discourse, and the global system of 
power relations (Peet and Watts, 1993:229)."
These themes manifest themselves in what Peet and Watts (1993:230) refer 
to as "regional discursive formations."
Certain modes of thought, logics, themes, styles of expression, and 
typical metaphors run through the discursive history of a region, 
appearing in a variety of forms, disappearing occasionally, only to 
reappear with even greater intensity in new guises. A regional 
discursive formation is, however, as important for the topics and 
themes it allows — its absences, silences, repressed ideas, marginalized 
statements. In a regional discursive formation even competing 
notions often use the same metaphors, interpret in similar ways, 
perhaps even think w ith similar logic,..We would argue that regional 
discursive formations originate in, and display the effects of, certain
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physical, political-economic, and institutional settings, but that 
discursive formations grounded in material, political, or ideological 
power supremacies demonstrate a continual tendency to extend over 
spaces with greatly different characteristics and discursive traditions 
(Peet and Watts, 1993:230-31).
So, in Butte, I am looking at a regional discourse interwoven with often 
implicit understandings of the political economy of the overarching structure 
of capitalism! (Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994; Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991). In 
this context, it is important to keep in mind the economic assumptions 
embedded within the structure of capitalism: 1. the individual operates to 
maximize his utility through the exercise of individual choice (atomism); 2, 
individuals act after obtaining perfect information (reductionism); 3. the laws 
of supply and demand will always correct the system when it deviates from 
its natural equilibrium, the norm (the universe is a natural order); 4. taste is 
exogenous to the system, e.g., human choices are not influenced by the world 
about them (removal of context); and 5. constant growth is essential to 
maintain the system (Hunt, 1990). These assumptions are very similar to 
those underlying scientific and technocratic activities, a result of historical 
congruences.
Historian Carolyn Merchant (1992) traces the shift in Western philosophy 
and scientific thought that transformed views of the earth as alive to a 
commodity to be bought and sold — a transformation essential to allow large- 
scale mining, clearing of forests, and dumping of waste from newly 
constructed factories into waterways, all of which was essential for 
industrialization. This is not determinism. This shift in thought alone did 
not preordain industrialization. Other factors converged over time; other 
outcomes were possible.
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Other factors that affirmed the shift in Western thought included the rise 
of Protestantism, the development of a rationalized body of science and of the 
scientific method, and the creation of a market economy (Hunt, 1990). The 
medieval sway of the Catholic Church, which had banned usury and the sale 
of surpluses for profit, gave way to Protestantism which allowed and 
encouraged pursuit and accumulation of profit (Hunt, 1990; Farganis, 1993). 
Currency and political systems supportive of the need for expansion of the 
new economic base were developed, and newly industrialized societies 
became characterized by the division between property owners and wage 
laborers (Hunt, 1990). The assumptions of classical economics, the basis of 
modern Western economics, were developed (Hunt, 1990).
During the seventeenth century, the socially accepted concept of a living 
earth was replaced by a view of nature as a machine, and science became the 
means to master the now-inanimate earth (Merchant, 1992). Science became 
the means to develop technology^ which was needed to increase the new 
capitalists' ability to amass profits, control their workforce, and create new 
markets for their products (Hunt, 1990). The New World provided the 
resources. The Puritan belief that the taming of the wilderness was carrying 
out the work of God was transformed into the notion of Manifest Destiny, the 
idea that the new Americans were entitled by divine right to possess the 
continent by taking and taming the land of Native Americans (Shabecoff, 
1993).
The market economy, imported from Europe, dem anded surpluses to be 
sold or traded for other commodities, the technology to clear the land, plant 
the crops and raise cattle, and the permanence associated w ith the notion of 
private property to be passed onto one's heirs (Shabecoff, 1993). Helped by
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federal government land grants, and urged on by railroad corporations which 
had been given huge tracts of land by the federal government, and the 
newspapers of the time, the new Americans moved west, changing the 
landscape to conform to the national ideal of progress and civilization 
(Shabecoff, 1993). These changes in turn necessitated alterations in the way 
the landscape was perceived by those who lived on and changed it (Shabecoff,
1993).
The economic logic of a commodity-producing system based on 
competition and economies of scale demanded expanded production, 
resulting in what sociologists Alan Schnaiberg and Kenneth Alan Could 
(1994) refer to as the "treadmill of production." Schnaiberg and Gould (1994) 
have identified seven characteristics of the treadmill:
1. An increasing accumulation of wealth, through the ownership of 
economic organizations that successfully use ecological resources to expand 
production and products.
2. The increasing movement of workers away from self-employment, into 
positions of employees who must rely on expanded production to gain jobs 
and wages.
3. Increasing allocations of accumulated wealth to newer technologies to 
replace labor with physical capital, thereby generating more profits for wealth- 
holders, in order to sustain and expand their ownership in the face of 
growing competition from other wealth holders.
4. Increasing activities of governments to facilitate the expanded 
accumulation of wealth for national development on the one hand and social 
security on the other.
5. The net result of these processes is the increasing necessity for even
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greater ecological withdrawals and additions to sustain a given level of social 
welfare.
6. The likelihood of ecological disorganization, or environmental 
degradation, is increased as economic pressures push toward greater 
extraction of market values from ecosystems.
7. Societies become increasingly vulnerable to socioeconomic 
disorganization as the ecological "resource base" (Schnaiberg and Gould, 
1993:69) becomes more disorganized.
During the exploitation process, social and ecological systems evolve in 
response to exploitation of the resources, rather than in response to each 
other, which makes it less likely that, after stock resources are exhausted, 
ecological and social systems are in a position to "co-evolve" (Norgaard, 1984), 
to interact postively. These stock-resource exploitive development costs 
increase dramatically when the extractive process is enhanced by the 
development of technology. Resource economist Richard B. Norgaard (1984) 
points to losses that occur because stock resources are unavailable for later 
investm ent,3 and losses associated with returning to or accepting a less 
advantageous development path after the stock resource is depleted — such 
as the millions of dollars now being spent to clean up Butte and related 
Superfund sites. Because these losses, which economists refer to as 
"externalities," are not counted as costs within the framework of production 
considered by classical economics, stock resources are overused.
Economist James K. Boyce (1994:169) maintains "the extent of an 
environmentally degrading economic activity is a function of the balance of 
power between the winners, who derive net benefits from the activity, and
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the losers, who bear net costs." He also argues that the greater the inequalities 
of power and wealth, the greater the environmental degradation. Outcomes 
are guided by what Boyce (1994:170) refers to as a "power weighted social 
decision rule," which predicts outcomes based on the winners' marginal 
benefits and losers' marginal costs.
...greater inequalities of power and wealth lead to more environmental 
degradation for three reasons: (a) the excess environmental 
degradation driven by powerful winners is not offset by the 
environmental degradation prevented by powerful losers; (b) 
inequality raises the valuation of benefits reaped by rich and powerful 
winners relative to costs imposed on poor and less powerful losers; and 
(c) inequality raises the rate of time preference^ applied to 
environmental resources by both the poor and the rich, by increasing 
their poverty and political insecurity, respectively (1994:178).
In Butte, the regional discourse represents understandings of the local, 
state, national, and global political economy. To address the global economy, I 
will use world systems theory which posits a global economy based on a 
world trade system with an international division of labor between the core, 
the rich capitalist technology-developing countries that are home to 
multinational corporations and value-added industries, and the peripheries, 
poor countries or regions, characterized by low-skill/labor intensive 
production and export of primary goods (W. Robbins, 1994). However, the 
core is not monolithic; there are peripheries within the core, for example, the 
state of Montana's economy occupies a peripheral position to the national 
core. Montana, as a resource colony, is also the periphery in the context of the 
global economy. The theory posits that terms of trade which are favorable to 
the core intensify surplus extraction and the dependence of peripheral
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economies and that this economic imbalance is mirrored by a political 
imbalance.
The division between development and underdevelopm ent, between 
center and periphery, between the colonizer and the colonized is 
therefore complex, existing at several levels: national, regional, local, 
within segments of the local population itself; and in both intra- and 
interclass relations. Critical to understanding new bursts of economic 
growth is recognition of the evolving dialectic between changes in 
world capitalism and local economies (W. Robbins, 1994:15).
On its own, this theory would imply a somewhat simplistic and 
deterministic approach. However, when used in tandem with local, state, 
national, and international politics, history, and cultural understandings, it is 
useful as a variant of regional political ecology. What is important is that 
local understandings of capitalism are arrived at by both individuals and 
organizations in many different ways, and this results in a m ultitude of 
understandings expressed as diverse, and often conflicting, priorities. Equally 
important, is that many of these conflicting priorities have not been explored 
in Butte where many voices, opinions of people in their own words which 
operate outside of discursive structures, have not been heard during the 
cleanup process. There are possible explanations for the lack of Butte voices 
— among them, tacit agreement with official definitions and solutions of the 
problem, different priorities (Maney, 9/22/95), lack of understanding 
(Dennehey, 9/21/95), disinterest (Weinstock, 7/31/95; Fitzgerald, 7/31/95; 
Craig, 7/30/95), and socialization to a mining culture (Ray, 10/24/95; Waring, 
10/21/95).
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Local voices, or non-privileged discourse, may be seen as a counter-claim, 
as an assertion of the legitimacy of discounted forms of knowledge an d /o r as 
a form of resistance (Peet and Watts, 1993; Edelstein, 1988; Schrader-Frechette, 
1991; Cormolly, 1993; Milbum, 1991; Brown, 1991; Stewart, 1990; Finn, 1995). 
These are the voices of the periphery, voices that are heard in daily 
interactions. The notions of counter-claims and silences are particularly 
useful in looking at the process of risk assessment, newspaper presentation of 
contamination and cleanup, notions of public health, and the importance of 
local history in Butte. It is possible to consider counter-claims, silences, 
government agency definitions and actions, newspaper coverage, notions of 
public health, and visions of Butte as landscapes, as representative of peoples’ 
relationships with the land.
The landscape concept is useful for a number of reasons. First, it keeps the 
focus of the study upon the interactions between the land and institutions 
and individuals working and living in Butte. Second, the metaphor of a 
social landscape has the scope to ground competing visions in the actual 
physical reality of Butte. And third, it provides an organizational framework. 
A social landscape can represent a collective local history, e.g., Butte's mining 
landscape as representative of economic security, economic development and 
profits, a contested history, or a composite of all these things. It can also 
represent a threat, e.g., the federal Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
classification of Butte as a Superfund site. When a landscape is transformed 
from familiar background to threat, when a hometown is stigmatized as a 
potential danger, individuals in the community must then renegotiate their 
beliefs about the place or deny the reasons for the stigma label, thereby 
denying any risk (Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a).
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The material reality of mining-related waste has always been the major 
constituent of Butte's landscape (Emmons, 1990; Toole, 1959,1972; Writers’ 
Program, 1943). The new material reality, which requires new negotiated 
meanings, is the EPA’s designation of that landscape as toxic. However, 
inherent in the Superfund label is the question of what that label actually 
means to individual residents and to the contaminated community at large. 
What is particularly important is how the meaning of the designation is 
presented to individuals in the community, e.g., the EPA presents 
information that quantifies and describes the contaminants, and from that 
data the agency develops a risk assessment that calculates the probability of 
illnesses that may result from exposure (Schrader-Frechette, 1991), The media 
also "play an important role in the social construction of risk and safety 
(Spencer and Triche, 1994:199)." Research into media constructions of risk 
and safety suggest:
...the importance of news sources, economic and political power, and a 
preference for monocausal frames in the social construction of news.
Our results also suggest the importance of local cultural world views in 
defining hazards and risks (Spencer and Triche, 1994:199).
In Butte, the mining contamination has been presented as simply the 
legacy of the Anaconda Company’s mining operations by both the EPA and 
the Montana Standard. This is a limited definition. What goes unquestioned 
when the contamination is presented in this way is how the Anaconda 
Company was able both to convey the landscape of Butte as a mining 
landscape, for example, the fame of Butte as ’The Richest Hill on Earth"
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(Finn, 1995). Also unquestioned is how the Company historically dealt with 
health concerns of residents (Emmons, 1990) and the ways in which this may 
shape health issues in Butte today. Further, this limited definition assumes 
that all the important impHcations of contamination have been addressed 
and put to rest. But that is not the case: what remains unexplored is any 
consideration of who benefits and who pays from acceptance of this definition 
of sole cause; and any recognition of the individual and social stresses 
involved in renegotiation of the landscape. Politically, the larger question 
this raises is whose landscape is being protected, changed, or exploited, or, as 
Boyce (1994) suggests, who benefits and who pays. Because the issues raised in 
contaminated communities may differ in many respects from other landscape 
changes, such as the siting of business or urban sprawl or protection of 
wilderness areas, 1 turn to a review of the literature on contaminated 
com m unities.
LANDSCAPES OF CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES
Environmental sociologists working in communities that have 
experienced toxic exposures have developed a number of subfields. This 
research is necessarily broad on scope. It comprises eight general and tightly 
interwoven themes, which include:
1. structural issues embedded in the federal Superfund law (Barnett, 1994; 
Yeager, 1991; Greider, 1992) and environmental law in general (Schnaiberg 
and Could, 1994);
2. corporate practices (Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 
1988; Brown, 1991; Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994);
3. the institutionalized practices of government technocracies (Weber,
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19%; Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Greider, 1992; Lupton, 1993; Schrader- 
Frechette, 1991; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Edelstein, 1988; 
Freudenburg, 1993; Brown, 1991; Fiorino, 1990);
4. discursive practices (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Connolly, 1993; Milburn, 
1994; Edelman, 1964; Greider, 1992; Greenough and Tsing, 1994; Brown, 1991);
5. public health issues related to contamination (Lappé, 1991; Cortese,
1993; H u and Kim, 1993; Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Castleman and Ziem, 
1988; National Cancer Institute, 1995; Bates, 1994)
6. class and gender issues in Butte (Finn, 1995), and as they relate both to 
distribution of toxic exposures (Edelstein, 1988; Schrader-Frechette, 1991;
Buttel and Flinn, 1978; Wolensky, 1991) and to the nature of toxic activism 
(Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Bullard, 1993; Chavis, 1993);
7. economic issues related to community development and natural 
resource use (Greenough and Tsing, 1994; Freudenburg, 1992; Norgaard, 1984); 
and
8. media coverage (Spencer and Triche, 1994; Bagdikian, 1990; Greider, 
1992).
The following summation of the literature will provide a sense of 
common issues in American contaminated communities and, most 
importantly, will provide information to help determine the ways in which 
Butte is similar and different from other contaminated communities. I am 
using Edelstein's (1988:6) definition of contaminated community: any 
residential area located within the identified boundaries for a known 
exposure to some form of contamination. I supplem ent Edelstein’s 
definitions with Finn's (1995:18) which captures the notion of process:
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community is a location, subject and product of the dynamic interplay of 
structures and practices.
At the core of this perspective [environmental sociology] is the 
assumption that people construct their social identities, organize their 
conduct, and form associations in exchange relationships with their 
built, modified and biophysical environments. Thus, environmental 
sociology suggests that the real issue is not the empirical qualities of 
hazard agents per se or the concept of collective crisis occasions that is 
of paramount importance, but how the aversive agent, of whatever 
type, alters the relationship between a community and one or more the 
three types of environments: built, modified or natural...How, in other 
words, do aversive agents alter relationships between environments 
and communities, and how do some of these environment- 
community changes shape the course of social change? (Kroll-Smith 
and Couch, 1991b:294-95)
Although not unanimously accepted, many researchers maintain that the 
dynamics of exposure to toxins are very different than those associated with 
natural disasters, such as earthquakes, or floods (Davidson and Baum, 1991; 
Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991,
1994; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Baum et al, 1983; Erickson,
1991).
Why do technological disasters diminish the long-term psychosocial 
health of victims to a greater extent than natural disasters? Perhaps it 
is because toxic spills, asbestos decay, or core meltdowns contaminate 
rather than damage ..they pollute, befoul, taint, rather thgm just create 
wreckage and they scare human beings in new and special ways'...The 
primordial antipathy to the thought of being poisoned requires little 
commentary (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a:62).
The anticipatory fears associated with toxic exposure speak to the 
symbolism of contamination, to the dread of poisoning. Edelman (1964:6)
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notes that a symbol, in addition to representing something other than itself, 
also "evokes an attitude, a set of impressions, or a pattern of events associated 
through time...which are useful because they help in logical thinking about 
the situation and in manipulating it." He points to two basic types of 
symbols: the referential which are "economical ways of referring to the 
objective elements in objective situations"; and the condensation which 
"evoke the emotion associated with the situation."
Examples of referential symbols would include statistics, such as those 
used in risk assessments, and figures used in a cost-benefit analysis. 
Condensation symbols operate on another level — "a check of the immediate 
environment is missing (Edelman, 1964:6)." No example of symbol is either 
solely referential or condensation; however in a situation that entails 
controversy or conflict, the condensation symbol may take precedence 
(Edelman, 1964).
Practically every political act that is controversial or regarded as really 
important is bound to serve in part as a condensation symbol...[which] 
symbolizes a threat or reassurance...Because the meaning of the act in 
these cases depends only partly or not at all on its objective 
consequences, which the mass public cannot know, the meaning can 
only come from the psychological needs of the respondents; and it can 
only be known from their response (Edelman, 1964:7).
Equally useful in analyzing how the victims and agencies respond to 
contamination are Edelman s notions of the symbolic forms of rite and myth:
Ritual is motor activity that involves its participants symbolically in a 
common enterprise, calling their attention to their relatedness and 
joint interests in a compelling way. It thereby both promotes 
conformity and evokes satisfaction and joy in conformity (Edelman, 
1964:16).
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Although it is difficult to imagine the "joy " of a risk assessor, it is possible 
to consider the process of risk assessment as a ritual of referential symbol 
collection in the service of a common enterprise which brings satisfaction, 
and to think of the mutual acceptance of the meaning of the symbols, as an 
expression of conformity. The construction and use of myth serves to 
reinforce the ritual just as the ritual reinforces the myth. In the instance of 
contaminated communities it is possible, depending upon whose perspective 
is taken, to consider the technocratic activities involved in remediation as a 
myth constructed about hum an independence of the physical environment 
and the ability of technology to control nature (Catton and Dunlap, 1980). 
From the perspective of many victims of contamination, protection of 
human health and the environment may also be a myth (Edelstein, 1988; 
Greider, 1992; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Brown, 1991).
Kroll-Smith and Couch (1991:63) have coined the term "chronic 
technological disaster"' to differentiate human-caused disasters from the 
natural. Among the most important differences between CTDs and natural 
disasters are those related to cause, duration, uncertainty, the quality of 
community support, and the nature of relief efforts (Davidson and Baum, 
1991; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991a; Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991, 1994; 
Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Baum et al, 1983). Equally important 
are the stigma " (Edelstein, 1988), and distributional issues related to the 
likelihood of exposure. Researchers have found that poor and working class 
communities are more likely to experience CTDs in their neighborhoods or 
workplaces than wealthier communities (Buttel and Flinn, 1978; Greider, 
1992; Chavis, 1993; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Boyce, 1994;
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Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Wolensky, 1991).
CAUSE
The fact that CTDs are caused by human actions, rather than occur as acts 
of God, colors the way in which victims respond (Davidson and Baum, 1991; 
Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991; Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991, 1994; 
Edelstein, 1988; Baum et al, 1983). Natural forces are generally viewed as 
uncontrollable; technology, controllable (Davidson and Baum, 1991; Kroll- 
Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991, 1994; 
Edelstein, 1988; Baum et al, 1983).
...technology is supposed to be regulated and managed; there is a 
common belief that since we created technology, we should be able to 
control it. Further, technological accidents represent violations of 
expectations and assumptions about the world, and this may also 
contribute to a sense of loss of control...
Loss of control created by technological mishaps may have far- 
reaching implications. Disasters of this sort may have a wide spread 
impact on confidence in technological systems in populations not 
directly touched by such disasters. Society at large may feel more 
vulnerable and distrustful of authorities who are supposed to protect 
them. Technological catastrophes may also create dangers which do 
not quickly abate (Davidson and Baum, 1991:35).
Because CTDs are caused by hum an action and because people assume that 
technology is controllable, CTDs also create a potential for long-term stress 
effects in victims (Davidson and Baum, 1991; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 
1991a; Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991, 1994; Edelstein, 1988). Two theoretical 
models suggest that assignment of responsibility for the CTD is important 
(Davidson and Baum, 1991). The first model posits that by assigning blame 
the process becomes controllable and, therefore may be averted in the future; 
the second is based on the notion that peoples' sense of a "just world" is
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threatened by "unpredictable or uncontrollable outcomes (Davidson and 
Baum, 1991:37)." So, the assignment of responsibility, or blame, "may be one 
way that victims cope with their experiences, explain events, and regulate 
emotional responses (Davidson and Baum, 1991:37)."
However, research conducted at Three Mile Island up to six years 
following the 1979 disaster indicates that stress-related symptoms, which 
often include depression, are more likely to be reduced if victims blame 
themselves, rather than others. The rationale for the effectiveness of self­
blame in stress reduction is that self-blame returns a personal sense of control 
(Davidson and Baum, 1991). This is problematic because, given the nature of 
"technological accidents," it is more likely that victims will blame others for 
their problems, creating social conflict and community dysfunction, and thus 
continue to suffer from higher levels of stress during the assessment and 
cleanup which are often long-drawn-out affairs, and for years afterwards 
(Davidson and Baum, 1991:50).
DURATION
Natural disasters generally result in a "brief moment of terror followed by 
an easily defined sequence of inventory, rescue, remedy, and recovery (Kroll- 
Smith and Couch, 1991:63)." However, CTDs frequently entail many years of 
testing, quantifying, and planning before cleanup begins (Kroll-Smith and 
Couch, 1991a; Erikson, 1991; Edelstein, 1988).
CTDS tend to trap a portion of a population in the warning and threat 
stages, freezing them in extended periods of apprehension and 
dread...Long-term exposure to warning and threat, particularly when it 
is unevenly distributed throughout the population, places severe 
dem ands on the coping resources of a population (I&oll-Smith and 
Couch, 1991a:63).
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The longer the duration of the "warning and threat stages" and "the more 
those stages become institutionalized,...the greater will be the toll on the 
affected populations (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991:63)."
UNCERTAINTY
Unlike natural disasters such as tornados, earthquakes and floods, which 
leave visible signs of destruction, contamination is often invisible (Kroll- 
Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Edelstein, 1988).
...because the effects of human-caused disaster may not be readily 
visible, not only is the occurrence subject to differing interpretations, 
but key decisions (e.g., regarding testing, protective measures, and 
remediation) may be based on those interpretations. Therefore, 
consensus about the cause, course, and possibly outcomes of the crisis is 
less likely than with natural disaster. Furthermore, because there may 
be no visible damage, each family is forced to make its own 
determination of the significance of the contamination. The lack of 
shared beliefs about what has happened opens the way for conflict 
within the community and between the community and potential 
helpers... (Edelstein, 1988:7).
The uncertainty about the implications can devastate a community (Kroll- 
Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991a; Davidson and Baum, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; 
Brown, 1991) by undercutting any shared notion of an "objective reality" 
which often results in "different claims about danger (Kroll-Smith and 
Couch, 1991a:63)."
Subjectivity is related to uncertainty. People facing the threat of 
chemical contamination or asbestos poisoning live in a chronic threat 
of contingency loss. The greater the degree of contingency or 
uncertainty, the greater the need to construct symbolic claims of the 
scope and the seriousness of the threat...Several studies suggest that 
these symbolic claims 'may be more important in determining chronic 
stress and mental health effects than is the actual threat or danger
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posed' (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a:63).
It is not unusual to find a contaminated community tom  apart by 
conflicting claims about the nature and extent of the risk presented by toxins 
(Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Erickson, 1991; Brown, 1991; 
Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992).
THE QUALITY OF COMMUNITY SUPPORT
In addition to conflicts related to uncertainty about the impact of the 
contamination, the abihty of the community to respond is often constrained 
because the problems related to contamination are so complex that 
communities must rely upon state or federal agency resources (Kroll-Smith 
and Couch, 1990). The technical activities begin with an assessment of risk — 
this is where the uncertainties often result in conflict.
Because appraisal is a subjective analysis, varied interpretations of a 
given event are likely. While some systems take a threat seriously, 
others may engage in defensive avoidance. Factors affecting appraisal 
include the beliefs of the appraiser, the knowledge of the threat, the 
threat’s visibility (e.g., amount and kind of publicity), and the 
significance of the threat.
Once a threat is perceived as legitimate, the affected system may be 
forced to continue its existing practices. Thus, for example, most toxic 
victims remain in their homes despite concerns over risk of continued 
exposure. Some victims will cope with this imbalance...by engaging in 
a form of denial (Edelstein, 1988:13).
The divisions in the community related to uncertainty also act to 
undercut community support for victims. Kroll-Smith and Couch refer to 
symbolic constructions of danger as "threat belief systems,” and note that 
beliefs "which are internalized ” and "located deeper in the psyche than 
perceptions" are "far less easily modified" than perceptions (1991a:63).
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The tenacity of beliefs is explained in part by the fact that they are social 
phenomena. While perceptions issue from sensory stimuli, beliefs are 
constructed in conversation, among people who agree that the world 
or a portion of it is sacred, safe, dangerous, worthy of trust or distrust, 
and so on...Collective agreement strengthens the hold beliefs have on 
believers. Perceptions are much more private matters, easier to revise; 
to violate a belief, however, is to risk censure and disapproval. Thus, 
embedded in beliefs is a moral claim on believers. They are required to 
emote and behave in ways consistent with the social reality symbolized 
by the beliefs (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a:63).
In the uncertainty created by toxic exposure, communities are often 
divided into "believers," who "are more likely to have had uncommon 
health problems and other direct experiences that they had related to 
chemical exposure," and "non-believers," who "had fewer direct impacts 
from chemicals and relied on their own limited experience and that of close 
acquaintances (Edelstein, 1988:48)." The clash between believers and non­
believers can become intense, as individuals seek out people with similar 
beliefs to form support networks (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991a; Brown, 
1991; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988).
What emerges are competing views of the same local world; it is 
dangerous and uninhabitable; you should be concerned; no, the 
environment is safe and habitable; you should get control of yourself.
Phenomenologists refer to this type of cognitive conflict as reality 
disjuncture' and suggest that it can be the source of considerable 
psychosocial stress...The social validation necessary to affirm the 
individual’s trust that the world is as he or she sees it is transformed 
into a source of conflict. The very nature of claims-making activity 
ensures that the conflict is not over whatever verifiable information is 
available about the hazards. Rather, the dispute is between people who 
perceive their antagonists as able but unwilling to cooperate in a 
realistic' and 'justifiable' definition of the threat (Kroll-Smith and 
Couch, 1991a:65).
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There is no "painless way out" of toxic exposure situations (Edelstein, 
1988:93)
Denial allows for a psychological balance to be maintained but does not 
address the external risks. Action involves recognizing the risk, a 
frightening prospect in its own right (Edelstein, 1988:93).
Research indicates there is a narrow latitude in which messages divergent 
to a person's beliefs may actually act to alter those beliefs, and the more 
strongly held the belief the narrower the latitude of acceptance for divergent 
messages (Milburn, 1991). On a community level, that narrow latitude may 
be further reduced because believers may be viewed as threats to local 
property values or jobs (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Edelstein, 1988). 
Frequently the corporate polluter "appears to receive less than its share of 
blame," and, as was the case of Hooker Chemical at Love Canal, the 
community's "anger and blame may be modified when the polluter is a 
major source of employment (Edelstein, 1988:80). "
Hooker was also active in trying to minimize public concern over 
health threats. Interestingly, while efforts by the state health 
department to allay panic met with public anger. Hooker was not 
similarly vilified... (Edelstein, 1988:80).
Another principal employer, Dow Chemical in Midland, Michigan, took a 
similar approach when dioxin contamination was discovered. The company 
"actively managed public perception of its responsibility, " stressing "the 
minuteness of the quantities of dioxin found, " producing a brochure called 
"The Truth About Dioxin," and maintaining the community "was a better.
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healthier place because of the corporation (Edelstein, 1988:80)." Despite 
indications the corporation previously had lied about dioxin and secretly 
edited a key EPA report, "many residents firmly backed the corporation 
(Edelstein, 1988:80)." Corporate ability to deflect public anger can have an 
adverse affect on government agencies working in the community — 
although victims may excuse corporate behavior, they view government as 
the agent to protect them, as the source of accurate information, and as the 
regulator of corporate behavior (Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992). Therefore, the 
anger in the community is often directed at the government agency that is 
mandated to help (Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Greider,
1992).
THE NATURE OF RELIEF EFFORTS
In a natural disaster relief efforts tend to focus on humanistic activities, 
e.g., providing shelter, food, and medical supplies for affected citizens; in 
CI'Ds relief efforts are technically designed to dispose of the contaminant 
(Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a). The situation is further compounded by the 
technocratic tendency "to define chronic technological disasters as 
engineering puzzles rather than as hum an or social problems, and to assign 
to technical agencies the lead role in managing the crisis. The engineers and 
other specialists who staff such agencies are used to tackling technological, not 
human, problems... (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990:29)." Victims, who very 
understandably have an emotional reaction to their exposures, are not 
reassured by engineers who are speaking a very different language and 
addressing a very different set .of concerns (Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Kroll- 
Smith and Couch, 1991a; Greider, 1992). One of the prime directives of 
government agencies working in contaminated communities is to avoid
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panic (Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Brown,
1991; Schrader-Frechette, 1991). The federal Superfund law, CERCLA (the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980), one of three federal laws that regulate hazardous materials, directs EPA 
action in contaminated c o m m u n i t i e s .  ̂ The EPA defines hazardous waste as 
"either toxic, corrosive, ignitable, or reactive materials which can be 
transmitted through all environmental media — air, water, biota, and land 
(Hird, 1994:5)."
The Superfund law is premised on the notion that the polluter pays. In 
the language of the law, potentially responsible parties are identified by the 
federal EPA and ordered to pay for the cleanup of sites the EPA has placed on 
the National Priorities List. However, there are "limits to the law," (Yeager, 
1991) the result of the political economy in which the law operates (Yeager, 
1991; Barnett, 1994; Schnaiberg and Could, 1994). Unresolved is the inherent 
tension between environmental protection and the needs of an overarching 
economic system predicated on profit and accumulation (Schnaiberg and 
Gould, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994). Social regulation is forged from a 
conflict between the corporate drive for profit and the public insistence that it 
be protected from the pollution that results from industrial production 
(Schnaiberg and Could, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994; Greider, 1992). Thus, 
there is a tension between maintaining the existing social order while, at the 
same time, maintaining the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of those being 
governed. To juggle both contradictory goals, regulation is intended to order 
the inherent conflict and channel it though interactive decision-making 
bodies: legislature, administrative agencies, and the courts (Barnett, 1994).
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Regulation therefore allows a perpetuation of conflict. The resulting 
system embodies contradictions and promotes neither efficiency nor 
equity (Barnett, 1994:48),
Within context of the Superfund law, this conflict manifests itself as 
disputes over who will pay the toxic debt and the impact of this conflict on 
interdependent funding and enforcement (Barnett, 1994). Because cleanup 
costs are high, interested parties exercise political and economic power to 
affect regulatory outcomes. In the case of Superfund, industry can use 
"significant economic resources" to delay implementation by challenging 
federal and state agencies in court while simultaneously using "significant 
political power" to appeal to the White House and influence Congressional 
oversight (Barnett, 1994:47). When the public agrees that the "polluter pays," 
but, in reality, the action taken is symbolic and the cost is actually socialized, 
distributional outcomes must be hidden, so "public perceptions must be 
manipulated (Barnett, 1994:47)." This manipulation has occurred in the 
financing of the Superfund program through a feedstock tax, which is actually 
paid by consumers, and in the arguments that Superfund sites are not a 
serious threat to hum an health (Barnett, 1994). Additionally, poor regulatory 
outcomes are frequently blamed on bureaucratic inefficiency or too aggressive 
and accommodative regulators, rather than on inadequate funding.
However, inadequate funding provides too superficial an explanation of 
government agencies' activities (Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Schnaiberg and 
Could, 1994).
Agencies, such as the EPA, are caught in the m iddle of the unresolved 
private/public conflict (Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Schnaiberg and Could,
1994). To negotiate this dangerous territory, agencies minimize the
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political opposition of regulated industries by embodying legal mandates into 
"a series of apparently neutral, technical decisions (Yeager, 1991:40)." The 
result is that decisions are made on the basis of limits imposed by the law, e.g., 
amounts of specific substances that trigger action versus amounts of the same 
contaminant that are viewed "acceptable," as well as technical requirements 
and feasibility and cost-benefit analysis (Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994). The 
technocratic approach has serious implications: first, it limits discourse about 
contamination; and second, reliance upon cost-benefit analysis both assets the 
importance of private production over the public interest, and places legally 
prohibited corporate conduct in the realm of moral ambivalence, thereby 
constraining the condemnation necessary to the deterrent effect of law 
(Yeager, 1991). This creates additional tensions because many victims of 
contamination view their plight in a larger context than that used by 
technocrats and, often, victims' concerns are framed in the language of moral 
outrage (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Edelstein, 1988; Schrader-Frechette, 
1991; Greider, 1992; Brown, 1991; Clarke, 1991).
These tensions frequently surface as the conflict between competing belief 
systems: technocrats believe that the contaminants and their potential 
impacts are measureable, and that these measurements are sufficient to both 
identify the risk and design a cleanup, or remediation, plan; victims tend to 
look to issues of ethics, justice, and the immeasureable implications, such as 
future illnesses and impacts upon future generations (Edelstein, 1988; 
Schrader- Frechette, 1991). The Superfund law mandates that the EPA 
consider long-term effectiveness, reduction of toxicity, mobility, volume of 
contaminants, short-term effectiveness, implementability and cost; once this 
is done, the agency must consider state and community acceptance of a
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cleanup plan (Hird, 1994). To mediate these often conflicting criteria, the 
agency relies upon risk assessment which is predicated on the notion that 
defensible "hard science" will provide an objective basis for decision 
(Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Schrader-Frechette, 
1991; Lappé, 1991; Greider, 1992; Brown, 1991). However, objectivity is likely 
impossible because "victims are not the only people who construct their 
reality socially; we all do, even those of us who call ourselves scientists (Kroll- 
Smith and Couch, 1991a:65)." The dichotomy between the "objectivity" of the 
risk assessor and the "subjectivity" of the victim is difficult to justify 
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991). It "is incompatible with formulation of any 
scientific theory or analysis to explain causal connections" because during the 
development of theory or analysis, value judgments must be made, e.g., the 
process entails the use of normative evaluative criteria in the selection of 
options (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:43).
The real issue is whether an evaluation is normative in a way that is 
misleading, incomplete, question begging, or implausible...risk 
assessment can be objective and testable, but not wholly value free 
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991:45-46).
Critics of risk assessment typically focus upon the reductionist and 
exclusionist nature of the risk assessment process, as currently utilized 
(Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Schrader-Frechette, 
1991; Lappé, 1991; Greider, 1992). There are other grounds for criticism. Risk 
assessors are inclined to underestimate risk probabilities because many 
assessments are conducted by assessors closely associated with the technology 
under evaluation so are sympathetic both to the technology and to those
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implementing it, and because it is extremely difficult to identify all the 
possible risks, assessors generally "assume unidentified risks are zero 
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991:134)."
In many contaminated communities, the risk assessment process has 
become the focus of conflict between victims of exposure and government 
officials (Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Greider, 1992; 
Brown, 1991; Clarke, 1991). Victims often question what they see as arbitrary 
threshold limits, e.g., under legally established threshold limits it is possible 
that one family's home will be subject to cleanup action while the home of 
the family next door which may have five parts per billion less of the same 
contaminant is not (Edelstein, 1988). Victims ask for explanations of illnesses 
in their neighborhoods that they associate with exposure (Kroll-Smith and 
Couch, 1991; Brown, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992). They fear future 
health effects and the impact on the next generation (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 
1991a; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992). However, the EPA, which is oriented 
toward technical solutions, has few physicians on its staff to address these 
concerns (Yeager, 1991). So, once the threat has been discovered and 
disclosed, beyond technical explanations, "government is unable to provide 
further clarification (Edelstein, 1988:77)." Victims, often angry because their 
questions are unanswered, may become suspicious of government (Edelstein, 
1988; Greider, 1992; Brown, 1991; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a). This 
suspicion is often intensified by agreements (orders of consent) that 
government officials reach with polluters, which are viewed as representing 
the polluter rather than victims (Edelstein, 1988). Accusations that 
government officials have not remedied the problem, that citizens' concerns 
have been ignored are frequently the result of these deepening suspicions
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(Edelstein, 1988; Schrader-Frechette, 1991).
The result is an "expert-judgement strategy," (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:78) 
the behef that risk can be reduced to some characteristics which can be 
determined only by experts or that experts only are capable of distinguishing 
between "actual" rather than "perceived" risk. The strategy also manifests 
itself in the assessors' presupposition that a technological risk is defined 
purely in terms of measureable physical impact even though social impact 
includes "increased trauma or decreased civil liberties' as part of the risk itself 
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991:78). The resulting conflict between experts and 
victims is further intensified because the Superfund law confines public 
participation to attendance at meetings and comment on government 
proposals — limitations which often anger victims (Fiorino, 1990; Greider, 
1992; Schrader-Frechette, 1991).
There are a host of problems with risk assessment as currently practiced 
(Lappé, 1991; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991). In terms 
of public health issues related to exposure, the risk assessment process 
overlooks synergies, relies upon thresholds which imply beneath a certain 
exposure level there is no health risk, and has insufficient information about 
many of the chemicals found at Superfund sites (Lappé, 1991). Additionally, 
final risk assessment figures are probabilities only; not a guarantee of illness 
or health (Cortese, 1993). Further, research into the historical development of 
workplace threshold limit values (TLVs), the standards beyond which people 
should not receive exposure, indicates a questionable level of corporate 
influence on the development of these standards (Castleman and Ziem, 1988). 
Also, in their attempt to avoid panic, government officials may withhold 
information from the public (Brown, 1991; Edelstein, 1988) which only
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intensifies victims' suspicion that their plight is more serious than officials 
are willing to acknowledge.
Even when government agencies determine that contamination poses a 
public health threat, victims find it difficult to prove their illnesses are related 
to exposure (Lappé, 1991; Brown, 1991; Cortese, 1993). Statistics may prove 
that a particular illness is associated with or correlated to a contaminant in 
the neighborhood, however a correlation does not constitute causality (Bates, 
1994).
In terms of the strength of an association, it is true that the stronger it 
is, the better evidence it provides toward causality. However, such 
factors as poor exposure measurement..., variability in outcome..., or 
the fact that we are studying multifactorial disease (such as asthma), all 
will act to weaken what might otherwise be a strong association. In 
other worlds, unless exposure and outcome are well characterized, we 
cannot dismiss a weak' association as necessarily representing reality 
(Bates, 1994:62).
To victims who see a pattern of illness in their neighborhoods, the 
distinction between association and causality is arbitrary (Brown, 1991; 
Greider, 1992). Public skepticism of this sort resulted in the first case of what 
has since become known as lay or popular epidemiology in Wobum, 
Massachusetts (Brown, 1991). Popular epidemiology is a "process by which lay 
persons gather scientific data and other information, and also direct and 
marshall the knowledge and resources of experts in order to understand the 
epidemiology of disease (Brown, 1991:135)." Because the public considers 
public health in a much broader context than experts, popular epidemiology 
tends to be far more inclusive than professional epidemiology.
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Popular epidemiology takes into account social structural factors, 
involves social movements, utilizes political and judicial approaches 
to remedies, and challenges basic assumptions of traditional 
epidemiology, risk assessment, and environmental regulation (Brown, 
1991:135).
Popular epidemiology, which consisted of intensive surveying conducted 
by residents in Wobum, also provides a way to research medical information 
about possible exposure effects, information which is often difficult for 
victims to obtain (Edelstein, 1988: Cortese, 1993; Lappé, 1991). Some members 
of the medical profession (Lappé, 1991; Cortese, 1993) maintain that 
environmental degradation poses a serious threat to public health.
The physical environment is the most important determ inant of 
public health...[and] protection of the environment and preservation of 
ecosystems are, in public health terms, the most fundamental steps in 
preventing hum an illness (Cortese, 1993:1).
Yet, physicians working in contaminated communities often lack the 
training to answer their patients' questions about toxic exposure (Cortese, 
1993), so victims’ concerns are often dismissed by their family physicians 
(Edelstein, 1988). The victims' medical problems thus become a personal 
"trouble" rather than a social problem (Edelstein, 1988). The privatization of 
a public problem results in the failure to acknowledge or address the public 
problem. Popular epidemiology may provide a basis to to acknowledge that 
public health impacts of contamination are a public problem and to challenge 
the official failure to address the issue (Brown, 1991).
STIGMA
However, whatever route victims may take to challenge government
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determinations of the problem or cleanup plans, they are bound to encounter 
some resistance within their communities (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991b; 
Edelstein, 1988). Some of the resistance is the result of the uncertainty of 
exposure effects which is open to different interpretations (Kroll-Smith and 
Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Edelstein, 1988); some is related to the stigma attached to 
contaminated communities (Edelstein, 1988). The community within the 
boundaries drawn by government officials is stigmatized by the 
contamination, it is marked as "deviant, flawed, spoiled, or generally 
undesirable (Edelstein, 1988:14)."
When the mark is noticed, it changes in a negative and discrediting 
way how the observer sees the victim, whose identification is now 
spoiled. And because we tend to assume that people deserve what 
happens to them, stigma readily invites a tendency to blame the victim 
(Edelstein, 1988:14).
The contaminated community becomes both a place to avoid and the 
source of "anticipatory fears (Edelstein, 1988:14)." Thus, victims tend to see 
themselves differently:
...in part, because they fear dreaded health impacts such as cancers, 
threats to unborn children, and cross-generational genetic effects. 
Victims also discover that others see them differently as well. Their 
homes and neighborhood are downgraded by observers who exhibit 
anticipatory fears' about the place.
Anticipatory fears are perceptions of threat associated with future 
outcomes that are connected casually to current happenings (Edelstein, 
1988:14).
During the process of mobilizing to challenge official definitions of the 
problem an d /o r official plans to remedy that problem, activists must take
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their concerns into the public arena (Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Greider,
1992). This often brings them into direct conflict, not only with the 
government officials they challenge, but with members of their own 
community (Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991). A common result of stigma 
associated with the label of contaminated community is reduced property 
value and difficulty in selling property within the boundaries of 
contamination (Edelstein, 1988).
...real estate agents often aggravated already high tension by reminding 
residents that it was community-generated publicity that had given 
Legler its bad name. This was truly a dilemma; without publicity, 
residents had no means of pressuring government for assistance 
(Edelstein, 1988:67).
So victims are trapped in a double-bind: to ensure that possible health 
effects of exposure are addressed they must take their case to the public; yet, in 
so doing, in addition to exacerbating tensions within their community, the 
publicity they generate often makes it harder for them to sell their own 
homes and relocate. Unlike the corporations often responsible for the 
contamination, most victims do not have the financial means to abandon 
their property, take a tax loss, and relocate to a presumably safer place 
(Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988). Instead, victims are trapped in a situation 
they believe to be dangerous to their own and families' health. 
DISTRIBUTION
Although not universally accepted, many researchers report that toxic 
exposures are correlated to income and race: the poorer, and often, less white 
the community, the more likely it is to be exposed to contamination (Chavis, 
1993; Greider, 1992; Bullard, 1993; Buttel and Flinn, 1978; Wolensky, 1991).
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Further, many communities with existing pollution may be viewed as good 
candidates for more polluting industries (Bullard, 1993). The reasoning for 
this is circular: better to site such an industry in an already contaminated 
conununity than to place a pristine community at risk (Bullard, 1993; Greider, 
1992; Edelstein, 1988), Also problematic is that communities with pollution 
may be less sensitive to the impact of additional polluting industries (Bullard, 
1993; Greider, 1992; Schrader-Frechette, 1991). Activists in these contaminated 
communities have become known as the environmental justice movement 
which consists, primarily, of grassroots groups (Bullard, 1993; Chavis, 1993; 
Greider, 1992; Freudenburg, 1993). Many of these groups have been accused of 
suffering from the NIMBY, Not In My Back Yard, syndrome (Bullard, 1993; 
Greider, 1992; Freudenburg, 1993). Members reply that they are fighting to 
keep poisons out of everyone’s back yard (Bullard, 1993; Greider, 1992). These 
groups have been the subject of much research, primarily focused upon the 
risk beliefs of members (Freudenburg, 1993). The majority of the research 
stemmed from examinations of differences between expert and lay risk 
judgments, which, experts charged, were the result of lay ignorance and 
irrationality (Freudenburg, 1993).
However, sociological studies have demonstrated "repeatedly that 
ignorance and irrationality are not the significant issues," so it is time to 
consider both the "nature of rationality' and the risk-related implications of 
the social division of labor (Freudenburg, 1993:913)." As technological 
approaches become more and more elaborate, the very real possibility of risk 
associated with system failure becomes an issue (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; 
Freudenburg, 1993). Sociologist William Freudenburg (1993:915) uses the
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term "recreancy" to address the possibility that the intricate division of labor 
in technocratic bureaucracies "may increase societal vulnerability to cases 
when duties are not carried out properly — whether the fault' is one of 
individual actors or of a broader system in which important responsibilities 
may fall through the institutional cracks."
Research indicates that technocratic charges that public concerns about 
toxic waste facilities or other land uses deemed undesirable by a community 
are based in "ignorance/irrationality or of undesirable selfishness" cannot be 
supported (Freudenburg, 1993). Research further indicates often citizens, 
rather than authorities, discovered problems related to contamination 
(Freudenburg, 1993). Also, studies have shown that citizen activism is 
generally a response to government inactivity or failure which is an 
important part of recreancy (Freudenburg, 1993). Much of the literature 
(Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992; Freudenburg, 1993) reflects this 
type of recreancy. The possibility of recreancy could be very important in 
Butte where controls will be implemented to monitor land use in areas 
where contamination will remain (Weinstock, 7/31/95; Craig, 7/30/95;
ARCO/ Butte-Silver Bow, 1993).
Researchers point to the possibility of social change in contaminated 
communities (Wolensky, 1991; Wenger, 1978; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; 
Greider, 1992; Chavis, 1993; Bullard, 1993; Cable and Walsh, 1991; Brown,
1991). The thesis will consider this possibility in Butte.
The following chapters will examine the specifics of Butte in relation to 
the general themes of the literature, pointing out those instances where Butte 
differs and the possible implications of those differences.
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1 This paper considers capitalism because that is the structure of the 
American economy; this is in no way to indicate that contamination does not 
occur in other economic structures. Clearly, the documented pollution in 
Eastern Europe indicates that state socialism has been no kinder to the 
environment or more protective of human health than Western industrialized 
capitalism. The commonality between the two systems is very likely a belief in 
the Human Exemptionalist Paradigm (Catton and Dunlap, 1980).
2 For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of "technology" will be that of 
Jacques Ellul (1991): technology is not merely machinery or equipment; it 
includes the assumptions of rationality and manipulation, as well as a 
hierarchy of technocrats to ensure both continued development of new 
technology and proper applications of existing technology.
3 These costs are what economists refer to as "opportunity costs," the net 
benefit that has been foregone because the resources used can no longer be 
used for their next beneficial use.
 ̂ Boyce (1994) defines time preference in terms of "the willingness to trade 
present benefits (or costs) for future benefits (or costs). People with a higher 
rate of time preference place greater weight on the present." (176) 
Environmentally degrading activities often generate short-term benefits and 
long-term costs (Boyce, 1994; Greider, 1992; Yeager, 1991; Schnaiberg and 
Gould, 1994).
5 The other two laws are the federal Toxic Substances Control Act, which 
regulates the introduction and use of new hazardous chemicals, and the 
federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which regulates disposal of 
hazardous wastes into the air, water and land, and imposes a system to track all 
hazardous wastes (Hird, 1994).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
THE CONTESTED TERRAIN OF BUTTE
Some 80 to a 100 million years ago, propelled by gigantic shifting plates 
and vast cauldrons of steaming lava, the Rocky Mountains groaned up 
through the earth's trembling crust. The massive eruption was followed by 
the emergence of enormous seas, lakes, and swamps which, two million years 
ago, disappeared in a frigid flow as boulder-strewn glaciers from Canada crept 
south, scouring the newly-formed landscape. Four times the ice cap advanced 
and receded, leaving giant folds of earth, U-shaped valleys and stony cirques, 
horns, and aretes in its wake. This is Montana -  the product of almost 
incomprehensibly powerful subterranean geologic forces (Malone et al, 1993).
Butte, Montana balances on granite rocks from the Boulder bathoHth, a 
massive body of plutonic rock, formed of fire, then cooled. The batholith 
destroyed and melted much of the structure it invaded, leaving giant 
fractures and faults, and minerals. In the upper 100 to 200 feet of weathered 
bedrock it left deposits of copper and other metals — in time, this legacy 
brought Butte into existence (USEPA, 12/15/93).
Historian K. Ross Toole (1959) maintains that the bounty that resulted 
from these violent vagaries of nature -  huge tracts of conifers populated by 
fur-bearing animals, seemingly never-ending plains darkened for miles by 
bison herds, and massive mineral deposits -  preordained Montana’s 
development pattern as a "colonial economy."
Nature, not the evil designs of men, decreed that Montana be a place 
with a colonial economy. The object of men had to be to trap it, mine 
it, shoot it, and get out. Every one of the salient industries has been 
extractive, from beaver through beef to copper. The capital required for 
frantic exploitation, whether of furs, cattle, silver, lumber, or copper, 
had to come from the East and as Eastern capital flowed westward, 
control and the bulk of the wealth flowed eastward (Toole, 1959:9).
58
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Although Toole’s work chronicles, and is critical of, the state's treatment 
as a resource colony, he treats Montana as if it were an exception, singled out 
for its unique characteristics, as a land of promise (W. Robbins, 1994).
Historian WilUam G. Robbins (1994:4) refers to this focus of "attention on the 
evolution and expansion of the nation-state and on the positioning of the 
West within an insular ideological context, " as an exceptionalist tendency." 
The focus is problematic because it leaves unquestioned the fact that "like 
other empires before it, the United States has generated a series of 
legitimizing myths to sanction its push to the western sea," (W. Robbins, 
1994:4) leading to the notion that somehow the American culture stands 
"apart, independent and unique from the experience of other nations (W. 
Robbins, 1994:5)."
Although the exceptionalist theme is recurrent in studies of American 
history, it is especially and most glaringly obvious in interpretations of 
the American West...in what has become the great American myth, it 
was above all the promise of the West that loomed largest; for it was 
there that people would find the answer to their quest for a better life. 
Reality, in that special sense, was less important than the symbols 
through which people perceived a larger design; indeed, in that 
scheme, symbol and myth passed for reality. In an approach that has 
been called a "triumphalist literature," the easy virtues of drama 
served as a substitute for explanation and interpretation.
A more inclusive understanding of Western America rests in the 
ability to grasp the full meaning of capitalism: the set of values and 
perceptions associated with that phenomenon, its structural 
framework as expressed in social and political relations, and its 
pervasive reach through American life... (W. Robbins, 1994:6-7).
Toole leaves unquestioned how it came to be that Montana was seen as a 
place to "trap it, mine it, shoot it, and get out. " Toole’s statement assumes 
that, given Montana's natural resources, no other development path was
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possible; that is not the case. It is true that development patterns in a 
capitalistic system turned Montana into a resource colony, however Toole 
presents his history as a struggle for equitable distribution of profits rather 
than questioning if there were another alternative. He assumes the model of 
capitalism was inevitable. It is also true that the development path taken 
assumed that man, as the master of the earth, will control the natural world 
with new technologies created through applied science (Merchant, 1992). 
However, mankind did not always look at the earth through that lens of 
mastery, nor was such a shift in thought an inevitability.
A number of factors — among them, a new vision of the earth as inert 
(Merchant, 1992), the development of protestantism which encouraged the 
accumulation of wealth and search for profits (Hunt, 1990), the emergence of 
a rationalized body of science incorporated into the scientific method which 
stressed objective, value-free, ahistorical, and reductionist knowledge 
(Merchant, 1992), and the development of a free-market system of economics 
(Hunt, 1990) — combined to create a worldview that fostered the creation of 
Montana as resource colony.
The state's resources were discovered in the mid-nineteenth century. By 
mid-1862, the gold mines of California, Nevada, and Colorado were in 
decline, prospectors had made new discoveries along the western slopes of 
the Rockies in Idaho, and the new Mullan Road provided an established 
route to the Idaho mines; four years later Montana was the second largest 
United States gold producer; only California produced more (Malone et al,
1993). Little technology was needed -  miners had only to pan along streams 
to find the placer gold that the combined forces of time, wind, glacial ice, rain 
and chemicals had eroded from large veins of ore and swept, in the form of
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dust, flakes, or nuggets, into streambeds (Malone et al, 1993). After the short­
lived placer gold rush, the boomtown of Silver Bow City, was almost deserted 
— just 241 of its 5,000 people were left (J. Robbins, 1994).
But Butte's future did not rest on gold. Some thought that silver was the 
key to Butte's future (Malone et al, 1993). Federal government policies, 
designed to facilitate the "opening up " of the West, greatly enhanced mining 
in Butte. By 1876, stimulated by the arrival of the railroad in western 
Montana in the first three years of that decade, and by passage of the 1872 
federal Mining Law, silver mines were beginning to produce in Butte. 
Montana's silver boom drew  wealthy investors who began to dominate the 
scene (Malone et al, 1993).
The federal Mining Act was an open invitation to miners to stake their 
claims. Among the encouraging provisions: the granting of "a right to 
mine"; a miner's right to say a claim has been made and tie up the land from 
further use by other miners, public users, and the United States government; 
the right of the miner to use the property fully as long as the use is 
"reasonably incident to mining, " which has been interpreted to mean the 
right to construct a home, cut timber, graze cattle, and divert water; the 
creation of a constitutionally protected property right that exists from the 
moment a miner makes a discovery; the inability of the federal government 
to w ithdraw  lands from mining use unless the government pays a miner 
with a patented claim the value of the mineral rights and the land; and the 
lack of a restriction upon the number of claims that can be accumulated by an 
individual or corporation (Wilkinson, 1992). For $2.50 a placer miner could 
stake a claim; for $5.00, a quartz miner — the fees have never been increased 
(Wilkinson, 1992).
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In 1872 William A. Clark came to Butte 0. Robbins, 1994). Four years later, 
Marcus Daly arrived to assess silver properties for Salt Lake mining investors 
(Malone et al, 1993). Daly brought to Butte both the technology to mine silver 
and the first outside capital and expertise 0. Robbins, 1994). Because quartz 
mining, unlike placer mining, required corporate organization and capital, it 
fostered the banking and legal professions (Toole, 1959). And quartz mining 
created a host of new industries -  the mines' need for timber created the 
timber industry, processing requirements brought forth stamp mills and 
reduction plants, shipping required roads. In addition to miners, the 
companies needed support personnel (Toole, 1959).
In 1880, New Yorker Michael Hickey, who had named his Butte company 
after the giant anaconda snake, sold the property to Daly. In search of 
desperately needed capital for expansion, men such as William Andrew 
Clark, Samuel T. Hauser, Marcus Daly, and others regularly visited cities in 
the East or Far West. More and more, policy decisions were made by 
investors with no knowledge of Butte or Montana (Toole, 1995). By 1883, the 
Montana territory was the second largest supplier of silver, a position it held 
until the mid 1890s. But the global market for silver was unstable, largely 
because so much of the silver went to the manufacture of coins used as 
currency. World silver prices rose and fell on government monetary policies 
(Malone et al, 1993). In 1893 a severe economic depression wreaked havoc on 
the silver industry. Convinced that the national silver purchase program 
was the major cause of the depression. President Grover Cleveland prevailed 
upon Congress to repeal the silver purchase act, ending mandatory 
government purchase of the metal. ̂  The economies of mining states were 
devastated by falling silver prices (Malone et al, 1993).
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Butte, however, had more than silver to mine -  it had vast copper 
deposits. After 1893, copper became the most important product of Butte's 
mines. The invention of incandescent lights and the telephone created a 
need for copper wire to criss-cross the rapidly industrializing country.
Thomas Edison's pioneer plant alone used 128,793 pounds of copper for 
wiring and equipment (Marcossen, 1957). In 1881, the Union Pacific railroad 
tracks arrived in Butte (J. Robbins, 1994). Butte was here to stay.
In addition to large capital investments, copper mining needed a stable 
work force. Butte promised a fair living and job stability. Miners came in 
droves. By 1895 Butte's 6,400 miners took home $640,000 each month for 
their part in producing more than one-quarter of the world's copper 
(Emmons, 1990). They worked in the Alice, Glengarry, Mountain Con, 
Bluebird Trail, Orphan Girl, Anselmo, Original, Lexington, Travona, 
Neversweat, Nipper, Rarus, "Wake up Jim," and Badger State Mines. They 
lived in Dublin Gulch, Seldom Seen, Nanny Goat Hill, Chicken Flats, and 
Dogtown. They drank in The Alley Cat, Open-All-Night, Bucket of Blood, Big 
Stope, Graveyard, and Pay Day. (Writers' Program, 1943) They answered to 
Buckets, Paddy the Duck, Goggle-eyed Tom, Danny the Dawg, Two-Bit Billie, 
and Swede Murphy (Duffy, undated).
These colorful characters created a brawling wide-open anomaly -  a city 
distinctly eastern in its immigration population, Catholicism, politics, and 
industrialization scrambling up  a remote Western mountain. They were 
serviced by saloons and what was reputedly the largest red-light district in the 
West (J. Robbins, 1994). Their stories have entered the realm of popular 
mythology, creating a history that is larger than life (Writers' Program, 1943). 
As Butte developed, the only commonality between the brash city and the
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rural state was found in their weather and newness, historian David 
Emmons (1990:62) notes:
There was no congruity between the city and the state, little sense of a
common past and even less anticipation of a shared future.
Butte would pay a price for its differences with the rest of the state.
Perhaps the most immediate price was Butte’s isolation from the rest of the 
state, combined with a largely immigrant population with no firm sense 
of American social reality, which gave the Anaconda Company and other 
major mining companies a free hand to construct the type of community 
most helpful to their interests (Finn, 1995; Emmons, 1990). It was the Irish 
who acknowledged, and celebrated, their differences from the rest of the state 
by referring to their home as "Butte, America (Emmons, 1990). " Other 
difference-related problems would surface later in Butte's history.
Butte was exploding. From the Flats at 5,400 feet above sea level north up 
the steep incline of Butte Hill to Walkerville at 6,500 ft, tiny miners’ homes 
crept up the hill, huddled together against the cold and wind. On the west 
end of town, the men who came to be called the "Copper Kings" constructed 
mansions of brick, stained glass, and turrets in Eastern fashion. The changes 
were fast and furious. The national need for copper was voracious (Malone, 
1995; Emmons, 1990; J. Robbins, 1994).
Marcus Daly’s newly formed Anaconda Mining Company was the largest 
mining operation in Butte. In search of the vast amounts of lumber 
necessary to fuel the smelters, and timbers to shore up mine tunnels, Daly 
formed a logging company which, within a few years, illegally denuded the
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mountains near Butte (J. Robbins, 1994). The company also began to generate 
power for its furnaces. It spread into other commercial holdings -  real estate, 
farmland, hotels, railroads, water and electrical companies. By 1895, when 
Daly reorganized the Anaconda Copper Mining Company as a public 
company, most Montanans referred to it as "the Company (J. Robbins, 1994)." 
The landscape had changed dramatically:
They had roasting heaps down around the smelters. Down in 
Meaderville and down at Clark's Reduction Works and so on. Boston 
and Montana smelters, things like that. They put out such a poisonous 
atmosphere that it killed everything. All the grass, every doggoned 
thing that grew around Butte. It was the most desert-like area you 
could imagine. All the trees on Timber Butte. Gee, that used to be 
covered with beautiful trees, but 1 never paid too much attention to 
them because I was too small at the time they were 
flourishing...whopping big pine trees killed...and all the timber on East 
Ridge as far as the smoke reached.
Sometimes the smoke was so thick in Butte that they had to put 
bells on the teams. You couldn’t see across the street...Just a bare desert 
out on the Flat. There was great big desert storms that came up 
whenever there was a strong wind... (Looking Back on Butte Hill;34).
In the lexicon of the times, this was progress. The copper was used to 
develop other burgeoning industries. Corporations were making huge 
profits. The West was being won, reshaped to meet production standards, 
and the land was dying under the onslaught. Blinded by smelter smoke, and 
caught up in a fundamental struggle for survival that depended upon 
meeting production quotas, Butte's immigrant workers settled in (Toole,
1959; Malone, 1995; Robbins, 1994; Emmons, 1990). The environmental 
degradation was the price to be paid for steady jobs which meant the married 
miners could put food on the family table and try to ensure their children did 
not have to go dow n into the mines (Enunons, 1990). Father Sarsfield
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O'Sullivan, a Roman Catholic priest in Butte, watched the immigrant miners 
adjust to life in Butte:
... The average immigrant, as distinct from the miner from 
Pennsylvania,...if he didn 't manage to get out of the mines himself, he 
would do anything to get his son out. Even when I was graduating 
from high school [in Ireland] we were shipping out my generation..
"The immigrants weren't people who thought. Oh, isn't mining fun. 
Down in dark and dangerous holes... (Oral history transcripts: 1)
Around Butte there is a lot of beautiful nature, but everything is 
about nine miles away from you. You don't experience nature until 
Spring when you went for a hike. Kids played on dumps. Butte was in 
a beautiful setting and yet it was divorced from nature. (Oral History 
Transcript 5)
Ironically, the deeper the miners dug into the earth, the more 
disconnected they became from the natural world. The towering gallows 
frames, mine dumps, and slag heaps on Butte Hill were viewed as the life of 
the community -  both as the economic security that sustained them, and as 
the trium ph of their struggles to survive in the dark and frightening tunnels 
beneath the Hill (Enunons, 1990). The forces of the natural world, which they 
daily faced beneath Butte Hill, were justifiably feared because so often they 
brought death.
Meanwhile the Anaconda Copper Mining Company was burrowing into 
every facet of the lives of Montana's inhabitants. By 1900, Anaconda 
employed nearly three-quarters of the state's wage earners (Toole, 1972).
With every new miner and every foot deeper into the earth, more capital was 
invested and alternative development paths less likely to be considered. The 
miners kept coming. By 1888, smelter smoke had killed trees and vegetation
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and a national magazine described the miners’ housing as "hovels -  untidy, 
neglected, and oppressive (Emmons, 1990:74)." Three years later, the Butte 
Intermountain  reported that 1,134 people lived in 141 houses in the Irish 
working class Third Ward and, that in this entire area, there was no new 
vegetation from 1890-1891 (Emmons, 1990).
The vast gulf between the wealth of the Copper Kings and the poverty of 
the workers was becoming more apparent w ith every miner’s shack 
constructed on what Finn (1995) refers to as borrowed land, ” land that might, 
in the future, be claimed by the mining companies as they traced the veins of 
ore through the depths of Butte Hill. Somehow the culture created would 
have to minimize and offer an acceptable explanation for that uneven 
distribution of wealth. In the larger culture, the notion of equality was 
fostered. Writers of the day, like Horatio Alger, popularized the notion that 
hard work and perseverance would bring success in America. The 
possibilities were endless. But, in Butte, everyone worked hard -  miners 
worked dangerous jobs and women struggled to hold their families and the 
new community together. More of a sense of possibilities was needed in this 
harsh place.
In Butte, the Catholic schools, which serviced a larger area than 
individual public school districts, brought many children of management and 
labor together, fostering the notion of a community less bound by class 
distinctions (Finn, 1995). Their familiarity as children likely also served to 
mediate some of their inevitable m anagement/ labor conflicts when they met 
in the work force as adults. As the city grew, shared experiences also 
reinforced a sense of classless community. Gala affairs were held at Columbia
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Gardens, the oasis of green W.A. Clark gave to the town, and Anaconda funds 
helped to maintain (Finn, 1995). Residents shared theater performances, 
movies, lunch and dinner at restaurants strewn about the city's ethnically- 
diverse neighborhoods. This rough western city rapidly became a 
cosmopolitan center (Robbins, 1993; Malone et al, 1993). Under that veneer of 
culture shared by all, the working class neighborhood and associational 
groups offered pockets of identity -  sometimes offering community strength, 
and sometimes heightening ethnic and class tensions (Finn, 1995).
Butte's largely Irish Butte Miner's Union, formed as the result of the strike 
of 1878, had benefited both from Marcus Daly's sympathy, or paternalism, and 
the ongoing feud between Copper Kings Daly and W.A. Clark, and later, F. 
Augustus Heinze (Emmons, 1990; Toole, 1959). The Butte Miners' Union's 
role as the birthplace of western mining unionism, and as the first local of the 
Western Federation of Miners, had earned Butte the title the "Gibraltar of 
Unionism (Emmons, 1990)." Buffered by Daly, Butte developed a very 
different culture than the mining camps in Idaho and Colorado that would 
soon become the scene of violent labor conflicts (Emmons, 1990). The Butte 
union was dominated by immigrant Irish who saw the union as a way to 
maintain the job security that the Irish enclave needed both to survive so far 
from home, and to work for Ireland's liberation from the British.2 Union 
control was greatly assisted by Daly, whose preferential treatment of the Irish- 
dominated union, "blurred class distinctions and contributed to worker 
conservatism (Emmons, 1990:190)."
...the working Irish could never be persuaded that he [Daly} was an evil 
man. By their cultural standards, to assign evil to Daly was self- 
proscriptive. It damned them aU. (Emmons, 1990:193)
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Daly's preference also perpetuated the notion that the Irish were entitled 
to have some control over the labor force and that they had a say in the way 
their community developed (Emmons, 1990). Aided by Daly, the Butte 
Miners' Union won an eight-hour day, dem anded, and got, a closed shop 
(Emmons, 1990). But the degree of cooperation from the more powerful 
would soon radically change, creating rigid divisions between labor and 
management, and bringing to light fault lines running through the union's 
mem bership.
In 1887, the mining industry was faced with the prospect of losing possible 
foreign investment, the result of a provision in the federal Alien Land Law 
which restricted foreign investment in territories. Two years later, the federal 
Omnibus Bill notified Montanans if they drew up a proper constitution, they 
would be immediately granted statehood. That same year, 1889, Montana 
became a state (Malone et al, 1993), open for business.
The Copper Kings sought capital. After the company's 1895 
reorganization. Anaconda's stock had found a home in Boston, the copper 
headquarters of the United States. Boston institutions had purchased the 
Boston and Montana and the Butte and Boston mines, and, in 1897, 
consolidated them (Toole, 1959). Also, in 1897, W.A. Clark incorporated his 
massive holdings, which included a smelter and refining complex in Great 
Falls, as well as banks, retail stores, lumber properties, coal mines, and street 
car systems (Robbins, 1994). By 1909, official promotional literature referred to 
Montana as 'The Treasure State." It was — for some.
Across the country, the merger movement gathered momentum after the 
election of 1896, the first in which corporate money and corporate-owned 
publications were brought to bear, in this case, against the rapidly growing
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Populist Party (Goodwyn, 1978). The merger movement, designed for greater 
corporate efficiency, also allowed for more corporate control, a fact that caused 
some concern in Montana where local stockholders were always in the 
minority (Toole, 1959). Montana’s fears led to a legal challenge to 
consolidations made without minority stockholder consent, a challenge 
which was upheld by the state's Supreme Court (Toole, 1959). Corporate 
response took the form of a bill to allow stock transfers without minority 
consent -  Montanans' first indication of the extent to which the executives of 
the New Jersey-based Standard Oil Trust had tunneled into the state's 
political economy (Toole, 1959). The group of capitalists intended to buy the 
Anaconda Company, along with other Butte properties, and consolidate. 
Montana stood little chance against the combined forces of "a great New York 
bank, a great railroad, and a great oil company, aligned in concert... (Toole, 
1959:165). " The legislature passed the bill over a gubernatorial veto allowing 
allowing Anaconda, to become the Amalgamated Copper Company, owned 
and controlled by Standard Oil (Toole, 1959).
The presence of Amalgamated did not end the Daly-Clark war which had 
already cost the state a seat in the U.S. Senate and a great deal of 
embarrassment. Amalgamated officials, who had carefully researched the 
international and national copper market, and the Butte operations, had 
overlooked the ambitious F. Augustus Heinze who had formed the Montana 
Ore Purchasing Company in 1893, and later opened a smelter in Meaderville 
(Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone, 1995; Robbins, 1994). Heinze had discovered he 
could use both the apex provision in the 1872 Mining Act, and well-paid-off 
local judges to appropriate Amalgamated's ores (Robbins, 1994; Malone, 1995).
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The intersection of a vein at the surface is known as the apex. Under the 
Mining Act, the physical existence of a vein must be established within the 
surface boundaries of claim ownership. However, the owner of that claim 
has a right to follow that vein from the surface downward, even when it 
leads under the surface holdings of another miner. Because of faults and 
fractures, the veins often break off into many fine veins, and sometimes are 
even cut off by a large rock. In the case of veins that are lost near the vertical 
side walls of a claim, with similar veins of identical ore below or beside it in 
an adjoining claim, geologists, and the courts, determine whether the vein 
below or beside the original is a continuation of the original (J. Robbins, 1994; 
Malone, 1995). Heinze had studied the law, and stacked the local court 
(J. Robbins, 1994; Malone, 1995).
Cloaked in cash-lined judicial garments, by 1902, Heinze employed 37 
lawyers, involved in almost 100 lawsuits on mining property worth close to 
$200 million (Toole, 1972). An electric orator, Heinze played on Montana's 
suspicion of the outsider. Standard Oil, painting himself as a local David 
fighting an Eastern Goliath (Robbins, 1994; Malone, 1995; Toole, 1972).
Unable to win the war of words. Amalgamated acted. On Oct. 22,1903, the 
Company announced the shutdown of its Montana operations, except its 
newspapers which it could use to present its case to the public (Toole, 1959; 
Malone, 1995). Ten thousand workers were immediately laid off (Toole,
1959). Within a week of the announcement, roughly 80 percent of the state's 
wage earners were out of work (Toole, 1959). The ground was no longer solid.
Montanans were shocked into the terrifying realization they were totally 
dependent upon one enormous out-of-state enterprise. Governor Joseph K.
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Toole's office was overwhelmed by anti-Amalgamated mail. Heinze fanned 
the anti-Amalgamated sentiment (Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone, 1995). Many 
Butte miners, betrayed by the company that, during Daly's tenure, they 
thought of as benefactor, flocked to Heinze’s standard (Toole, 1959. 1972; 
Malone, 1995).
Nine days after the shutdown announcement. Amalgamated set out its 
terms on the front page of its newspapers (Toole, 1972; Malone, 1995). 
Montanans could go back to work if the governor called a special session of 
the legislature to pass a "fair trials bill" which would allow a change of venue 
if one of the litigants charged judicial bias (Toole, 1972; Malone, 1995). For a 
month, while Amalgamated's agents scurried about the state with printed 
petitions asking the governor to call the special session, the shutdown 
continued, wearing down the hungry populace (Toole, 1972). Faced with 
economic ruin. Governor Toole called the special session which convened on 
Nov. 10, passed the Fair Trials Bill, and adjourned (Toole, 1972). Montanans 
were employed again.
However, the terrain was different -  not only had the Company recreated 
the landscape of Butte, both above and below ground; it had clearly delineated 
the boundaries of the new political landscape (Toole, 1972; Malone, 1995).
The union, which had operated inside shared boundaries in Daly's time, was 
now fenced out. The effect of the shutdown on labor was long-lived and 
deep, setting off years of internal struggle. Even the unions had finally 
pressured for the special session, belying the strength implied in the title 
"Gibraltar of Unionism (Toole, 1972:123)."
The shifting terrain led to changes in mine operations, alterations that 
weakened the Irish ability to control the work force. Amalgamated had
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purchased W.A. Clark's holdings (Toole, 1972), and, in 1906, bought Heinze 
out (Malone et al, 1993). Heinze's departure constituted another betrayal: 
when Heinze sold out to Amalgamated, the only hope the miners had of 
escaping the yoke of the New Jersey trust was lost (Toole, 1972). Once its 
corporate adversaries had been eliminated. Amalgamated saw no need to 
court the Irish or the workers (Emmons, 1990). Amalgamated's labor policy 
was formulated in New York — it "was based on an inherent hostility to 
labor organizations, to strikes, to bargaining (Toole, 1972:126),"
It was a fractured union that confronted the vast power of Amalgamated 
(Emmons, 1990; Toole, 1972; Malone, 1995). Suspicions ran rampant among 
union members. Amalgamated began to infiltrate the Butte local to further 
buttress its position.
As of 1900, Amalgamated began to infiltrate the Butte M iner’s Union 
with its own men, w ith trained detectives and with others instructed to 
sow dissension. By the time of the shutdown of 1903, Amalgamated 
was satisfied that labor would protest feebly at best. Their [sic] appraisal 
was accurate. (Toole, 1972:126)
Beneath the surface of the company's betrayal of the union, another 
chasm developed. The company, which in Daly's time was a part of their 
lives at social events and funerals, was now something apart, mysterious, 
operating behind closed doors on the sixth floor of the Hennessey Building. 
Faced with the company's secrecy, the workers struggled to fill in that chasm, 
using all they had -  "myths, truths, and lies. (Finn, 1995:287)."
Anaconda has a number of large black automobiles, with low- 
numbered license plates; bystanders say The Company’s out!' much as 
they might say The elephants are loose! when these leave the 
Hennessey Building for unknown destinations (Gunther, 1947:169).
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So, beneath the surface, the workers created another landscape, scarred by 
betrayal. And, worse than the company's betrayal, was that which came at the 
hands of their own, the company’s plants. The workers were not naive, they 
learned quickly that loyalty to the workers played no part in the corporate 
ethic; but they had expected loyalty from their own (Finn, 1995).
As the more conservative faction led the Butte local to the right; the WFM 
moved to the left, the result of dire conditions and events in Leadville, 
Cripple Creek, and Telluride, Colorado; in the Couer d'Alenes; and Goldville, 
Nevada (Emmons, 1990). Given the need of the Irish enclave for security and 
the Irish dominance of the Butte union, the union's conservatism was 
compatible with its mission to guard the jobs that were essential to keep the 
enclave intact (Emmons, 1990). Recognizing that married men were less 
volatile than the single hard-drinking miners who originally settled Butte, 
the Anaconda company carefully fostered a family-oriented community 
(Finn, 1995). The company was successful. The large Irish family structure, 
with older children in the labor force and non-working mothers, the 73 
percent of Irish miners who owned their own homes, and the 434 widows 
with 1,117 children in 1910, also dampened labor radicalism in Butte 
(Emmons, 1990).
Here then was a union -  the largest in the United States and 
potentially one of the most radical -  whose leaders had unchallenged 
control, revealed strong craft biases, bought company stock, permitted 
hiring officers to retain membership, tolerated company stores and 
subscription "health plans," favored corporate consolidation, and 
declared socialism 'a dead issue.' And this is only a partial list of union 
offenses... (Emmons, 1990: 229).
The union health plan did nothing to help miners suffering from miner’s 
consumption, a debilitating lung disease caused by exposure to silicate dust
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
(Emmons, 1990). Nor did the Montana Supreme Court when, in 1900, it 
ruled that companies cannot be considered "negligent," and, although a 
business must use "reasonable diligence" to provide a safe work area, this 
could not be continuously required in a mining area where workmen 
constantly change their work place (Johnson Chronology). Further, agitating 
for mine safety would have violated the BMU constitution and bylaws 
because all "politics" were excluded for fear of "dissension and disharmony 
(Emmons, 1990:229)."
In 1911, the state mine inspector testified he had never received an official 
BMU complaint (Emmons, 1990). But, lack of official complaints about 
conditions in the mines, not withstanding, Butte had more than its share of 
hazards:
...Mortuary records for 1906-07 list scores of death from acute 
alcoholism, drug addiction, syphillis, suicide (usually from carbolic 
acid), and stabbings and gunshot wounds. Add to these typhoid fever 
and, as additions to the enormous toll among the miners, the deaths of 
children in falls down abandoned and unmarked mine shafts...
In addition to these hazards, there was the constant threat of 
tuberculosis and related respiratory diseases. Between 1911 and 1916 
Butte’s death rate for all forms of TB was 237.45 per 100,000, more than 
twice the national average... Residence in no other Montana town was 
remotely as lethal. Butte's mortality rate for all respiratory disease was 
513.8 per 100,000; in Missoula, only 120 miles to the west, the rate was 
207.7 (Emmons, 1990:72).
Ellen Crain (1996), director of the Butte-Silver Bow Archives, says, "In 
1890, mining men in Butte were the highest paid in the nation for that kind 
of work. One m an a day died of TB; one man a week in a mine accident." 
Life in Butte was risky business, both above and below ground. Given the
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imbalances of power between the "Copper Kings" (Malone et al, 1993; Malone, 
1995; J. Robbins, 1994) and workers, residents had little choice other than to 
adapt. And adapt they did, producing a local culture that inadvertently 
supported the imbalances by priding itself on its toughness and survival 
skills. Butte's kids handled chores around the house and made money on the 
side doing odd jobs, selling newspapers, and occasionally pillaging 
neighborhoods to "pick up" a few things to bring in a little cash from the 
pawn shops. Butte’s kids grew up with a well-chronicled penchant for battles 
between neighborhood gangs and sometimes breathtakingly dangerous 
pranks. They were risk-takers and proud of it. Butte was different and so 
were they (Writers’ Program, 1943).
Olga Sontum, born in 1893, remembered the smoke:
You could hardly see to get to school. You couldn’t see 20 feet from 
you and it never hurt any of us. Now they’re yelling so much about all 
that. It's foolish, isn’t it? (1-2, Oral History Project)
Later in the interview, Sontum referred to her father, who worked for a 
time as a solicitor for Montana Power Company. Although he died young, 
she did not connect his illness or death to the smoke or other potential health 
problems in Butte:
...But he got sick, he had lung trouble and one thing or another so he 
couldn’t work steadily and he died in 1907 (1-2, Oral History Project).
That was life in Butte where miners who lived into their forties were 
considered "old," where miners had, on average, a 15-year working life in the 
mines (Emmons, 1990). Perhaps because they were so aware of how they
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differed from the rest of the state, and of the difficulties they encountered in 
making a home in this harsh steep place, their loyalty to Butte was absolute:
Butte people possess a fierce civic pride, the like of which can be found 
in few places. They love the camp with such an intense devotion that 
it blinds them to the physical bleakness and ugliness of the town.
When away they are clannish. In Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
Washington, New York, or wherever there are numbers of former 
Butte residents, one will find them getting together socially. The 
principal topic of conversation will invariably be happenings in the 
old camp, current and past (Writers' Program,1943:24).
That loyalty implies a shared reality, a mutual understanding of 
meanings and cultural nuances that were not understood outside of Butte. 
Perhaps, though, that loyalty was not merely a randomly occurring 
development. Finn (1995) notes, that Anaconda Company officials played a 
large part in constructing a community that would inspire such loyalty from 
residents, while simultaneously deflecting attention from the harsh realities:
Butte became known as "The Richest Hill on Earth," a name the 
community still wears with pride as if the mere evocation could 
restore its depleted wealth (128).
The hard working, hard drinking miner became the prototype of working 
class men (Finn, 1995). However, jobs, provided by Anaconda, were essential 
to maintain this working class pride and to sustain the place Butte families 
were creating as home. This became more difficult as the union's attempts at 
control of job assignments in the 1907 contract were quickly undercut both by 
an anti-labor national political climate and by Amalgamated's assemblage of a 
disposable work force — migrant laborers (Emmons, 1990).
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That addition to the labor force in Butte allowed the mining companies to 
change to power drills, which were frequently referred to as "widow-makers 
(Emmons, 1990)." The new drills increased the amount of silicate dust which 
miners early knew was a cause of miner's consumption, although the mining 
companies denied the connection. They also eliminated much of the need 
for craftsmanship by making a miner out of anyone "strong enough to lift 
one and reckless enough to go underground with it (Emmons, 1990:248)."
The migrant laborers, who just wanted to "make enough money to go home" 
were seen as careless by the settled miners (Emmons, 1990:245). Ironically, the 
anticipated passage of the state's workmen's compensation law, gave further 
impetus to hire migrant workers -  companies would not have to pay 
survivors of foreign nationals (Emmons, 1990).
Safety aside, the new miners also threatened to erode both the more 
settled miners' sense of teamwork and their work as craft:
Work became lonelier and, after the introduction of machine drills, 
less a function of honed skills and more a test of brute strength...
...New drills meant enforced idleness for the skilled men too old or 
broken to lift them, a diminished status for those who could lift them. 
Indeed, there were no real miners left, only workers ranked by the 
machines they tended rather than the skills they had learned 
(Emmons, 1990:239).
Demeaned by technology, economic security threatened by the new 
"disposable" miners, their union beset within by ethnic and political 
differences and the presence of "company spies, " the labor force became 
increasingly restive (Emmons, 1990). Occasional Socialist party victories in
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Butte d ty  elections from 1903 to 1910, and increasing radicalism in the 
WFM likely fostered Amalgamated’s suspicion of labor. Migrant laborers, at 
least, could not vote in local elections. By 1910, the Anaconda mines’ labor 
force included more than 1,000 new immigrants and less than 1,000 Irish 
(Emmons, 1990).
As the composition of the work force changed, conditions in the mines 
appeared to become more dangerous (Emmons, 1990). Although it is possible 
that the mines were more dangerous in 1896, before the non-English speaking 
workers arrived, from 1910 through 1914, the death rate in Anaconda’s 
mines, excluding deaths from respiratory illnesses, was more than six times 
that from accidents m British mines (Emmons, 1990). An average of 4.68 men 
of every thousand working in Anaconda’s Butte mines were killed from 1910 
through 1914 (Emmons, 1990). North Butte Mining Company records show 
15 underground accidents that resulted in injuries and deaths in a work force 
of 576 in 1907; 70 injuries and deaths in a work force of 714 in 1911; and 291 
injuries and deaths in a work force of 769 in 1913 (Emmons, 1990). The BMU 
and Ancient Order of Hibernians paid out ten times more sick and death 
benefits in 1910 than they did in 1878 and 1899 -  another indication that the 
mines were more dangerous and the Irish less able to control their work 
assignments (Emmons, 1990). The numbers of half-brothers and half-sisters 
attested to the danger of their work, former Anaconda employee John T. Shea 
says;
There are more half-brothers and sisters in Butte than 1 ever saw 
anywhere else — the result of widows remarrying. Such a high rate of 
accidents here in Butte. The Irish controlled the Con and a few of the 
other big mines. The Ancient Order of Hibernians had a fund for
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widows. It [the sense of community] was great. You didn't call anybody 
a half-brother (10/24/95).
The associational funds for widows and burials, which were desperately 
needed in the harsh reality of Butte (Emmons, 1990), inadvertently performed 
another function: they privatized medical and death benefits, making what 
may otherwise have become public concerns a personal trouble.
In addition to loss of control over job assignments and an increase in 
worker accidents, the conservative orientation of union leadership was 
threatened by the existence of the local Socialist party and growing numbers 
of Wobblies, members of the radical International Workers of the World 
(Emmons, 1990). The Socialist party had gained strength rapidly since it first 
appeared in Montana in 1902 (Emmons, 1990). In 1911, it had joined forces 
with the International Workers of the World to elect a Socialist city 
government in Butte (Malone et al, 1993; Emmons, 1990). Founded in 1905 in 
opposition to capitalism, the IWW advocated conflict, worker solidarity, and 
the creation of one industrial union to which all workers, skilled and 
unskilled, would belong. Butte labor leaders had played important roles in 
organizing the national IWW, which had gained a substantial following in 
Montana's lumber camps and mining towns (Malone et al, 1993).
The company did not idly sit by as radicals gained in numbers (Emmons, 
1990). In 1912, the Anaconda Company fired almost 500 Finnish miners it 
had identified as socialists (Emmons, 1990). The fired Finns then demanded 
the BMU avenge them, calling a strike, if necessary, to recover their jobs.
BMU membership voted almost four to one against a strike. Many Finns, 
who had not left Butte, boycotted the BMU, paying only those dues essential
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to retain their jobs (Emmons, 1990). Union membership fell dramatically — 
from 7,000 in February 1913 to less than 4,000 in May 1914, in a work force of
11,000 (Emmons, 1990). Anaconda's "divide and conquer" tactics were 
effectively further weakening the existing fault lines of ethnic and political 
differences in the labor force (Emmons, 1990).
The company found an additional way to keep control of job assignments 
out of union hands in 1912 in the form of the "rustling card" system which 
required all prospective miners obtain a card to allow them to look for a job 
(Emmons, 1990). Resentment and fear that the card would be used to blacklist 
intensified, manifesting itself in June 1914 when more radical BMU members 
refused to show their cards to BMU representatives at the Black Rock and 
Speculator Mines (Emmons, 1990). That action led rapidly to other 
demonstrations of displeasure, including an attack on one of the company- 
sponsored symbols of community and union power in Butte, the annual 
Miners' Union Day parade (Finn, 1995). The day after the challenge to the 
rustling card system, dissidents disrupted the parade that celebrated the 
founding of the Workingmen's Union in Butte in 1878 (Finn, 1995).
However, even some of those marching did not support the union. Cliff 
Hodges reports:
As a smaller number of the miners than usual lined up  for the parade, 
something seemed to be wrong. The spirit of fun and joviality that 
always was present at such occasions in the past were sadly lacking and 
the somber faces of the participants implied that they would not have 
been there except for the fact that a penalty would be levied against all 
union members who refused to parade (A-12, Oral History Project).
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The rioting continued. A group of BMU progressives formed a new 
union, the Butte Mine Workers’ Union (Malone et al, 1993). Shots were fired 
and two men killed, as an angry crowd gathered outside the Butte Miners' 
Hall at the union's June 23 meeting (Malone et al, 1993). A group of men, 
possibly Wobblies or members of the new union, set of a series of dynamite 
blasts that levelled the hall after the BMU leaders and police had fled (Malone 
et al, 1993). The surface terrain was now as threatening as that below ground.
On Aug. 30,1914, the Parrot Mine hiring office was dynamited (Toole,
1972; Emmons, 1990). The following day. Governor Stewart declared martial 
law and sent in the National Guard to occupy the city (Emmons, 1990; Malone 
et al, 1993; Toole, 1972). The new union's leaders were tried and imprisoned, 
the city's Socialist mayor and sheriff were removed from office after a 
summary grand jury investigation (Malone et al, 1993). On Sept. 9, Anaconda 
announced it would not recognize either union (Toole, 1972). The Gibraltar 
of Unionism was pulverized by the combined forces of corporate and 
government power and carefully fostered intensification of existing divisions 
within the labor force (Toole, 1959; Malone et al, 1993).
After the trust had consolidated Clarke's and Heinze's holdings, there was 
just one major operating subsidiary which rendered the trust "an 
anachronism." (Malone et al, 1993:273) This, coupled with the federal 
government's threat to double-tax holding company profits, was likely 
responsible for the liquidation of the trust in 1915 (Malone et al, 1993). From 
that date, the Anaconda Copper Mining Company was independent (Malone 
et al, 1993).
Standard Oil's departure notwithstanding, under the surface, labor's 
resentments continued to simmer. Farmers, whose Populist Party had been
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crushed by corporate money and influence in 1896, were also seething 
(Malone et al, 1993). By late 1916, the Non-Partisan League, founded in North 
Dakota, took root in eastern Montana (Malone et al, 1993). In Montana, the 
league charged that farmers had to support the costs of state government 
because the Anaconda Company was not paying its fair share of taxes (Malone 
et al, 1993).
Further contributing to unrest in Butte, many Irish immigrants were 
adamantly opposed to entering World War I on the side of England 
(Emmons, 1990). Three days after the national draft registration was ordered, 
in association with the Finns, and probably the Wobblies, Butte’s Irish Pearse- 
Connolly Club led a large rebellious anti-draft protest march which ended in a 
"small-scale riot (Emmons, 1990:363)." On June 8, three days after the march, 
flames roared up the Granite Mountain shaft of the Speculator Mine 
(Emmons, 1990; Malone et al, 1993; Toole, 1972). The fire, which killed 165 of 
the 410 men who went to work on that night shift, became the worst disaster 
in the history of Butte mining (Emmons, 1990). On June 11, the Metal Mine 
Workers' Union, which had been formed on June 5 in response to the draft 
registration order, called for a strike against all the mines (Emmons, 1990).
The deaths occurred because a state law had never been enforced in Butte 
(Toole, 1972). Montana law mandated metal bulkheads that could be opened; 
the Speculator mine used stationary cement bulkheads (Toole, 1972). The 
trapped miners had no means to escape the roaring flames and poisonous 
gases:
Many of the dead miners had been found piled against cement
bulkheads, their fingers worn to the bone. (Toole, 1972:143)
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The company-owned Butte Post reported the fire with telling omissions — 
no mention was made of the cause of the disaster or of improvements that 
could avoid such future horrors (Toole, 1972). It maintained that Butte had 
better-than-average working conditions and charged that a strike bulletin 
referring to "intolerable” working conditions merely represented the 
Socialist-IWW invective (Toole, 1972:143). The company's representation of 
the miner had changed from that of a hard worker, to an ungrateful pawn of 
radicals.
Given the newspaper charges of "German/Irish" antiwar influence, the 
presence of the IWW and federal troops, this strike which threatened the 
country's wartime copper supply was likely doomed to failure (Emmons, 
1990). However, even without the fire, Butte's workers would have walked 
out in protest of the use of the rustling card to ensure work crews in the 
dangerous mines, the seven- and fourteen-day layoff system, inadequate 
wages, inflation, and tyrannical shift bosses and foremen (Emmons, 1990:366). 
These work conditions had radicalized many of the older men who had voted 
against support of the Finns three years previous (Emmons, 1990).
Despite facts to the contrary, the company-owned paper insisted that 
Butte's workers enjoyed the "highest" pay in the world, better living 
conditions than any other camp, and few fatalities (Toole, 1972). The facts 
included (Toole, 1972): a U.S. Department of Labor study that found 80 
percent of Butte's wage earners in debt, and the city's cost of living far higher 
and wages lower than anywhere else in the country; 17 men killed in an Oct. 
16, 1915 mine accident; 21 men killed in a Feb. 14, 1916 accident; from 1910 to 
1913, in Anaconda-owned mines only, 162 men were killed in work-related 
accidents, and 5,795 miners lost time as the result of injuries on the job.
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Additionally, U.S. Health Service data indicated, in 1917 and 1918, largely as a 
result of poor ventilation which could have been corrected by technology in 
existence, "at least 20 percent" of men who had worked underground for five 
years or more, had miners' consumption. Those figures do not include the 
deaths that occurred when periodic influenza epidemics occurred in Butte, 
where residents' lungs were already weakened by exposure to silicates and 
smoke from processing ores. This is Herb's account:
There was an influenza epidemic came along in 1918 and five of the 
seven (members of the speaker’s family), were stricken. I laid in the 
front room in the big folding bed and looked out the window. 1 could 
see in the Catholic Cemetery, three or four funerals in there at one 
time. It was really a terrible, terrible situation. The paper was just full 
of obituaries every day, just a long list of them. (Looking Back from the 
Hill: 13)
Poor communities, those that are both economically and politically 
marginalized, often have multiple problems. Butte was, and is, no exception 
to this synchronicity. Mining and urban-type overcrowding were not the 
only sources of potential health problems or annoyances in Butte, Ann 
recalls:
We used to have all that smoke from burning garbage at the dumps. 
Where Safeway on Front Street is, there was a dum p there, and Silver 
Bow Creek used to run under that. There was a wooden sidewalk 
there. Talk about stink. There was no garbage collection. Well, there 
was no garbage, just mostly ashes 'cause you’d burn everything in the 
stove...and the odors. People had cows. They'd take the manure to the 
dum p. And stink! 1 know. We had pigs to haul that out there, and, by 
the time you got there, you were half dead. Oh, and Hansen's Packing, 
they used to butcher and slaughter. You couldn't breathe in the 
summertime from the odor. Where we lived over that way, we used
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to really get the brunt of it. If there was a w ind carrying it. I'm telling 
you, you had to close all the windows. So we were used to all these 
high potent odors and dust and everything. Sometimes you wonder 
how you existed. (Looking back at the Hill: 62)
While denying the brutal reality of Butte, the company-controUed press 
went on the offensive, calling strikers "cowardly agitators," and "IWWs, Irish 
zealots, and German sympathizers (Toole, 1972:135)." By June 29, more than
15,000 men were on strike in Butte, Anaconda, and Great Falls (Toole, 1972). 
Their only voice was the Butte Bulletin which evolved from a strike bulletin 
to a radical labor paper but its circulation was small (Toole, 1972). Although 
there were industrial workers in Anaconda and Great Falls, Butte, in its 
physical size and urbanization, was unlike any other place in Montana. Few 
outside of Butte knew the reality, and few had any sympathy for the strikers 
(Toole, 1972). Again, the differences between Butte and the rest of the state, 
worked against Butte. As did the company's control of the press, and the 
company's spies (Toole, 1972).
To ensure victory, the company, which had first used Pinkerton detectives 
against labor in 1914, now imported squads of detectives to infiltrate the 
union:
By late July there were more than 200 detectives in Butte -  nearly as 
many detectives as IWWs. Their fundamental assignment was to 
harass strike leaders, to work their way into the union, and to report to 
the Company. To labor they were goons' who formed goon squads.' 
They were widely feared (Toole, 1972:147).
On Aug. 1, 1917, Frank Little, an outspoken IWW organizer who had 
arrived in Butte to convince the newly-formed Metal Mine Workers' Union
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to join forces with the Wobblies, was brutally m urdered (Toole, 1972; Malone 
et al, 1993; Emmons, 1990). Six masked vigilantes had dragged him out of his 
boarding house, beaten him, tied him to the back of their car, and dragged 
him to the outskirts of town where they hanged him from a railway trestle 
(Toole, 1972). They left the sign of the vigilantes -  "3-7-77" -  on Little’s 
maimed body (Toole, 1972; Malone et al, 1993). The numbers referred to the 
dimensions of a grave: three feet wide; seven feet long; and 77 inches deep 
(Writers’ Program, 1942: Toole, 1972). The m urder has never been solved 
(Toole, 1972; Malone et al, 2993). Today, in what can be construed only as an 
ambiguous message, Montana's state troopers wear 3-7-77 on their uniform 
insignias. Three thousand people marched in Little’s funeral cortege; along 
the sidewalks, thousands more watched silently as the largest funeral Butte 
had ever seen passed by (Malone et al, 1993). That silence indicated dangerous 
ground beneath which rage festered.
Wartime emotions blazed -  Little's anti-war speeches had triggered the 
equivalent of a witch hunt for German-sympathizers in the state (Malone et 
al, 1993). Although most of the state’s press did not condone Little’s murder, 
coverage continued to fret about the subversives in their midst (Malone et al, 
1993). The Montana Council of Defense, the Montana Loyalty League, and 
other state organizations warred on the IWW and the Non-Partisan League 
(Malone et al, 1993). On Aug. 11, the federal government sent troops into 
Butte (Malone et al, 1993). Faced with company-hired detectives, the 
invective of the company press, anti-union public sentiment, and federal 
troops, the strike petered out and the MMWU workers returned to work 
(Malone et al, 1993). The search for traitors continued (Malone et al, 1993). 
Between September 1914 and April 1920, the national guard and federal
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troops occupied Butte six times (Malone et al: 278). Butte's residents were 
learning an important lesson: even when alliances were made with other 
laborers -  e.g., the Irish and the Finns -  the balance of power was weighted 
heavily against them.
Thirteen days after Little's murder, in response to frantic reports from his 
constituents, Montana's senator, Henry L. Myers, introduced an anti-sedition 
bill (Toole, 1972). Although that bill was buried in the Senate's Judiciary 
Committee, it was passed by the state legislature as the Montana Sedition Law 
on Feb. 22,1918 (Toole, 1972). The same bill was later rescued by Montana 
Senator Thomas Walsh and passed as the federal Sedition Act on May 16,
1918 (Toole, 1972).
Thus a federal law which was probably more restrictive of traditional 
American freedoms than any legislation since the Alien and Sedition 
Acts of 1798 was directly traceable to violence and conflict in Montana 
and the lynching of an IWW agitator in Butte (Toole, 1972:154).
Montana's Sedition Act and Criminal Sedition Act outlawed the IWW, 
and, more importantly, made labor agitation dangerous business (Toole, 
1972). The company profited — not only did it avoid the expense of 
improving conditions in the mines, it was able to brand all union activity as 
seditious and unpatriotic (Toole, 1972). Charges of unpatriotic behavior 
notwithstanding, in 1918, Butte's workers struck again (Toole, 1972).
The Bulletin, which had continued to publish after the 1917 strike was 
broken, called Anaconda Vice-president Cornelius Kelley to account for his 
refusal to deal with the union and jabbed at the federal troops that had 
remained in the city until, under the guise of the sedition acts, Butte police
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and federal troops raided the Bulletin offices as part of an anti-IWW 
campaign (Toole, 1972). Bulletin  editor, W.F. Dunne, and his staff were 
arrested, charged with sedition and turned over for prosecution (Toole, 1972). 
The strike was broken (Toole, 1972). Dunne was convicted of sedition in 1920, 
and fined $5,000, however the Supreme Court subsequently reversed the 
decision (Toole, 1972).
The federal government needed copper and that required loyal workers to 
dig it up and process it, as well as continued corporate investment to sustain 
the national economy. Butte officials knew well the city was dependent upon 
the company's jobs and tax revenues. All systems were oriented toward 
development, regardless of impact on workers. The end of the war brought 
no relief for the worker; fear of Bolshevism replaced fear of the Hun, keeping 
patriotic sentiments high and anti-union vigilance alive.
Butte continued to simmer and occasionally to boil over, but federal 
troops were still there and they had become expert strikebreakers. The 
Company reduced its expenditure on detectives substantially. The 
press turned its attention from the l.W.W. to the Non-Partisan League 
(Toole, 1972:196).
The company press prospered and served the company well in its fight 
against reform of the state’s tax structure which had originally been designed 
by the mining companies (Toole, 1972). In 1917 and 1918, the company press 
fought off changes that would have cut into profits (Toole, 1972; Malone et al, 
1993). Although the Anaconda Company seemed involved in all aspects of 
the state, it never left "fingerprints (Toole, 1972:219). " This was the case with 
the company's purchase, at some point between 1917 and 1920, of the
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Missoulian  from Joseph Dixon -  the date of purchase and other details of the 
sale were never published (Toole, 1995).
At the close of World War I, Montana’s mining and lumber industries, 
like the rest of the national economy suffered, through the adjustment to a 
reduced peacetime demand for their products (Malone et al, 1993). However, 
Montana's economic dow nturn was even harsher because local agriculture 
was also suffering from years of drought (Malone et al, 1993). Although the 
national economy rebounded by 1922, Montana's crisis continued until the 
rains returned in the mid-1920s (Malone et al, 1993). As a result of the exodus 
of failed farmers, Montana was the only state to lose population in the 1920s 
(Malone et al, 1993). This loss had a profound impact on the state's 
demographics: as younger families left, the state was left w ith a population of 
the very young and very old; few young and middle-aged adults remained 
(Malone et al, 1993).
As prosperity vanished, so did optimism. Montana lost more in the 
postwar depression than its marginal farmers. To a considerable 
extent, it also lost its self-confidence and its faith in the future. 
(Malone et al, 1993:291)
The mood in Montana was conservative -  the result of a congruence of 
interests shared by corporate and associational interests, and voters concerned 
about "big government, excessive spending, and maintaining the status quo 
(Malone et al, 1993:291). " For the most part, the state's economy relied upon 
the Anaconda Company and an assortment of other equally conservative 
interests -  five railroad companies, coal, oil, lumber, and smaller metal- 
mining firms, bankers, merchants, chambers of commerce, and the
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Stockgrowers’ and Wool Growers' Associations (Malone et al, 1993).
However, labor was increasingly more restless, and the Montana Labor 
League joined the Non-Partisan League's dem ands for reform (Malone et al, 
1993). This presented the company with a serious problem -  it had no club 
with which to beat down the desperate farmers (Toole, 1972), Faced with a 
choice between outspoken Democrat Burton K. Wheeler, who was supported 
by the Non-Partisan League, and moderate Republican Joseph Dixon, who 
supported tax reform, the company chose to turn its press against Wheeler in 
the 1920 gubernatorial election (Toole, 1972). Dixon won and pressed for tax 
reform (Toole, 1972; Malone et al, 1993). The company lobbyists, often also 
legislators, went to work against reform:
Lobbying in the Montana legislature was part art, part cold cash, part 
rubber-hose bludgeoning, and part cajoling, all of which was mixed in a 
perpetual stag drinking room, prohibition not withstanding. The 
Company ran the only legislative information agency that existed, a 
service rendered gratis to all senators and representatives...They also 
provided, gratis, a bill-writing service... (Toole, 1972:259)
The company buried Dixon's tax reform bills in committee, introduced 
extraneous, harmless (to the company) bills, guaranteed to inflame voters' 
passions and set to work on Company-owned editorial pages, debating, in 
length and passionately, the fate of their manufactured bills (Toole, 1972).
The end result was that the public was completely unaware of economic 
matters (Toole, 1972). Dixon's reforms failed; the session adjourned (Toole, 
1972).
In what had become its standard operating procedure to indicate
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displeasure, the company shut down operations for nine months (Toole, 
1972). Although copper stocks were high and copper prices low, the company 
gave no explanation. "It is probably that most Montanans got the message," 
Toole notes (1972:265). The unemployed in Butte understood all too well 
what the company’s message meant. Closures and strikes meant struggles to 
meet basic needs and, inevitably, falling behind in the daily business of living:
When there were strikes, we would just about starve... What we used 
to do was charge the groceries. The grocers would come to your house 
and take your order and then deliver it the next day. They were 
independent grocers. They would carry you for maybe five or six 
months, for the duration of the strike. It was such a hardship to pay 
that off. It would be maybe a year or two years to get back on their feet. 
(Looking Back on the Hill: 57-58)
Again, the company did not shut down its press during the closure (Toole, 
1972). The invective continued. Dixon took his case to the people, but could 
not match the audience of company-owned papers (Toole, 1972). His tax 
reform attempt of 1923 also failed (Toole, 1972; Malone et al, 1993). In 1924, 
although Dixon lost his bid for re-election, his tax reform initiative passed 
and, through the next several years increased the state tax base by an 
additional $300,000 to $400,000 annually (Toole, 1972). Additional taxes 
notwithstanding, the Anaconda Company grew, becoming an international 
enterprise, and incurring heavy debt in the process (Malone et al, 1993). In 
1922, the company, already the world's greatest producer of brass, a copper 
alloy, became the world wide leader in copper fabrication with the acquisition 
of the American Brass Company (Malone et al, 1993). Confronted with high
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labor and operating costs in Butte, the company sought new cheaper sources 
of copper and found it in the Guggenheim family-owned mines in Chile's 
Andes Mountains. In 1923, Anaconda paid $77 million for the Chilean 
mines, which included the vast open pit mine at Chuquicamata (Malone et 
al, 1993).
"The Richest Hill on Earth" became a minor player overnight, a province 
in Anaconda's copper empire. "The company was able to create a 
transnational community of labor while residents were tied to a more 
circumscribed sense of place (Finn, 1995:128)." In 1928, the company expanded 
further, buying W.A. Clark’s remaining properties (Malone et al, 1993). In 
1929, it acquired the Green Cananea Copper Company in northern Mexico 
and created another fabricating subsidiary, the Anaconda Wire and Cable 
Company, with plants at Great Falls and outside Montana (Malone et al,
1993).
Until the late 1920s, the Company press attacked the Company's enemies. 
However, in the early 1930s, the Company press changed tactics: instead of 
directing vitriol at its enemies, it ignored them. Space on the news and 
editorial pages was now filled with problems far from Montana, a technique 
called "Afghanistaning " by journalists (Malone et al, 1993). The journalistic 
"talent departed with invective (Toole, 1972:273)." No ever knew what 
precipitated the decision to change tactics (Toole, 1972). Nor did anyone 
know, at any given time, how many papers the company owned or controlled 
(Toole, 1972).
Some tried to find out. Shocked at the state of the press in Montana, in 
1919 Upton Sinclair reported that the company owned all but two of the daily 
papers in the state (Toole, 1972). In 1931, a writer for The Nation admitted
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there was no way to obtain accurate ownership figures, but felt the Company's 
influence on the entire press of the state was "pervasive and corrupting. 
(Toole, 1972:274). ” In 1947, John Gunther wrote, "Anaconda, a company aptly 
named certainly has a constrictorlike grip on much that goes on, and 
Montana is the nearest to a colony’ of any American state, Delaware alone 
possibly excepted (1947:155)." The company's control of the state press "is 
unique in America (Gunther, 1947:171). " In the early 1950s, a T im e  magazine 
reporter sent to do an "in-depth" study of this "unique captivity," wired his 
editors he could not do the story because it was like trying to "get in a solid 
blow in a battle against feathers (Toole, 1972:275)." In 1952, an amazed Denver 
Post reporter found enough information to write a series in which he referred 
to Montana as "the last outpost in America of feudal journalism" and 
charged that not only did the papers not report the news, but "indulged in 
Afghanistanism." (Toole, 1972:275) Anaconda’s control of the press was also 
criticized by the New Republic and the London Economist (Toole, 1972). 
Montanans complained, calling the company papers "monuments of 
indifference" and "a dedication to the status quo." (Toole, 1972:275)
The Great Depression altered the company-fostered status quo. Because 
the Montana economy still relied heavily upon copper mining, when the 
Great Depression devastated the copper industry, the state's mining towns 
suffered greatly. A Consumer's Council survey of 1934 found that five of 
every six children in Butte were not sufficiently nourished (Malone et al, 
1993). A commerce department survey of the same year, found that 64 
percent of Butte's homes needed repair, nearly 20 percent had no indoor 
toilets, and almost 30 percent had neither baths nor showers (Malone et al, 
1993). Butte struggled with poverty until, gradually, the mines began to
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produce again. John T. Shea, president of the ARCO Retirees Club, was a 
child in Butte during the 1934 strike and the depression.
I went through the 1934 strike here. It was horrible, but my dad and the 
miners got fresh air. He worked for the WPA, two weeks on and two 
weeks off. We got WPA clothes. Everybody looked alike in those days. 
We got our meat at city hall in Walkerville. Got beans and canned 
stuff at Veterans' HaU. We'd go down with the little red wagon (Shea, 
10/24/95).
Under Roosevelt's New Deal, encouraged by legislation supportive of 
unionism, labor movements regained strength across the nation. The 
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, which succeeded 
the Western Federation of Miners, led a campaign to waken the Butte Miners 
Union from its torpor and, within weeks, had 4,500 new members (Malone et 
al, 1993). On May 8, 1934, over 6,500 Mine Mill and Crafts union members 
walked off the job. Company guards and labor organizers faced off again 
(Malone et al, 1993). Four months later, in a major victory, the union won 
both recognition of the union and a closed shop, two things that Anaconda 
had denied for 20 years (Malone et al, 1993). Union members also won wage 
increases and a 40-hour work week. Equally important, faced with the 
community unease at the possibility of Anaconda's abandonment, they 
forged an agreement which allowed union workers to maintain the mines 
during future strikes. This agreement allayed union fears of impending 
closure of Butte's operations and afforded the company protection from 
financial losses that might result from equipment damage (Finn, 1995).
Butte’s post-depression prosperity was immediately visible to visitors:
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When the mine wheels are turning and copper is selling high, Butte 
goes in for luxuries. A casual visitor is always surprised at the high 
percentage of bright, large, new-model automobiles driven by the 
miners. When the shutdown comes, as it always does, the finance 
companies get them back as they have before...Five out of ten women 
wear fur coats.
They might be dyed rabbit, but they are fur, and if prosperity perches 
on the Hill for two or three years in a row the coats will be 
predominantly mink (Writers’ Program, 1943:26).
The community had internalized the concept of mining it and getting 
out. It had adjusted to the boom and bust. The cars and furs represented 
symbolic benefits, a "cultural wage," that allowed the workers to identify with 
the interests of management while stiU occupying a working class position to 
power (Ewen, 1988). These trappings of power, available to some of the 
working class some of the time, fostered further divisions among people who 
might have otherwise identified with each other (Ewen, 1988). These 
divisions became a factor in the 1970s after labor had sacrificed its social 
agenda for pay raises, cost-of-living adjustments and protection for workers 
with highest seniority (Bluestone and Bluestone, 1992).
Even in prosperity, life in Butte was not easy, John T. Shea says:
The mines were such a hard life. My generation grew up during the 
Depression. We were raised in tough neighborhoods where you had to 
take care of yourself. The one thing my father preached was 'Get that 
education.' We had two choices: get an education and get a job 
downtown; or go partners with dad in the mines. Dad said if 1 did that 
he'd break my neck.
But I was a craftsman, a rope man, and World War II changed 
things, changed our ways of looking at things. We weren't going to 
take any grief. W ere equal, if not more, because I gave my all. After 
World War II you don’t hold down the masses anymore. You saw the 
whole world. I was in three countries, saw 33 of the 48 states and I was 
only a kid. Your whole attitude changes. I was taught I’m just as good 
as the rest of the guys (Shea, 10/24/95).
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Big cars and furs were the norm in Butte during the increased demand for 
copper in World War II. But, again, the end of the war produced another 
upheaval in Butte's labor force. Once more, Butte was the scene of violence 
during the 1946 strike when bands of men, women, and children sacked the 
homes of non-union scabs (Finn, 1995). Cutbacks cost jobs and nationally a 
growing anti-communist sentiment gained momentum (Malone et al, 1993). 
The Congress of Industrial Organizations expelled the Mine, Mill and Smelter 
Workers Union in 1950, after determining Communists had gained influence 
over the union’s leadership (Malone et al, 1993). Mineworkers, the majority 
of whom were not communists, but were loyal to the union of their fathers, 
were not inclined to join the union to which the CIO had given jurisdiction 
(Malone et al, 1993). It took 17 years for the CIO and the United Steelworkers 
of America to convince the Butte union to join the steelworkers (Malone et 
al, 1993). After World War 11, mining unions saw steady declines in 
membership and strikes became a permanent part of the landscape in Butte 
(Malone et al, 1993). However, the ever-present concern that Anaconda 
would close its Butte operations was reduced when the company announced 
the "Greater Butte Project," a cave-block mining plan that indicated the 
company's commitment to Butte (Malone et al, 1993).
In 1951, the union was again on strike, part of an industry-wide action 
against the mining giants during the Korean War. From Aug. 27 to Nov. 14, 
the Montana Standard reported the course of the strike: President Harry S. 
Truman's invocation of the Taft-Hartley Act emergency provisions; his 
injunction against the 40,000 men still on strike nationally; the court-issued 
injunction ordering the workers back on the job; the return of the Montana 
workers on Sept. 7; and the contract, retroactive to June, that was signed on
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Nov. 14, giving workers raises from 64 cents to $2.96 a day.
Also in 1951, the question of how many newspapers the Anaconda 
Company controlled was finally answered when The Fairmount Company, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Anaconda Company, applied to the Federal 
Communications Commission to purchase a radio station in Great FaUs. To 
meet with FCC regulations, the company divulged it:
...owned all the stock of the Post Publishing Company (Butte Daily Post, 
evening); Standard Publishing Company (Montana Standard, Butte, 
morning, and Sentinel, evening); 72.49 percent of the Montana Record 
Publishing Company (Helena, Independent Record, evening); 33.3 
percent of the Western Montana Publishing Company (Western News, 
weekly, Libby); and 90 percent of the Mineral Publishing Co. (weekly, 
Superior)...total circulation of Company newspapers, 89,934; total 
circulation of all independent papers in the state, 69,552. (Toole,
1972:277)
Only one daily newspaper in the state — the Great Falls Tribune — was 
not owned by the company (Toole, 1972). The other independent papers were 
weeklies with small circulation, which only added to the authority of 
Anaconda's papers. The captivity theorists were correct — for all intents and 
purposes. Anaconda controlled the state's press, doled out information as it 
saw fit (Toole, 1972).
Sometimes the company's carefully gathered information failed it.
Within three years of its onset, the cave-block plan proved too costly, and the 
company undertook open-pit mining, a method which had been avoided 
previously because it meant "blasting away large parts of the city (Malone et 
al, 1993:324)." Faced with profit losses. Anaconda exercised its right of 
eminent domain and undertook open pit mining, creating the Berkeley Pit in 
1954 (Marcossen). The city which had been born as a result of mining was
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now, quite literally, going to be eaten up by it. Local officials, fearful of their 
workers' positions in a global economy and of the loss of corporate revenues 
needed to sustain the community, were already overcommitted to 
maintaining mining operations. There was no going back. Then, an omen 
perhaps -  the earthquake of 1959.
For 25 years, the Pit gobbled up neighborhoods, forcing thousands to accept 
whatever the company offered for their property, and relocate to the Flat, 
south of town. Some did not wait for the company as the following Montana  
Standard stories indicate: 17 fires in vacant or abandoned houses and other 
buildings in Big Butte-Center ville-Walker ville area between May 1 and Dec.
1, 1962; J.C. Penney and 10 other businesses destroyed in a $3 million fire of 
unknown origin in December 1972; three uptown shops and the Copper City 
Chevrolet storage facilities were destroyed in a fire in December 1974; and 
another unsolved arson in August 1978 prompted the fire chief to direct his 
staff to enforce fire and building codes more strictly. Insurance policies paid 
more than the company, so businesses, fearful of the loss they would suffer at 
the company’s hands, opted for larger insurance payments instead, one 
resident explained.
The Berkeley Pit reshaped the landscape both above and below ground. 
Above ground, the pit devoured communities, including the long-established 
neighborhoods of Meaderville and McQueen. Exiled, the former residents of 
the Hill created new neighborhoods on the level ground of the Flat, which 
was formerly claimed by the city's cemeteries. Less and less time seemed to 
come between troubling announcements. Rumors. Rumblings. Events.
Loss.
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Community officials sought federal funds to cope with the changes and 
preserve the city's historic place. After being denied federal Model Cities 
funding in 1967, the city was successful in 1968 (Montana Standard). But that 
good news was undercut by a 1970 company pamphlet which reported that Pit 
operations were far from profitable. Although more than 275,000 tons of ore 
and waste were removed each day from the open pit operations, this was low- 
grade ore. As a result, five tons of material had to be removed to recover only 
10 to 12 pounds of copper ore. This meant to recover approximately $5 worth 
of copper, after processing, the company had to blast, load, and transport more 
than 10,000 pounds of ore and waste and the pit (Anaconda Mining Company, 
1970).
New arenas of contested terrain surfaced. The question of where to 
relocate the Butte uptown business district, which lay in the path of the 
expanding Pit, became a hotly disputed subject in 1970. Uptown merchants 
organized to fight for their right to stay on the Hill (Montana Standard). The 
question became more urgent when Woolworth's moved off the Hill, the 
Finlen Hotel suffered a partial collapse, and the old Metals Bank was sold 
(Montana Standard). Two years later, planning studies had made it painfully 
clear that Butte must move from the Hill (Montana Standard). The company, 
which had refrained from comment throughout the debate, broke its silence 
at the end of 1972 when it announced it would mine the Hill and 
recommended a move southward as being in the city's best interest (Montana 
Standard). However, the company did not suggest a timetable for the move; 
nor did it commit itself to funding the move (Montana Standard).
Faced with the voracious appetite of the pit, residents sought to preserve
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the only natural land that remained -  the Columbia Gardens. This was the 
locus of community contact with the natural world as play, celebration, and 
ritual. Butte's perennial escape from drudgery in the harsh bowels of the 
earth, from slag-heaped and mine-dumped playgrounds, from dust and dirt 
ground into clothes and bodies. Alarmed by the company's planned 
construction of the East Continental Pit, the community sought corporate 
assurances that the gardens would be spared. On November 12, 1973, 
Columbia Gardens burned to the ground, the result of a fire of mysterious 
origin (Montana Standard). Although suspicions related to the convenient 
timing of the fire still rumble under the surface in Butte, no "fingerprints" 
were found at the blackened scene that once was the source of community 
pride.
Mary Kay Craig, who was living out of state when the fire occurred, 
remembers her shock at the loss of Columbia Gardens:
When I was still here they started doing open pit mining. The Pit grew 
and grew. My friends — a lot of my friends lived out where the Pit is 
now, in Meaderville and McQueen. I went to Columbia Gardens. That 
disappeared. 1 just couldn't believe the people in Butte would let that 
happen. But I talked to someone recently who said he favored it for 
jobs, so the mining would go on for years( Craig, 7/30/95).
Also, in 1973, predicting that more employment would result, the 
company began to dig in the Continental-East Pit, just east of the expanding 
Berkeley Pit (Montana Standard). That same year, the company paid $800,000 
to acquire the Holy Saviour Church and other property in the path of the 
Berkeley Pit's expansion (Montana Standard). On June 30, 1974, parishioners 
celebrated the final Mass in the 72-year-old Holy Saviour Church in
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McQueen. The parish school was later used as a mining research building, 
the rectory was moved to be used as the Holy Spirit rectory, and the church 
itself was buried with rock from the Berkeley Pit (Montana Standard).
Faith in local officials was likely eroded when former Butte Mayor Tom 
Powers, who had brought the Model Cities program to Butte, was charged 
with bribery, offering false evidence, and preparing false evidence in a state 
workmen's compensation scandal at the close of 1974 (Montana Standard).
The Pit continued to grow. The company opened the Kelley mine; closed 
the remaining underground mines (Malone et al, 1993). The company 
opened the East Continental Pit. The layoffs continued. The strikes 
accelerated in frequency and in length- 1954,1959-60, 1962, and 1967-68, the 
longest in the state's history (Malone et al, 1993).
Steadily, the expensive underground mines closed down, and the 
hardrock miners and smeltermen became a vanishing breed. Open-pit 
mining is highly automated and requires far fewer employees than 
underground mining does. Butte, once the economic and political 
center of the state, saw its population and political power crumble away 
(Malone et al, 1993:325).
Newspaper headlines proclaimed the erosion of the tax base and 
devaluation of property. The loss of revenue threatened a loss of community 
services and local government jobs. The sense of family tradition and 
continuity that had always provided comfort through the tough times was 
ripped apart as the grief-struck community watched their younger people 
leave Butte in search of that now-elusive corporate-produced commodity, a 
job. From 1980 to 1988, Butte’s population dropped from 50,600 to 43,200 
(Malone et al, 1993). The older people who stayed in Butte wondered how
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they would survive economically. Worried that the devastated community 
would see an increase in family violence, county Domestic Violence Program 
employees geared up for an increased demand for their services (Maney, 
2/21/95). Marilyn Maney, who served as director of the county Domestic 
Violence Program, says:
We had anticipated we would see an increase in violence against 
women; in fact, it stayed pretty level. We did, however, experience an 
increase in the suicide rate among men...This is not to say the shelter 
did not have heavy usage. We saw family breakdown but as far as I 
know there has not really been a detailed study (Maney, 2/21/95).
Because suicide is not considered a crime, the state is unable to break out 
figures of suicides during that period which would make it difficult, but, 
given the possibility of local records, not impossible to tally the human costs 
of the shutdowns. There were fleeting moments of hope. Many hoped the 
1971 Chilean government nationalization of Anaconda’s Chilean mines 
(Malone et al, 1993) would restore Butte to its former privileged position in 
the company's hierarchy. The company was forced to rely more heavily on 
mines in Montana, Arizona, and Nevada but, because of its untenable 
financial situation, continued to cut back in Montana (Malone et al, 1993). In 
the mid-1970s, the company cut more, eliminating 700 to 1,000 jobs in Butte 
and Anaconda; in February 1975, the company announced 1,500 more layoffs 
(Malone et al, 1993).
A further glimmer of hope followed the 1976 announcement that the 
federal Department of Labor was investigating to see whether 1,000 workers 
laid off by the Anaconda Company would be eligible for trade adjustment
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assistance under the federal Trade Act of 1974 which allowed workers who 
believe they are, or will be, unemployed as a result of increased imports, to 
petition the secretary of labor for assistance (Montana Standard). But the good 
news was always followed by the bad.
Also, in 1976, as a result of disagreement about where to relocate the 
business district, the city council rejected the Anaconda Company's offer of 
$13 million in cash and in-kind contributions to fund the move (Montana 
Standard). As the dispute about relocation continued, the company's poor 
financial condition was taking its toll on the community: the county's taxable 
valuation dropped 26 percent because the company showed no profit in 1975 
and was assessed no net proceeds tax in 1976. County officials warned the 
layoffs and decreased services would likely result from the loss of tax revenue 
(Montana Standard). The following year, the Anaconda Company appealed 
its tax bill in the middle of the fiscal year, jeopardizing some $1.4 million of 
county tax revenue (Montana Standard).
In 1977, in reply to residents who continued to fight to save the uptown 
area, once the scene of bustling commercial activity, the company discouraged 
a search for investors to revitalize the area:
Anaconda says the uptown has millions of tons of low grade copper and 
it might want to mine it but is not sure when. The community will 
have to wait until the company decides whether it can afford to mine 
the uptown. The Berkeley Pit won't be mined out for 20 years and a 
dome-shaped deposit beneath the pit must be mined before the uptown. 
Mining the dome will take 20 to 25 years, the company says. Anaconda 
discouraged renovation saying it could not afford to buy the uptown if it 
were redeveloped (Montana Standard,!fH1978).
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In 1977, the Atlantic Richfield Corporation's (ARCO) purchase of the 
company brought some desperately needed tax dollars to Butte's sagging 
economy {Montana Standard). However, competition from South American 
and African copper mines, and the development of satellite communications 
systems and fiber optics which reduced the demand for copper, forced ARCO 
to continue the already established pattern of layoffs (Malone et al, 1993). As 
the layoffs and uncertainty continued, in 1982, the community drew on its 
real natural resource — its people — forming the Butte Community Union, 
"an organization of people in Butte who lack economic and political power 
and who organize, educate, and empower people to identify and satisfy their 
needs through altering power relationships to change an unfair system and 
give the poor a voice; and to assist all people who are able to seek and find 
suitable employment (BCU fact sheet, 1989). "
Employment was desperately needed: a 1985 BCU survey of 171 
households in Central Butte found that 70 percent were below the low- 
moderate income level and and 61 percent were below the low income level. 
By 1989, the group, which had roughly 200 paid members and a mailing list of 
500, had been involved in three law suits fighting to retain the General 
Assistance Program for unemployed people; a fourth law suit forced the state 
to retain optional Medicaid Services of eyeglasses, hearing aids, and dentures. 
BCU research and action forced the state to end the "archaic and 
dehumanizing practice of allowing low-income people to see only one doctor 
and one dentist (BCU fact sheet, 1989). " The group's General Assistance 
victory was subsequently undercut by an opposition who changed the state 
constitution so that the indigent, elderly, and disabled were no longer
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guaranteed assistance (O’Sullivan, 3/23/96). "So that sort of backfired," Sister 
Kathleen O'Sullivan, one of the board members of the group, says.
On the local level, the group forced the school board to reinstate the 
Elementary Hot Lunch Program, organized to get one more pharmacy to fill 
prescriptions for people receiving General Relief and Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children, conducted a comprehensive study of the lowest income 
neighborhood in town and made suggestions to improve it, and organized a 
tenant group in a subsidized housing complex. The group also was 
responsible for the park at the Emma Mine Site (BCU fact sheet, 1989), saved 
the Fox Hotel, and came a few votes short of increasing the state's minimum 
wage (O'Sullivan, 3/23/96). O'Sullivan, a Roman Catholic nun who was 
working in Butte, found herself drafted as a board member and "had to learn 
a new vocabulaiy. Through it all I discovered what the Gospel was about. " 
(O'Sullivan, 3/23/96)
It was a powerful group. Bob McCarthy [the first director] knew what 
he was doing. He was a person with a passion for justice, he 
instinctively knew, smelled, injustice. We got a [Roman Catholic] 
Campaign for Human Development grants, plus Presbyterian and 
other church grants. We were always fundraising and grant writing. 
Bob had to go on welfare for a while because we were out of money 
(O'Sullivan, 3/23/96).
The group worked for "jobs and justice " and was not afraid to confront 
directly when it was necessary. "BCU was looked upon as a sort of threat to 
the status quo," O’Sullivan (3/23/96) says. By picketing the state secretary of 
labor's office in Helena the group got the secretary to correct the
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unemployment figures he had been using. "Unemployment in Butte was 17 
percent, not 7 percent. He was using incorrect figures and wasn't portraying 
the correct situation (O’Sullivan, 3/23/96)." When the governor visited 
Butte during the fight to retain General Assistance, the group erected a 
cardboard house on a vacant lot to illustrate the plight of the poor 
(O'Sullivan, 3/23/96). In the late 1980s, the group found itself struggling with 
internal divisions and hired a mediator.
My interpretation was that some people seemed to resent anyone who 
was not low income on the board. Our mediator was a volunteer who 
did well, but it didn 't work out. A year later the National Campaign 
for Human Development started to fund — money to hire a mediator 
— for these situations but ours came a year too soon. We got word we 
were going to be voted off the board so we resigned. They tried to 
continue but they couldn't keep it going, they couldn’t get funding 
(O’Sullivan, 3/23/96).
The group left a legacy that includes Montana Family Shares, a state-run 
charity that exists on donations from workers' paychecks, much like United 
Fund, and, as important, a continuing tradition of a community that helps 
itself.
However, the community had to rely on state assistance when, in 1978, 
environmental concerns surfaced in the form of radon gas. Environmental 
science researchers found high levels of radiation in slag produced by the 
Stauffer Chemical plant west of Butte. The slag had been used by Montana 
Concrete industries during the 1950s for housing, school, hospital and 
commercial construction in southwest Montana. The company's sales 
records were turned over to the state and a $78,000 study was launched to
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determine if radon gas emitted from the cement building blocks pose a health 
hazard. Throughout 1979, the state investigated, eliminating both building 
blocks and paving as a source of radon contamination, and turning to possible 
radiation emissions from fractures and fissures in the ground into certain 
homes as an explanation. The federal Housing and Urban Development 
agency mandated radon testing on homes in Butte and Anaconda before 
approval for federal mortgage loans (Montana Standard).
As the community fought to save the uptown area, workers protested the 
loss of their jobs. In 1980, a picketer during the Anaconda Smelter closure 
carried a sign that read, "We need JOBS, not just clean air," (Montana 
Standard) a testament to corporate ability to equate job loss with 
environmental regulation rather than corporate practices in the arena of 
global capitalism (Edelstein, 1988). In 1981 the feared shutdowns began when 
ARCO closed the Kelley shaft (Montana Standard). The following year, the 
corporation closed the Berkeley Pit operations (Montana Standard). Workers 
and county officials struggled with the loss of the personal and community 
finances. Butte-Silver Bow Chief Executive Don Peoples estimated that the 
1,000 jobs that remained in the Berkeley Pit sustained 2,700 other jobs in Butte 
(Montana Standard).
In 1983, ARCO suspended mining operations in Butte, laying off the 
remaining 700 employees and shutting off the pum ps which allowed metals- 
contaminated water to flow into the Pit (Malone et al, 1993). The shutoff of 
the pumps took the community by surprise. Local officials were presented 
with a done deal, former state Representative Fritz Daily says:
People ask why the people from Butte didn't stop this. At midnight
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April 24, 1982 ARCO shut the pum ps off and at noon the next day 
ARCO told the people of Butte they'd put the pum ps off. The area was 
already flooded. (12/8/95)
In another of the ironies that constitute Butte’s history, ARCO shut off the 
pumps on Earth Day (CTEC and Women's Voices for the Earth, 1996). As the 
Berkeley Pit began to fill, the company gave assurances that the influx of 
water would drive oxygen out of the mine workings under the Hill, thus 
preserving timbers and preventing collapse {Montana Standard). It also 
announced that its newly-installed system of wells in  the Summit Valley, 
near the Flat, would detect any encroachment of minewater into the Summit 
Aquifer {Montana Standard). However, the state Bureau of Mines was 
concerned because the company did not announce plans to monitor either 
surface water or the effect of increased volume flowing into Silver Bow Creek 
and waterways downstream {Montana Standard). The bureau also questioned 
if the estimated 70 degree average temperature of the water in the Pit would 
create a steam and fog problem during cold weather inversions {Montana 
Standard). There was no American precedent for a mine flooding of this scale 
— even company officials admitted no one knew what would happen 
{Montana Standard).
Suddenly there were new fears: groundwater flow as a source of poisons. 
Corporate maneuvers continued. The company refused to abrogate its claim 
to the Hill {Montana Standard). If copper prices increased, the mines and pit 
could be dewatered, company officials announced, therefore, this was not a 
permanent closure so the company would not pay supplemental benefits to 
laid-off workers {Montana Standard).
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More contested ground emerged. In 1982, Butte’s religious community 
and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Western Montana sent representatives to 
an ARCO shareholders meeting in Los Angeles to ask for fair treatment for 
those laid off, and for corporate reinvestment of tax write-offs in Butte 
{Montana Standard). A  group of laid-off workers formed the Coalition for 
Benefits to put pressure on ARCO (Montana Standard). ARCO resisted. Relief 
came in the form of a Congressional extension of supplementary 
compensation — 7,953 claims for the additional four weeks of 
unemployment benefits were filed in Montana alone (Montana Standard).
Another flicker of hope accompanied the announcement of Montana 
millionaire Dennis Washington's purchase of the old Anaconda/ARCO 
properties in Butte. Union members, delighted with the prospect of mining 
jobs, offered to help Washington, the new owner of the East Continental Pit, 
set up the operation; however, once established no union jobs were 
forthcoming (Finn, 1995).
Undaunted, the community threw its support behind the dream of a Butte 
man who had promised if his wife survived her bout with cancer he would 
build a statue in honor of mothers. In the early 1980s, unemployed workers 
began to plan the project that would become Our Lady of the Rockies, a 90- 
foot steel statue. Against all odds they raised the funds to construct the statue 
and convinced the department of defense to loan them a helicopter to place 
the statue on the East Ridge, overlooking the Berkeley Pit. To an outsider, the 
combination of the welcoming open arms of the Lady of the Rockies and the 
vast toxic léïke in the Berkeley Pit is sufficiently incongruous to be startling. 
Mark Reavis, the county's historic preservation officer, was a newcomer in
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Butte when the mines were closed and the community embraced the Lady of 
the Rockies project. At first, he was baffled, but quickly understood why this 
90-foot statue was so important:
This town had a real problem in 1982. It had to make a decision 
whether to live or die. There was a certain community 
acknowledgement that we had to build something new. The statue 
was a sign we were still here, despite all those community 
controversies. It was a real critical time when they put the statue up 
there. I saw a real change. The town stopped and took a look at 
themselves (Reavis, 11/29/95).
John T. Shea, who is still involved with the operation of Our Lady of the 
Rockies Chapel on Main Street, believes the faith of Butte, as expressed in the 
construction of statue, gave the embattled community new life:
I worked on Our Lady of the Rockies. I got laid off in 1983 and went to 
work [on her] in 1984. When they shut the mines down, they said they 
were going to bury us in that hole down there, the Pit. It was tough.
My sister died in 1983, the 14th of July, right after I got laid off on June 
30th.
We started the statue in 1984. In January 1986 Washington opened 
up and brought 300 jobs. We’ve been going up ever since." (10/24/95)
Yet, more new dangers came to light — arsenic, the evacuation of 14 
families at Milltown, cadmium, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
investigations, lead (Montana Standard). The 1986 designation of the city as a 
federal Superfund site initiated what has become almost 10 years of 
environmental cleanup. Newspaper stories featured new jargon — 
remediation, operable units, maximum contaminant levels, risk assessment, 
feasibility studies. News stories about dioxins, volatile organic chemicals, 
Walkerville, Silver Bow Creek, the Colorado Tailings, and the Montana Pole
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Plant (Montana Standard). Also in 1986 Chief Executive Don Peoples 
announced the county anticipated losing over $800,000 in taxes because of 
reduced valuations (Montana Standard). The reductions were attributable to 
the already delinquent Port of Montana, Anaconda Minerals now owned by 
ARCO, and the Safeway Warehouse during fiscal 1986-87, as well as a loss in 
federal revenue sharing and aid to the transit system, and in rent from the 
local welfare office which was moving from the courthouse to new quarters 
(Montana Standard). Given the financial straits of individuals and businesses 
in the county, tax increases to compensate for the $800,00 loss were not 
realistic. Peoples said. Instead, the county would have to drop 33 employees 
from the payroll and decrease the valuation of county property to "an 
unheard of low" of roughly $39 million in 1986, compared to $60 million in 
1975. (Montana Standard,! I SI SS).
In 1990 the EPA became a permanent presence when it opened a Butte 
office in the basement of the copper-doored large gray stone courthouse on 
the corner of Granite and Montana Streets.
This was Butte. A century of different lessons learned in diverse ways. 
Boom and bust. Illness. Consolidations and divisions. Death. Differences. 
Trust and betrayal. Giving and taking. Burrowing and tunnelling. StiUed 
voices. Silences. Rumors. Rumblings. Whispers. Eruptions. Disruptions. 
Profits. Loss. Changing contours. Grief. New boundaries. Shifting 
landscapes.
These are the forces that have shaped both Butte's physical landscape, and 
the way in which Butte's people perceive that landscape. It is a remarkably 
single-minded history of frontier capitalism and industrialization that 
extracted every resource practicably possible from both the land and Butte’s
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people. It is a history of exploitation on a vast scale. It is a history of a place 
that had just one reason for being, a place that has assumed the status of 
myth.
This is nothing like you’d expect. The downtown's located on a hill.
This is totally based on mining. It has no reason for existing other than 
that. Most towns are based on things like transportation or water. But 
everything about Butte is about mining— when they first laid out the 
original town site, it was related to the mines in operation at the time.
You can trace the development to geology, in the frames that follow 
the arc of the Hill, the track that connects all the headframes. This 
wasn't a Western mining camp; there was too much of it [the ore]
(Reavis, 11/29/95).
Too much ore — enough to inspire wars between powerful men, to 
attract tens of thousands of immigrants in search of jobs, to spawn a vast 
international corporation with investors willing to do whatever was 
necessary to maintain profits, to hold local, state, and federal governments 
hostage to their share of taxes on those profits, to create a place in which every 
resource — human and nonhuman — was put to one end only.
That ore had existed for millennia until humans discovered a use for it 
and developed technology to extract it. It should be kept in mind, when 
considering Butte, that the presence of the ore was not responsible for human 
events any more than the chemicals that leach out of the gutted earth are 
responsible for the toxins in Butte today. The responsibility resides in human 
assumptions embedded in political and economic institutions, embedded so 
deeply they remain unquestioned; yet they are the background which shape 
our relationships w ith each other and with the land. It is those assumptions 
that drive the federal law mandating the cleanup of Butte.
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1 Cleveland's actions were the result of an ongoing battle between the 
proponents of the gold versus the silver standard. The battle was heated 
because bankers and wealthy elites who had purchased government bonds 
during the Civil War insisted upon being paid back in gold. Had silver 
prevailed, they would have had less return on their money. The conflict would 
come to a head in the election of 1896. For a full discussion, see Goodwyn in 
works cited.
2 Because this thesis is primarily concerned with the socially constructed 
landscapes of Butte, it does not include references to Emmon's consideration of 
the immigrant Irish national identity and related issues. Thus, this thesis 
gives a necessarily oversimplified recapitulation of Emmon's work.
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SUPERFUND AND RISK 
The Limited Landscape of Technocratic Discourse
The practical quest for a defining "hard science" has mythic qualities and 
may be as elusive as the proverbial Holy Grail. The EPA has scientists; ARCO 
has scientists. Claims of "scientific objectivity" notwithstanding, EPA 
scientists, state of Montana scientists, and ARCO scientists find little common 
ground. The terrain of "hard science" has become as contested as any other 
ground in Butte. This thesis argues that the contest has resulted from the 
allocation of what are unresolved and properly political issues to the realm of 
science.
In 1986, as Butte struggled with the loss of mining -  a loss of both 
economic base and cultural identity -  the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) designated the city a federal Superfund site, precipitating an influx of 
technocrats to work in both public and private spheres. Decisions made about 
the health threat posed by contamination and the extent to which it should be 
cleaned up will be made by these technocrats; another instance of outsiders 
making important decisions for Butte natives. The technocratic approach to 
Butte is not founded in the social realities of the place. Rather, federal agency 
employees and contracted private sector technocrats are mandated to solve a 
presumably technical problem with the presumption that their skills can be 
applied universally (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Merchant, 1992). Their goal is 
to measure the contaminants, assess the degree of risk posed by the 
contaminants, and clean them up to agreed-upon standards, and to develop 
new technologies to accomplish their tasks (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Yeager, 
1991). This is in no way an assertion that scientific research is unimportant.
115
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The research conducted in Butte is important, both for Butte and other 
contaminated communities. What is at issue here is not the scientific 
research itself, rather it is the institutionalized assumptions that determine 
the definition of the problem and scope of the work (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; 
Merchant, 1992; Kroll-Smith and Couch 1991a; Brown, 1991). This section 
will argue that the technocratic approach reduces a complicated social 
problem to a narrow technical problem, and, in so doing, both camouflages 
and reinforces the reality of inequalities of wealth and power that produced 
the contamination (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Peet and Watts, 1993; Boyce, 
1994; Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994). Equally 
important, the technocratic approach leaves little latitude for public 
participation (Greider, 1992; Schrader-Frechette, 1991).
With the exception of Sara Weinstock, the EPA public affairs officer in 
Butte, most of the researchers working in Butte are not natives. This fact is 
important because the newcomers’ lack of connection to the place and its 
history allows them to maintain their belief in the possibility of objective, 
rational solutions to a seemingly technical problem (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; 
Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Greider, 1992). Once social issues, such as the 
impact of the toxic label which stigmatizes the community, have been 
factored out, it is possible for researchers to look at the contamination in 
Butte as another resource to be mined, as a marketable commodity to be sold 
as an employment and research material. Technologies developed in Butte 
can be marketed as solutions for future contamination; and, if an officially 
sanctioned cleanup can be accomplished in Butte, the status quo can be 
maintained — hierarchical relationships, patterns of discourse, issues of who 
pays and who benefits will remain unaddressed. Given the federal
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government's interest in maintaining economic stability, which is 
dependent upon tax revenues from continued corporate profits (Schnaiberg 
and Could, 1994), it is not surprising to find that federal grant money has been 
the impetus for much of the high-tech research in Butte. For example, $3.5 
million to develop a Waste Technology Center in Butte (Montana Standard, 
10/4/1990); $12 million to develop a process using magnets to upgrade the 
value of coal which would be very useful to ARCO Coal, the company's 
division in charge of the Superfund projects (Montana Standard, 10/17/1990); 
and $15 million for the Berkeley Pit to become a test site both to develop 
cleanup methods and to extract the metals, that remain in the contaminated 
water (Montana Standard, 12/12/1990). Within context of Butte's history, this 
is simply another variation of "mine it and get out. "
However, there are local economic benefits to this new form of mining, 
Butte-Silver Bow Chief Executive Jack Lynch points out:
..in a sense they have been a real economic boon to Butte-Silver Bow.
The number of engineering, environmental, investigation, and 
remedial firms currently doing business here as well as the major 
expenditures on cleanup have proved in many ways beneficial. (Lynch, 
10/25/95)
The marketing of contaminants has been a boon for the local economy.
The community desperately needed the additional revenues which the 
newcomers brought in the form of property taxes from businesses and 
individuals who relocated in Butte an d /o r purchases from local businesses. 
"Superfund's doing some good, " John T. Shea, president of the ARCO 
Retirees Club, (10/24/95) says wryly. "It's making millionaires out of two
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contractors." The 1990 federal census indicates that Butte-Silver Bow has a 
higher percentage of managerial an d /o r professional specialty occupations 
and of technical, sales and administrative support personnel, 25.6 percent and 
32.1 compared to the state which has percentages of 24.1 and 28.2, 
respectively. Unfortunately, the the economic benefits of remediation have 
not filtered dow n through the workforce, Butte-Silver Bow’s unemployment 
rate is still higher than that of the rest of the state. The 1990 census figures 
post Butte’s unemployment at 9.7 percent, compared to a state rate of 7 
percent (1994 County and City Data Book).
The cleanup of Butte is governed by CERCLA, the federal Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 
commonly called Super fund. The 1980 Superfund law and the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 regulate cleanup of 
abandoned hazardous waste^ sites, such as those created by mining operations 
in the Butte/Anaconda area. The law is premised on the notion that the 
polluter pays." In the language of the law, potentially responsible parties 
(PRPs), identified by the federal ERA, pay for cleanup, often called 
remediation, of those sites that have been placed on the National Priorities 
List. The Atlantic Richfield Corporation (ARCO), which bought the 
Anaconda Company in 1977, has been identified as the prim ary potentially 
responsible party for Butte’s Superfund sites, which are part of a group 
referred to as the Clark Fork Complex.
The EPA took control of the contaminated lands surrounding Anaconda 
and Butte in December 1982 and November 1986, respectively. Cleanup of 
Butte and the other sites which are part of the Clark Fork Complex is a 
massive undertaking. (See map of the Upper Clark Fork Superfund Sites in
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the appendix.) For the 100 years of mining operations in Butte, 
mining-related toxins ran down Butte Hill into Silver Bow Creek which 
recovers discharge from storm drains, secondary effluent from the Butte 
Sewer Treatment Plant, and groundwater underlying the Butte Reduction 
Works (USEPA, 1991). After leaving Butte, the creek flows southward where 
it empties into the Upper Clark Fork River near Warm Springs Pond 
(USEPA, 1991).
The 340-mile Clark Fork River is one of the Mountain West's largest 
rivers, with nearly twice as much water as the Missouri and Yellowstone 
(Nielson, 1988). The Clark Fork watershed drains a 22,000-square mile basin 
which receives about 33 million acre-feet of water a year from rain and snow 
— roughly half of this yearly precipitation reaches the Clark Fork River; the 
rest evaporates or is used by plants (Sarver, 1994). Because groundwater 
movement through the Clark Fork aquifers is rapid — ranging from three to 
60 feet per day — the water is very clean (Sarver, 1994). However, that rapid 
movement means that contaminants would spread quickly (Sarver, 1994).
The entire Superfund site includes 20 square miles of tailings ponds, 175 
square miles of soil and plants contaminated by air pollution from smelting 
operations, 30 square miles of unusable agricultural land, and 150 miles of 
contaminated river bed along Silver Bow Creek in Butte and the Clark Fork 
River (Montana Standard, 10/15/1991). The geographic area involved is so 
massive — running from Butte southwest to the Milltown Dam, just 26 
miles east of Missoula (see Milltown Reservoir map in the appendix) — that 
EPA scientists have divided it up into operable units, based on geography and 
type of contamination (USEPA, 1991). A list of toxins identified at the
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operable units referred to in this section and related illnesses is included in 
the appendix.
The operable units in Butte contain a toxic brew of mining-related 
contaminants — including lead, copper, arsenic, cadmium, and mercury, and 
dioxin and PCP (pentachlorophenol). (See map of Silver Bow Creek/ Butte 
Area Superfund Site Operable Unit Locations.) To simplify the discussion, 
this analysis will refer only to the following operable units in Butte: the Mine 
Flooding Operable Unit, known as the Berkeley Pit; Lower Area One; Area 
One; and the Montana Pole Treatment site.
THE BERKELEY PIT
The Mine Flooding Operable Unit, also known as the Berkeley Pit, covers 
14 square miles, and includes the flooded underground mine workings 
connected to the Pit, the Yankee Doodles Tailing Pond, The Montana 
Resources' Concentrator, Silver Bow Creek, and the alluvial groundwater 
that is connected to the Berkeley Pit and Silver Bow Creek (USEPA,
12/15/1993). The site is bounded to the south by Silver Bow Creek, to the east 
by the East Ridge / Continental Divide, to the north by the northernmost 
limits of the Yankee Doodle Tailings Pond, and to the west by Missoula 
Gulch. Part of the site is within Butte city limits, the remainder is owned by 
Montana Resources and other mining companies.
The bottom of the Pit was located at elevation 4,265 feet when mining 
operations ceased in 1982 (USEPA, 12/15/93). The total depth of the Pit, 
which covers 800 acres, from the bottom to the highest point on the rim is 
1,780 feet. The chemicals evaluated for public health risk include: arsenic,
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cadmium, lead, sulfate, and zinc. Those evaluated for ecological risk include: 
aluminum, arsenic, cadmium, copper, iron, lead, zinc, along with hardness 
and pH. Because scientists have concluded that residents will not be exposed 
to the chemicals unless the water level in the Pit rises to meet the 
groundwater level in the East Camp bedrock aquifer, their estimates of public 
health risk are based on possible scenarios that would result in contaminated 
water meeting uncontaminated water, or from an overflow of the Pit water. 
Using a conservative methodology, more protective of hum an health, 
scientists assumed that any exposure to the carcinogenic chemicals in this 
operable unit is to be avoided. Threshold limits, below which exposure is 
considered safe, are not used for carcinogenic chemicals. For chemicals 
classified non-carcinogenic, threshold values were used to determine 
exposure risks.
LOWER AREA ONE 
The Lower Area One (LAO) is the downgradient portion of a larger unit, 
called Area One (USEPA, 1991). LAO, which contains the Priority Soils 
Operable Unit, is located west of Montana Street to below the Colorado 
Tailings. (See Lower Area One map in the appendix.) The two primary 
sources of contamination in this unit are the Colorado Tailings and the Butte 
Reduction Works. Chemicals identified as posing risk to human health are 
arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, and zinc; chemicals of ecological concern 
are aluminum, arsenic, cadmium, chromium, copper, iron, lead, silver, and 
zinc USEPA, 1991). This contamination, primarily the result of milling 
activities over the years, has polluted Silver Bow Creek. Further degradation
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has resulted from direct discharges of effluent from the Butte Sewage 
Treatment Plant into Silver Bow Creek.
Unlike the Pit, there is public access to this contamination. Children have 
been observed playing in the section of Silver Bow Creek adjacent to the test 
site, and dirt bikes have been observed in the Colorado Tailings area (USEPA, 
1991), Within the LAO there is the Butte Sewer Treatment Plant, a livestock 
stockyard, a city-council asphalt plant, a privately-owned asphalt plant, 
autobody shop, restaurant and bowling alley. Currently there are currently no 
homes within the area (USEPA, 1991).
The contaminants are spread by groundwater and surface water flow. The 
groundwater occurs in fractures and weathered zones but the system is not 
clearly understood, partially because of the network of underground mine 
shafts and tunnels in the bedrock under Butte Hill (USEPA, 1991). Surface 
water flow is the result of Silver Bow Creek, Blacktail Creek, the Metro Storm 
Drain, Missoula Gulch, and Butte Sewer Treatment Plant discharge (USEPA, 
1991). Carcinogenic chemicals on the site include arsenic, lead (which was not 
considered carcinogenic by the scientists working on the Mine Flooding Unit), 
and possibly zinc, which has been associated with the growth of tumors 
(ESEPA, 1991). The greatest incidence of increased cancer as a result of the site 
is associated with drinking contaminated groundwater, which is unlikely 
because this is not a residential area (USEPA, 1991).
AREA ONE
The risk assessment for Area One has not been completed, however the 
agency has completed a Draft Baseline Risk Assessment for Lead in the 
Priority Soils Operable Unit, which includes Butte and Walkerville, and
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extends from the Missoula Gulch eastward to the Berkeley Pit, and from 
Walkerville south to Timber Butte (USEPA, 2/11/94). The EPA will 
address risks related to the cadmium and arsenic associated with this area 
when the risk assessment is prepared. The lead is the result of waste rock 
dumps, railroad beds constructed of mine waste, mine tailings, smelter 
emissions, and other mine-related materials associated with mining, milling, 
and smelting, which ceased in Butte in 1910 (USEPA, 2/11/94). The 
contamination has been spread by surface runoff and wind. Samples of soil 
were taken from 142 residential yards of a total 1,604 in this area. Fifty percent 
of the residences sampled had environmental lead concentrations that result 
in a predicted 95 percent probability a child would have a blood lead level 
higher than the EPA limit of 10 micrograms per liter of blood. Children up to 
age six and pregnant women are most at risk from lead (USEPA, 2/11/94).
MONTANA POLE TREATMENT SITE 
The 45-acre Montana Pole Treatment site off West Greenwood Street (see 
Montana Pole map in the appendix), which operated from 1947 until the 
company went out of business in 1984, is contaminated with carcinogens, 
including pentachlorophenol (PCP), dioxins, furans, and over 100 types of 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, the result of chemicals used to treat timber 
products (USEPA, 2/10/93). The Colorado Smelter wastes and mill tailings 
are located to the west and north of the site, a federal government manganese 
stockpile site and the former Butte Reduction Works are directly north, and 
the Montana Power Company's transformer maintenance and storage facility 
lie to the west and north. A partially reclaimed gravel pit, as well as a blasting 
and explosive powder company lie to the south of the site, which is
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surrounded on the east and west sides by active railroad lines. There are 
residences within a quarter mile of the site to the east and west.
Although the greatest chance of exposure on the site comes from PCP, the 
most potent of the cancer-causing chemicals are the dioxins/furans (USEPA, 
2/10/93). Other chemicals on the site include arsenic, chromium, copper, 
lead, other phenols, and zinc. Contaminants are spread by surface water and 
wind. The risk associated with ingestion of groundwater from this site was 
estimated as one additional cancer in each 1,000 people. Groundwater is 
currently being treated to remove the contaminants.
All but a very small part of Butte is a Superfund site. Throughout the city 
there are three million cubic yards of old mine tailings, rocks, dirt, arsenic, 
lead, cadmium, and mercury. From 1988 to the summer of 1995, the EPA 
removed half a million cubic yards of mine waste (Weinstock, 7/31/95). On 
the EPA's 1,200-site National Priority List, which ranks sites by the threat they 
produce to human health and the environment, the Silver Bow Creek Unit, 
which includes the Berkeley Pit, is number 20, and the Montana Pole Plant, 
number 735 (J. Robbins, 1994).
Yet few people in Butte participate in the cleanup process. And the few 
who do — primarily members of the Citizens Technical Environmental 
Committee (CTEC), which was established under an EPA technical assistance 
grant (TAG) to translate Superfund jargon into recognizable English — cry 
foul. CTEC's composition has changed over the years, moving from a 
membership of scientists and mining engineers from Montana Tech, the 
former school of mines, in Butte, to lay membership, more of the type 
associated with toxic waste grassroots groups (Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992;
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KroU-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Wolensky, 1991; Edelstein, 1988). Another 
group, the Clark Fork-Pend Oreille Coalition, based in Missoula, is primarily 
concerned with the cleanup of the Clark Fork River. The Coalition is a well- 
established, hierarchically organized group, more representative, in structure, 
of the large national environmental groups, e.g., the National Audubon 
Society and the Sierra Club.
Activist complaints, such as those raised by CTEC members, are not 
unusual. From its passage. Superfund has been the subject of controversy 
(Barnett, 1991; Yeager, 1991). Public fears of hazardous waste reached a fever 
point in the 1970s with the publicity related to the Love Canal site in New 
York (Greider, 1992; Brown, 1991; Hird, 1994; Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991). 
And, according to a recent national survey, those fears have not subsided -  66 
percent of respondents rated the danger posed by hazardous waste sites as 
"very serious." (Hird, 1994:5) Concerns about health impacts of hazardous 
waste were ranked higher than the dangers related to nuclear accident 
radiation, pesticide residues, contaminated tap water, ozone layer destruction, 
acid rain, and every other environmental problem listed (Hird, 1994).
Given the political economy of Superfund, and other major 
environmental laws, conflicts between government agencies and the public 
are inevitable, some analysts say (Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Schnaiberg and 
Gould, 1994). Economist Harold C. Barnett maintains that Superfund has 
failed because of conflict over who will pay the toxic debt and the impact of 
this conflict on interdependent funding and enforcement decisions at federal, 
state, and local levels.^ Because of the unresolved conflict between the 
corporate search for profit and public fear of the health impacts of 
contamination, interested parties often find it necessary to become involved
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in the cleanup process (Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992). However, 
the notion of public participation as negotiation put forward by the EPA is 
misleading (Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1998; Barnett, 1994). Implicit in the 
concept of negotiation is an equal distribution of power for all parties. But hat 
is not the case because corporations have far more resources at their disposal 
than do the citizens affected by corporate practices (Barnett, 1994; Greider,
1992; Brown, 1991; Yeager, 1991). The effectiveness of the law is undercut 
because the information-driven decision-making system favors those parties 
with the financial and technical resources necessary to negotiate with agency 
officials (Yeager, 1991; Greider, 1992). The end result is the 
disenfranchisement of the concerned public which does not have the 
resources to participate in the multitude of decisions (Yeager, 1991; Greider, 
1991).
In Butte, this unresolved conflict between private and public, manifests 
itself in relationships between federal, state, and local governments, ARCO, 
and CTEC members who believe they have been shut out of the debate. It 
surfaces in disputes over "who pays," "how clean is clean," definitions of risk, 
and permanent versus imperm anent solutions.
WHO PAYS?
The question of who will foot the bill for the reclamation of Butte and 
related Superfund sites has become an ongoing battle. The Superfund, 
financed by taxes on petroleum products and 42 chemicals, is used to clean up 
land-based sites which pose an immediate threat to hum an health and the 
environment prior to recovery from responsible parties, and to clean up sites 
for which there is no responsible party (Barnett, 1994). Because on some sites
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it is impossible to identify the responsible party, as in cases of "midnight 
dumping," or, in other cases, businesses that may be responsible have gone 
out of business years prior to discovery of the contamination, the 
government must absorb the cost in some cases. However, when the 
responsible parties can be identified, under federal and state Superfund laws, 
those responsible parties must pay.
The EPA and state of Montana maintain that ARCO is the primary 
responsible party. In June 1989 the EPA filed a lawsuit against ARCO to 
recover $6.3 million which the agency had spent to replace the arsenic- 
contaminated water supply at Milltown, relocate 37 families at Mill Creek, 
and demolish the Anaconda smelter, each part of the Clark Fork Complex 
{Montana Standard, 2/11/1990). The state of Montana has filed a $635.4 
million lawsuit against ARCO for damage to natural resources (Montana 
NRDP, 1994). The state charges that 11,590 acre-feet of groundwater has been 
injured by mining operations in Butte and that contaminated surface water in 
Silver Bow Creek is a source of hazardous substances to injured aquatic 
resources downstream (Montana NRPD, 1994). Additional damage has been 
done to surface water, soil, river sediments, plants, fish, wetlands and wildlife 
(Montana NRDP, 1994). The dollar amount of the lawsuit is based both on 
the cost of restoring the environment to a less-than-pristine state and on the 
lost revenues for tourism and recreation that resulted from the pollution.
The state gave ARCO a break when waived its right to collect even more 
money for damages done to tourism and recreation before the passage of the 
federal Superfund law {Montana Standard, 5/12/1995).
But ARCO claims it has no responsibility for cleaning the Clark Fork River 
of the pollution that resulted from mining and smelting operations in the
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Butte area. In February of 1990, the company asked the court to dismiss the 
EPA’s $6.3 million lawsuit (Montflufl Standard, 2/11/1990). In 1991, the 
company listed 46 defenses against liability, including: laying the 
responsibility on the state because the state "aided and abetted miners for 
more than a century;" claiming that state and federal Superfund lawâ are 
unconstitutional; claiming that the pollution occurred before the Superfund 
law was created; maintaining that because much of the waste was created 
during wartime, when the miners worked extra shifts to meet Department of 
Defense demands for copper, the contamination is the result of "acts of war; 
and charging the company cannot be held liable for damages caused by an 
"act of God {Montana Standard, 7/28/91)." ARCO’s defenses provoked angry 
responses from environmentalists. Peter Nielson of the Clark Fork Coalition, 
said it is absurd for ARCO to blame the state for environmental damages at a 
time when the mining companies, and especially the Anaconda Company, 
controlled the state {Montana Standard,7/2811991).
Also in 1991, ARCO sued Montana millionaire Dennis Washington for 
"untold millions," claiming that Washington, the owner of Montana 
Resources which is still mining in the East Continental Pit, and associated 
mining companies were sending contaminated water into the Berkeley Pit 
{Montana Standard, 10/8/1991). ARCO claimed that 1.5 million gallons of 
heavily polluted water from MRI's operation has flowed southward into the 
Berkeley Pit from the Yankee Doodle tailings ponds and precipitation, and 
that MRI’S polluted water constitutes the primary contaminant of the Pit 
{Montana Standard, 10/8/1991). Two and a half weeks later, ARCO officials 
announced they would file a lawsuit against two EPA contractors because 
their "shoddy work" caused 68 percent of the contamination at the site
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(Montana Standard, 10/25/1991). Sandy Stash of ARCO said the contractors 
allowed treated water to return to groundwater with a PCP level of 1600 parts 
per million even though the EPA drinking water standard for PCP is one part 
per billion (Montana Standard, 10/25/1991). ARCO also charged that EPA 
personnel were aware of the spread of contamination and did nothing about 
it (Montana Standard, 10/25/1991).
These conflicts are inevitable because the imposition of cleanup costs on 
the corporations deemed responsible for the contamination presents a real 
threat to the "treadmill of production." (Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994) ARCO's 
lawsuits and maneuverings are not the result of evil intent; they are directly 
related to the economic need to grow to survive, to produce profits to 
compete with other firms for limited expansionary funds (Schnaiberg and 
Gould, 1994). Millions of dollars spent on cleanup pose a real threat to the 
profit side of corporate balance sheets. So corporations will go to great lengths 
to minimize threats. Those lengths include the creation of the Coalition on 
Superfund, which was created within months of Congressional passage of the 
reauthorization amendments in 1986, to analyze how Superfund worked and 
recommend improvements (Greider, 1992). Founding members included 
General Electric, Dow, Du Pont, Union Carbide, Monsanto, and AT&T, 
"leading culprits in hazardous waste pollution," and major insurance 
companies which stood to lose huge amounts if their clients were held 
responsible for the pollution they created (Greider, 1992:42).
The Superfund Coalition's initial budget, $840,000 a year, was targeted at 
obtaining high-quality "research " and building alliances in " industry. 
Congress, the adnunistration, academia, think tanks, the media and select 
environmentalists (Greider, 1992:43)."" The goal was to convince the public
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the law was not working when it came up for reauthorization in five or six 
years. This type of lobbying is part and parcel of what former journalist 
William Greider calls "mock democracy," a governmental form that appears 
to involve "free and open political discourse, but is shaped and guided at a 
very deep level by the resources of the most powerful interests (1992:43)."
Other participants come and go in the political debate, especially 
unorganized citizens, who cannot always afford continuous 
involvement. They are temporarily aroused by an issue, see reforms 
enacted and then move on to other concerns. But the corporations do 
not go away from the legislative debate, even in the off-seasons....[they] 
are always at the table, fighting over the same points year after year. It 
is their business to be there. Their profits depend on the outcomes 
(Greider, 1992:43).
Corporate tactics in the late twenty-first century are far more sophisticated 
than those of the Anaconda Company earlier in the century. ARCO, along 
with the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the American Petroleum 
Institute, and the insurance industry have proposed settlement strategies 
designed to increase the portion of cleanup financed by the Superfund, place 
greater emphasis on negotiation, and provide more incentives for voluntary 
settlement -  all in the name of efficiency (Barnett, 1994). The corporations 
argue that these reforms will reduce astronomical amounts currently paid to 
attorneys and, therefore, free up more of the money now spent on legal costs 
for cleanup (Barnett, 1994). It may be possible that less money would be spent 
for lawyers but that is no guarantee that the money saved would go into 
cleanup rather than corporate profits.
ARCO has suggested that problems created before final Resource
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Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous waste regulations were 
adopted in 1981 be subject to less stringent liability than those created after 
adoption (Barnett, 1994). Prior to passage of RCRA there were few regulations 
and no requirements that companies document hazardous materials, so, if 
ARCO’s suggestion were adopted, it would be far more difficult for 
government to prove corporate responsibility, virtually guaranteeing that 
taxpayers fund more cleanups (Barnett, 1994). Because the company 
discontinued mining operations in Butte in 1982, it is conceivable that 
ARCO's recommended "improvement" of Superfund would virtually let 
ARCO off the hook for cleanup, leaving taxpayers to pay billions of dollars.
ARCO also is seeking the abandonment of joint and several liability as a 
basis for negotiation, claiming it discourages settlements and voluntary 
cleanups and forces companies willing to settle with the EPA to then sue 
other responsible parties to recover costs (Barnett, 1994). Because in many 
cases, there are numerous responsible parties for a particular Superfund site, 
the joint and several liability provision is designed to allow the EPA to target 
the most financially stable PRP to recover remediation costs (Barnett, 1994; 
Greider, 1992). That PRP must then initiate legal action to recover costs from 
other responsible parties (Barnett, 1994; Greider, 1992). ARCO argues, since 
the courts generally use the same evidence as the EPA, the agency could 
reduce transaction costs if it apportioned liability prior to negotiation and 
agreed to fund any balance that may have resulted from the activities of 
insolvent or unidentified parties (Barnett, 1994). EPA officials disagree 
(Barnett, 1994).
Because the agency must stay within the budget voted by Congress and 
cleanup costs are so high, EPA officials argue that cleanup of sites would be
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dragged out interminably if the agency had to resort to the courts to 
determine the proportions paid by each PRP before beginning remediation 
(Barnett, 1994). Because many sites consist of a mixture of toxins, 
determining the fair share is complicated, difficult, and time-consuming, so 
ARCO's "improvement" would "effectively remove such action from 
Superfund," EPA officials argue (Barnett, 1994:298). State officials support the 
EPA. In May 1995, Montana's chief deputy attorney general told a Senate 
subcommittee that Congress would "be ripping off Montanans" by 
eliminating retroactive liability and limiting damage awards to the cost of 
cleanup (Montana Standard, 5/12/1995:1).
The financial stakes are high in Butte. Cleanup costs may run as high as 
$1 billion; the EPA has already spent over $30 million (J. Robbins, 1994)) and 
much of the planned cleanup has not yet begun. Cancers and other serious 
illness may also be an issue (Craig, 7/30/95; Waring, 10/21/95; Brown, 1991; 
Greider, 1992; Cortese, 1993; Lappé, 1991). Those human costs are far more 
expensive than currency. And they are far harder to prove (Greider, 1992; 
Cortese, 1993; Lappé, 1991; Bates, 1994). The thesis will consider these costs in 
a later section.
While ARCO lobbies to effectively eliminate its liability, it runs full-page 
advertisements and expensive television ads in Montana, touting its 
responsible behavior as a "partner " in cleanup, subtly making the point that 
others should also pay (ARCO, 1995). At the end of its 76-page full-color 
Environmental Action Plan for the Clark Fork River, ARCO (1993) addressed 
its complaints with Superfund more directly, criticizing liability provisions 
under the law. In the company’s discussion of the Montana Pole site, it says:
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As the result of a $25 lease by the Anaconda Company several decades 
ago, ARCO today is implicated in a Superfund site it never operated 
and faces liability that could run to tens of millions of dollars. Years 
have now passed since the initial contamination was discovered.
Studies have been done, costs are mounting, but final action is still to 
be decided.
Few can blame American business and industry for protesting the 
current scheme. Lawyers and consultants profit as private and public 
resources dwindle. Ultimately the environment loses as substantive 
cleanup is delayed... (ARCO, 1993:Issues section).
ARCO’s publication and its circulars, distributed in the local newspaper, 
do not mention the profits the company is still reaping from the other 
properties it obtained from the Anaconda Company (Craig, 7/30/95). Nor do 
they mention that ARCO itself is responsible for many of the delays, e.g. legal 
actions (Montana Standard), it cites as reason to amend the federal Superfund 
law. However, ARCO’s advertising which has been decried by local activists, 
has been effective in some quarters. The appeal to simple equity strikes a 
responsive chord in many. The notion of fair play is deeply imbued in most 
Americans, especially when contradictory data have been omitted. John T. 
Shea, president of the ARCO retirees club in Butte, says he and the majority of 
retirees question the distribution of cleanup costs. The Anaconda Company, 
not ARCO, was responsible for the pollution (Shea, 10/24/95).
...I grant ARCO has a lot of money. A lot of guys in the club have the 
same opinion. When you pay $58 million to clean up...The biggest and 
foremost worry here is about pensions. I’d hate to lose my ARCO 
pension. This club (totally funded by ARCO) has been a great thing to 
these guys and their wives who never went out so much as in the last 
10years. (Shea, 10/24/95)
In this case, ARCO's oversimplified equity argument has connected with a 
very valid concern -  loss of pensions which have been earned, and are
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needed to survive and maintain a social life. ARCO is using a common 
corporate ploy. In 1987, corporations spent $941 million in print and 
broadcasting media on image advertising -  designed to promote images and 
political attitudes rather than to sell products (Greider, 1992). Although 
market research shows the ads do not diminish the public distrust of business 
in general, it does reduce animosity toward the individual companies that 
advertise (Greider, 1992). So;
Americans are saturated in feel good' messages about the largest 
business corporations. Dow Chemical, notwithstanding its notorious 
reputation as a polluter, portrays itself as an old friend of nature. 
AT&T saves eagles. IBM teaches children in the ghetto... (Greider,
1992:339.
And ARCO, as it works in Washington D.C. to reduce its liability, touts 
itself as a responsible "partner" in cleanup, and producer of golf courses from 
toxic tracts (ARCO, 1993,1995). It is noteworthy that corporations who are 
supportive of the current Congressional bent to eliminate the social "safety 
nets" for the marginalized poor, are so insistent upon maintaining them for 
themselves -  the limited liability they espouse falls into a category of "safety 
net," protecting corporations and their insurance companies from the risks 
inherent in corporate expansion. While the discussion of how to overhaul 
Superfund during its upcoming reauthorization is debated, cleanup of Butte 
suffers delay after delay. Many of the delays to date have been related to the 
second problem identified by Barnett (1994): enforcement on the federal, 
state, and local level.
In Butte, the enforcement-related conflict revolves about EPA standards, 
which determine the maximum "safe" levels of exposure for toxins, and the
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process of risk assessment by which the EPA determines if a site should be 
listed on the National Priorities List (Barnett, 1994). The risk assessment is 
also part of the health assessment required in the 1986 reauthorization 
(Barnett, 1994). On a regular basis, corporations challenge the threshold 
levels, concentrations beyond which exposure is declared harmful, as 
overprotective (Greider, 1992), Victims of exposure and some medical 
professionals argue the EPA standards are not protective enough (Greider, 
1992; Brown, 1991; Schnaiberg, 1988). The question that is still unanswered is 
"how clean is clean."
In Butte, this unanswered question manifests itself in debates about 
cleanup standards, and in conflicts between federal, state, and local 
government agencies.
HOW CLEAN IS CLEAN?
The federal Superfund law is driven by a mandate to protect public health 
and the environment while complying with applicable or relevant and 
appropriate state regulations (Hird, 1994). But does protection mean no risk, 
no additional risk, or acceptable additional risk? In making its 
determinations about remediating a given site, the EPA must consider long­
term effectiveness, reduction of toxicity, mobility, or volume of contaminants 
through treatment, short-term effectiveness, implementability, and cost 
(Hird, 1994). Once this has been accomplished, the agency must consider 
"modifying criteria," state and community acceptance of a cleanup plan (Hird, 
1994:143).
Often these criteria conflict (Hird, 1994). To justify its decisions, the 
agency relies upon risk assessments, estimations of the probability of
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developing cancer or other health problems as the result of exposure to toxins 
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988). Much of the testing 
and risk assessment process is based on associations between exposure and 
disease — the stronger the association, the better the evidence for causality 
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Bates, 1994)). But factors, such as poor exposure 
measurements, variability in outcome, or the fact that some illnesses, such as 
asthma, are often the possible result of numerous sources, will weaken the 
association (Bates, 1994). Therefore, unless exposure and causality are well- 
characterized, a weak association should not be dismissed (Bates, 1994). 
Arguably, exposure and causality have not been well-characterized in Butte 
where, as will be discussed in a later section, health studies, other than for 
exposure to lead, have not been conducted and reporting of illness is 
incomplete.
During the risk assessment process, information available on dose and 
expected response from exposure to a specific chemical or metal, is expressed 
by standards which are the result of testing, done on animals and, less often, 
on people (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Lappé, 1991). In developing an 
assessment, chemicals and metals and the specific levels found of each are 
analyzed separately for each pathway of exposure that might exist, e.g., 
ingestion, dermal contact, inhalation (Bates, 1994; USEPA, 2/10/93, 2/15/93,
2/11/94). By comparisons of the established threshold limits for each 
chemical through each pathway to the actual amount of the chemical found 
at the site, risk assessors calculate mathematically the risk posed by each 
chemical (Bates, 1994; USEPA, 2/10/93, 2/15/93, 2/11/94). The risks are then 
added up  to determine if the site should be cleaned up (Bates, 1994; USEPA, 
2/10/93,2/15/93,2/11/94).
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These calculations are used to justify decisions for action or lack of it. But 
what do these elaborate calculations really tell anyone? Predictions are 
complicated by the long period of time it often takes cancer to develop to a 
stage at which it can be diagnosed, by the fact that some people do not develop 
cancer even after exposure to a carcinogenic, and by the mobility of people 
who may be living hundreds or thousands of miles away from where their 
cancers may have been initiated when the diagnosis is made (Lappé, 1991). 
There is a large, rapidly-growing body of literature on the subject of risk 
assessment (Lappé, 1991; Greider, 1992; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1983). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to recapitulate the 
arguments so the thesis will consider only those issues relevant to Butte.
Although scientists are careful to point out the limitations of risk 
assessment, those limitations -  and there are many -  are frequently ignored 
when the assessments are used to justify cleanup policy (Greider, 1992;
Brown, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Schrader-Frechette, 1991). The risk assessment 
process is predicated on the notion that defensible hard science will provide 
an objective value-free basis for decision (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Greider, 
1992; Edelstein, 1988). This is rarely the case (Schrader-Frechette, 1991;
Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988). The concept of risk is a social construct, which 
entails a consideration of the distribution of risks under discussion; this does 
not occur in the risk assessment process as currently structured (Schrader- 
Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983).
It is not possible to exclude normative decisions, entailing values, during the 
formulation of a scientific theory or explanation of causal connections 
because value judgments are made at every step along the way (Schrader- 
Frechette, 1991; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988), e.g. what to study, how to study
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it, what to exclude from the study, how to determine what constitutes 
evidence for the theory or for causality. The selection of options to reduce or 
eliminate risk also involve normative criteria (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; 
Greider, 1992).
The limitations in the risk assessment process are challenged on a regular 
basis by victims of exposure to contamination (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a, 
1991b; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1991; Brown, 1991; Schrader-Frechette, 1991). 
Sometimes the limitations are also challenged by corporations (Greider, 1992; 
Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Brown, 1991). For the past five years, ARCO has 
challenged both federal and state standards. In March, 1990, ARCO asked an 
appeals court to strike down the EPA standards for lead contamination of soil, 
calling the standards "arbitrary and capricious {Montana Standard, 3/6/90)." 
The standards, above which the presence of lead is dangerous, especially to 
children, were set by the federal Centers for Disease Control (Montana 
Standard,316190).
In August 1991, ARCO sought to define a number of conditions, "upsets," 
from which it would not be held liable for failure to meet water quality 
standards and any associated impact downstream on the Clcirk Fork River 
(Montana Standard, 8/11/1991). The "upsets" consisted of weather and 
seasonal conditions which are routine in southwest Montana, including high 
winds, high water flows in the spring, lack of biological activity in winter, 
increased biological activity in the summer, and "roll-over" of ponds in the 
spring and winter (Montana Standard, 8/11/1991). Clark Fork Coalition 
spokesmen charged the corporation with an attempt to avoid accountability 
for effects of normal and anticipated weather conditions (Montana Standard, 
8/11/1991).
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Also in August of 1991, ARCO announced it no longer planned to clean 
up residential yards in Butte to the 2,000 parts per million standard to which 
it had previously agreed {Montana Standard, 8/15/1991). ARCO spokesman 
Sandy Stash said the standard was too low to affect health and that the 
corporation was pushing the EPA to adopt a new lead standard of 2,500 to 
3,000 parts per million for residential yards {Montana Standard, 8/15/1991). 
The EPA had originally set the level at which ARCO had to clean up 
residential yards at 1,000 parts per million {Montana Standard,8l8l 1991). 
However, after the corporation challenged the standards in court, the agency 
and corporation negotiated the 2,000 parts per million standard {Montana 
Standard, 8/8/1991), EPA Assistant Director Don Pizzini said the EPA was 
considering amending the 2,000 ppm  level to 2,500 or 3,000 but had not 
reached a decision {Montana Standard, 8/8/1991). In November 1991, EPA 
Montana Director John Wardell warned Butte-Silver Bow officials that ARCO 
was becoming even more resistant to cleanup projects and creating further 
delays {Montana Standard, 11/21/1991). The Montana Department of Health 
and Environmental Science also challenged the EPA lead standards. The 
state’s standard of 1,000 part per million was more protective than that 
negotiated by ARCO and the EPA {Montana Standard,8/8/1991).
Hard science notwithstanding, there is ample room for disagreement 
among scientists; clearly there are limits to scientific rationality. Critics of risk 
assessment question scientific claims to rationality and objectivity, frequently 
focusing upon the reductionist and exclusionist nature of the risk assessment 
process (Greider, 1992; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Brown, 1991). Schrader- 
Frechette (1991:128-129) reports that "researchers have concluded risk experts 
typically overlook six common "pathways to disaster":
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1. Failure to consider the ways in which human error can cause 
technological systems to fail, as at Three Mile Island, or with the Geographic 
Information System which will be used to monitor future use of 
contaminated land in Butte;
2. Overconfidence in current scientific knowledge, even though such 
inadequate scientific knowledge caused such catastrophes as the 1976 collapse 
of the Teton Dam -  a complaint often voiced by critics of the plans to clean up 
the Berkeley Pit;
3. Failure to appreciate how technical systems as a whole function, which 
will likely be an issue when the institutional controls, which will be discussed 
in a later section, are implemented in Butte;
4. Failure to take into account chronic, cumulative effects, as in the case of 
acid rain, or the conglomerate of health risks in Butte;
5. Failure to anticipate inadequate human responses to safety measures, 
such as the failure of Chernobyl experts to evacuate immediately;
6. Failure to anticipate "common mode" failures simultaneously affecting 
systems designed to be independent. (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:128-129)
More problematic than what is included in a risk assessment is what is not 
(Lappé, 1991; Bates, 1994; Schrader-Frechette, 1991). For example, because 
synergistic effects, the possible interactions of chemicals that produce effects 
greater than the sum  of each individual chemical, are unknown, synergies 
are omitted. However, at every site in Butte, there are multiple metals and 
chemicals which may well create more, or less, of a risk together than can be 
calculated. Exposures are usually multiple and complex, former public health 
official Marc Lappé (1991) notes. In addition, chemical contaminants in 
drinking water can act in ways that occupational experience doesn't
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adequately anticipate (Lappé, 1991). By passing through the liver before 
entering the body generally, substances absorbed through the gastro-intestinal 
tract may be activated by the liver into more hazardous chemical byproducts 
(Lappé, 1991). This may well be the case with chemicals which are not 
considered carcinogens or toxins and, therefore, screened out of the 
assessment (Lappé,1991).
Further, the concept of thresholds may well be a "red herring" because it 
implies that below a certain exposure level there is no health risk (Lappé, 
1991). This may not be the case. Some toxic chemicals acquire different 
properties from one dose to another; low doses affect human systems also, 
especially in the development of organ systems of an embryo or fetus; and 
even "infinitesimal" doses "can in theory start a cascade of heritable changes 
in a single cell that lead to cancer (Lappé, 191:122)." Although EPA does not 
use thresholds for chemicals that have been classified as cancer-causing, it 
does use thresholds for chemicals which have not been classified as cancer- 
causing (USEPA, 1991,1992,2/10/93,12/15/93,2/11/94).
Testing to determine adverse affects is slow and costly. For that reason, 
little or nothing is known about health effects of many chemicals found at 
Superfund sites (Lappé, 1991). However, lack of knowledge is no guarantee 
that these chemicals do not pose health risks (Lappé, 1991). At the Montana 
Pole Treatment Plant site — just one of the many contaminated sites in Butte 
— toxicity values are unavailable for 11 of the chemicals found in 
groundwater and an additional 13 chemicals were omitted from the risk 
assessment because they were found at levels below established thresholds in 
the groundwater (USEPA, 2/10/93). Another 31 chemicals found in the
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groundwater were retained for consideration in the risk assessment (USEPA, 
2/10/93). Equally numerous lists of chemicals on the Montana Pole site were 
considered in analyses of surface water, soil and sediments (USEPA, 2/10/93). 
After screening out chemicals for which there are no toxicity values and 
which occurred in each medium below threshold level, the risk assessment 
identified 12 chemicals of concern for soil, 11 for surface water, and three for 
sediments (USEPA, 2/10/93). Much is not known about the chemicals at the 
site and, given the numbers of chemicals found, the possibilities for 
synergistic effects are great at the Montana Pole Plant site. Although PCPs, 
volatile organic chemicals, dioxins and furans have not been found at the 
other Superfund sites in Butte, there is still a possibility of synergistic effects 
between the metals which contaminate soil, air, and water.
Further, research into the historical development of workplace threshold 
limit values (TLVs), the standards beyond which people should not receive 
exposure, indicates a questionable level of corporate influence upon 
development of those standards (Castleman and Ziem, 1988). This is relevant 
because much of the data used in health and risk assessments has been 
developed from workplace information because it is so difficult to assess 
impacts outside of controlled situations (Castleman and Ziem, 1988; Lappé, 
1991). Researchers found they could not access unpublished corporate 
"documentation" for nearly one sixth of the "documented" workplace TLVs, 
thus precluding scientific scrutiny (Castleman and Ziem, 1988). Researchers 
expressed great concern that the TLV committee, responsible for setting 
standards, accepted uncritically industry "assertions based on scant 
unpublished data' (Castleman and Ziem, 1988:554)." Three of the 
contaminants — copper, manganese and compounds, and silver and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
compounds — found in Butte Superfund sites are on the researchers' list of 
TLVs for which unpublished corporate data was important (Castleman and 
Ziem, 1988). Government reliance on industry information to establish 
discharge limits and set standards is problematic, especially in light of the fact 
that:
Some 65,000 chemicals are manufactured in the United States every 
year, and for many there is little knowledge of their toxic effects, either 
alone, or in their myriad combinations (Yeager, 1991:219).
Beyond the possibly questionable practices entailed in setting threshold 
limits, there are other problems. Risk assessments consider only the risks 
related to the site under study — they screen out other risks that subject 
groups may be exposed to simultaneously, such as other Superfund operable 
units, landfills, and biological contaminants in drinking water. In addition to 
the Montana Pole site, Butte residents are exposed to other potential public 
health problems, including:
1. Other contaminated operable units (USEPA, 1991, 1992, 1992, 1994);
2. Possible contaminants from the former town landfill (Craig, 7/30/95). 
Although, in June 1995, CTEC filed a request under the Freedom of 
Information Act for information related to the type and extent of 
contamination associated with the former town landfill, no response has 
been forthcoming as of February 1996 (Craig, 7/30/95). However, landfill 
contamination commonly results in exposure to carcinogenic volatile organic 
chemicals, the result of the dum ping of solvents and other chemical cleaners 
(Lappé, 1991).
3. Air pollution. Butte is located in an area of the state that exceeds
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standards for particulates stipulated under the federal Clean Air Act. These 
particulates have been associated with respiratory problems (Bates, 1994).
4. Biological contaminants in the water supply. The city has been under a 
federal order to warn residents to boil water from the tap prior to drinking 
{Montana Standard).
5. Exposure to large amounts of chlorine used to minimize the biological 
contaminants in the water, which likely created the presence of carcinogenic 
trihalomethanes which were detected in excess of state standards in Butte 
water in 1993. Butte-Silver Bow water operations chief Mike Patterson said 
this was the first time the water supply had exceeded the state standard of 100 
parts per billion, and that trihalomethane was dangerous only in long-term 
exposure (Montana Standard, 1/ 6/1994). However, his information on the 
implications of exposure was faulty.
The two most common trihalomethanes are chloroform and bromoform 
(Lappé, 1991). Chloroform has been shown to produce liver cancer in all 
animal assays; bromoform, although less thoroughly tested, has "potent 
kidney and liver toxicity of its own (Lappé, 1991:220)." The National 
Academy of Sciences has estimated that at the 100 parts per billion standard, 
the cancer risk from chloroform (if it were the only chemical ingredient in 
the trihalomethanes) is one in 100,000 (Lappé, 1991). In 1981, case-control 
studies showed a clear relationship between exposure to chlorine-treated 
municipal water supplies and an increased incidence of bladder, rectal, and 
colon cancer, especially in municipalities that relied on surface or shallow 
aquifers (Lappé, 1991). Although not all epidemiological studies have found 
the same cancers, Kenneth Cantor of the National Cancer Institute believes 
"the chlorinated organic molecules that form in drinking water from
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chlorination coupled with those that are unintentionally added combine to 
create a carcinogenic risk (Lappé: 221)."
...in a penultimate study involving tens of thousands of people at risk 
from contaminated water systems. Cantor has shown a convincing 
dose-response relationship between the levels of halogenated 
contaminants (estimated from the amount of contaminated drinking 
water ingested) and the occurrence of bladder cancer.
What makes Cantor's findings all the more disturbing is that the 
communities he studied were all on drinking water that had been 
treated according to the rules,' that is, the water met federal drinking 
water standards (Lappé, 1991:221).
Equally disturbing, and unmentioned in the Montana Standard news story 
that alerted residents to problems with their drinking water, is the fact that 
trihalomethanes are often correlated with the presence of carcinogenic 
volatile organic chemicals, including 1,2-dichloroethane, trichloroethylene, 
and 1,1-dichloroethylene (Lappé, 1991) — chemicals often found at landfill 
sites in the United States and which could well be present at Butte's 
municipal landfill. These three chemicals have been associated with certain 
cancers of the digestive and urinary tracts. In Woburn, Massachusetts, the 
presence of trihalomethanes was the first indicator of the volatile organic 
chemicals that were associated with a cluster of childhood leukemia (Lappé, 
1991; Brown, 1991). Another study in New Jersey found females, probably 
because they were more likely to drink water at home during the day than 
males who worked outside the home, had higher leukemia risk in regions of 
the state where high levels of volatile organic chemicals were found (Lappé, 
1991).
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In addition to omission of other potential sources of public health risks, 
although the Butte risk assessments mention "sensitive populations," the 
calculations are done assuming a fairly uniform population. As was the case 
in the influenza epidemics, when Butte residents whose health was 
weakened as a result of the environment died in great numbers (Emmons, 
1990), the health effects of other sources and kinds of contamination in Butte 
may well affect how people will respond to the chemicals listed in the risk 
assessments (Lappé, 1991). Also, poor nutrition, which has historically been 
problematic in Butte because of poverty (Emmons, 1990), and a lack of 
medical care, which is often the case when people whose health insurance 
coverage was supplied by their jobs lose those jobs, create greater health 
vulnerabilities in people. Yet, such things are not factored into the 
assessments.
Given the unresolved conflict between economic structure and 
environmental protection, it is not likely that such real-world issues will ever 
be incorporated into the process, even in the very unlikely event that policy 
required such inclusion. The reason, again, is not evil intent, but rather the 
structure of bureaucracies. To endure over time, the bureaucracy must 
suppress rivalries, must collectivize decision making so no one person can be 
held accountable for any given decision (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983).
Consequently the strategy emerges of compromise, of not pressing 
problems to the point of defining a single overriding objective, and of 
creating a complex and obscure tradition in which each subunit can 
find its place. To keep the subunits from fearing for their sectional 
interests, the hierarchy avoids adopting a single overriding goal,
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983:91)
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Bureaucrats are apolitical, tend to construct "only closed static systems of 
thought",..and react to new law or policy changes "as if they were only a 
further elaboration of the original system (Douglas and Wildavksy, 1983:91)." 
Most alternatives most of the time are not considered as candidates for 
adoption. "Only a few ideas -  those best known and closest to existing 
programs -  are given attention (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983:91)." In other 
words, bureaucracies tend to appropriate reform efforts into their existing 
perceptions of reality, tend to interpret and administer law and regulations to 
uphold the status quo. For this reason, Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) report, 
hierarchical decision-making tends toward the remedial and serial, as the 
same problems are confronted again and again, confronted, in the case of 
Superfund, because the fundamental issues of who pays and how clean is 
clean have not been addressed (Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991). The result of this 
type of decision making is that the ability of the hierarchy to "control the 
future by planking down its procedures," assures that the hierarchically 
construed notion of "a rational order" will be fulfilled (Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1983:93-94). Above all, that "rational order" must include the 
continued existence of the bureaucracy (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983).
Once it is fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures 
which are the hardest to destroy. Bureaucracy is the means of carrying 
community action' over into rationally ordered societal action.' 
Therefore, as an instrument for 'societalizing' relations of power, 
bureaucracy has been and is a power instrument of the first order -  for 
the one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus (Weber, 1996: 119).
Protected by data and buffered by bureaucratic structure, technocratic
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agencies can successfully avoid consideration of social issues. This is essential 
to maintaining their control; if some suffer as a result, so be it (Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1983). The bureaucracy represents what Douglas and Wildavsky 
(1983) refer to as "the center," as opposed to "the border."
...It will also put the maintenance of the whole system above 
individual survival — this time the system is the bureaucratic 
organization. It frankly believes in sacrificing the few for the good of 
the whole. It is smug about its rigid procedures. It is too slow, too 
blind to new information. It will not believe in new dangers and will 
often be taken by surprise. It will accept large risks if they appear on a 
horizon beyond its institutional threshold of concern... (Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1983:101).
One of the hallmarks of a successful bureaucracy is that employees 
internalize the organization's values and goals (Weber, 1996). Internalization 
goes far deeper than parroting the company line. It means that the employee 
has adopted the organization's worldview as his own. To this end, the agents 
of socialization -  schools, in particular -  are oriented toward inculcating 
beliefs, values, self-concepts, types of solidarity and fragmentation, as well as 
modes of personal behavior and development, that will perpetuate, validate, 
and allow for the smooth operation of economic institutions and 
bureaucracies to maintain the status quo (Bowles and Gintis, 1976).
Obviously, there are bureaucrats and technocrats who care about people. 
However, trapped in the "iron cage" (Weber, 1996) of bureaucracy, they must 
express their concern in the manner of the bureaucracy, which is paternalistic, 
dispensed according to rules, and technical. It is paternalistic in the sense that 
it is expressed by the government agency's plan, a plan that is sufficient to 
ameliorate the problem as the agency defines it, but is not necessarily the
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problem that citizens define. It is bureaucratic in the sense that everything 
goes through agency channels and follows the agency timetable. Government 
agencies are organized as clearly segmented units, each with its own limited 
area of responsibility. It is not unusual for one department to be unaware of 
information another department has on the same site until, at a point in the 
process which is never entirely clear to an outsider, the different departments 
meet to share information. The end result is that anyone who seeks a full 
picture of the status of any project must try to piece together an overview on 
his or her own. Victims of contamination often feel a sense of urgency 
(Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991; Brown, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992). 
There is real need to know what they are facing and how it will be resolved. 
This urgency is not shared by bureaucracies whose timetable is generally 
defined by law -  usually in terms of years.
The caring is technical; that is the agency orientation and that is how it 
both defines and solves problem. Yet, that is often not what victims need:
The victims’ plight is further compounded by the fact that relief efforts 
aren’t humanistic, but are, instead, technical activities designed to 
eliminate the contaminant (Kroll-Smith & Couch, 1991a:62).
Government agencies, such as the EPA, differ from corporate 
bureaucracies in that government bureaucrats must deal with inputs from 
both corporations and the public (Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994; Schnaiberg and 
Gould, 1994). As noted previously, control often lies in the hands of those 
with the greatest inputs into the system. However, the nature of inputs is not 
stable over time. It can be argued that, throughout the 25 years of its 
existence, the EPA, caught in the middle of unresolved environmental
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conflicts, has had to heed corporate concerns and, in some cases, internalized 
those concerns into its operating procedure (Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994; 
Schnaiberg and Could, 1994). It can also be argued, to a lesser extent, the 
agency has, especially in the early years when environmental groups were 
vocal, tried to reflect the concerns of those groups also (Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 
1994; Schnaiberg and Could, 1994). This is the tension between the 
contradictory demands of maintaining the existing social order while, at the 
same time, maintaining the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of those 
governed (Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994; Schnaiberg and Could, 1994).
Further, the EPA is not monolithic. The agency has hired people like Sara 
Weinstock in Butte who is trying to educate the agency away from its 
technical stance toward a greater understanding of the communities the 
agency enters. As a public affairs officer, Weinstock has a very demanding 
job. It is she who must deal with every party involved in the cleanup. It is 
she who must explain agency decisions and, given the magnitude of the 
stakes, emotions often run high when cleanup is discussed. It's Weinstock, a 
small attractive down-to-earth blonde with a wide grin, who plays the point 
position in the EPA's Butte office. It's not unusual to find her explaining 
some facet of Superfund on the phone and signalling to someone else 
standing by her desk waiting for information, while, in the background, her 
computer, on which she's trying to complete an agency report, glows. It's also 
not unusual to find engineers going through reports and talking about the 
tables clustered in the center of the small room. Weinstock's domain is 
crowded and, often, hectic. This is no nine to five job; Weinstock also attends 
frequent night meetings. A Butte native herself, Weinstock is well-equipped 
to recognize there are emotional issues involved in the cleanup:
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When we (the EPA) came in in 1988 our first meeting was in 
Walkerville. We were closing Alice Baseball Field. People in their 80s 
said they played on that field — and so did I. I think it's the grieving 
cycle -  denial. You can't send in male engineers to deal w ith an 
emotional issue. The engineers say, Tm not a psychologist. That’s 
where we make our mistake. I've been at several conferences pushing 
the EPA on this. Explain to them [the people of Butte] that it's not their 
fault their kid was put in this situation and then they can go on.
(7/31/95)
Weinstock’s approach would go far to address the complaint that the 
nature of agency response is so often technical. (She raises issues that will be 
addressed in a later section.) Her knowledge of Butte is a real asset for the 
agency. However, given her limited terrain as an agency employee and the 
structural constraints and unresolved issues cited earlier in this section, 
Weinstock may well be fighting a losing battle with the agency. But, the battle 
she fights is important because it is vital that alternative perceptions of the 
agency role are brought consistently to the table.
In light of the fine line that the EPA must walk between environmental 
threats (posed by Superfund sites), economic concerns, and conflicting 
political pressures, it is not irrational that the agency has apparently set 
internal limits related to the scope of remediation it requires. The nine 
criteria in SARA to evaluate cleanup remedies are: compliance with 
standards under federal laws; reduction of toxicity, mobility, or volume; 
short-term effectiveness; long-term effectiveness and permanence; 
implementability; cost; community acceptance; state acceptance; and overall 
protection of hum an health and the environment (Hird, 1994). After passage 
of SARA, EPA headquarters "advised the regions to consider effectiveness, 
ease of implementation, and cost in selecting a remedy and to choose the 
remedy that provided the best balance among these factors (Barnett, 1994:
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240)." From this vague directive with the implication of cost-benefit analysis, 
the regional offices shifted to a greater awareness of cost, causing a firestorm 
of criticism (Barnett, 1994).
PERMANENT V. IMPERMANENT SOLUTIONS
A Hazardous Waste Treatment Council/environmental group report, 
after reviewing 75 of the agency's records of decisions (RODs), found, despite 
Congressional instructions to use permanent treatment remedies wherever 
and whenever possible, 68 percent of the remedies the agency selected in 1987 
failed to use any treatment on the contaminant (Barnett, 1994). Partial or 
ineffective treatment options were used in another 24 percent; in only eight 
percent of the 75 RODs was a permanent treatment used when possible 
(Barnett, 1994). The report also found the agency "ignored existing 
environmental standards, set cleanup goals unscientifically, exempted 
Superfund cleanups from the environmental regulations it imposed upon 
waste management facilities, and generally ignored the impact of Superfund 
sites on natural resources (Barnett, 1994:243)."
A follow-up study of the 150 RODs issued in 1988 found at 54 percent of 
sites cleanup standards had not been established for groundwater, surface 
water, or soil (Barnett, 1994). Also, at sites where standards were set, the 
agency relied on risk assessments instead of objective standards and criteria 
(Barnett, 1994). Further, the risk assessments "often contained suspect and 
unsubstantiated assumptions," e.g., people would stay away from 
contamination (Barnett, 1994:244). The follow-up report also found 
continued reliance on impermanent remedies, and indicated that, often, 
contaminated groundwater was written off rather than cleaned (Barnett,
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1994). When the agency addressed contamination, it often called for 
alternative water supplies, plugging wells or institutional controls to prevent 
use (Barnett: 244).
In Butte, CTEC members have consistently, and unsuccessfully, reminded 
the agency that its remedies should be permanent (Montana Standard). They 
argue that the agency's preference for impermanent solutions has resulted in 
what appears to be the writing off of the water in the Berkeley Pit (USEPA, 
12/15/93), in the agreement signed by Butte-Silver Bow and ARCO that calls 
for the implementation of institutional controls to protect public health from 
the contamination that will remain after the cleanup is completed 
(ARCO / Butte-Silver Bow, 1993), and, to a lesser extent, in the agreement to 
retain "historic mining waste (ARCO / Butte-Silver Bow, 1993). "
A few Butte residents are involved with the Citizens’ Technical 
Environmental Committee (CTEC). Under the Superfund reauthorization of 
1986, the EPA was authorized to give grant money. Technical Assistance 
Grants (TAGs), to citizen groups in Superfund communities to help the 
community translate the technical jargon of remedial investigations, 
feasibility studies, risk assessments, health studies, and records of decision 
(Barnett, 1994). The grant money can be used for such things as hiring experts 
and print newsletters to keep members of the community abreast of 
developments (Barnett, 1994). However, there are real limits on TAG 
recipient activities, which will be addressed later in this section.
Butte's 28-member CTEC committee originally included 10 Montana Tech 
officials, several engineers or professors, four Anaconda Company officials, 
two legislators, two doctors, a health board member, the county sanitarian, a 
representative of the National Center for Appropriate Technology, and a
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member of the Clark Fork Coalition (Montana Standard, 2/26/1990). The 
composition is now more representative of residents, rather than scientists 
(Craig, 7/30/95). The only sustained and published criticism of EPA plans 
have emanated from this committee. Montana Environmental Information 
Center board member John Ray says (10/24/95), "Before May Kay [Craig] got 
into it, CTEC was ARCO operated."
Even before the shift to a predominantly non-scientist membership, the 
committee challenged the EPA's decision to allow the Pit to fill to elevation 
5,450 feet (Craig, 7/30/95). The EPA had originally set 5,270 feet as the critical 
point at which the contaminated water in the Pit would reach the 
groundwater in Butte's alluvial aquifer, but, after negotiations with ARCO, 
the EPA raised the leveP to 5,450 feet (Montana Standard, 2/26/90). The EPA 
and ARCO maintained the water level in the Pit would not reach the 5,450 
feet level until 2009; CTEC members argued that even the original 5,270 feet 
level was too high because the Pit water could reach the groundwater through 
the Old Pittsmont Mine workings at level 4,970 feet (Montana Standard,
2/26/90). Nor were CTEC members comfortable with the thought that 
landslides in the earthquake-prone area could displace enough water to rise 
the level of the Pit water to a critical point within a matter of minutes 
(Montana Standard,!/26/1990).
The following May, the committee argued that the EPA should consider 
draining the Pit and treating the water because the contaminated water in the 
Pit could hurt Butte-Silver Bow's economy and pollute the area groundwater 
(Montana Standard, 5/25/1990). The consequences of that are extremely 
serious, " Bill MacGregor said. "We would become the next Mill Creek 
(Montana Standard, 5/25/1990)." Residents of Mill Creek, near Missoula,
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were evacuated as one of the first responses to the contamination. Creighton 
Barry, also a CTEC member, said Butte residents should be asked about what 
they want left when the reclamation work is complete:
Nobody's ever recognized that maybe we don't want to have a
poisonous lake {Montana Standard, 512511990).
"If it (the water leaving the Pit) happens, how are we going to plug the 
dike? We can't plug the dike, it's too late...It's far better to err on the side of 
safety than on the side of some environmental disaster, " Rep. Fritz Daily 
argued (Montana Standard, 5/31/1990). Committee member Floyd Bossard 
said the group wanted a study on the social and economic effects of leaving 
the water in the Pit and that the study should be included in the EPA's 
cleanup plans (Montana Standard, 5/31/1990). Their concerns were not just 
about the probability of a future event -  one resident, worried because a 
swamp near his home becomes damp when the water level in the Travona 
Mine rises, asked how often he should test his water (Montana Standard, 
5/31/1990).
Neither the EPA nor ARCO saw the need to adjust the critical level 
downward. Dailey, frustrated by the lack of official response, ultimately 
brought and fought unsuccessfully for passage of a bill before the state 
legislature to establish fines of $25,000 a day for those who contaminate 
groundwater with industrial wastes and hazardous substances (Montana 
Standard, 1/31/1991). Passage of the bill would hold ARCO responsible for 
the contamination caused by flooding the Berkeley Pit, Daily said (Montana 
Standard,!/31/1991).
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CTEC members also questioned why the risk assessment and earthquake 
report discounted the possibility of seismic activity even though the risk 
assessment reported, if the contaminated water escaped, hum an health would 
be seriously jeopardized (USEPA, 12/15/93). Because risk assessors are prone 
to what a lay person would call understatement (Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992; 
Schrader-Frechette, 1991), the unusually strong language used to describe the 
effects of the release of the contaminated water in the Berkeley Pit into the 
environment is startling:
The resulting impact to the local aquatic ecosystem...would be
catastrophic in both nature and extent (USEPA, 12/15/93:Section 7.4).
Critics' fears of earthquakes were given more credence in June 1995, when 
a newspaper story reported that state and local officials were surprised to learn 
that earthquake ratings had been updated seven years previously, in 1988, by 
the International Conference of Building Officials. As a result of that update, 
Butte is in a zone of probable major damage (Missoulian: 6 / 30/1995). Those 
who remember the 1959 earthquake are acutely aware that it can happen 
again, current CTEC president Mary Kay Craig says (7/30/95). Thirty six years 
after the fact, Craig still can describe vividly the shock of waking to the jolt, of 
the mirror falling from her wall beside her bed (7/30/95).
Schrader-Frechette calls this divergence of what is considered possible the 
expert- judgment strategy" — the belief that risk can be reduced to some 
characteristics which can be determined only by experts or that experts only 
are capable of distinguishing "actual" rather than "perceived " risk. The 
strategy also occurs when assessors presuppose that a technological risk is
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defined purely in terms of measurable physical impact; an erroneous 
supposition because social impact includes "increased trauma or decreased 
civil liberties" as part of the risk itself (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:78).
Catastrophic potential and the fact that low-probability /  high 
consequence situations are often the product of societally-imposed (as 
opposed to privately chosen) risks may also explain risk aversion.
There is evidence that the psychological trauma (feelings of impotence, 
depression, rage) associated with the imposition of a particular hazard 
is greater than that associated with the choice of a private risk of the 
same probability...people are typically more averse to the low- 
probability/high consequence situation (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:90).
The failure of risk assessors to assume that public preference, when it is in 
disagreement with the expert preference, is the "result of misperceived 
probabilities, not a legitimate value system," goes "hand in hand with 
assessors' tendencies to define ethical and political issues as merely technical 
ones... They assume, incorrectly, that agreement about technical matters is 
sufficient for resolving normative disputes (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:98)."
Psychologist Michael Edelstein notes that, once a government agency 
makes a decision, it is likely to use a "scientific rationale to legitimate it, 
dismissing problems with their (citizens') reasoning. Once locked into this 
position, the agency defends it stubbornly. Thus, what may begin as an open 
inquiry under the scientific method is transformed into a distorted approach 
under the guise of science (1988:121). "
There is a synergy that operates in what Edelstein refers to as "Citizen's" 
and "Regulator's Bind. " (1988:124) The more rigidly the agency defends its 
choices, the angrier the public; the angrier the public, the more rigid the 
agency defense (Edelstein, 1988). But there are also other constraints. As
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angry residents seek to publicize their concerns, they enhance the "stigma" 
associated with a "contaminated community," often earning the animosity of 
groups such as realtors and chambers of commerce which want to downplay 
the existence of contamination (Edelstein, 1988). Also, by seeking answers, 
the activists increase their own stress levels for frequently protracted periods 
of time because of the time gap, often up to five years, between definition of 
the problem and cleanup (Edelstein, 1988).
In contrast, regulators’ bind involves the frustration involved with acting, 
as public servants, to solve a complicated problem while faced with regulatory 
limits to their actions, political realities, limited resources, and their own 
individual perspectives toward the task at hand (Edelstein, 1988).
Bureaucratic organization structures create fragmented patterns of 
work and responsibility that result in dehumanizing practices and 
make likely overlapping, confusion, gaps in offered response, and poor 
coordination among different agencies working in the same 
community. Such regulations may also be subject to regulatory capture 
in the sense of having a built-in conflict of interest in favor of one side 
of a controversy, most often corporate, not citizen, interests (Edelstein, 
1988:123).
Government officials also confront the difficult task of walking the fine 
line between actual danger and false claim (Edelstein, 1988). In some cases, 
there are no clear standards, and, there are often "gray areas ' (Edelstein, 
1988:123) even when standards exist. Above all, government officials must 
avoid causing public panic (Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991).
...government agencies are typically secretive about environmental 
health risks. They withhold information on the basis that it will alarm 
the public, that the public does not understand risks, or that it will 
harm  the business climate...(Brown, 1991:144).
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To this end, government officials tend to cloak themselves in the science 
of risk assessments, which provide both justification for agency actions and 
an institutional distancing from the actual politics at hand (Schrader- 
Frechette, 1991; Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988). This ability to 
limit discourse -  to frame the question and constrain the debate -  is a 
powerful, although subtle means of control (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Brown, 
1991; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988). It is an effective way to assure that issues 
are dealt with as a technocratically oriented authority wants them to be 
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988). The 
result is what Edelstein (1988:125) refers to as "constrained communication" -  
actions by private or government groups to structure and limit public 
communication, which distorts communication. Among his examples of 
constrained communication, Edelstein cites "giving of false reassurances, 
withholding of information, responding slowly, taking inadequate actions, 
drawing arbitrary boundaries, using insensitive and incomprehensible 
language, denying citizens' perceptions and fears, and hiding behind scientific 
reasoning for political decisions (Edelstein, 1988:125)."
CTEC members in Butte have charged that ARCO, the EPA, and local 
government officials are guilty of using all of Edelstein's examples (Montana 
Standard). In this context, the risk assessment becomes the battleground and, 
as such it is invested with great symbolic content.
Every symbol stands for something other than itself, and it also evokes 
an attitude, a set of impressions, or a pattern of events associated 
through time...Referential symbols are economical ways of referring to 
the objective elements in objective situations. Such symbols are useful 
because they help in logical thinking about the situation and in 
manipulating it (Edelman, 1964:6).
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To the risk assessor and government official who relies upon that 
assessment to justify policy, the assessment is an expression of an objective 
reality, it is a referential symbol. However, Edelman (1964) notes, no symbols 
are ever totally referential; there is always a condensation symbology 
involved. Condensation symbols evoke the emotion associated with the 
situation.
The condensation symbols for the risk assessor and the policy-maker come 
into play when the risk assessment is questioned. The use of mathematical 
symbols as means to express reality allows for further distancing -  potentially 
life-threatening chemicals are divested of terror when they become formulae 
that can be manipulated (Griffin, 1978). In the manipulation of the 
mathematics, the risk assessor, and the policy-makers who rely upon this 
manipulation, can be lulled into a sense that he or she can control the 
outcomes. In this sense, the risk assessment is a claim (Connolly, 1993) -  a 
claim both that the assessor's view is the only valid representation of the 
landscape in question and that that landscape can be controlled. When critics 
question the risk assessment, they are also implicitly questioning the 
objective reality that the assessor and policy-maker has described and, thus, 
threatening comfort levels, at least momentarily.
In Butte, the environmentalists who question the risk assessment on the 
Pit are reacting to the condensation symbology of the risk assessment. For 
them, the existence of the "poisonous lake" represents a threat to both 
economic and emotional security (Montana Standard). They view the 
negotiated critical water level with some suspicion. To them the Berkeley Pit 
is far more than a vast amount of water which can be broken down into 
isolated mathematical formulae and probabilities. It is a very real fact of life -
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it looms over the Uptown and the Flat, dominating the Butte landscape. 
Implicit in the critics’ criticism is a claim of the landscape as threatening, very 
likely uncontrollable. It is a source of alarm.
Thus, both groups are talking about very different landscapes. It is possible 
that notions of participation also differ.
Participation
However, most residents of Butte do not participate in the cleanup, 
earning them the labels of apathetic or ignorant of public health issues (Craig, 
7/30/95; Weinstock, 7/31/95; Kirkpatrick, 7/31/95; Dennehey, 9/21/95).
Federal and state officials maintain it is not possible to involve an unwilling 
citizenry. The EPA has gone to great lengths to seek public involvement -  
Sara Weinstock (7/31/95) tells of preparing public notices of meetings, along 
with fact sheets, at every stage of the process. When the public appeared not 
to notice, Weinstock went to the schools to send fact sheets and notices home 
with the students.
We had information nights....We had an information fair at the 
Copper King [a large motel with function rooms in Butte]. We had big 
maps, fact sheets. We had 100 people. If you have 25 it's a good 
meeting. 1 can remember only three meetings when we really had a 
turnout, outside of the EPA, state, contractors and the newspaper.
Until you get a bulldozer in the neighborhood, even with the 
newspaper, school fliers, radio, and TV...
For the majority, even with lead, there was denial with the 
children’s health. But if you got a new fence, OK. (Weinstock, 7/31/95)
County public health director Dan Dennehey (9/21/95) agrees with 
Weinstock's assessment:
The agency [EPA] does a real good job about what cleanup operations
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will be and what the health risks are.. For me it's easy, but for the rest 
of the community... They won't even read a one-page 
handout. They're apathetic. I've been at meetings where the only 
people there are bureaucrats. If they [the public] come to the meeting, 
they're more concerned about the impact on their property.
We invite people to serve on an ad hoc committee, create the most 
diverse group we can to study and debate. On the lead issue we had 
twenty people. We had a number of public hearings, we had two or 
three people from public health, one public hearing at [Montana] Tech, 
one CTEC hearing.
We've been screening since 1990. If you ask about lead, people will 
have heard about it... (Dennehey, 9/21/95).
Dave Kirkpatrick (7/31/95), a former Montana Standard reporter who now 
works for CDM Federal Programs Corp. in the EPA's Butte office, says 
unfamiliarity with bureaucratic procedures may account for some hesitancy 
to become involved. But, even factoring in the unfamiliarity with 
bureaucracy, the lack of participation is noteworthy.
It's not unconunon to have 30 people in the room and only 10 of them 
are legitimate public. Interest is stunningly low.
There were probably only 30 to 50 people at the Pit meeting. They 
wanted the Pit elevation lowered; not for public health, but to mine...
When the Pit decision came out, there was not one call from a 
legitimate person, just contractors.
At the Butte Priority Soils Time Critical Removal Action public 
meeting, no one showed up. I went to cover it for the paper, but no 
one was there. There had been ads in the paper for it.
All the time I covered government, there was little response. But 
one time a hydroseeder at the Anselmo [mine] went nuts. People 
called me like crazy then (Kirkpatrick, 7/31/95).
However, there are very few people who attend any meetings, never mind 
all of them. Weinstock (7/30/95) remembers one well-attended meeting 
(discussed at length in the media section) related to an arsenic spill that 
occurred on Second Street in 1978 or 1979.
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There was at least one percent arsenic in some of those yards. What 
surprised me was that their lawsuit was never followed through.
People at Timber Butte had a lawsuit against ARCO and they 
won...There is a lawsuit ongoing for all the people on the hill (relating 
to the water company; not the Superfund cleanup)... (Weinstock,
7/31/95).
There is an enormous difference in the costs of participation in a class 
action suit as opposed to a small neighborhood group. The failure to follow 
through with the lawsuit may have been the result of inability to pay lawyers' 
fees, take time off from work to meet with attorneys and attend court dates, 
an d /o r maintain the emotional stamina needed to fight the system. The 
failure to pursue the lawsuit may be more reflective of a recognition of the 
powers weighted against the neighborhood than an indication of apathy.
Butte's historic preservation officer Mark Reavis (11/29/95) agrees with 
Kirkpatrick that bureaucratic procedures are problematic for the public. He 
points to government officials' use of acronyms, e.g. ROD for Record of 
Decision and RA for Risk Assessment, and to the years that it takes to make 
decisions as impediments to public involvement:
When we did the [historic] preservation, every time they used an 
acronym we'd yell at them. There's no reason to communicate with 
the public that way. We've tried to participate in designs, but the 
process is cumbersome.
How can you really expect to hold their [the public's] interest for all 
those years? Even when decisions are made, changes happen in the 
field. There's nothing in the track record that would show that any 
public participation would have changed the course. In the [local] 
government, though, people have worked with it and that has had an 
impact. (Reavis, 11/29/95)
However, even local government officials get worn down by the long- 
draw n out complicated process. Butte-Silver Bow Health Director Dan
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Dennehey (9/21/95) leans back in his chair and groans when asked about the 
interm inable meetings.
The Superfund issue is so broad. The Priority Soils Unit, the Old 
Works, the Rocker operable unit ...We’re taking an operable unit at a 
time, but people don't go to meetings every week. It gets to be mind- 
boggling -  RTFs, RODs, proposal and planning meetings, Streamside 
tailings....(Dennehey, 9/21/95).
Underlying all of these comments about the public’s lack of participation, 
there appears to be an assumption that public concern is measurable only by 
terms of participation established by federal law. This is an either/or 
definition of participation: either an actor spends hours attending public 
meetings, poring over remedial investigation/feasibility studies, risk 
assessments, seismic reports, and records of decision, and submitting written 
comments during public comment periods; or the actor does not care about 
the outcome. However, there are a number of problems with this 
assumption, among them the possibility that actors are interested but cannot 
pay the transaction costs associated with this definition of participation, that 
actors have defined a very different problem than that which the government 
is addressing, an d /o r that they do not believe that their participation, as 
narrowly defined, will change policy (Greider, 1992).
Transaction Costs 
Participation on the government's terms is time-consuming. The EPA 
office is crammed with volumes, three large bookcases full, on the Superfund 
sites. Most of these volumes are written in the jargon of technocrats and, 
because they are written for other technocrats, concepts and connections
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between them are rarely explained. Mary Kay Craig, president of CTEC and 
former Clark Fork Coalition employee, spends hours each day on Superfund- 
related activities, much of it poring over information and seeking 
translations of the scientific jargon (7/30/95). Then she attends meetings at 
night:
The sources of information I have are agency documents -  RIs, FSs,
RAs, ECAs, and I've read all those things myself.. I've even read 
the appendices. Although I'm not trained as a hydrologist or geologist, 
if you read enough of this stuff you leam to understand it. Also, 
people have been very helpful -  even people who don't always agree 
with me, like Floyd Brossard who used to be on CTEC. I appreciate that 
because there are people who make it personal if you don’t agree with 
them.... a hydrologist at Montana Tech spent half an hour on the 
phone with me, explaining this stuff to me. Most of the people at 
agencies have spent a lot of time with me. I've spent hours and hours 
and hours on the phone with scientists.
Now, I try to have the student staff [of CTEC] on the phone.
They've got engineering mentors at the agency, and they call ARCO.
They know who you have to ask to get what you need to know. You 
often get a better overview from someone who's not a specialist, who 
attends every meeting." (Craig, 7/30/95)
Working people, especially parents, may have neither the time nor the 
energy, or other resources, such as a car to get to government-sponsored 
public meetings in Rocker or Anaconda, or the money to hire a babysitter. 
Further, at meetings, the discussions are conducted in jargon and comments 
are made without background information, making it very difficult for a 
newcomer to understand what is happening. Protocol at every such meeting 
I have attended, in Butte and in Massachusetts as a reporter, is fairly rigid: 
officials conducting the meeting sit at a table at the front of the room; the rest
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of the room is divided into two sections with an aisle down the center for the 
public. A newcomer might not realize that protocol dem ands the first few 
rows on each side are the domain of personnel from other involved agencies 
and members of the press and that from that point on one side of the aisle 
belongs to opponents; the other to proponents of whatever is under 
discussion. This is often somewhat daunting to newcomers, who, nervous 
and uncomfortable, tend to stand at the back of the room.
Since she was told in 1992 that some Butte citizens stopped attending 
government-sponsored public meetings because felt they were being "batted 
down" and made to look stupid, CTEC meetings include a "word warden" to 
screen out jargon (Craig, 1996)
Different Problems 
The EPA, state, and environmental groups are addressing technical 
problems — what kind and how much of a cleanup will occur where and 
when? Although this is important, this technical orientation assumes that 
Butte's quality of life can be measured in the contaminants identified by the 
EPA. But others in Butte who may define both quality and contamination 
differently are effectively silenced by the narrow parameters of officially 
sanctioned discussion. This is a very serious problem.
The quality of democracy is not measured in the contentment of the 
affluent, but in how the political system regards those who lack 
personal advantages. Such people have never stood in the front ranks 
of politics, of course, but a generation ago, they had a real presence, at 
least more than they have now. The challenging conditions they face 
in their daily lives were once part of the general equation that the 
political system took into account when it decided the largest economic 
questions. Now these citizens are absent from politics — both as
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participants and as the subjects of consideration (Greider, 1992:183).
"Whose quality of life?" Marilyn Maney asks (9/22/95). Through years of 
working with the Butte Public Archives' labor history -  she is president of the 
Butte archives -  and her job retraining laid-off workers for the Montana state 
AFL-CIO, Maney has developed a formidable knowledge of Butte. Butte 
people are perfectly capable of determining what's important to them, she 
says hotly. The "vitality and strength and quality of life" in Butte comes from 
its working class background which has a very different ethos than that of the 
professionals who have arrived to oversee the cleanup, she maintains.
There are different kinds of contamination, Maney notes, and some forms 
are more dangerous than others. Butte's communal working class culture 
runs the risk of being contaminated far more by the cleanup professional's 
middle-class individualistic and competitive ethic than by existing mining 
waste, she says.
This is a working class culture that takes care of each other. This is a 
quality of life I don't believe I would have had somewhere else... The 
quality of my life, quite frankly, is much higher than those I know 
from other places. A lot better than just the physical.
We know entirely what's important to us as our livelihood. And 
that's reclaiming our right to speak for ourselves (Maney, 9/22/95).
The serious economic issues related to the end of mining and Superfund 
designation are beyond the scope of Superfund, EPA officials have repeatedly 
told I0 C9 I officials (Montana Standard). This effectively excludes issues that 
have just as much impact as the contaminants on residents; their comments 
on their priorities are dismissed. This is very different than apathy. Mark 
Reavis also disputes the apathetic label:
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I don't think it's apathy. If someone was willing to listen to them. I've 
seen older people stand up and tell their story. It's politely received but 
public participation has been nothing more than a process. Some 
people have tried to make a difference (Reavis, 11/29/95).
As Marilyn Maney (9/22/95) aptly put it, the people of Butte can identify 
what's important to their quality of lives and speak for themselves — but, 
because the human values of Butte have been discounted, there is no 
common language with which to speak to authorities.
...The public's broad political values have been preempted by other 
materials — arcane rules draw n from economics, law and science — 
that provide the main grist of information politics. On issue after 
issue, the public is belittled as self-indulgent or misinformed, incapable 
of grasping the larger complexities known to the policy-makers and the 
circles of experts surrounding them. That complaint, though 
sometimes correct in the narrow sense, masks the nature of the 
conflict.
The real political contest, on issue after issue, is a struggle between 
competing value systems — the confident scientific rationalism of the 
governing elites versus the deeply felt human values expressed by 
people who are not equipped to talk like experts and who, in fact, do 
not necessarily share the experts' conception of public morality... 
(Creider, 1992:54).
Especially in a place like Butte, the inherently elitist nature of technocratic 
agencies and professionals working in the field will have to be 
radically altered, before any public support can be earned. Among the 
necessary alterations is the elimination of a professional bias that 
automatically assumes the working class is opposed to environmental 
reforms. Buttel and Flinn's research (1978) also indicates that the generally 
accepted belief in working class hostility to environmentalism is overstated:
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... In terms of theory of the U.S. class structure, restraint should be 
imposed on utilizing environmental attitude studies to suggest the 
narrowly, self-interested, undemocratic, or overly materialistic 
behavior of the U.S. working class. Second, our data suggest that mass 
environmental beliefs may be more accurately characterized as 
expressions of generational -  rather than class -  interests (Buttel and 
Flinn, 1978:446).
Butte has an elderly population, Ellen Crain, director of the Butte-Silver 
Bow Archives, notes:
Older people who lived in their houses for 100 years and ate out of 
their gardens don't see a problem. The younger people are more 
educated, more informed... For the elderly, it's low on their priority 
list. They've already fought their wars (Crain, 9/21/95).
The age of the population could be a significant factor. The 1990 census 
reports that twenty-two percent, 7,392 of a 33,941 total population, of people 
living in Silver Bow County were over 60 years of age (U.S. Dept, of 
Commerce: Table 140). Research conducted by sociologists Frederick H. Buttel 
and William Flinn (1978) indicates that both awareness of environmental 
problems and support for environmental reform is strongly correlated with 
age4 and length of residence, with younger people being more aware and 
supportive. During the years of layoffs as mining wound down, the younger 
workers left Butte; those who had reached retirement age or were eligible for 
pensions tended to stay (Malone et al, 1993). Consequently, the majority of 
Butte's elderly population are long-term residents. However, the situation in 
Butte is far too complex to attribute to one cause, such as a given percentage of 
elderly long-term residents.
There is also another factor operating here. When, working class people
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question environmental reforms it is almost always interpreted as hostility to 
environmentalism, rather than as an expression of a more immediate 
concern, that of providing food for families (Buttel and Flinn, 1978). And, 
even when this priority is recognized, it is often treated as narrow self-interest 
by researchers who, by dint of their education, do not expect to find 
themselves in that situation (Buttel and Flinn, 1978). This suspicion of 
working-class values may be a factor, especially when, as will be discussed in a 
later section, most of the researchers and environmental groups working on 
the Superfund sites are not Butte natives. This class-based suspicion is 
compounded by the fact that Butte has historically been the "other," the 
chattel of the Anaconda Company which held the state hostage 
(Malone, 1995). Researchers who have considered working class 
environmental beliefs have often assumed that "liberal environmental 
reforms compete for funds with welfare state agendas, as well as pose threats 
to working class economic security (Buttel and Flinn, 1978:438)."
However true or false that assumption may be in a particular situation, it 
is too narrow a way of looking at the working class, which is traditionally 
defined in the research by education, income and occupation (Buttel and 
Flinn, 1978). (The issue of "class" in Butte will be considered in a later 
section.) This narrow perspective also ignores the contributions that working 
class communities like Love Canal and W oburn have made to 
environmental thought, (Brown, 1991) and the potential of workers as a 
possible base of support.
The poor quality environments of many working class families, plus 
the hostility of some workers to (corporate) targets of environmental 
reform, may lead a substantial number of working class families to
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favor environmental improvement ... many researchers have 
underestimated the extent to which environmental issues affect low 
socioeconomic status' families and how the working class represents a 
substantial nascent support base for the environmental movement 
(Buttel and Flinn, 1978:435).
By addressing just one narrow symptom of a multi-faceted social problem 
(Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987) the EPA and other government and national 
environmental organizations have both effectively alienated a possible base 
of support and allowed corporations to frame pollution in the misleading 
jobs/environm ent duality (Edelstein, 1988). Established environmental 
groups, like the Clark Fork Coalition, who focus their arguments on the 
quality of the land and water, to the exclusion of jobs, also contribute to the 
maintenance of the duality (Creider, 1992). Too often, environmentalists and 
workers meet at hearings, representing opposing points of view (Creider, 
1992). Recognition of the importance of well-paying jobs to sustain 
communities would "lead to different kinds of public policies — transitional 
assistance to threatened workers or small businesses, " (Creider, 1992:218) 
which would likely bring the community together, rather than divide it.
Narrow Definitions of Participation 
The notion of participation may well be an "essentially contestible 
concept," (Connolly, 1993:10) open to a wide range of interpretations. The 
definition of participation in federal law is narrowly constrained to comment 
upon technocratic definitions and plans; activists' definition is often broader 
(Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Creider, 1992). It is possible that some people in 
Butte may not either accept the EPA's constrained definition of participation
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and / or believe that their participation within such narrow parameters, will 
be unable to change policy.
In 1991, in response to a call from the Land Use Task Force, a 15-member 
citizen committee, for individual neighborhood development plans, just one 
neighborhood, Centerville, responded (Montana Standard,8/19/1991). 
Centerville residents wanted the New Butte Mining company to sell its 
properties in their neighborhood to develop sidewalks and install street lights 
and to monitor vacant lots. But one Centerville man said;
The thing is, after all this paperwork is done, is anything going to get 
done? By the time we re 65 is there going to be a sidewalk in 
Centerville? The reality is that in Centerville we've been waiting 
seven years just for stop signs (Montana Standard, 8/19/1991).
This may indicate that some residents, accustomed to governmental 
inaction and lack of response, decline to spend time on what they anticipate 
to be futile attempts. Or it may indicate that residents are tired of fighting the 
powers that be on the terms established by the powers that be. The issue of 
whether participation had any impact on agency decisions surfaced at a 
meeting about an EPA plan to dum p Colorado Tailings from Butte into an 
area near the Opportunity Ponds, roughly 26 miles downstream from Butte. 
Residents of the area in which the tailings would be dum ped charged the EPA 
with reached a decision before holding hearings on the plan. One resident 
said:
People are pretty well disgusted. When they [the EPA and ARCO] were 
here the last time, they basically told us the decision had been made, 
now go home and cry (Montana Standard,^/!?/91).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
173
"Most people in town just don't see any point in resisting when the plan 
is a foregone conclusion/’ the reporter wrote (Montana Standard, 6127191). A 
former county commissioner said people weren't "screaming" because, "Feed 
the candy to the kid and he's quiet. I'm talking about this golf course and the 
new pasture down there...They've been spoon-fed stuff about the golf course 
(Montana Standard, 6/27/92)." He was referring to the golf course ARCO is 
building on contaminated land near the former smelter in Anaconda.
In communities, like Woburn, Mass. (Brown, 1991) and Love Canal 
(Creider, 1992), victims moved outside the system to fight back, Woburn with 
a lay epidemiology study (Brown, 1991) and Love Canal with what Lois Gibbs 
calls the politics of "rude and crude (Creider, 1992:214). " Victims in Wobum 
and Love Canal expressed a sense of betrayal because the government that 
they believed existed to help them did not do so adequately. Lois Cibbs 
describes her experiences at Love Canal:
Generally, people at first have a blind faith in government. So when 
they go to EPA or the state agency and show them that there is a 
problem, they think the government will side with them. It takes 
them about a year before they realize the government is not going to 
help them. They see the agencies studying them to death. That's when 
they become really angry — radicalized.
When I started, I believed democracy worked. I believed everything 
1 had learned in civics class. What I saw is that decisions are made on 
the basis of politics and costs. Money. (Creider, 1992:167)
Given the history of Butte, its people may have never known the luxury 
of blind faith in the government because the government itself was so often 
seen as the enemy. As noted earlier, between September 1914 and April 1920,
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the national guard and federal troops occupied Butte six times, always with 
the intent of sustaining a status quo that was heavily weighted against Butte's 
working people (Malone et al, 1993; Toole, 1959). And in 1951 President 
Truman applied the Taft-Hartley Act against the striking miners (Malone et 
al, 1993), Federal and state law was often used against the community, and 
government was often viewed, justifiably, as an adjunct of the Anaconda 
Company (Toole, 1959). This was hardly a climate in which people would 
develop a sense of a benevolent government. Given the passion of Butte 
residents for their history (Reavis, 11/29/95), the role of government is not 
likely to be forgotten.
Also, it is oversimplistic to assume that lack of government sanctioned 
forms of participation or direct public challenges such as those seen in 
Woburn, Mass. (Brown, 1991) and Love Canal (Kroll-Smith, 1991a; Creider,
1992) automatically assumes acquiescence.
There is the sense that everyday life and culture, in which people 
implicitly conform to' or accept' their situation, should not always to 
be contrasted with dramatic 'social movements,' in which people 
question or challenge the status quo. Instead, while organized social 
movements remain enormously im portant in understanding large- 
scale transformation, much can be learned to by attending to everyday 
forms or resistance' as well (Dirks et al: 5).
Given Butte's labor history and the fact that the boycott was an invention 
of Irish peasants resistance to landowners, some residents may choose not 
participate as a form of resistance. Their silence may be the equivalent of a 
boycott by an "aggrieved " (Wolensky, 1991) population. It is also possible that 
some adults have come to feel powerless to influence events in which
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corporations and government agencies are involved, and, instead, direct their 
energies into areas where they can accomplish change. This could well be 
attributable to lessons learned in years of interaction with the Anaconda 
Company, and in the current imbalances of power between Butte residents, 
governments at the local, state, and federal level, and ARCO.
Additionally, the environmental movement itself is fragmented, stratified 
along class lines.
The [environmental] movement is splintered into many different 
pieces, including different social classes that do not even talk to one 
another, much less try to work out a common political agenda. On one 
end are Ivy League lawyers, urbane and well educated and completely 
comfortable in the inner circles of government. On the other end are 
the thousands of home-grown neighborhood activists, utterly skeptical 
of government and engaged in rude and crude' politics at the factory 
gates (Creider, 1992:213-14).
In Butte the issue of class and environmentalism may be best illustrated 
with a story. Although Butte was designated a Superfund site in 1986, Butte's 
people were on their own. Environmental groups in the state have never 
mounted a demonstration to focus attention on the possible public health 
impacts of the contamination on Butte's people, even with the 1990 
publication of the Moore and Luoma health study, which indicated the 
possibility of serious health problems in Butte and called for a detailed study. 
Yet the gruesome deaths of 342 snow geese in the Berkeley Pit in November 
1995 resulted in a memorial service which was planned, publicized and 
attended by environmental groups across the state. (The study and memorial 
service will be discussed in a later sections.) This is in no way to minimize 
the horror of the birds' death; it is merely to illustrate the relatively low
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position of Butte's people in the mainstream environmental pecking order.
Also, environmentalists frequently appear to be apprehensive about 
expanding participation to allow working-class people and anti­
environmentalists to shape government policies. The following comment is 
fairly typical:
Don't forget that Wise Use has just as much right as you to be involved 
in citizen participation. Would you rather Gary Irgman decided what 
was to be done on the Clark Fork or a roomful of Wise Users versus 
you? I'd rather Gary Irgman decided — a caring biologist and public 
servant even though he happens to be a bureaucrat.
There is an assumption here again of either/ or, in this case, the educated 
scientist or members of a group, the Wise Use, that is perceived by 
environmentalists to be anti-environment. There is no sense of an 
understanding that in a democracy all voices should be included, or of the 
possibility that exclusion may have led to some of the anti­
environmentalism that is so feared. The argument of exclusion seems to rest 
upon the same kinds of arguments that were used against giving former 
slaves and women the vote: they just won't be smart enough to make the 
"right " decisions.
Fearfulness aside, there is some recognition in some quarters that the 
broader values of citizens should be included in decision making. Daniel J. 
Fiorino (1990), an employee of the EPA, maintains that more citizen 
participation is needed to improve the technocractic orientation of large 
bureaucracies because: lay judgments about risk are often more sensitive to 
social and political values that expert models do not acknowledge; 
technocratic orientation is often incompatible with democratic ideals which
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presume citizens are the best judge of their own interests; and effective lay 
participation in risk decisions makes them more legitimate, which leads to 
better results. Fiorino's analysis of five participation methods finds 
shortcomings in each method: 1. public hearings involve amateurs, but do 
not share authority, allow limited scope for discussion, and do not promote 
equality; 2. initiatives allow amateurs direct involvement, shared authority, a 
potential for discussion, and some equality; 3. public surveys involve citizens, 
provide limited shared authority, rarely generate discussion, and do not 
promote equality; 4. it is unlikely for citizens to participate in negotiated rule 
making which offers the most opportunity for shared authority, discussion 
and equality; and 5. citizen review panels involve amateurs with limited 
authority in discussion with some involvement (Fiorino, 1990). To 
circumvent the shortcomings of each method, Fiorino (1990) suggests one 
mechanism be used to complement another.
In science policy, there are additional reasons to actively engage the 
public in decision making (Brown, 1991; Schrader-Frechette, 1991).
Some governmental agencies and scientific communities have sought 
public involvement in science policy. As [Sheldon] Krimsky notes, 
public participation provides for a just input from involved and 
affected people; it may even offer illumination from the perspective of 
those affected; and it may increase legitimacy. Yet even when lay 
participation has been attempted, lay members of advisory boards and 
panels are given insufficient information and training, and are granted 
inadequate power. Perhaps the central flaw in official approaches to 
public participation is that it is viewed as a formalistic process — 
simply good politics.' This is a shortsighted perspective, since public 
involvement is truly a question of good science' since it changes the 
nature of scientific inquiry. Our investigation of popular epidemiology 
has provided many examples of data that would have been unavailable 
without conununity input. If scientists and government fail to solicit 
such data, and especially if they consciously oppose and devalue it.
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then that data may be lost (Brown, 1991:145-46).
As it stands, despite Sara Weinstock's understanding of Butte and her 
caring approach, the unresolved conflicts in the federal Superfund law and 
bureaucratic structure of the EPA have combined to disparage local 
knowledge in Butte. And, although, as indicated above, Butte’s people have 
not reacted like some victims in other communities, there is no basis to 
assume that Butte residents are apathetic or do not care. Butte is not 
monolithic; there are simply too many variables and possible explanations to 
label the community.
One of the variables is that of local newspaper coverage. Assuming that, 
for the majority of these people, their perceptions of Superfund issues are 
shaped by the coverage provided in the local newspaper, the Montana  
Standard, the thesis will now turn to an analysis of four years of that paper's 
reporting on Superfund.
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1 The EPA defines hazardous waste as "either toxic, corrosive, ignitable, or 
reactive" materials which can be "transmitted through all environmental 
media -  air, water, biota, and land." (Hird: 5)
2 A thorough discussion of the debate about Superfund's effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness is beyond the scope of this paper. Both Yeager (1991) and 
Barnett ( 1994) offer excellent analyses.
3 That level is given as 5,410 feet in the Mine Flooding Unit Risk Assessment, 
indicating there may be some uncertainty.
Interestingly, Buttel and Flinn (1978) posit that environmentalism in the 
young may be a generational form of resistance, of rejection of parental 
values.
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LOCAL NEWSPAPER COVERAGE 
The S t a n d a r d i z e d  Landscape
Since the majority of Butte's people are not involved in the day-to-day 
business of Superfund cleanup issues, the quality of the local news coverage is 
important because the newspaper coverage puts the events into a 
recognizable context for the community. It is this coverage that daily helps to 
shape the way readers interpret the meaning of the Superfund label and 
cleanup activities, and then integrate that meaning into their lives and their 
notions of their community.
Our picture of reality does not burst upon us in one splendid 
revelation. It accumulates day by day and year by year in mostly 
unspectacular fragments from the world scene, produced mainly by the 
mass media. Our view of the real world is dynamic, cumulative, and 
self-correcting as long as there is a pattern of even-handedness in 
deciding which fragments are important. But when one important 
category of the fragments is filtered out or included only vaguely, our 
view of the socio-political world is deficient. The ultimate human 
intelligence -  discernment of cause and effect -  becomes damaged 
because it depends on knowledge of events in the order and 
significance in which they occur (Bagdikian, 1990:xvi).
Butte’s only daily newspaper, the Montana Standard, is part of the Lee 
Enterprise chain, the group of papers bought from the Anaconda Company in 
1959. Writing in 1976, local historians (Malone et al, 1993) described the 
improvements that the ownership change brought to the papers: improved 
personnel policies and mechanical facilities; expanded and improved news 
staffs; establishment of a state news bureau in Helena; the addition of the
180
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New York Titnes News Service to supplement Associated Press wire service 
coverage; and encouragement to staff members to upgrade their skills by 
attending conferences and seminars.
At long last, Montanans had access to objective and professional news
reporting (Malone et al, 1993:368).
Given the removal of what John Gunther (1947) called the "Gray Blanket" 
from the majority of Montanan dailies, and the Lee corporation’s 
improvements, Montana's delight at the changes wrought by Lee Enterprises 
is understandable. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, a 
comparison of Montana Standard coverage in the early 1970s with that of the 
1990s might be interesting because, as will become clear in this section, some 
of those improvements seem to have disappeared over the years.
However, changes in coverage or not, the local historians (Malone et al,
1993) pointed to two important trends; the first, the professionalism of 
journalism; the second, the changing patterns of ownership, from families or 
local ownership to fewer and larger outside firms. Both trends are important 
to an analysis of the world according to the Montana Standard.
Ben Bagdikian's (1990) research into the characteristics of chain 
newspapers in The Media Monopoly, provides some insight about the 
coverage of the Montana Standard. A  former reporter and dean of the 
University of California/Berkeley Journalism School, Bagdikian (1990) writes 
that after purchase of a newspaper, chains typically make four general 
changes: 1. introduce cosmetic alterations of page design and makeup to give 
the impression of modernity, and quietly reduce the amount of serious news;
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2. reduce local news coverage (experienced news reporters are expensive) and 
replace the local news with inexpensive syndicated features; 3. reduce the 
news staff and hire inexperienced reporters; and tone down the editorial 
page. Afghanistanism is fairly common and local editorials are relatively 
bland to avoid upsetting advertisers.
The Montana Standard possesses all of the characteristics Bagdikian 
associates with chains. These characteristics affect a newspaper’s coverage, for 
the worse, but there are other aspects of coverage that are harder to quantify -  
the role the newspaper's management sees for the paper within the 
community, the paper’s relationship with local authorities, and the paper’s 
overall political orientation. Because local media are generally more aware of 
local issues and concerns, especially of ’local political, economic, and social 
consequences of reporting practices (Spencer & Triche, 1994:199)," an analysis 
of the paper’s environmental reporting patterns is a useful way both to map 
the landscape presented daily to readers and to determine the forces that 
landscape, in turn, exerts on the paper. An analysis should consider: what is 
reported and how what is reported is presented; what is not reported; what 
are typically the reporters' news sources; whose voices are reported; how 
events are defined; and the paper's editorial stance. Both the quantitative, the 
number of news stories, and the qualitative, the substance, of the coverage is 
im portant.
However, because newspaper staff work under budgetary and institutional 
constraints, these also must be considered in any analysis. Most editors and 
reporters are draw n to journalism for reasons other than making money: 
some are generalists by nature and so are attracted by the variety of issues they 
will cover and the different people they will meet; others see the job as a
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means to both learn themselves and educate the readers about important 
issues; some are draw n by the desire to be known in their communities; and 
some want to shape people’s thoughts. Journalists, like members of any 
other profession, are fairly diverse in interests and orientations. But most 
want to do a good job. And most work under very stressful conditions. So, 
when looking at the paper’s coverage, it is important to remember that 
reporters and editors will generally do the best with what they have.
QUANTITATIVE COVERAGE 
From Jan. 1, 1990 through Dec. 31, 1993, the Montana Standard ran a total 
of 732 news stories, editorials, letters to the editor, and columns, which 
covered national, state, and local environmental issues. Given that there are 
365 days in a year and that this coverage is for a four-year period, or 1,460 days, 
this averages out to one news story, letter to the editor, editorial, or column 
related to national, state, andjor local environmental issues every two days. 
This is a very low rate of environmental coverage, l Astonishingly low in 
light of the size of the Superfund site and the myriad of environmental issues 
on the state and national level.
Eighty-five news stories focused on state environmental issues, including 
14 relating to the state's natural resource damage claim -  making coverage of 
state-related environmental issues 11.5 percent of the Montana Standard’s 
732-story total environmental coverage. Forty-five news stories, 
predominantly from the Associated Press wire service, covered national 
environmental issues, making national coverage just 6.4 percent of the total. 
Twenty-three percent of the newspaper's total environmental coverage was 
related to coverage of Anaconda and streamside (along the Clark Fork River
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and Silver Bow Creek) Superfund issues. The remaining 59 percent, 432 news 
stories as well as letters to the editor, editorials, and columns, of the 732 total 
consisted of coverage of environmental issues in Butte. However, a 
breakdown of the 432 total for Butte, indicates that 14.4 percent of the 
coverage was not related to Superfund issues; just 369 covered activities 
connected to the Superfund sites. And, of this 369, five percent consisted of 
letters to the editor, which are not generated by newsroom personnel. This 
means just over 80 percent, 350 news stories, editorials and columns, of the 
total 369 stories related to Butte Superfund coverage was actually produced by 
the newspaper. When this 350 total is brought back to the 1,460 days in the 
four-year period being analyzed, this translates to one story, editorial, or 
column about Butte Superfund sites every four or five days. This is a 
painfully low rate of both overall environmental and Butte Superfund 
coverage.
QUALITATIVE COVERAGE
The Montana Standard's Superfund coverage in Butte during this four- 
year period is equally poor qualitatively. In general, although the majority of 
the news stories are reasonably well-written, the coverage is restricted to a 
recitation of cleanup actions, is devoid of any understandable or meaningful 
context, relies exclusively on authorities as sources, fails to include voices 
other than ARCO, local, federal or state authorities, and members of the 
Citizens’ Technical Environmental Committee (CTEC), and defines events 
narrowly.
In the Montana Standard's case, the most striking aspect of Butte coverage 
is what has not been covered. Of the 369 news stories, editorials, letters to the
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editor, and columns, only three (all written in 1990) provided any substantive 
information about health effects of exposure to the metals or chemicals 
referred to in the story. Only ,8 percent of all Superfund coverage in Butte 
over a four-year period gave the readers an indication of the health 
implications of exposure.^ In only one of these three stories is the type of 
health effects -  in this case, cancer -  near the top of the story (Montana 
Standard, 6/14/1990). This is a story about the meeting to which Sara 
Weinstock referred in the previous section. This is also the only story that 
quotes concerned residents. After discovering a site where arsenic, lead and 
cadmium had been dumped 12 years previously, the EPA had slated seven 
yards in the area for immediate emergency cleanup, and brought in a 
toxicologist to warn residents to keep their children away from the site where 
arsenic. Not only children are affected, one resident said:
There's a lot of sick people in that neighborhood. I know. I'm a nurse.
(Montana Standard, 6/14/1990)
Health officials replied that more time would be needed for cancers related 
to the exposure to develop. Furthermore, the toxicologist said, about 25 
percent of the general population will get cancer anyway so officials have no 
way to know whether the spilled concentrate is causing cancer in the area 
(Montana Standard, 6 /1 4 / 1990). Three things are noteworthy about this 
story.
First, that the EPA is so quick to negate local knowledge and, invariably, 
when pressed, falls back on the incidence of cancer as a given for some of the 
population. As a rule of thumb, government environmental agencies use
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statistics with certainty to assure people of protection when siting issues are 
on the table; they use different statistics, and uncertainty, to discount 
residents' claims after exposure. And, while the statistics are bandied about, 
what goes unquestioned is why 25 percent of the population is expected to 
develop cancer.
Second, although a reporter might not be expected to be aware of cancer 
statistics, that same reporter should spend some time after the meeting or, if 
necessary, within the next few days by telephone, obtaining additional 
national data about the prevalence of cancer, types of cancer, and official 
interpretations of the data. From there, the reporter should contact the state 
and local health departments seeking further local data. The results of these 
interviews should run as a follow-up story, and then, appear in summarized 
form in every story in which cancer incidence is mentioned. The idea behind 
this is that every news story should be put into an understandable context so 
that a first-time reader would get a grasp of the total situation. This did not 
happen.
The third noteworthy aspect of this story is that it was never followed up. 
Common journalistic procedure would entail a visit to the neighborhood to 
interview the residents and put forth their historical awareness of the 
numbers and types of illness among families in the neighborhood. No such 
story ever ran in the Montana Standard.
The other two stories from 1990 that referred to health effects, printed 
information about effects well past the point at which newspaper readership 
surveys show that most readers reach -  in the sixth paragraph in one story; in 
the eleventh paragraph in the other. All new reporters are trained to write in 
a style commonly called an "inverted pyramid," which means the reporter
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leads with the most important components of a story. This format is based on 
two premises: first, it simplifies an editor's job because he or she can save 
editing time by cutting the less important paragraphs at the end to shorten the 
story for a small newshole; and second, because, as reporters are taught from 
day one, both in journalism schools and on the job, readers rarely read past 
the headline and the first paragraph, the lead, of a story. So, information 
important to readers must be within the first two or three paragraphs of the 
story, especially if the headline does not refer to health risks, as was the case 
in both of these stories. Placement of health effects in the sixth and eleventh 
paragraphs of both stories is the equivalent of burying the information.
Even more startling is that the EPA risk assessments were rarely 
mentioned, and in the few instances they were, were never explained. 
Standard operating procedure for journalists covering Superfund sites is to 
use the risk assessments as one of the focal points of coverage. The risk 
assessments are the source of the reporter's information about what illnesses 
are associated with each metal and / or chemical on the contaminated site. As 
a matter of routine, in the course of covering Superfund sites, the reporter 
interviews the agency responsible for each risk assessment to obtain a 
translation of the jargon to present to the public in terms of probability of 
increased cancers and other illnesses, and the types of cancers and illnesses 
associated with the contaminants on-site. This information, written in a clear 
calm manner, is far more important to the public at large than recitations of 
the number of tons of dirt moved or gallons of water cleaned.
Also noteworthy is, although the adverse impacts of lead on children, 
including retardation in severe cases, were mentioned in the paper's stories 
on lead, no mention was made of the fact that in both Anaconda and Butte
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high schools, rates of learning disorder and cognitive disorder are nearly 
twice the rate averaged among the state's 21 largest schools (Tuholske, 1993). 
Anaconda and Butte have the dubious distinction of ranking first and second 
for both disorders (Tuholske, 1993).
In addition to omission of health information, another interesting aspect 
of the Montana Standard's coverage is the manner in which Superfund 
issues were presented during this four-year period. The breakdown of 
coverage, which is presented graphically in the appendix, is as follows:
• 38 percent of the coverage, 142 stories, presented cleanup issues in a 
routine manner, e.g., moving dirt from one place to another, establishing 
monitor wells, so many yards scheduled to be cleaned up. There is occasional 
reference in these stories to carcinogenic chemicals, but no additional data is 
given and the reference is usually buried within the story.
• 76 stories, 21 percent of the coverage, were oriented toward the 
economic benefits of high tech industries coming to Butte to develop 
techniques to separate the metals from the water in the Berkeley Pit or clean 
the contaminants from the soil.
• 32 stories, 8 percent, were concerned with conflicts between ARCO and 
the EPA an d /o r state government.
• 6 percent was in the form of 22 editorials.
• 21 stories, 5.7 percent, deal with the economic boost that development of 
Butte as a mining history park will bring to the community.
• 21 stories, 5.7 percent, refer to the blood lead tests and studies done on 
Butte children. Although all the stories refer to the danger to children and 
pregnant women from lead exposure, good detailed information on the 
effects of lead exposure are not part of these stories. The possibility of
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synergies was never raised as an issue.
• 19 stories, 5 percent, of the total 369 Butte Superfund coverage, came in 
the form of letters to the editor.
• 17 stories, 4.6 percent, were focused upon conflict between levels of 
government, e.g., federal and state, state and local.
• 10 stories, 2.7 percent, were oriented to the economy.
• 2 percent of the coverage came in the form of eight columns on the 
editorial page.
• .2 percent of the coverage, the one story referred to above, consisted of a 
public health warning.
Excluding the voices of members of the Citizens' Technical 
Environmental Committee (CTEC), only five Butte Superfund-related stories 
in the four-year period included voices of Butte people, other than local 
officials -  just one percent of all coverage. All other coverage was presented 
through the voices of participants, arguing in technical terms -  e.g., disputes 
over threshold limits, potential solutions, elevations of the Pit.
The reasons for and dangers of reliance upon organizational sources of 
information will be explored later in this section. For now, it is sufficient to 
stress the importance of including Butte voices in coverage of Superfund 
issues. As part of routine Superfund coverage, the reporters should go out 
into the neighborhoods where cleanup activities are taking place and 
interview residents.
Given the scale of the contamination, the most amazing aspect of the 
Montana Standard's coverage is that, unlike the majority of the daily 
newspapers in the United States, this newspaper has no designated trained 
environm ental reporter.
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There are four basic messages stressed by the Montana Standard's news 
coverage over the four-year period. The cumulative impact of these messages 
includes the notions that:
1. the Superfund cleanup is a technical procedure only and, as such, has 
little relevance, other than as an occasional source of armoyance, to the lives 
of people in Butte;
2. cleanup standards are little more than arbitrary numbers over which 
ARCO, government agencies, and CTEC members squabble;
3. technology will save Butte by developing solutions to mine the mining 
waste and, in so doing, bolster Butte's sagging economy; and
4. Butte's history can be mined to attract tourists.
Nowhere in the Butte Superfund coverage is the contamination presented 
as a social issue or is reference made to other Superfund sites and possible 
similarities to Butte, e.g. income levels, types of contamination, public health 
issues, population impacts, geographic locations. Also, nowhere in the Butte 
Superfund coverage has there been an attempt to look at the political 
economy of Superfund. This type of coverage would entail consideration of: 
the number of Superfund sites in the United States; they location of the sites; 
identification of the most common PRPs and whether they are still in 
business; how profitable their operations are; how many people they employ; 
what is known about health impacts of those sites; what kinds of cleanup 
solutions EPA has allowed; how much the PRPs at other sites have paid for 
cleanup; and how much have taxpayers paid. These would be reasonable 
places to start questioning, and much of this data is available in EPA 
computerized data banks.
An additional shortcoming is that nowhere in the Montana Standard's
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Butte Superfund coverage has there been an attempt to take a hard look at 
ARCO, e.g. an analysis of corporate balance sheets that indicate profits made 
and losses declared, reference to the corporation’s lobbying to gut the 
Superfund law, or any indication when corporate-issued statements differ 
from its actions. However, in fairness to the Montana Standard, this type of 
corporate coverage is very rare in the mass media. The reason for this will be 
considered later in this section.
EDITORIAL STANCE 
The paper's editorial positions have come under fire from CTEC members 
and other environmentalists who charge that the paper takes a pro-ARCO 
position. Through letters to the editor, the critics are talking back. After the 
paper ran an editorial that charged CTEC with overstepping the legal 
constraints that prevent recipients of federal technical assistance grants from 
taking advocacy positions, CTEC president Mary Kay Craig (7/31/95) brought a 
copy of the law to the editor to show him that CTEC was operating legally.
"He said he didn’t care about the law. That [the content of the editorial] was 
his opinion," Craig recounted after her meeting.
George Waring expressed his frustration in a letter to the editor:
According to Mr, Lewis the Citizens' Technical Committee that's 
staying on top of the Superfund cleanup shouldn't be informing us of 
the pros and cons of the various options available. Why not?
Certainly the Montana Standard isn't performing that function. All we 
get are ARCO handouts printed on the front page.
What this town badly needs is a non-ARCO newspaper. The old 
Copper Collar is sure locked back in place (Waring, 10/21/95).
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This points to another serious structural constraint operating against 
activists. Because there are such high transaction costs in the Superfund 
information-driven process, citizens frequently find they must hire 
professionals to help them translate and assess official definitions of the 
problem and proposals for cleanup plans (Brown, 1991; Creider, 1992). The 
EPA recognizes this imbalance in its provision for Technical Assistance 
Grants (TAGs); in Butte, CTEC operates with such a grant. But there are 
strings attached; TAGs preclude any activity that could be construed as 
overstepping narrow definitions of advocacy. Members of committees 
operating under TAGs frequently find themselves walking a tightrope when 
taking a position on a cleanup option. They are always vulnerable to charges, 
like that made by the Montana Standard, that they are overstepping the 
bounds. The end result is that TAG committee positions tend to be self­
censored by legitimate fear of loss of funding (Greider, 1992).
The strings are even more tightly draw n when citizens must rely upon 
grants from non-governmental organizations, such as foundations (Greider, 
1992). The federal tax code is structured to allow wealthy corporations and 
individuals to fund "activities that are really self-interested expression 
(Greider, 1992:5)."
Under the federal tax code, tax-exempt grants are fully deductible for 
the donors only if the recipients stay clear of partisan politics, and 
many organizations accept these limitations on their politics. They 
may develop educational issues’ or create civic projects' for citizens 
but they cannot take these concerns into the arena of accountability that 
matters most to those in power — elections (Greider, 1992:219).
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The federal tax code assures that the wealthy have the ability to "define the 
political agenda for others... The overall effect of political charity, as one 
might expect, is mostly conservative — guaranteed to preserve the 
status quo. Charity is another form of political power (Greider, 1992:219)."
In addition to struggling with the constraints of the TAG grant, activists in 
Butte also contend with instances of faulty reporting. The day after a July 1995 
meeting about the state’s plan to address contamination along Silver Bow 
Creek, state officials, CTEC members and myself were amazed to read an 
account of the meeting that bore no resemblance to that which we attended. 
The Montana Standard reporter, liberally quoting ARCO project manager 
Sandy Stash, announced that no support for the state plan had been expressed 
at the meeting. This was simply not the case.
To someone unfamiliar with the news business this looks like the paper is 
taking a position. Sometimes that is the case; other times it is the result of an 
inexperienced reporter who has had difficulty locating the comments within 
the context of the complicated issues under discussion. Advocates at public 
meetings would be well advised to preface their comments with an indication 
of support or opposition. In this case, the story was written by an 
inexperienced reporter who likely did not understand the implications of the 
comments made by those who preferred the state's plan to that proposed by 
ARCO. Stash and critics of the state plan were much more direct in their 
comments than were the proponents.
However, CTEC president Mary Kay Craig notes, the reporter "makes no 
attempt to speak with anyone after the meeting than ARCO." The paper has a 
slant, she says:
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The point of view is you have to get every buck out of ARCO in terms 
of economic growth. Forget why Superfund came here in the first 
place. I said (Superfund came to Butte) for the protection of human 
health and the environment. The paper cut out health. Although at 
least this article [about the meeting referenced above] said there were 
some environmentalists concerned about hum an health 
and the environment. They call you an environmentalist because they 
disagree with you and, in a mining town like Butte that makes you not 
credible (Craig, 7/30/95).
Research indicates that activism in contaminated communities is always 
difficult. Further, corporate activity often makes activism even harder in 
those based on resource extraction:
...Overall, the pattern suggests that resource-exploiting industries may 
have been able to avoid political responsibility for worker layoffs — 
and in fact, by contrast, have been able to develop politically useful 
allies — by blaming environmental regulations, and not their own 
practice, as the key reasons for shutting down their operations 
(Freudenburg, 1992:326).
John Ray, CTEC member and board member of the Montana 
Environmental Information Center, characterizes the Standard's orientation 
as more pro-development than pro-ARCO. The coverage is:
...very much filtered through "what's good for Butte is economic 
development. " The paper takes things very much at face value. Six 
years ago I wouldn't have said that; it had a more balanced approach.
It's not promoting a pro-ARCO position; but Butte development. It's 
not a strong environmental paper. The Standard has no 
environmental reporter...It pays low wages, gets people right out of 
school...
Given Lee Enterprise's nature...they want to be in with the powers 
that be. They won’t rock the boat. They'll pick a little on local 
government but less now than six years ago (Ray, 10/24/95).
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Analysis of editorials and columns over the four-year period shows a 
pattern more complicated than a simple pro-ARCO orientation, which bears 
out Ray's assessment. Of 22 environmentally-oriented editorials: two were 
pro-EPA; one very strongly anti-ARCO; three advocated a good timely 
cleanup,; one spoke for the public right to know about decisions being made; 
one addressed the need for planning to address future environmental risks 
(although the subject of this editorial was a site in Helena); and one insisted 
that the ERA move its offices to Butte. Together, those editorials accounted 
for 41 percent of the editorial coverage. Editorials critical of the ERA 
accounted for another 41 percent. The remaining 18 percent of editorials were 
distributed as followed: 9 percent relating to other environmental issues in 
the state; 4.5 percent stressing the need for technological solutions to Butte's 
Superfund cleanup; and 4.5 percent informational.
Of the eight columns, three were written by Standard staff, and of these 
three, two were critical of the ERA. Of the remaining five: John Ray urged a 
cautious interpretation of the lead study results; John Ward ell of the ERA 
corrected six inaccuracies in a Standard editorial; a column critical of the ERA 
was picked up from Mining Engineering magazine; a free-lance writer raked 
ARCO's publicity campaign over the coals; and ARCO replied to the freelance 
writer. From 1990 through 1993, the paper's opinion page ran a gamut of 
sentiments. Three of the eight columns were critical of the ERA.
However, it is in the national environmental stories picked up from the 
wire services, where an anti-government agency sentiment surfaces.
Roughly 32 percent of these national environmental stories consisted of 
criticism of the agency, e.g. ERA officials shredded incriminating documents.
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EPA is too large, EPA budget should be cut, EPA health reports are faulty, EPA 
doesn't collect all the money that is due it. Given the minimal national 
coverage, the large percentage of critical copy selected from the wire services 
does give a sense of anti-EPA overtones over time. But it is not solely the 
selection that gives a sense of bias, it is the manner in which the issues that 
are written about are framed.
The production of news also involves ideological, political, and 
economic factors. Events may be framed in ways that tend to confirm 
or reformulate a dominant ideology. This may result from a reliance 
on organizational sources of information, but it can also result from 
the power that different organizations can wield. Economic factors 
include constraints imposed by deadlines, sales and advertising, the 
assumed beliefs of news sources and the public... (Spencer & Triche, 
1994:201).
In any field, there are constraints. For reporters, the most common are 
deadlines and the timeliness of stories. Deadlines are the bane of a reporter's 
existence. Far too often, a reporter must file a story without the additional 
information he or she would like to include or without comments from an 
interested party because it was too late to call that person, or he or she was out 
of town. And, missing information or comments notwithstanding, the 
deadline must be met. Most experienced reporters will try to get the 
additional information or contact the interested person the following day to 
do a follow-up story but sometimes, given a large beat, the followup may be 
postponed because another story or two is planned for the following day and 
the next day, and the next. Timeliness is another constraint. All too often an 
involved story that may take weeks to gather will go by the board as reporters 
chase breaking stories. Other institutional constraints will vary from
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newsroom to newsroom.
CONSTRAINTS IN THE S T A N D A R D  NEWSROOM
The most common common impediment to good news production is 
understaffing. There is no way around it -  good newsgathering takes time, 
and time is something that reporters working for an understaffed paper do 
not have. The Montana Standard has a very small staff: four full-time 
reporters for Butte; and two bureau reporters who cover Anaconda and other 
outlying areas within the paper’s circulation area (Van Fossen, 11/14/95). 
Publisher Norm Lewis, who joined the paper as editor in January 1994 
reorganized the news staff, eliminating the use of stringers, part-time 
reporters who are called in for additional coverage, and put the stringer 
budget into full-time reporters (Van Fossen, 11/14/95). Although, given the 
tendency for reporters to be restricted to their own beats, the elimination of 
stringers may reduce some flexibility, it has the advantage of both consistency 
in coverage and a staff that is more aware of the local issues and players than 
stringers might be. Also, full-time personnel tend to be more committed to 
their jobs than part-time or occasional employees.
But, adjustments or not, the paper, which has a circulation of 16,000, has a 
small staff and the Superfund cleanup is just one of many other issues in 
Butte (Van Fossen, 11/14/95). Local government issues -  municipal services 
such as water provision and landfills, zoning ordinances to channel future 
development and protect existing sources of water, and taxes among the 
standard staples. Schools must be covered -  curriculum, funding, school 
sports, and features about programs that bring schools and community
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together, special projects, and gifted students. Crime and fire stories must be 
written. Features on local people are needed. Businesses news and Butte's 
sizable elderly population must be covered. And, for this city of some 30,000 
people, there are just four full-time reporters to do all that for seven papers a 
week (Van Fossen, 11/14/95).
Each of the four reporters who cover Butte have very large beats (Van 
Fossen, 11/14/95). One covers what Managing Editor Drew Van Fossen calls 
"cops and courts," as well as writing occasional features; the second covers 
business stories in additional to producing the Sunday business page and 
writing business briefs; the third covers education, in addition to general 
assignment stories and features; and the fourth handles city/council 
government and Superfund. There are also two bureau reporters -  one who 
covers Dillon, Sheridan, Twin Bridges, Virginia City, and the Big Hole area; 
the second covers Anaconda -  and a three-member sports staff -  one works 
five nights; the other two one night apiece (Van Fossen, 11/14/95).
One city editor is responsible for reporter supervision, story planning, 
assignments, and editing everything from obituaries to news stories (Van 
Fossen, 11 /14/95). He works 9:30 a.m. to 10:30 p.m. five days a week and a half 
day the remaining two days. This is the editor's preferred schedule. Van 
Fossen explains:
He likes it like that. He lives at the newspaper. One of the reasons I 
was hired here is that we re so opposite we complement each other 
(11/14/95).
The paper currently has one full-time photographer and is hiring another 
(Van Fossen, 11/14/95). One of the bureau people also takes photos. Four
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copy editors, who work two to a shift in four 10-hour days round out the staff 
(Van Fossen, 11/14/95). This is an extremely small staff for a daily newspaper.
The next most common impediment to good coverage on any newspaper 
is inexperienced reporters. Clearly, all new reporters are inexperienced and 
have to start somewhere to get experience. Equally clearly, some are far more 
equipped to do the job and catch on more quickly than others. In a well- 
staffed newsroom, where experienced reporters, particularly those who may 
have covered the same beat, have some time to spend mentoring the less 
experienced, inexperienced reporters do not usually adversely affect the 
quality of coverage. But, when experienced reporters are overworked or, as in 
the case of the Montana Standard, no longer working in the newsroom, 
inexperienced reporters can present problems to coverage. The problems 
related to inexperienced reporters are two-fold:
1. They have not developed the news instincts that set off alarms in 
experienced reporters who have developed a familiarity with governmental 
forms, have worked in a number of places and learned to recognize certain 
patterns, and are acutely aware of the importance of what is not said.
2. Their output tends to be far lower than that of experienced staff.
Much of what shapes a reporter's coverage of issues depends upon that
reporter's familiarity with an area -  who are the major players, what are their 
connections, their political affiliations, their interests? What is the history 
behind the issue at hand? Who can be trusted for direct information? Who 
has an ax to grind and how does that color the information this person gives 
you? If the reporter is new to an area, he or she must rely upon experienced 
reporters or clips in the paper's library. If the experienced reporters are not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
200
available for consultation an d /o r coverage has been poor, an inexperienced 
reporter can easily be duped. And, in the process, coverage suffers.
John Ray (10/24/95), who is also a political science professor at Montana 
Tech, attributes the poor environmental coverage to a combination of 
laziness on the part of some reporters, the inexperience of other reporters, 
and understaffing on the part of the Montana Standard . Excepting laziness, a 
former reporter for the Montana Standard confirmed Ray's assessment, 
noting that the paper hired reporters out of school, gave no training to 
reporters covering Superfund sites, and expected reporters to cover large 
beats.
An experienced reporter, covering a Superfund site for the first time, is 
usually not afraid to ask the questions he or she needs answered to get an 
understanding of the process. Also, an experienced reporter generally has 
developed a good news sense that will direct his questions, and is accustomed 
to writing about conflicts. In contrast, inexperienced reporters tend to be 
timid about asking questions and have not yet developed the news instinct to 
ask the right questions, and many are uncomfortable writing about conflict. 
Unless there is a good editor, who is knowledgeable about Superfund and not 
himself overworked, the inexperienced reporter's copy wiU consist of little 
more than poorly connected quotes from authorities.
In the absence of investigative reporting, news personnel rely heavily on 
organizational sources of information, which often possess their own 
agendas, perspectives, and timetables and can shape media definitions of risk 
and safety (Spencer & Triche, 1994:201). Inexperienced reporters are not 
trained in investigative techniques, and experienced overworked reporters do 
not have the time to devote to digging.
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Because Superfund issues are complicated, good coverage takes time -  
hours spent talking to government officials, reading government documents, 
becoming familiar with the site and the jargon. An inexperienced or 
overworked experienced reporter with a large beat, no matter how motivated, 
does not have the time to do the research necessary to write coherent copy on 
the subject, never mind do the additional work essential to supplying a full 
range of voices and context. Additionally, many reporters, even those with 
experience, are not inclined to question authorities too deeply. Greider, a 
former reporter, writes:
For several generations...Americans have been systematically taught to 
defer to authority and expertise in a complicated world. The modem 
political culture, transmitted by schools and universities and the news 
media, teaches implicitly that those chosen to hold power have access 
to special knowledge and intelligence not available to others and, 
therefore, their deliberations and actions are supposedly grounded in a 
firmer reality...(Greider, 1992:407).
In the Standard newsroom, as in many others, the staff relies upon 
authorities and ARCO for information that is "safe." The result of reliance 
on authorities as sources often affects which occurrences become news events 
and, in turn, how these events are defined in terms of risk and safety.
The media's reliance on one particular news source may privilege one 
set of definitions over other, competing definitions (Spencer & Triche, 
1994:201).
This seems to be the case in the paper’s environmental coverage from 
1990 through 1993.
Standard managing editor Drew Van Fossen has inherited a difficult
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situation. New to the position himself, he is working with five 
inexperienced reporters out of a total of six (Van Fossen, 11/14/95). And, 
given the low rate of pay for reporters and "the impression that this paper is 
not one of the best in the state," Van Fossen recognizes that the likelihood of 
attracting experienced reporters is low. He knows, given the salaries the 
newspaper offers, it is extremely unlikely he will be managing experienced 
reporters in the near future, so he's trying to create a climate in which 
"people will work hard (Van Fossen, 11/14/95)."
We'll give them autonomy. We'll provide as many opportunities as 
we can and give them the chance to get good clips (Van Fossen,
11/14/95).
O utput among the Standard staff is not uniform. The two best of the staff 
produce 15 stories apiece a week, but the others produce less. Van Fossen says 
(11/14/95). The combination of understaffing and inexperienced reporters is a 
recipe for disaster in any newsroom. In addition to grappling with a small, 
inexperienced staff. Van Fossen, an Anaconda native, is also trying to find a 
way to reach younger readers:
Thirty-five percent of our readers are elderly. They're careful 
newspaper readers... They spend a lot of time with it. At least the ones 
who call me do ...But I don't know if we re picking up readers from the 
young age group (Van Fossen, 11/14/95).
Van Fossen is trying to instill a new approach in the newsroom. He has 
just completed redesigning the paper and is now trying to upgrade the
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content, using a consensus, rather than the usual "vertical hierarchy of the 
newsroom (Van Fossen, 11/14/95)." He has two primary goals: to make the 
reporting less institutional and to "do a better job of looking back and 
following up."
I’m looking for how this public official's decision affects real people.
So much that we write is controlled. People want to know how Jack 
Lynch's city council decisions will affect their tax bills and their kids in 
schools. I want to know when, say, a great reading program is cut, how 
the mother of a kid in that program feels (Van Fossen, 11/14/95).
The need to follow up stories should extend from reporters to the copy 
desk. Van Fossen says (11/14/95). He’s stressing consistency in coverage and 
good headline writing:
The motto everybody should have tattooed on them is "Words 
Matter!"
By and large I’m happy with our staff. I’m trying to breathe new life 
into them, to get a different thought process out of them, and 
sometimes it comes down to using my own thought process (Van 
Fossen, 11/14/95).
Van Fossen is handicapped by more than under staffing, reporters' 
inexperience, and low salaries. He must grapple with the impact of the two 
trends that Malone and fellow authors identified in 1976: the professionalism 
of journalism and the concentration of media ownership in the hands of few 
corporations.
In the Standard newsroom, as in newsrooms across the country,
"objectivity ” is the goal. The insistence on objectivity which requires the 
"meticulous certification of almost every phenomenon by an authority with a
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title," came about w ith the professionalism of journalism (Bagdikian, 
1990:130). This has had a profound influence on the nature of reporting, both 
print and broadcast:
American news, under that [objectivity] doctrine, has become 
increasingly conservative, not truly neutral, and too often devoid of 
meaning. The doctrine led journalists in the standard media to "safe," 
politically neutral subjects like crime and natural disasters, and it 
delayed for decades intelhgent examinations into the causes of 
events...It has given American standard news a profoundly 
establishmentarian cast under the guise of a press independent of 
established authority (Bagdikian, 1990:130).
The objectivity doctrine also keeps news coverage "superficial" to avoid 
offending or boring readers by screening out interpretation and background, 
which has resulted in a loss of context in much news coverage (Bagdikian, 
1990). This is problematic. Mere recitation of facts is "inadequate" because, 
although readers are bombarded with fact after fact they are given no clue 
about how to put the facts together into any coherent reality (Bagdikian, 1990). 
In addition, readers have difficulty understanding the relative importance or 
unimportance of what they are reading because facts without context "imply 
that all facts are of equal value (Bagdikian, 1990:214)."
Another important impact of the dependence on authority-sanctioned 
facts and limitations on context is that American journalists are ill-equipped 
to indicate when authorities lie or evade facts (Bagdikian, 1990).
Unfortunately, neither situation is uncommon (Bagdikian, 1990; Greider, 
1992).
It [objectivity] widened the chasm that is a constant threat to democracy 
-  the difference between the realities of private power and the illusion
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of public imagery...(Bagdikian, 1990:180).
The professional standards of journalism bear a strong resemblance to 
both the scientific and economic assumptions referred to in a previous 
section: news stories that consist of recitations of facts out of context have 
both an atomistic and reductionist nature in that they deal with complicated 
subjects as isolated incidents reduced to scattered quotes or sound bites from 
authorities; the removal of context effectively serves to abstract 
knowledge and information from the natural, and social, world; insistence on 
objectivity denies that subjective decisions are made in the selection of news 
items and the manner in which they are reported; and the removal of context 
leads to an illusion of value-free stories.
However, some argue, these stories are far from value-free. Greider 
maintains over time, think tanks "have shaped the very language and 
thought patterns of the media (1992:300)." He traces the flow of information 
produced by corporate-sponsored think tanks and foundations into schools 
and universities and the news media (1992). It is not surprising, he writes, 
that reporters are so comfortable with authorities — the intellectual 
frameworks of those producing the information and those reporting are 
compatible -  "ostensible rationality and objectivity of disinterested statistics 
and abstract argumentation (Greider, 1992:300)." The press reports everything 
in the manner of objective academic inquiry, keeping its distance.
The stories of real people, while often told in compelling detail, are 
treated as interesting "anecdotes" rather than hard evidence of political 
failure. When they wish to know what the public thinks, the media 
usually turn to opinion polling, a measuring device that is also 
distancing because it reduces public opinion to an impersonal
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commodity. When the results are in, various influentials are invited 
to debate what the polling statistics mean (Greider,-1992:300-301).
However, as is the case with risk assessments, the decisions about what to 
include and exclude in news stories are clearly subjective, as are decisions 
made about what to write about, how to write about it, and who to use as 
sources. The reliance upon authorities and removal of context have political 
consequences, and contribute to the creation of a landscape as removed from 
reality as our Lady of the Rockies from the Berkeley Pit. This tends to serve 
the status-quo because:
Informed social-economic context has unavoidable political 
implications which may disturb some in the audience whose world 
view differs. Those readers and viewers might grudgingly accept the 
briefly announced, indisputable fact but not the display of its similarly 
indisputable implications... (Bagdikian, 1990:214).
However, decisions about what is proper context require both experience 
and an understanding of the issue at hand, as well as the history and political 
economy in which that issue is considered. This demands an experienced 
competent reporter who understands the difference between personal 
opinion and legitimate historical and social background. There are 
journalists who have the necessary skills but they are not used "for the wrong 
reasons (Bagdikian, 1990:214)." Those "wrong reasons," are related to 
ownership of media outlets. In the 4th printing of his book The Media 
Monopoly, Bagdikian reports that just 29 corporations own the major 
markets -  some 25,000 outlets -  in the American media market. He connects 
this concentrated ownership to the sanitizing of the news. Just as the 
consolidation of mining interests under the umbrella of the Anaconda
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Company, and the subsequent entry of Standard Oil executives shifted 
decision-making to outsiders interested solely in short-term profits, now, 
rather than depending solely on their readers, newspapers must answer to 
advertisers. Wall Street investors, and parent corporations (Bagdikian, 1990).
As the media monopoly developed and corporate ownership sought 
increased advertising revenue, the papers became blander to avoid alienating 
readers (Bagdikian, 1990). Political expression, even that which was 
sympathetic to corporations, was eliminated from coverage (Bagdikian, 1990). 
Opinions in political columns were channeled into the mainstream: only 
centrist positions, operating within a narrowly defined interpretation of 
centrism, were seen (Bagdikian, 1990). Ideas questioning the operations of 
corporations or capitalism as a system were not published in the mass media 
(Bagdikian, 1990).
It was a clear demonstration of neutralizing the news to make papers 
more efficient carriers of advertising, but it produced social sterility and 
silence on fundamental forces behind major news events (Bagdikian, 
1990:205).
That silence gave credence to the movements to limit taxes that surfaced 
in the 1980s, Bagdikian notes. The major media, the primary sources of 
information and analysis of economic and political issues for the majority of 
citizens, have, by dint of ownership, become "partners in achieving the social 
and economic goals of their patrons and owners (Bagdikian, 1990:151)." And 
the new "central authority over information" is the "national and 
multinational corporation (Bagdikian, 1990:xix)." This is troubling because 
news, information, and popular culture "shape the consensus of a society
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(Bagdikian, 1990:xx)." The American press has always served as "an 
important and controversial mediating voice for citizens, a corrective 
mechanism that both speaks to power and sometimes checks its abuses," 
Greider writes (1992:277). Like other primary political institutions, such as 
political parties, the press has lost connections to its own readers and no 
longer speaks as reliably on their behalf (Greider, 1992). Although people may 
sense the distance they may not recognize how connected the media has 
become to elite interests and those who dominate politics (Greider, 1992). Not 
only does the news business have no economic incentive to exercise its 
historical role of mediator of social forces, it "faces economic risk if it tries 
(Greider, 1992:305)."
The result is a pattern of media coverage that stresses the shortcomings of 
the public tax-supported sector and ignores flaws in the corporate private 
sector (Bagdikian, 1990). Over time, the public, and some journalists, have 
come to believe the public sector is inherently flawed and private enterprises 
function efficiently (Bagdikian, 1990; Greider, 1992). The most common 
manifestations of this belief can be found in the anti-tax campaigns and in the 
cry for privatization of public service agencies (Bagdikian, 1990; Greider, 1992).
The Montana Standard's coverage reflects these interests. The paper's 
limited environmental coverage has stressed government agency 
incompetence and highlighted disputes between levels of government, while 
simultaneously lauding the forward-thinking of the high-tech businesses 
working on the Superfund waste. The result of elimination or vague 
inclusion of corporate American from analysis is the production of a deficient 
view of the socio-political world (Bagdikian, 1990).
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In Butte, this sense of something missing manifests itself as concern that 
the paper is pro-ARCO. Suspicions of the paper's connection with ARCO run 
deep, especially after the newspaper published a statement of ownership on 
October 1, 1994 which listed ARCO as one of the principal stockholders. After 
a series of letters to the editor charging that ARCO’s stockholder status 
colored the paper’s coverage of Superfund issues, the paper replied in an 
editorial:
Yes, ARCO is a 'significant stockholder in Lee Enterprises. That is, it 
holds more than one percent and less than five percent of Lee stock.
There are dozens of individuals, companies and organizations in this 
category. ARCO is just one more largish investor in Lee Enterprises. It 
has no special privilege.
Nobody from ARCO sits on the Lee Board of Directors or occupies 
any corporate office.
ARCO’s advertising revenue is insignificant.
As far as we know, the publisher isn't being paid off under the table.
This paper makes its own editorial decisions. Reporters are given 
no instructions on how to cover stories that involve ARCO, except to 
report the facts. No editing is done to make a story conform to some 
pro-ARCO opinion....
Assertions of an evil ARCO connection makes dramatic 
accusations, but they're fiction {Montana Standard, 6/15/1994).
However, to look at the paper's ownership in terms of ARCO only is 
much too oversimplistic. The composition of major stockholders is the story 
here. The primary stockholders consist of banks, trusts, and insurance 
companies -  a group very similar in composition to the Superfund Coalition 
Greider wrote about. These are the interests which would be well-served if 
the Superfund law were overhauled much along the lines that ARCO has 
suggested (Barnett, 1994; Greider, 1992). These are the interests promoting the 
efficiency of the corporation versus the inefficiency of government
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(Bagdikian, 1990; Greider, 1992). The corporate practice of interlocking boards 
of directorates (boards with shared members), leads to a frequent 
commonality of political interests (Bagdikian, 1990; Greider, 1992). Charges of 
conspiracy would be equally oversimplistic, but:
The absence of a conspiracy, however, does not mean that large media 
corporations lack power or fail to use it in a unified way. They have 
shared values...[which] are reflected in the emphasis of their news and 
popular culture. They are the primary shapers of American public 
opinion about events and their meaning. And through that, and their 
organization in large powerful corporate units, they are a major 
influence on government(Bagdikian, 1990:9).
However, media owners deny that they influence the news. That may be 
true for "most operators in day-to-day, hour-by-hour operations, but it is not 
true for larger issues in which the media corporations have a strong interest 
(Bagdikian, 1990:100)." It is naive to think, as the Montana Standard editorial 
implies, that exercise of power is necessarily overt, e.g., mandating a certain 
type of coverage in memos from the board of directors or as directives at 
editorial meetings. Control in the news media is exercised far more subtly.
As previously indicated, owners can virtually assure simplistic coverage 
by understaffing and offering salaries low enough to attract only 
inexperienced reporters. Additionally, the passage of open meeting laws in 
most states and the Freedom of Information Act, which allows the press 
access to government documents (unless they relate to Butte-Silver Bow's 
landfill), makes it easier for the press to cover government. Because 
corporations are private entities, with the status of persons, the press does not 
have access to corporate records. Given a 40-hour work week and the
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demands of covering a given beat, new reporters will usually take the path of 
least resistance, and focus their energies on government. And, by placing 
strict boundaries around beats, editors can assure that reporters work within 
fairly strict parameters. Also:
Every year there is a distressing list of reporters and editors of 
newspapers and magazine who are fired or demoted because they 
stumbled on the private politics of their owner . Even when such 
firings and demotions are clear interventions of corporate politics into 
the editorial process, the worse damage is not in one particular incident 
but in the long-lasting aftermath in which working professionals at the 
editorial level behave as though under orders from above, although no 
explicit orders have been given (Bagdikian, 1990:36-37).
Additionally, given the profit motivation, the editorial's contention that 
ARCO advertising money is "insignificant" is questionable. ARCO's 
advertising has also become a source of controversy. ARCO sees it as a means 
of public communication about the Superfund process. Activists see it as a 
source of propaganda and subversion of public awareness and participation.
In response to complaints, ARCO operations manager Sandy Stash said:
The company will continue to advertise...it has increased its 
advertising as more work gets underway. Advertising has proven to be 
an effective method to increase public involvement (Montana 
Standard:12l8ll993).
Even under the EPA's narrow definition of participation, the reading of an 
advertisement would not constitute public involvement. Nor, short of 
activists' angry response to the ads, is it clear how other more conventional 
methods of public involvement came about as the result of the ads. C.B.
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Pearson, 1993 Clark Fork Coalition executive director, expressed concern to 
ARCO that the corporation is shaping public perceptions in an attempt to 
avoid liability:
Under Superfund law, ARCO is the major responsible party -  not as 
your advertisements say, "responsible partner." Your ’Shared Duties’ 
campaign ignores the reality that ARCO is legally responsible for the 
massive damage to our water, aquatic and terrestrial areas {Montana 
Standard: 12/8/1993).
CTEC president Mary Kay Craig says that ARCO’s influence goes well past 
its advertisements:
The biggest problem I have is the corrupting of public energy by ARCO 
(Craig, 7/30/95).
Because the county has also been named a potential responsible party by 
dint of its operation of the Metro Storm Drain through which wastes were 
transported into Silver Bow Creek, it, like ARCO, which controls the purse 
strings, has a stake in limiting the cleanup to avoid spending scarce county 
resources, Craig (7/30/95) says. She points to possible of conflict of interest 
between local officials and ARCO which may result in "not looking out for 
the health of people (Craig, 7/30/95)." These issues are also not included in 
the paper's Superfund coverage.
Unlike the activists, the county health director and chief executive have 
no quarrel with the paper. Health Director Dan Dennehey (9/21/95) says the 
paper does present the information he wants, given the limited amount of
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column inches that can be expended:
The media here has been very good. We use them for so many other 
things -  announcements, immunizations. We've developed a good 
working relationship over the years (Dennehey, 9/21/95).
The publication of press releases announcing immunizations and health 
screening events are an important part of a newspaper's role in a community. 
But the press releases should not be a substitute for good reporter-generated 
news coverage. And, apparently access to the media does not extend past the 
county level. The EPA "can't get a story in the newspaper," public affairs 
officer Sara Weinstock says (7/31/95).
Craig agrees. CTEC also has been unsuccessful at obtaining coverage:
We (she and one of CTEC's technical staff) would like to put an 
educational feature in the paper about Superfund. We explained our 
mandate and said we wanted people to participate more fully. We'd 
put it together, weekly or monthly. He [former editor and current 
publisher Norm Lewis] said, "It's not my job to educate people; this 
paper is for news"....If we could give him news, he'd put it in (7/30/95).
George Waring notes that there are major gaps in the Montana Standard's 
coverage:
Just the idea that there's an EPA office in town where you can get 
volumes of information. But people don't know that. I didn't know.
You don't have to hide information -  just overwhelm people with 
the amount of material and level of expertise needed [to understand 
the material]. The local newspaper has been terribly bad at doing this.
The connection is not made by scientific people (Waring, 10/21/95).
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Greider (1992) maintains that newspapers have a role as educators. "The 
erosion of democracy" is stark proof of newspaper editors failure to take on 
this "responsibility for their own readers (Greider, 1992:303)."
That is, to speak frankly in their behalf, to educate them as citizens, to 
create a space for them in the political debate and draw them into it... 
From time to time, newspapers bemoan the ignorance of the general 
public -  citizens who do not know the name of their own senator or 
hold grossly mistaken impressions about government -  but 
newspapers would never blame themselves for the ignorance and 
inertia of their readers. The decline of voting and elections is the 
subject for regular sermonizing in the press, but newspapers would 
never accept that their own performance as mediating voices is 
perhaps implicated in the decay. Notwithstanding the usual civic 
bromides, newspapers, like other political institutions, run away from 
their own failure to communicate what matters to citizens, in a timely 
context that citizens might understand and act upon... (Greider, 
1992:303-304).
So, in Butte, CTEC and MEIC board member John Ray has developed a 
different set of expectations for the Montana Standard's coverage.
Yes, I read it. Yes, it gives me the information I want because all I want 
is to see how the paper's treating an issue. For example, if the Standard 
had a neutral headline and the other papers had a much more 
proactive headline...! want to know how the paper's presenting it (Ray, 
10/24/95).
Activist George Waring adds:
If one relies on the newspaper you get very little or highly biased 
information. I’m not convinced it's pro-corporate bias but you have 
inexperienced people covering these stories. They can be manipulated. 
Sandy Stash [ARCO spokesman] and Don Peoples [former Butte-Silver
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Bow chief executive and current local businessman] take time to give 
her [the reporter] a worldview, like a form of socialization (10/21/95).
Residents who are not involved with Superfund also find the paper 
lacking:
No. I don't read the Montana Standard because it doesn’t give you 
information. I go to the sources, to the departments involved (Crain, 
9/21/95).
No, because I think the Montana Standard has totally missed the point 
on what Superfund is all about. If there's something I felt had a lot of 
relevance to my life I’d probably go to the EPA or Mary Kay Craig’s 
group (Maney, 9/22/95).
Beyond the lack of relevance that results from removal of context and 
local voices, the trend toward consolidating hosts of warring weeklies and 
dailies, each with their own unique voice that spoke to their own distinctive 
readers, has led to blandness that pleases few (Greider, 1992).
Trying to hold the mass audience's loyalty, newspaper editors have 
retreated from identifying with any single part of their readership -  
especially the lower classes where reader attrition is greatest. This 
strategy has not been especially successful in halting their decline. But 
newspapers have adopted an angle of vision that presumes an idyllic 
class-free community — a city where everyone has more or less the 
same point of view on things (Greider, 1992:292).
Butte is far from idyllic. Nor, can a researcher find one prevailing point of 
view. Neither fact is acknowledged in Montana Standard coverage. Whether 
the result of understaffing, inexperience, ownership, consolidation, a definite 
orientation, or a combination of any or all, the Standard’s coverage for the
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four years from 1990 through 1993 was poor journalism -  the result of what 
was not, rather than what was, reported. If Van Fossen can implement his 
goals, coverage will be greatly improved. It is ironic that Van Fossen's 
background, which is in the area of graphics, rather than journalism, may 
actually be an asset in the Montana Standard newsroom because he has not 
been exposed to the "professional" standards of journalism. However, Van 
Fossen will be constrained by the publisher and board of directors.
If Van Fossen cannot change the orientation of the newspaper, the 
Standardized landscape will remain very similar to Butte's geology -  the 
driving forces are unseen, underground. And the media-constructed 
landscape above ground, like the city of Butte, will contain large gaping 
vacant areas -  among them spaces for public education, public health 
information, and the political economy that directs decisions made. The next 
section focuses upon operative perceptions of public health in Butte, 
indicating where there are gaps and where there are indications that there 
may well be legitimate causes for public health concern which are not being 
addressed.
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1 As a reporter covering a small New England town of 11,000 people (roughly 
one-third of the population of Butte), my environmental coverage of a small 
state Superfund site and a potentially contaminated landfill consisted of four 
stories a week, on average. In addition, the newspaper, a daily with a 
circulation of 100,000 (roughly 3.5 times the circulation of the Montana 
Standard, ran at least two state-related environmental stories a week, plus daily 
environmental coverage from other towns, and federal environmental 
coverage from the wire services.
2 Standard news reporting of contaminants always includes a paragraph or 
two that tells the reader what types of cancers or illnesses are associated with 
the chemicals at the site under discussion. Most reporters keep a previously 
written "kernel" paragraph or paragraphs, if the site has numerous 
contaminants, filed for use in every story on the Superfund site.
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Subterranean landscapes
One very noticeable vacant area in Butte is that which is, in other 
Superfund sites across the country, often occupied by vocal groups of 
residents worried about the health impacts of contamination (Kroll-Smith 
and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Edelstein, 1988,1991; Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992). 
The previous sections addressed the historical landscape, as well as those 
landscapes put forth by the EPA and local health officials, and the local 
newspaper. This section considers the ways in which residents have come to 
understandings of public health issues. It also points to data which indicate 
that public health may well be cause for concern, and notes the failure of 
government agencies to conduct the health studies which are necessary to 
determine if, indeed, a public health problem does exist.
The history of public health in Butte is an important factor in the 
understanding perceptions of health issues in 1996. Unlike the situations in 
W obum (Brown, 1991), Love Canal (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Greider, 
1992), and Three Mile Island (Davidson and Baum, 1991), which have been 
extensively studied, Butte residents were not shocked into the sudden 
realization that their town was possibly unhealthy. Butte is a mining town 
with a history of health risks, both below and above ground. Further, health 
issues were politicized early in Butte’s history.
At the turn of the century, the Women’s Protective Union, organized by 
women working in the boarding houses and restaurants of the mining camp, 
fought against the pollutants that spewed forth from the smelters in Butte, 
and, as early as 1898, "called for national health insurance, unemployment
218
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insurance and a retirement plan for all workers...(Maney, 1990:6). ” Shortly 
after the turn of the century, miners and their families knew that miners' 
consumption, silicosis, was the result of working in dry, poorly- or non­
ventilated mines:
The risk, however, was routinely assumed. From 1916 to 1919 a U.S. 
Bureau of Mines study found that of 1,018 Butte miners interviewed, 
432 (42.5 percent) had miners' consumption, another 63 had 
tuberculosis... As one Butte newspaperman wrote, the miners’ wives 
were also "unhealthy from washing clothes saturated... with... bad air 
and giant powder smoke, and [being] compelled to inhale the... deadly 
fumes (Emmons, 1990:150).
In addition to silica-laden dust, miners were exposed to carbon dioxide 
levels more than 20 times that of "clean country air " and temperature 
extremes that ranged from tropical in the mine shafts to Butte’s above ground 
temperature, which was fiercely cold in the winter. The result:
...in the winter, men were hoisted, in five minutes time, from 90 
degree mine shafts into outside air that routinely reached a brittle 40 
degrees below zero. One longtime Butte resident remembers men 
emerging from the mines "covered with sweat, ” hitting the cold air 
and disappearing in balls of steam. Before the construction of change 
rooms, or dries, the men then walked home w ith their clothes frozen 
on them (Emmons, 1990:150-51).
Along with this acceptance of risk, came prestige and, at least at certain 
points in local labor history, high pay that indicated the danger of the work. 
The m iners’ need for economic security sometimes came into direct conflict 
with health issues, as was the case when the head of the Butte Miners Union, 
disagreed w ith a concerned physician’s suggestion that consumptives be
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"quarantined" from the mines because the quarantine would interfere with
the miners’ ability to support themselves (Emmons, 1990:158).
There was considerable strife among union men about a company 
decision that senior miners receive X-rays to determine the condition 
of their lungs. Those whose X-rays showed "black spots ' would be 
dismissed from their jobs, supposedly for health reasons. The union 
interpreted this as a company ploy to get rid of senior employees who 
cost them more in wages and benefits. The company would also be 
insuring that the men retired before they were eligible for a full 
pension. The men, knowing they would fail the health exams, wanted 
to refuse the X-rays so they could continue working. The union's 
challenge in this case was a boycott of the mandatory X-rays so that the 
men and the company would not know who had "black spots" and the 
company could not discriminate against senior workers. The report on 
the issue indicated that it would be rare for an older worker not to fail 
the exam. It is ironic that the refusal of diagnosis of a chronic illness or 
health risk would be turned into a union victory. The union won the 
right for men to risk their lives in unsafe conditions so they might a 
get a full pension should they live long enough to retire (Finn, 
1994:259-60). The underlining is the author's.
The mining companies disputed the connection between consumption 
and silica dust, maintaining it was the result of the miners' lifestyles or that 
the numbers of miners' consumption in Butte were skewed because younger 
men left Butte to work in cooler mines (Emmons, 1990). The Anaconda 
Company held sway.
Dad died of miner's con. They called it TB to make the Company not 
responsible. It was formerly silicosis. Uncle Pat, everybody I knew as a 
kid, died of silicosis (Shea, 10/24/95).
"From the 1940s to the 1960s the Montana State Welfare Department, 
not the Anaconda Company, shared the burden of pensions for the 
state's "silicotics (Finn, 1994:257)."
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The risky nature of life in Butte was known outside of Butte's boundaries. 
Historian David Emmons refers to a U.S. Navy recruiting advertisement in 
1916, when World War I was raging in Europe, and American intervention 
under discussion. The ad, which ran in the Montana Socialist, indicated that 
miners stood to gain a better life in war conditions than in Butte's mines. 1 
Later in the history, the Anaconda Company operated a local hospital 
(Malone et al, 1993). In Butte, the Company owned the town and this fact, 
activist George Waring notes, has implications:
There's a psychological factor. The Company owns the whole town. It 
really is a factory. You can live here in your little house but can be 
kicked out at any time. You're living on borrowed time. My property's 
defined as part of the Old Plymouth Lode. It's described in mining 
terms.
There's no idea of res publica. Everything is private property 
owned by an absentee landlord. Not only isn't this your property; it's 
the enemy's property (Waring, 10/21/95).
The mines, and the town, were privately owned (Malone et al, 1993; 
Malone, 1995; Toole, 1959, 1972; Emmons, 1990).
In Butte, the company enjoyed the right of eminent domain to exploit 
mineral resources beneath the surface lands. While many Butte 
residents realized the American dream  of owning their own home, 
they were often living on borrowed space and time (Finn, 1994:143).
The miners' bodies were private (Finn, 1995) so silicosis , like mining 
accidents, was a personal "trouble " (Edelstein, 1988), a private problem which 
could occur to anyone in the community. Unlike the more public approach 
of the Women's Protective Union (Maney, 1990), the male-dominated 
associations, which were supported by non-mining residents of Butte,
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approached illness and death as private loss which, inadvertently, reinforced 
the notion of private trouble (Emmons, 1990).
Although county health commissioners noted the poor working 
conditions in the Butte mines in 1914 and recommended that mining 
companies provide toilet cars and covered steel water containers and health 
checks of the horses working in the mines, they did not call for improved 
ventilation in the mines (Emmons, 1990). They called for ordinances 
requiring more square feet for people living in the boarding and rooming 
homes (Emmons, 1990). However, they maintained that the workers were 
primarily responsible for workers' health and advised the permanent 
residents to educate the transient miners (Emmons, 1990).
The pattern that emerges is clear and understandable. As important as 
steady work, in fact an integral part of it, was work in cool, safe drifts 
with congenial mates and a friendly shift boss. It may not need saying, 
but a broken head or miners' con had the same effect on steady work as 
a mine shutdown. Certainly no one could have missed the point of 
the sign posted on the North Butte Mine: "Don't Get Hurt. There are 
TEN MEN waiting for YOUR JOB (Emmons, 1990:154)."
Public health awareness in Butte historically was associated with the 
hazards of mining which extended to the women washing the miners' 
clothes (Emmons, 1990). But that illness was associated w ith the 
underground workings; it extended aboveground only on the miners' 
clothes. The landscape aboveground was threatening only to the extent that 
children had to be kept away from abandoned mine shafts. Although the 
community, in its funding of associational programs for miners, was 
generous, the hazards were not perceived to be shared by the community as a
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whole (Emmons, 1990). However, the EPA Superfund designation changed 
that by labelling most of the community a toxic site, forcing a renegotiation of 
the landscape, or denial. Researchers at other Superfund sites have noted 
"secondary impacts" produced by the "social, technological and legal 
responses to the contamination (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991b:303)." Among 
those "secondary impacts" are issues related to stigma.
In pollution cases, stigma routinely accompanies the announcement of 
contamination and the identification of its boundaries. The stigma can 
apply to a variety of targets, including affected residents, objects...
...accordingly, one can evaluate how disruptive an exposure event 
is, whether its existence is concealable, whether it affects aesthetic 
qualities, whether the victim is any way responsible for its occurrence, 
what its prognosis is, and the degree of peril it portends... [victims’] 
homes and neighborhood are downgraded by observers who exhibit 
anticipatory fears' about the place (Edelstein, 1988:14).
Arguably, the cessation of mining activities, which resulted in years of job 
loss in Butte, was far more overtly disruptive to the community than the 
Superfund label and the accompanying stigma. Because of the risks that have 
always existed in Butte, it is residents adapted culturally many generations 
ago, adopting a way of life that stressed their ability to survive by 
taking risks, and expressing pride in their difference. Outsiders, tended to 
look upon Butte w ith some suspicion (Emmons, 1990). Very possibly, the 
local pride in the risk-taking involved in mining, the pranks of Butte’s kids, 
and the often noted clannishness of Butte’s people was the community's way 
of talking back to the outsiders’ suspicion, both acknowledging the outside 
perception of their community while simultaneously denigrating it by 
making life in Butte far more exciting and Butte’s people far better at
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surviving than outsiders. If this is the case, EPA designation of the 
community as a Superfund site would change little because the cultural 
adaptations to stigma were already in place -  the risks inherent in the place 
had been internalized by the culture and those risks and differences celebrated 
in the Irish designation of "Butte, America (Emmons, 1990)."
There was no way to conceal the mining landscape. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, the land was degraded and, to outsiders, Butte was ugly 
and, as such, already stigmatized. But to residents, this city amidst mine 
waste, was home and, as such, was beautiful. Former state representative 
Fritz Daily, explains:
I'm from Butte. I love Butte. I don't know a better place to live.... I 
don't think the Pit's ugly. When I look at mine dum ps and mine 
waste I don't think it's ugly. But when I drive through Kellogg, Idaho 
[another former mining town] I think it's ugly (Daily, 12/8/95).
The waste in Butte is part of a familiar landscape -  home; the waste in 
unfamiliar communities is immediately apparent and aesthetically 
displeasing to an outsider.
In the case of hazard agents that linger for seemingly indeterminate 
periods, these cultural adaptations to the invisible threat are especially 
significant, as they may become routinized and a new way of life' for 
affected populations (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991b:301).
The toxic label was attached to familiar places, e.g., mine dumps where 
current Butte adults played as children. Butte-Silver Bow Health Director 
Dan Dennehey, who spent all but his college years in Butte, says:
Most people I've talked to about Superfund issues have lived with
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mining scars for years. They played on mining dum ps and tailings. It’s 
hard to get them to understand (Dennehey, 9/21/95).
John T. Shea says the town was a playground:
We played on the mine dumps. We'd find mercury and quicksilver 
and put it in a jar and the bottom of the jar would fall out By the 
Mountain Con [mine], the Centerville football team practiced on a 
mine dum p, especially up here [in Walkerville]. All the mines were 
up here (Shea, 10/24/95).
Sara Weinstock, EPA remedial project manager, says:
I grew up right below Walkerville. Missoula Gulch was filled with 
dumps, there were dum ps everywhere. We played on them 
constantly. There were only two things -  blasting caps and shafts- we 
were told to stay away from. We had a bottle of mercury from the Alice 
Mill area.
On the other hand, my Dad always took a shower before he came 
home. Because my mother was a nurse we didn't picnic on waste 
dum ps (Weinstock, 7/31/95).
CTEC president Mary Kay Craig says she had been told to avoid certain 
areas:
I lived two blocks from Silver Bow Creek as it goes through town. It’s 
now called the Metro Storm Drain. I didn't play in it — my folks told 
me to stay away from it. It was called Silver Bow Creek, Copper Creek, 
Shit Creek. It was Shit Creek to most people. It had raw sewage in it. 
The stench was so bad. We used to take our bicycles under the railroad 
viaduct (bridge). There was a place where there was a 2' by 10’ plank 
across the creek. It wasn’t very wide to get your bike across. We had fat- 
tired bikes. You had to do it or be called chicken. So, of course, we'd 
take the dare and take the chance we wouldn’t fall in.
Along the railroad tracks, boys would hitch rides on boxcars from 
the Utah and Wyoming Street area, and then jumping before they 
reached Kew Avenue. It seemed like a fun thing but we didn't do it.
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We were told to stay away from the slag heaps which are now 
dubbed by ARCO as an "historical mining landscape (Craig, 7/30/95)."
Although Craig points to ARCO’s attempts to minimize cleanup and, thus, its 
costs, the assignment of blame for the contamination is m uddied. One of the 
many differences between natural disasters and CTDs is that in natural 
disasters the survivors are often portrayed as heroes; however "cadmium or 
lead pollution of soil or drinking water creates no heroes (Couch and Kroll- 
Smith, 1991b:304)." In Butte, there is a twist on this theme— the toxins are 
the result of mining activities performed by miners who, because of the 
dangers that accompanied their jobs, were local heroes who brought the 
community to life and then sustained it economically, giving the place its 
identity in the process. Within Butte, the respect for the miners, who are 
often family members, would likely mitigate against assigning responsibility 
to them. However, given the Anaconda Company’s control of the 
community, it would be very possible to lay the responsibility at the corporate 
door.
For three-quarters of a century the enemy was the Anaconda Company. 
The Company controlled the land and the local government, except for brief 
instances when local officials and / or the union asserted themselves (Malone 
et al, 1993; Malone, 1995; Toole, 1959,1972). However, Company authority did 
not forestall collective response, the most public in the form of strikes 
(Malone et al, 1993; Malone, 1995; Toole, 1959, 1972). Because of the vast 
differences in power, the collective resistance was conducted within the 
physical and social landscape established by the Company. The result of 
operating within such constrained terrain was often, ironically, to reinforce
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the oppressive structure. 2
However, it is important to note that resistance comes in many forms.
The challenge to the new owner (ARCO) when the corporation fought against 
paying benefits to the laid-off miners, the appeal to ARCO stockholders for 
reinvestment in the community, the organization of the Butte Family Union, 
and the construction of Our Lady of the Rockies can be seen as forms of 
resistance. As important as, if not more than, success is the existence of a 
tradition of community resistance and the resiliency involved in challenging 
consistently (Finn, 1995).
There are observers who point to a despairing tendency to blame the 
Company when things went wrong in its communities, Butte and Anaconda, 
home to the Company smelter. Bob Vine, Anaconda historian, summed it 
up.
In the past we could always blame the Company. Now many have 
shifted the blame to our city-county government and our elected 
representatives. In our inability to adjust to change, we have the 
myopic tendency to continue to blame others and not ourselves 
{Anaconda Standard, 11/10/90).
Anaconda psychologist Timothy Casey saw the greatest challenge for 
Anaconda as "the need to discard the traditional and entrenched characteristic 
of a company town.’ " Casey defined the problem as one of dependency:
The residents of Anaconda attempted to cope with the stress of the 
shutdown by either attacking ARCO or denying the problem. The 
attackers sought to fight big business. The drezuners preferred to 
believe the smelter would reopen. Unfortunately neither approach 
served to change individual or community circumstances. To 
complicate matters further, the people of Anaconda had always been 
taken care of by the Company {Montana Standard, 11/30/90).
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Casey identified an additional complication related to the cessation of 
mining and smelting operations: the loss of jobs for skilled craftsmen.
From my training and experience, I really see one’s work as a major 
factor in terms of creating and developing an identification. .. I know 
there are skilled people working on jobs where they are unhappy 
{Montana Standardill130190).
Both criticisms seem somewhat harsh given the am ount of change to 
which residents of Anaconda and Butte had to adjust. The criticisms seem to 
miss the importance of mining-related activities which were far more than 
an economic base. Mining activities provided the cultural identity; their loss 
requires extensive renegotiation, as does the Superfund designation. More 
importantly, both criticisms fail to take into account the historically great 
disparities in power between the communities and corporation and their lack 
of traditions of independent governance. However, the issue of blame raised 
by Vine is im portant in contaminated communities.
By assigning the blame the event becomes more controllable because 
then someone should be able to avert it and similar events would be 
escapable in the future (Davidson and Baum, 1991:37).
Researchers have found that who is blamed is also important. A number 
of researchers have correlated the loss of control experienced by victims of 
toxic exposure with long-term stress in instances where victims hold 
someone else responsible (Davidson and Baum, 1991; Edelstein, 1988). In 
Butte and Anaconda, where the communities also lost control over the 
industry that provided their economic base and identity, the stress levels may 
well run  deeper. Researchers at Three Mile Island discovered that symptoms
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associated with blaming others included "more somatic complaints, anxiety 
and depression, poorer concentration or motivation...(Davidson and Baum, 
1991:48)." More than two years after the 1979 nuclear accident occurred in 
1979, these symptoms were still manifesting themselves in some people 
(Davidson and Baum, 1991). Although the notion of blaming yourself may 
seem contradictory, some researchers have found that self-blame restores the 
lost sense of control inherent in toxic exposure situations (Davidson and 
Baum, 1991). Working at Three Mile Island two years after the accident, 
sociologists Laura M. Davidson and Andrew Baum (1991) found that theories 
about different types of self-blame may have explained some of the earlier 
discrepancies about the benefit of self-blame. If the self-blame is attributed to 
behavior, e.g., such and such an action or series of actions on my part was a 
mistake, the sense of control can be regained (Davidson and Baum, 1991). 
However, if the self-blame is attributed to failings in character, e.g.. I'm too 
dum b to do anything else, it simply deepens the depression (Davidson and 
Baum, 1991). So, people who blame themselves for making a mistake are 
more likely to cope better with CTDs (Davidson and Baum, 1991). But:
Unfortunately, because of the nature of technological mishaps, these 
types of disasters are frequently accompanied by externalizing blame. 
And, blaming others is likely to highlight the loss of control created by 
the original mishap and to lead to greater feelings of helplessness and 
its accompanying stagnation (Davidson and Baum,1991:50).
Medical psychologist Michael Edelstein (1988) reports that activism also 
serves to restore a sense of control. But, he adds, in challenging the system, 
activists take on a different kind of stress:
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...in the preponderance of cases, toxic incidents move very slowly... As 
a result, the life cycle of American community groups tends to be 
prolonged through a gruelling period of study and evaluation. Groups 
become exhausted as they enter slow-moving and protracted states of 
the incident during which continued mobilization becomes difficult to 
sustain... (Edelstein, 1988:148).
Further, activist groups often find their questions are not welcomed. 
George Waring tells of receiving a "tongue lashing" from a local official at a 
meeting on the Berkeley Pit after the activists had turned in a petition with 
3,700 signatures that protested the local government acquiescence with the 
EPA in allowing water to continue to flow into the Pit:
...It really made you feel what it was like when Anaconda ran the 
place...He told me the key was to protect the 400 jobs of MRI. H e’d been 
told MRI would be shut down if they couldn't put water in it. His 
view was we’d get the same, or better, level of cleanup by waiting...
That idea of job losses had been planted early in the process. We felt 
the council of commissioners didn’t like being blackmailed but simply 
had to cross their fingers and hope they were doing the right thing. 
They’re willing to put short-term profit ahead of long range (Waring, 
10/21/95).
Also, activists frequently find themselves in conflict with other 
segments of their communities:
For some residents the threat of contamination is remote or simply 
nonexistent. For others, however, contamination is not a remote 
possibility but an immediate reality... For other residents, however, the 
problem is not as immediate, perhaps not as severe, and calls for a less 
volatile and drastic response». Biospheric contamination creates a crisis 
of requiring a choice as to which of several competing experiences of 
the same world, each of which tacitly claims to have faithfully reflected 
that world will be credited as the valid version...
People who define the problem as at worse a warning or perhaps as 
no problem at all are likely to begin viewing believers and their
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emergent groups as threats to property values or jobs. Those who do 
not find in the environmental cues w arrant for extreme concern are 
likely to see themselves as victims of a fictive or at best exaggerated 
crisis (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a:64-65).
Because of the difficulty in establishing causal relationships between 
contaminants and cancers and other illnesses, there is always an uncertainty 
about whether local illnesses are the result of exposure, so in most 
contaminated communities, there are "non-believers" and "believers 
(Edelstein, 1988)."
"Non-believers" espouse a highly individualistic and meritocratic set 
of values. They are defenders of the status quo, and subscribe to the 
view that life in present-day American industrial society is inherently 
and pervasively risky. Accordingly, they hold that the major burden of 
responsibility legitimately resides with each family to secure the 
information and resources necessary to safeguard its welfare...
The "believers" live in less privatized and more sociable worlds. 
They articulate an inextricable linkage between individual and 
collective welfare and an expectation that the polity properly stands for 
the interests of the individual when these would be compromised or 
jeopardized by the interests of the industrial order (Edelstein, 1988:47).
In Butte, because of the mining identity and economics, the situation is 
more complicated. Although she questions the priorities of Superfund, 
Marilyn Maney of the AFL-CIO and Butte-Silver Bow Archives, is no 
defender of the status quo. This points to a possible conflict that could affect 
whether and how Butte residents renegotiate their relationship with the 
landscape as a result of the Superfund designation: residents both 
internalized and celebrated the risk-taking nature of the place, while often 
linking individual and collective welfare in both female and male union
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issues. However, the bottom line which both directed and limited, activity in 
Butte, was always geared toward whatever it took to keep the community 
intact (Emmons, 1990).
Another difference between believers and nonbelievers is related to 
personal experience with health problems. Believers generally have had 
unusual health problems or have had experience with others' illnesses and 
believe that those health problems are directly related to toxic exposure 
(Edelstein, 1988). Nonbelievers and their acquaintances have not had similar 
experiences with illnesses and usually keep a distance from events and 
sources of information which tends to reinforce their denial (Edelstein, 1988). 
In Butte, there are believers and nonbelievers, and people who take stands 
between both poles. Convincing the nonbelievers that there are health risks 
so they should become involved with the cleanup is close to impossible,
Mary Kay Craig says:
People told me if they walked across it [toxic waste] and immediately 
dropped dead they'd pay attention. All you can say is cadmium may 
cause this, lead may cause this, etc. (Craig, 7/30/95).
People with relatives working at the ongoing MRI mine operation or for 
others involved with local politics "are scared to speak out," CTEC president 
Mary Kay Craig says. "Their relatives need their paychecks."
Nonbelievers interviewed dismissed a question asking if there is more 
illness in Butte than in other places with a simple, "No. " When asked if they 
worry about their own or their children's health, there was more variety in 
the responses, from a simple "No" to:
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No, related to Superfund. I tend to worry about what happens if I lose 
this job and I don’t have health insurance (Maney, 9/22/95).
This response indicates an apparent lack of concern about illnesses 
specifically related to the contaminants present in the community and 
simultaneously returns to the ongoing problem of maintaining jobs, with 
benefits packages in the community. Some non-believers tend to return to 
the theme of personal trouble, linking it w ith lifestyle choices, rather than 
environm ental causes.
I don't think there’s any different sicknesses here. If we have an area 
of high morbidity, it’s smoking. My uncle worked in the mines but he 
also smoked three packs a day. There's nothing statistically (Dennehey, 
9/21/95).
Some researchers have noted a shift in the meaning of the word "risk" 
from a fairly neutral term based on mathematical probability where "good ” 
risks were possible, to a negative, meaning "danger" (Douglas and Wildavsky, 
1983; Lupton, 1993). Risk discourse can be loosely grouped into two 
perspectives: the first, as a "health danger , posed by environmental 
hazards...over which the individual has Uttle control ”; and the second, as a 
consequence of "lifestyle ” choices (Lupton, 1993:429). This is not a simple 
issue. Clearly, public health officials would not be protecting public health if 
they did not point out correlations between cigarette smoking and lung 
cancer. Although cigarette manufacturers refute the connection between 
cigarette smoking and lung cancer, most physicians accept the correlation and 
are adamantly opposed to smoking (Montana AHEC, 1989). Published 1989 
estimates indicated a decrease in the numbers of Montana smokers, however.
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lung cancer was the leading cancer among both men and women (Montana 
AHEC, 1989), which is not surprising because cancer often takes years to 
develop (Lappé, 1991; Bates, 1994). What is important to note is: it is more 
difficult to correlate an illness, such as lung cancer or emphysema, with 
environmental causes in the case of a person who smokes; conversely, it is 
also easier to dismiss the possibility of environmentally induced lung cancer 
in a smoker.
Just as a moral distinction is draw n between those at risk' and those 
posing a risk,' health education routinely draws a distinction between 
the harm caused by external causes out of the individual's control and 
that caused by oneself. Lifestyle risk discourse overturns the notion 
that health hazards in postindustrial society are out of the individual's 
control. On the contrary, the dominant theme of lifestyle risk 
discourse is the responsibility of the individual to avoid health risks 
for the sake of his or her own health as well as the greater good of 
society (Lupton, 1993:432-33).
The determination of whether a risk is external or internal, and therefore 
the personal "trouble (Mills, 1959) of the person who smoked, drank, used 
drugs, or engaged in other risky activities, is often made by institutions which 
have a stake in the matter (Lupton, 1993).
Health education emphasizing risks is a form of pedagogy, which, like 
other forms, serves to legitimize ideologies and social practices. Risk 
discourse in the public sphere allows the state, as the owner of 
knowledge, to exert power over the bodies of its citizens. Risk 
discourse therefore, especially when it emphasizes lifestyle risks, serves 
as an effective Foucauldian^ agent of surveillance and control that is 
difficult to challenge because of its manifest benevolent goal of 
maintaining standards of health. In doing so, it draw s away from the 
structural causes of ill health (Lupton, 1993:431).
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When the structural causes of ill health, which could include a unsafe 
environment, poverty or both, are disregarded, public health issues become 
privatized, a personal problem. There is a fine line here which, in light of 
previously cited information regarding the need of government officials to 
allay panic, is of potential concern.
When asked if he worries about the health of his own or children's 
health, Butte-Silver Bow Health Director Dan Dennehey says:
I worry about my children's future in terms of violence, suicide, 
teenage pregnancy -  the num ber one health issues in the U.S. and 
Montana. I don’t worry that my children will get cancer because we 
live in Butte instead of Missoula. We live in a lead-free house, try to 
teach our kids about tobacco and pregnancy. We re worried at 
Congress taking away family planning funding. Worrying about 
poverty and taking children off Medicaid. Worried about [whether] the 
Womens, Infants and Children program  can continue immunizations. 
Concerned about where there is lead, but trying to improve and take 
care of it. That's what our lead program does (Dennehey, 9/21/95).
Dennehey is locating protection from illness in individual family 
practices, while also recognizing the impact that poverty and the 
environment can have on public health. His beliefs about the possibility of 
environmental illness echo those of the EPA risk assessments. History and 
economic concerns, other than as they affect the staffing of his department, do 
not appear to direct his comments.
Other nonbelievers noted they would worry more about their own or 
children's health if they lived somewhere other than Butte. Given a choice 
between living in a more professional individualized culture or in Butte with 
working class culture that takes care of its own, Marilyn Maney (9/22/95) said.
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"With the kinds of things I'm worried about. I’d probably worry a lot more [if 
she and her children lived somewhere else less caring]." Dennehey also 
speaks to the strong sense of community in Butte when asked the same 
question.
I wouldn't worry less. I love it here. The reason is the people here...
When we have issues like Clean Up Butte Day, we had 60 tons of 
garbage given to us in one day. When we had an outbreak of measles 
we had over 3.500 kids immunized -  parents, physicians, the hospital 
and the health department working together. When we had a 
meningitis outbreak we did 7,200 kids -  92 percent of the targeted 
population had shots. The Centers for Disease Control said that was an 
incredible rate. This community rallies around issues when their 
children are at risk (Dennehey, 9/21/95).
It is precisely the issue of whether children, or adults, are at risk that 
separates the believers and nonbelievers. A further indication of conflicting 
belief systems are disagreements about whether more information is needed 
to accurately assess potential public health inputs. Nonbelievers, and some 
believers, say they have sufficient information; other believers say much 
more information is required. Chief Executive Jack Lynch points to his 
reading of "resource and information journals, periodicals and publications 
from both public and private sector agencies " which supplements additional 
information (10/25/95).
We derive our information from both the federal government, the 
Department of Environmental Quality as well as a variety of sources 
that have done studies, both on a contract basis here for public health 
agencies and from individual and private sources (Lynch, 10/25/95).
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Dennehey (9/21/95) says he has "all the information I can get from CTEC, 
EPA, ARCO and the state." Maney (9/22/95) agrees she also has sufficient 
information, but adds, "Again, I just don’t think it has any particular 
relevance."
There is some m iddle ground. When asked if Butte has more illness than 
other communities, if she worries about her children’s health or would 
worry less elsewhere, Ellen Crain said:
I don’t know about illnesses in the state. I look at other mining 
conununities like places in Colorado. We’re going to be different than 
other places in Montana.
1 don't know about cancer. I would say we might have more 
unusual cancers but the first cancer spot is Anaconda.
Of course I worry about my kids' health. When we did the lead 
study I went over it with my doctor. 1 feel for quality of life we re in 
better shape with Superfund (Crain, 9/21/95).
Crain (9/21/95) feels "informed to the nth degree" on Superfund issues and 
"is on everyone’s mailing list."
On public health that depends. My kids had low blood lead levels but 
Sarah had a high arsenic level because she sucked her thumb. I go to 
meetings, know people involved. I called my physician and he said he 
didn’t know. The doctor said she’s probably fine. So, yes on lead, but 
not other related things that aren’t well known (Crain, 9/21/95).
John Ray, a board member of the Montana Environmental Information 
Council who is also involved with CTEC, is comfortable both with the 
information he has and the ease of getting more.
I have no problem getting additional information. I was on the phone 
this morning with Jim Ford [a state official]. I can look at the Great
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Falls paper. It had two articles on streamside tailings; there were none 
in the sub-Standard [a critical nick name for the Montana Standard] 
(Ray, 10/24/95).
Ray, also, would not worry less if he lived somewhere else.
Our house was built by the Anaconda Company; there's no lead, no 
arsenic. They knew where to build for their executives. Butte has 
problems with air pollution but it's worse on the Flats, We have a 
water purifier. We eat organic vegetables (Ray, 10/24/95).
Some of the believers have had personal experience w ith illness:
Statistics show we have a exceptionally high cancer rate, lung diseases, 
heart disease -  here and in Anaconda. My wife's father died in his 30s 
from a disease that attacked his brain. She [the speaker's wife] suffered 
from really terrible asthma and she grew up right across the street from 
a mine on East Park Street. Her neighborhood was devastated by the 
Pit. Her house still stands. She was raised right next to an active mine. 
The asthma and a spinal problem -  a heart condition, 25 percent lung 
capacity -  all made worse by a spinal disorder. Death at 35. Her mother 
died two years after her retirement of stomach cancer at 62 or 63 
(Waring, 10/21/95).
In an editorial in CTEC's publication. Simply Superfund, Mary Kay Craig 
writes:
...I've already had cancer thanks. And we all have friends and relatives 
who ve had cancer of unknown cause. We can't prove that any of us 
contracted a disease from mining wastes left by Anaconda/ARCO. But 
health studies done in the 1970s revealed our Butte-Anaconda area had 
the nation's highest per capita incidence of all disease,' and of heart 
disease.' Lung disease claimed as many women as men here, despite 
only men working underground. Why us? Other towns have had the 
same kind of hard working, hard drinking citizens. Without further 
studies we may never know.
What we do know is that there are plenty of toxins around us -  and, 
yes, in the floodplain of Silver Bow Creek — toxins causing specific
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diseases: Arsenic causes skin cancer. Cadmium is a carcinogen and is 
also associated with systemic lupus erythamatosis, a 'rare' blood 
disorder which claimed two of my very good friends. Lead causes 
learning disorders in children. Mercury is related to a host of human 
health concerns. Unfortunately^ we don’t know where else it is in the 
floodplain other than the 12 (only) test samples ARCO produced for the 
25-mile stream (June/July 1995: 5).
John T. Shea says:
Two years ago I had a lung taken out. I quit smoking in 1964 because I 
couldn't keep up with eight- and nine-year-old kids when I 
was smoking. I smoked cigars for a while. I had a slow-moving cancer. 
I asked the doctor who operated on me, told him I quit in 1964, tried 
chewing but didn't like it, tried cigars. Then the doctor asked me about 
work, I was down in the mine. I worked in the Kelley Mine every day. 
Down there in dust. Then the Pit was nothing but dust. The doctor 
said that combination plus whatever's in the air [was responsible for 
the cancer].
There's a lot of cancer. My mother. My sister lost both breasts and a 
leg. Everybody ... when we were kids most of the guys died of the con 
and there was a lot of cancer...
In the last four or five years, we've had a lot of guys die of 
Alzheimer's (10/24/95).
Janet Finn reports:
Each resident has her story of unexplained cysts. The presence of 
inexplicable forms of cancer, and, as she tallü, she looks knowingly to 
the mines for the cause (1994:266).
George Waring (10/21/95, a history professor at Montana Tech, says whether 
he worries about living in Butte will "depend on what kind of a cleanup you 
get. " He, like so many other Butte residents, is critical of the EPA's decision to 
allow water to continue to flow into the Berkeley Pit.
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The decision at the Pit, the local government was coopted by mining 
interests, to accept a cleanup that no independent community would 
ever deal with. It's as though the people at Love Canal wanted a 
generation to clean up. I’m sure local government thought it did the 
right thing. Grief can induce a level of fatalism (Waring, 10/21/95).
Waring (10/21/95), who attends pubUc meetings and the EPA Technical 
Assistance Grant group (CTEC) meetings, says, "Of course not," when asked if 
he has all of the information on public health and the environment in Butte. 
And Mary Kay Craig (7/30/95) would like to see a health study.
The believers consistently referred to the M oore/Luoma health study 
which was presented at the Clark Fork Coalition Symposium in 1990 but 
never referred to in the Montana Standard in any story that appeared in the 
four years studied for this thesis, years which included the publication of the 
study. University of Montana geologist Johnnie Moore and Samuel N. 
Luoma of the U.S. Geological Survey found, relative to the 480 largest U.S. 
cities, for disease-caused mortality ratio^ showed^:
• All diseases -  Butte had the highest mortality, ranked number 1 in 1949- 
1951 and 1959-1961, and number 5 in 1969-1971.
• Heart and kidney disease -  Butte was ranked number 1 in 1949-1951, 
number 2 in 1959-1961, and thirty-first in 1969-1971.
• Heart disease -  Butte was ranked number 2 in 1949-1951, number 18 in
1959-1961, and number 94 in 1969-1971.
• Other than heart and kidney -  Butte was ranked number 3 in 1949-1951, 
and number 1 in 1959-1961 and 1969-1971. (179)
Their study also found that counties in the area of primary contamination
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were among the highest American counties in terms of rates of mortality of 
both men and women from all types of cancer, and, more specifically, from 
trachea, bronchus and lung cancer through 1979.
Moore and Luoma reported the following data on all cancers in Silver 
Bow County:
• MEN -  211 deaths per 100,000 in 1950-1959; 202 per 100,000 in 1960-1969; 
and 204 per 100,000 in 1970-1979 in comparison to 156, 170, and 180, 
respectively, for the same periods in the state of Montana. The number of 
male deaths in Silver Bow County in 1950-1959 was statistically significant, 
e.g. greater than expected from national statistics. Silver Bow County was 
ranked in the top 30 percent for male deaths in 1979.
• WOMEN -1 6 3  deaths per 100,000 in 1950-1959; 127 deaths per 100,000 in
1960-1969; and 156 deaths per 100,000 in 1970-1979 in comparison to 129,121, 
and 119, respectively, for the same periods in the state of Montana. The 
number of female deaths in Silver Bow County in 1950-1959 and 1970-1979 
was statistically significant. Silver Bow County was ranked in the top three 
percent for female deaths in 1979. (p.lBO)
For mortality rates from lung, cancer and bronchial cancer in 1970-1979, 
the study found a rate of 65.2 deaths per 100,000 in Deer Lodge County, where 
Anaconda is located, and 55.3 in Silver Bow County in comparison to 31.1 in 
Montana, 22.9 in Idaho and 26.7 in Wyoming. (p.lSl)
Also, the study reported that for the period 1970-1979 women in Silver 
Bow County suffered from significantly greater rates than expected from 
national statistics from the following cancers:
• Pancreas, 94th percentile
• Chorion-uterus, 91st percentile
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• Hodgkins disease, 90th percentile
• Lung, trachea, bronchus, 96th percentile (p.l82)
Moore and Luoma noted that the high incidence of cancer in women 
appeared to indicate that the illness was not related to workplace exposure 
only. They called for "detailed local studies" to be "undertaken immediately 
to determine if the risk of death from disease remained unusually high into 
the 1980s"; to determine if the risks are environmental or confounded by 
smoking; to find if elevated incidence occurred outside of the areas of primary 
contamination; and to examine relationships of illnesses with specific types 
of contaminants (182-183). Cancers, which are a national issue, are 
increasingly being traced to environmental conditions.
In 1982, the National Cancer Institute warned that one in every three 
Americans would die of cancer. Cancer already takes more American 
lives, each year, than were lost during all of World War II, the Korean 
War, and the Vietnam War combined; it is responsible for eight times 
as many annual deaths as automobiles.
Apart from the magnitude of such statistics, at least three facts about 
cancer deaths are significant. For one thing, many epidemiologists 
claim that about one-third of the fatalities are correlated with cigarette 
smoking. Also, the deaths are occurring among the young, not merely 
among typical elderly victims. Cancer is the leading cause of death for 
all U.S. children between the ages of one and ten and for all women 
between the ages of thirty and forty. It is second only to accidents as the 
leading cause of death for all Americans under the age of thirty-five. 
Cancer rates for all age groups have been increasing in the last three 
decades. Most important, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment 
claims that up to 90 percent of all cancers are "environmentally 
induced" and hence preventable (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:25).
Although originally his concerns were with the future economic 
development of Butte, former state Representative Fritz Daily has fought 
consistently to lower the water level which will trigger pum ping and
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treatment of the 26 billion gallons of toxic water in the Berkeley Pit. Unlike 
CTEC members and some other Butte residents who w ant immediate 
pum ping and treatment. Daily's fears are targeted at a future point, at the 
elevation at which the poisoned Pit water meets groundwater. He wants the 
level at which the water is the Pit is treated to be lowered.
Every foot the water rises the danger becomes more imminent. I 
personally think the Berkeley Pit and the Butte Mine Flooding Unit is 
the most serious issue for Butte, the state of Montana, and the whole 
Pacific Northwest because the Pit lies at the headwaters of the 
Columbia River Basin.
1 believe the Pit and Mine Flooding Unit has the potential to destroy 
my community from an environmental standpoint, an economic 
standpoint, and a social standpoint. How difficult will it be, in the 
future, to attract new businesses to employ people knowing we have 
the largest body of contaminated water sitting in the m iddle of town? 
Socially, the EPA says a major contaminant is arsenic and every time 
they mention arsenic they say it's a carcinogen. This can present some 
problems in Butte, Montana. (Daily, 12/8/95)
There are miners who believe that the poisoned water will seep through 
cracks and fissures in the rocks before it reaches the level at which the EPA 
says the local groundwater would be threatened. Daily (12/8/95) shows a 
slide of metal railroad tracks in a mine shaft which are systematically being 
eaten by the acidic water. John T. Shea (10/24/95) says the "copper water will 
find seams — it eats rock, eats steam pipe."
The November 1995 deaths of 342 snow geese in the Berkeley Pit sparked 
public concern. Bonnie Immonen of Walkerville wrote to the Montana  
Standard to question ARCO’s manager of Montana facilities, Sandy Stash, 
who has insisted that there is insufficient proof to connect the birds' deaths to 
the waters of the Pit:
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My goodness if she had ever been married to a miner who worked his 
entire life in the Butte mines, she would know that the water in the 
lake’ is highly toxic.
My husband used to come home from work in the mines (even 
when the pum ps were still going up on the hUl) w ith his legs just full 
of copper sores. We treated them each night w ith zinc oxide and 
w rapped them in plastic in hopes of keeping them dry through the 
next shift. It never helped. He worked in water up to and over his 
ying yang, which is now speckled with arsenic bum s (Immonen,
12/10/95).
The large color photographs of some of the autopsied snow geese 
displayed at the Feb, 24, 1996 memorial for the birds were a gruesomely 
graphic affirmation of Immonen's letter. Speakers at the memorial protested 
the EPA's refusal to take seriously public comments in 1993 and 1995 that 
warned of danger to migrating birds. Caroline Byrd, a member of Women’s 
Voices for the Earth, made the link between the death of the birds and the 
public health of Butte, and asked people at the memorial:
How many dark birds have died in the dark waters of the Pit? We 
have no idea (Byrd, 2/24/96)."
In newspaper articles that appeared the following day in Lee newspapers, 
the Missoulian  and the Montana Standard, Sandy Stash^ of ARCO was 
quoted as asserting the deaths were "a unique occurrence and that there is no 
evidence of previous major bird kills (Missoulian, 3 /7 /96).’’ Byrd replied to 
Stash’ comments pointing out information in the state of Montana’s report 
on the incidence.
The report says that the snow geese's deaths were not an isolated 
occurrence" and details an incident in November 1993 when six birds 
were found. The report points out that the dead geese were discovered
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only because snow geese are white and people happened to be in the pit 
checking water quality shortly after their deaths. According to the 
report, it's likely that darker birds, such as loons, grebes, pelicans, 
cormorants, geese and ducks have died unnoticed in the dark water of 
the pit.
...The Golden Sunlight Mine in Whitehall, not far from Butte, has 
developed methods to keep birds from landing in its toxic tailings 
ponds. H undreds of dead birds have been found in cyanide heap-leach 
ponds in the Black Hills (Byrd, Missoulian,'M7196).
Despite the warnings of seepage and the deaths of birds, health studies 
have not been conducted in Butte. There are few health records on the local 
l e v e F .  The county relies upon the state for data and protocols, Butte-Silver 
Bow Health Director Dan Dennehey says. The local health board has both a 
maternal child health assessment and breast and cervical cancer assessment.
We're surveying by mail. The state of Montana has a task force of 
breast and cervical cancer. How do they screen? What protocols do 
they use? The state’s doing that; we re trying to make it community 
and county specific.
A lot of women over 50 or 60 are not going to gynecologists. In the 
initial phase we looked to the state for records and found nothing 
out of the ordinary here in terms of incidence. But the hospital hasn't 
reported for a number of years. Now we re hoping for better statistics 
(Dennehey, 9/21/95).
No local studies have been undertaken; even worse, cancer reporting from 
Butte has fallen behind, skewing state records (Hellhake, 9/15/95). Obtaining 
recent cancer data from the state public health and hum an services 
departm ent will not be possible until sometime in 1996 because St. James 
Hospital, the only hospital now operating in Butte, has not reported cancer 
statistics properly for the past three years or so, according to Debbi Hellhake of 
the state Tumor Registry (Hellhake, 9/15/95). Until the reporting is up to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
246
date, the numbers for Butte-Silver Bow, and for the rest of the state of 
Montana, will not be correct (Hellhake, 9/15/95).
An official at the state office of Vital Statistics Division says:
Cancer in Butte is probably a real issue. But it's a problem for 
government. Epidemiologists say until we know more about what 
people have done and where they have been... ( 7/18/95).
And, the official says, because of a "smedl number" statistical problem, for 
the first time since 1954 the 1995 Vital Statistics Annual Report will not 
include cancer morbidity rates "because people at the local level tend to 
misinterpret those numbers (7/18/95)." The "small num ber problem" he 
refers to is related to what statisticians call "chance variation," the possibility 
that one occurrence of the events being measured can occur, at random, in 
such a way that it changes the ratio of the events being measured. For 
example, a very intelligent person may take the Scholastic Aptitude Test on a 
day he or she is feeling ill which results in a much lower score than he or she 
would normally get. In a study of many test takers a total will not be changed 
by one skewed test score; in small populations, like Montana, one randomly 
sick person could alter the ratio, producing a rate that is misleading and could 
appear to be well above or below the state or national average for the event 
measured. So statisticians prefer to avoid working w ith small numbers. The 
end result is that the statistical approach, which considers only the problems 
inherent in numbers, can overlook a possible social reality and, thus, 
perpetuate the status quo, even if that status quo is possibly unhealthy.
Other states, such as North and South Carolina are working with
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Geographic Information System technology to get a handle on health 
statistics, the state official says.
We haven't touched that here -  partly as a result of issues related to 
geocoding and partly because of rigid confidentiality laws. So we 
cannot or will not identify individuals who may have died of cancer by 
address. We have, within our constitution, very strong language about 
the individual's right to privacy ( 7/18/95).
So, in Montana, it is well nigh impossible to determine areas of high 
incidence, what epidemiologists call "clusters. " This identification of a cluster 
is a first step in the process of determining a connection, or lack of it, to a 
specific illness and the environment (Brown, 1991). A grouping of cancers 
does not necessarily prove that connection -  such groupings can occur 
naturally, by random. However, if clusters are not identified, the studies 
necessary to indicate if they are random or environmentally induced will not 
take place. In the name of privacy, Montanans have the right to suffer from 
potentially high rates of environmentally induced illness. And the morbidity 
figures that might give credence to calls for further study of public health will 
not be published for fear of misinterpretation.
There are two remaining impediments to data collection which could lead 
to underreporting of Butte and Montana cancers. The first is that many 
Montana residents go out of state both for cancer diagnosis and treatment so 
some of these cases may not be reported to the Montana Cancer Tumor 
Registry (Montana AHEC, 1989). The second relates to Butte residents who 
have relocated. Because of the latency period of cancers, the time before the 
illness manifests itself (Lappé, 1991), and the migration of families from Butte 
in the years that mining operations wound down, the full public health
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impact of exposure to contaminants in Butte will never be known -  any 
illnesses experienced by those who relocated will be recorded as belonging to 
the places of relocation. This causes two statistical problems: first, another 
community's cancer rates will appear to be higher than they actually are; and, 
second, Butte's will appear to be lower.
To date, no federal health studies are planned in Butte -  in spite of the 
Superfund Reauthorization of 1986 which directs "the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry [ATSDR] to perform a health assessment at 
each Superfund site to assist in determining whether to take additional steps 
to reduce human exposure and to collect additional information (Barnett, 
1994:231)." Sara Weinstock, the EPA's remedial project manager in Butte, 
says:
The agency has done no health studies here. They're expensive and 
take a long time. Butte-Silver Bow did the blood lead study. There's a 
small number problem, even on the blood lead study. I’d rather spend 
money cleaning it up than doing the studies ( 7/31/95).
The EPA will conduct a Baseline Risk Assessment for the Butte area, the 
agency conducted the Time Critical Removal of lead-contaminated soil 
concurrently with the risk study to immediately reduce the possibility of 
adverse health effects of exposure, especially on children (Weinstock, 1996). 
Weinstock is correct -  cleanup operations should reduce the risk of 
environmentally-caused illness in Butte and, assuming a limited am ount of 
dollars, money would likely be better spent on cleanup than tests. If, up 
front, money were an issue, Weinstock’s approach would be the only
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reasonable alternative. However, under the federal Superfund law the costs 
involved should be recoverable from the potentially responsible party(ies) 
(Barnett, 1994). So, without considering the unresolved structural issues 
inherent in the Superfund law referred to in the previous chapter, it is 
difficult to understand why the EPA is more concerned w ith reducing 
expenditures than studying the full extent of health impacts involved with 
the largest contaminated site in the country.
And there are other issues involved here: possible teratogenic (adverse 
impacts on a fetus) and mutagenic (changes in individual DNA structure) 
results of exposure will not be identified without health studies.
Furthermore, residents, as was the case in W obum (Brown, 1991), who may 
have been sickened from exposure, will lose the opportunity to win a legal 
claim for future medical costs without health study data to buttress their cases 
(Brown, 1991); and, given the number of applications for expansions of 
existing mines and new mines in Montana, data about the potential health 
damages of exposure to mining-related contamination would be very useful. 
Under the reauthorization, citizens are allowed to petition ATSDR for health 
assessment (Barnett: 231).
Mary Kay Craig says:
The agency [ATSDR] that might do an epidemiological study is too 
dam n busy. When they came to town, the then board of C l EC asked 
them to go away. I got them back here [in 1995]. They just don’t have 
the resources to look at Butte closely (7/30/95).
CTEC has not heard from ATSDR. Craig is not alone in her criticism. 
...studies of health risks at early 1,000 Superfund priority sites are
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'seriously deficient.' Because ATSDR health assessments have not fully 
evaluated the health risks of many Superfund sites, communities have 
not been adequately informed about possible health effects... If the 
agency can't improve its performance. Congress should consider 
abolishing the assessment program... EPA has seldom used the 
assessments and most local officials and community residents do not 
value the assessments highly if they know them at all^ (Montana 
Standard: 9/4/91).
A researcher on the ATSDR performance in Butte and Anaconda found:
The so-called health assessment for Butte is a memo written by an 
ATSDR staffer regarding whether people swam or waded in Silver Bow 
Creek would incur health problems. The memo doesn't address the 
widespread contamination in Butte nor does it determine whether 
Butte's 34,000 residents might be exposed to lead, pentachlorophenol, 
cadmium or any of the other contaminants that lace the streets of the 
town.
Likewise the ATSDR document labeled as the health assessment in 
Anaconda is not a health assessment either. Instead, it is a letter from 
an ATSDR physician confirming the EPA's 1985 decision to move the 
Mill Creek families. As was the case for Butte, the so-called ATSDR 
health assessment for Anaconda did not address the widespread arsenic 
contamination in the community, nor possible exposure to arsenic 
among Anaconda residents (Tuholske, 1993).
It is not surprising that the health assessments have been discounted 
outside of the agency; they have been discounted within the agency too, partly 
as a result of the agency's orientation. Since 1970 the EPA has been more 
oriented to the concerns of engineers and technologies than to consideration 
of the effects of toxic exposure on human health (Yeager, 1991).
In 1977 there were only some fifteen physicians on EPA's (relatively) 
large professional staff, and EPA Administrator Douglas Costle 
suggested in congressional hearings that the agency's research on the 
health effects of toxics was quite limited. Other congressional 
testimony indicated that EPA experts tended to deal more with cities'
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and towns' treatment facilities' managers than with their public health 
officials.... and that within EPA there was poor coordination between 
the dom inant engineering component and the health effects 
researchers (Yeager, 1991:225).
Physicians need a number of skills to answer questions about toxic 
exposure and other health risks, including "the ability to evaluate and assess 
the nature and the extent of a patient's exposure to an environmental hazard, 
the ability to assess the degree to which the hazard presents a health threat, 
and the ability to communicate the extent of the risk to the patient or to the 
community ... to minimize or prevent further exposure (Cortese, 1993:5)." 
However, medical students receive little training in these skills:
One study that examined the teaching of occupational and 
environmental medicine concluded that current medical students 
receive less than four hours of education in these two areas during 
their four years of medical school...The most likely candidate [to teach 
these skills] is the course on epidemiology..., but in general this subject 
is given little attention. The same situation applies to the education of 
physicians after medical school -  environmental and occupational 
health are rarely covered (Cortese,1993:5).
Most physicians lack an adequate background in statistical reasoning 
and in environmental and occupational epidemiology, and many risk 
assessors have not been adequately grounded in human disease biology 
or toxicology.... (Cortese, 1993:10).
The EPA was fortunate to have local physicians working on the Butte 
cleanup, Weinstock (7/31/95) says.
We had a pediatrician helping ... the cleanup. We had a couple of 
doctors here working with us; one died, another's moved on. We 
have a gap there now. But we already have the Butte Lead Abatement 
Program which will clean up all avenues [of lead]. Dr. McCarthy played 
in an integral role in developing the lead plans.
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The current lack of physicians involved in the cleanup and studying data 
is important. Given the lack of training in medical school, unless physicians 
are willing to educate themselves, there is the very real possibility they will 
not consider environmental sources of illness.
During a period of health concern, the family is dependent upon 
physicians reluctant to accept environmental explanations for 
symptoms, relying instead upon conventional explanation and 
treatment. After being diagnosed as "normal," the illness becomes 
demystified, and the victims have no reason to search for 
environmental causes. Even environmental' diseases rarely prod 
physicians to search for environmental causes. It is no wonder that 
many victims have this jaded view of the medical establishment.
When doctors fail to "legitimize" toxic exposure as the cause of health 
problems, claims by victims may be viewed as irrational. Furthermore, 
establishing a rational basis for health impacts is epidemiologically 
difficult under the best of circumstances. The resulting uncertainty 
about health effects at Love Canal helped to split believers from non­
believers (Edelstein, 1988:50).
In Butte, as in other contaminated communities, the uncertainty has 
resulted in believers and nonbelievers. But Butte may differ from other 
communities in that the Moore-Luoma research which indicates a need for 
study of public health is not common knowledge. It is difficult to say if 
awareness of the study would change nonbelievers’ minds; beliefs are 
strongly held (Milbum, 1991; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a). However, it 
does seem to be important that people in Butte have the right to all relevant 
inform ation.
As it stands, there may well be a local knowledge about health issues that 
is disregarded by government officials. As long as this local knowledge is 
discounted and believers are hampered in their attempts to gather
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information on public health, the public health landscape in Butte will 
remain buried -  will continue to be a private problem, an ignored local 
knowledge expressed in rumors, whispers, knowing glances, and silences.
Although Butte residents have not been adequately informed of health 
risks and limitations inherent in the risk assessment process, there is some 
indication that the shocking deaths of the 342 snow geese have brought, at 
least, the possibility of future health hazards into the public arena. Whether 
the increased awareness of health hazards will mobilize residents to join the 
few who have challenged what they believe to be inadequate cleanup plans 
and an inequitable distribution of power, to influence the cleanup process 
will depend upon a number of factors. One of those factors, the local 
understandings (the social landscapes) of Butte will be considered in the next 
section.
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1 "Mining jobs, said the Navy, were uncertain; there were strikes, layoffs, and 
the omnipresent threat of illness; even a mild one meant lost wages and high 
medical costs. The Navy promised steady work, paychecks that came whether 
sick or well, and free medical and hospital care. A disabling illess or injury 
meant economic catastrophe for the miner, no job, no prospect of a job, no 
income. The disabled Navy man received a 'generous pension." Accidental 
death in the mines, 'stuffy, gloomy places at best, left your family with only 
what you've saved.' The Navy's death benefits were six months' pay and full 
pension benefits to the survivors. In the mines, promotion was slow and 
uncertain and marked by favoritism. In the Navy it was sure and quick and 
'the best man wins.' Old miners were not just scarce, they were unknown. 
Illness and age related debilities meant their jobs went to 'younger men.' Navy 
men, on the other hand, retired after only thirty years' service spent, 
moreover, in 'fresh air, sea, clean, healthful, athletic life,' at three-fourths 
their pay at the time of retirement." (Emmons, 1990:167)
2 See Finn's discussion of the gender-based differences in resistance.
3 Michael Foucault, a psychologist and philosopher, is best known for his 
work that stressed that "human sciences have become techniques of power." 
(Farganis, 1996:419) He coined the phrase "carceral society" to denote that 
power is embedded in relationships of people with teachers, doctors, 
therapists, social workers and psychiatrists" who act as moral agents whose 
discretionary power is based on their membership in the credentialed 
knowledge elite." (Farganis, 1996:420)
Mortality ratio is the per capita mortality rate relative to that expected for 
the nation.
5 Numbers have been adjusted for population to avoid what statisticians refer 
to as "small number problems."
 ̂ Stash has since been convinced that the water in the Berkeley Pit killed the 
geese {Missoulian,4 /25 /95)
7 Health records from emergency room services of Silver Bow Hospital from 
Jan. 19, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973, the latest year of records in Butte-Silver Bow 
archives, indicate that, of a total 10,409 visits, 13.8 percent involved chest- 
related complaints, and of these chest-related complaints, more than half,
50.51 percent, were children/young adults aged 20 or y o u n g e r . Of the 10,409 
visits 1.9 percent (199) involved health exams and work releases, 22.5 percent 
(2,341) involved trauma, and the remaining 75.6 percent (7,869) were medical 
visits. Although, on their own, the records have no statistical weight, I spent 
some time with them. Because of the illnesses associated with the contaminants 
in Butte, I searched for references to convulsions, spontaneous abortions, 
cancers, lesions, cysts, tumors, dermatitis, lupus, neuromuscular disorders, 
headaches, urinary and kidney problems, liver, heart, chest-related visits, 
nervousness and/or agitation, and flus and colds. All of these categories were 
present (and would likely be present in any hospital emergency records for a 
similar period). Of the 7,869 medical visits, those references that showed up as 
one percent or more included: chest-related visits, 13.8 percent; flus and colds, 
3.3 percent; heart-related visits, 3.2 percent; cancer and chemotherapy, 1.13 
percent; dermatitis and rashes, 1 percent; and lesions, cysts, and tumors, 1 
percent. Although less than one percent, during this period the hospital 
treated four patients with lupus. Slightly more than half of the chest-related
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visits involved people under the age of 20. Although in 1973 there were two 
hospitals in Butte, I am assuming that complaints seen in Silver Bow General 
Hospital's emergency room in 1973 were representative of those seen at St. 
James Hospital. Because St. James Hospital was larger ( 180 beds) it is likely its 
emergency ward saw more people, proportionately, during the year than 
Silver Bow General Hospital (140 beds). (State records for 1974 indicate St. 
James Hospital treated almost twice the number of inpatients than treated by 
Silver Bow General Hospital.) Although children in school are exposed to 
outbreaks of communicable diseases, the large numbers of children seen in 
the Silver Bow General Hospital's emergency room for respiratory problems 
could indicate that the respiratory tracts of children in Butte may have been 
weakened. Or a statistical comparison may find that in that year this was a 
typical emergency room pattern in a similar-sized community. The only way to 
put the health question to a test is to conduct a health study.
8 The report, "Superfund: Public Health Assessments incomplete and of 
Questionable Value, was prepared by the federal Government Accounting 
Office for the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, August, 1991.
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THE SOQAL LANDSCAPES OF BUTTE 
Diverse Terrains
Butte was founded on the notion of extraction of natural resources, and 
was developed within context of a Western industrialized belief that the 
environment was background, that human activities were exempt from the 
ecological constraints that acted upon "lower" animals and the landscape 
(Catton and Dunlap, 1980). These beliefs are deeply embedded in humans and 
our social institutions, which are slow to change. The change, which 
involves a renegotiation of the relationship with the land, involves both 
"political disagreements about how to live in nature" and "divergent 
discursive frameworks for understanding the environment' (Greenough 
and Tsing, 1994:95)." Those frameworks are shaped by experience, both 
personal, and historical.
History, however, is more than antiquarian reminisences of colorful 
mining kings and of epic doings of yesteryear. Much more weightily, 
history is the burden of attitudes, mores, prejudices, loves, and hatreds 
rooted in the economic, social, and political milieu which formed over 
100 years ago...
...Like the frontier itself, Butte was rich, unabashedly exploited, 
turbulent — and endlessly fascinating (Malone, 1995:217).
The key word is was — Butte was rich, was unabashedly exploited and 
turbulent, was endlessly fascinating. What is the Butte that is? What does it 
mean when the entire history of a community is intimately tied to current 
notions of contamination? Does this necessarily disparage the lives of those 
who lived and worked and died in Butte? Will one of the most vibrant and 
exciting histories in the United States be placed on a slag heap of
256
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contamination to be scrapped as unenlightened, to be junked? There is a real 
tension here which surfaces in the residents' justified love of the history and 
of their place, their home. It is possible that the history is the locus of 
community resistance, the site of "buried subjugated knowledges^ (Foucault,
1994)."
"...with what in fact were these buried subjugated knowledges really 
concerned? They were concerned with a historical knowledge of 
struggles. In the specialized areas of erudition as in the disqualified 
popular knowledge there lay the memory of hostile encounters which 
even up to this day have been confined to the margins of knowledge 
(Foucault, 1994: 203)."
Butte is no stranger to struggle. Given the extreme physical and social 
landscapes of Butte, the process of negotiating new self-definitions will likely 
be painful and slow. From the 6,500-foot elevation of Walkerville to the 3,500 
miles of tunnels in the depths of Butte Hill, there is little m iddle ground.
The simple truth about Butte, Sara Weinstock (7/31/95) says, is "you either 
love it or hate it." But, depending on whether you were bom  and brought up 
in Butte or you are a outsider, you may be loving or hating something quite 
different for various reasons.
Likely a result of the life-and-death nature of the forces that shaped Butte, 
almost from its inception it assumed metaphorical status. There are many 
metaphorical Buttes. And the metaphors are often contradictory — home, 
poison, a disaster, an opportunity, ugly as sin, beautiful, fact, fiction, beloved, 
despised. The metaphorical Buttes, as represented in discursive frameworks 
which often border on the nostalgic, seem to diverge along the axes of history, 
economics and the import of the contamination. The Superfund designation
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may have exacerbated already existing divergences by dint of the stigma 
inherent in the Superfund label and the uncertainty about the impact of the 
contamination upon public health. The Superfund process itself, which has 
been characterized by "absences, silences, repression ideas, and marginalized 
statements (Peet and Watts, 1993:230-01)," may have widened the chasms. 
Absences in the Superfund process in Butte include organized public 
participation, health coverage in the local media, a study of the synergistic 
effects of contaminants and sites, as well as accurate health records. Perhaps 
the most important absence is that of social context in technocratic visions of 
the landscape.
The issue of cancers and other diseases in Butte is cloaked in silence. 
According to Mary Kay Craig, the notion of health studies has been repressed:
We don't have the health studies. Anyone who comes to town to do a 
health study may get run out. When I was living in California 
someone said they were doing a health study. I'm not sure if it was 
this [Superfund-related contamination] or radon. It was something 
about the slag heaps. Lately, I hear ARCO has done some new studies 
— but that is proprietary information, so they aren't sharing what they 
know (Craig, 7/30/ 95).
It is possible to attribute ARCO's attempts to keep its cleanup costs down 
to the structure of the "treadmill of production" (Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994) 
which mandates exploitation of both natural resources and labor to produce 
profits for stockholders rather than to evil intent. However, it is impossible 
to leave unquestioned the corporation's right to withhold health 
information. Clearly the corporation's private rights in this respect should be 
subordinate to the public right to know.
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Equally clearly, as evidenced by official reaction to the previously referred 
to nurse's statement about illness in her neighborhood, some residents' 
concerns about illness have been repressed in the Superfund process. 
Throughout Butte's history, health issues have been marginalized — from 
the Anaconda Company's refusal to comply with state occupational safety law 
to its ability to alter death certificates, to its changing the cause of death on 
death certificates from miners' consumption to tuberculosis to free the 
company of responsibility, to the associations' efforts to provide health and 
death insurance. In his research of a coal-based community in Appalachia, 
Wolensky (1991) found:
This structure of domination, centered around the civic governmental 
order has meant that the vast majority have been excluded from the 
practice of economic and political decision-making. The benefits of 
business productivity were tightly controlled by those with economic 
position while the government jobs and other factors were under the 
direction of political leaders whose regimes were characteristically 
corrupt and particularistic. High levels of poverty, unemployment, 
and underemployment amid extremes of wealth and inequality have 
not only reflected political and economic exclusion but have reinforced 
dependency (Wolensky, 1991:230).
THE HISTORY
The patterns of community development in the area Wolensky (1991) 
researched and Butte are similar. Imbalances of power have always existed 
close to the surface in Butte. Although it is difficult to imagine that 
politicians in the 1990s would have the autonomy of those in Butte's not-so- 
distant past, it is conceivable that the history has led to both a very narrow 
definition of democracy, especially in terms of citizen participation in
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government. John Ray notes a lack of professional criteria for 
governm ent office:
Jobs were set aside for blind people, like the justice of the peace 
position... the debate was whoever was the blindest. The notion of 
who could do the job was irrelevant. The notion of setting aside a job 
for people, the sheriff's job was often set aside for Serbians. In the 
history of these jobs, none were based on qualifications.
The first election, when we moved to Butte, there were three 
criteria for public office: family man, union member, veteran. They 
campaigned on the steps of various parishes. None of them needed 
certain qualifications for office...(Ray, 10/24/95).
Lack of professional qualifications notwithstanding, the criteria to which 
Ray refers is understandable within context of Butte's history. This setting 
aside of jobs is the legacy of a community in which members took care of each 
other, and recognized, given the dangerous nature of their work, any one of 
them could be the next person who needed to be cared for. The criteria speak 
to the need for local government to reflect the community's working class 
family values, shared by many American communities, which have been 
discounted by the increasing professionalism of all segments of American life. 
Clearly, an electoral system built solely on values which exclude notions of 
job qualifications can be abused. This may be what local critics mean when 
they charge Butte officials with "economic boosterism " and question their 
competence.
The local government operates the way machine politics or Southern 
politics do, where you have one party which is not particularly 
accountable to the public and doesn't want it to participate. It operates 
on graft or corruption. The approach of Butte government to a 
problem is, "Let's cut a deal. " Butte has never had good government.
It was controlled by the company, on occasion by labor or been
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controlled by someone else, socialists in the early 20th century. The 
notion of public responsibility is meaningless... The Anaconda 
Company did not sponsor a spirit of critical objectivism.
There's an interesting phenomenon in Butte. Maybe it's part of its 
corporate past. Competent people never get involved in government. 
Maybe it's because if you were prosperous you could control without 
running for government. It's interesting, also, how elected officials get 
family members jobs (Ray, 10/24/95).
The movers and shakers tend to be people who never left Butte or 
went away to college and came right back. There are certain families 
here in Butte, intertwined with the Montana Power Company [which 
was founded by the president of the Anaconda Company] and 
government. Their influence has been so pervasive (Waring, 
10/21/95).
In any community, the dominance of one particular group is problematic. 
However, the dominance of "objective " professionals from community 
values and human concerns about care leads to situations just as easily open 
to abuse, as is the case with risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. The 
trick is to find the m iddle ground, to think past a community /  professional 
duality. Given that the community is now associated with contamination 
and the professionals with its cleanup, it would be easy to dismiss community 
values but this would be wrong. There's much to be said for the the 
operative values of Butte, Mark Reavis says:
This is one of the most generous towns around. When I first got here I 
saw a brief mention of need on a radio show get incredible results.
There's a level of generosity for providing for others here. Other 
towns, like Bozeman, put their poor on a bus and send them to Butte 
(Reavis, 10/24/95).
Some are concerned with preserving the quality of care associated with 
Butte's working class life, as well as its history. In addition to working to
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create new jobs, Marilyn Maney (9/22/95) says the AFL-CIO is trying to 
protect the 4,000 union jobs that still exist in Silver Bow County, jobs that 
help to maintain the community’s working class^ nature. Some, like 
Marilyn Maney (9/22/95), are concerned that the influx of professionals who 
work in the high tech industries in Butte, will change the community for the 
worse by making it more individualistic and competitive. Others believe that 
the professional newcomers will adopt Butte’s values.
They put us down so many times... When they shut the mines down 
they said they were going to bury us in that hole down there, the Pit.
But as long as there’s people like me, they'll have that Butte spirit. We 
fought to go to work, to stay at work... I’ve seen this town go from good 
to bad and bad to good. But it came back. There will always be a Butte.
If they come into Butte to live, give them a year and they’re Butte 
people... I don’t think people can change this town -  they get the same 
values I got about Butte (Shea, 10/24/95).
Those values cannot be separated from the history and practices of the 
place.
People growing up in communities of memory not only hear the 
stories that tell how the community came to be, what its hopes and 
fears are, and how its ideals are exemplified in outstanding men and 
women. They also participate in the practices — ritual, aesthetic, 
ethical — that define the community as a way of life. We call these 
’practices of commitment ” for they define the patterns of loyalty and 
obligation to keep the community alive (Bellah et al, 1986:154).
There is much vitality and commitment in the local struggles to redefine 
Butte and develop a new way of life, with its own ritual, aesthetic and ethical 
practices. At stake are both the history and health of the place. Although the 
closing of the mines threatened both the livelihood and identity of the
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community, the stigma attached to the Superfund designation, has the 
possibihty to denigrate its entire history. So Butte natives hold onto their 
history, a simpler time when the opposition was clearly understood as the 
Company, and talk back to the stigma through their history. The Butte that 
natives describe is not a contaminated community; it is a rich tapestry of past 
and present, people and history, diverse neighborhoods of colorful ethnic 
groups clustered around that mines that sustained them, "big shots" (Finn,
1995) and laborers, held together by caring communities of women.
It’s dynamic, able to adjust. When things get thrown at us we just grab 
the ball and go with it. We're really strong people with good moral 
fiber. The people here work hard, live decent. It's a wonderful, 
fascinating place. It's the best example of industrial America, small 
enough to study with all the components of a larger industrial 
community (Crain, 9/21/95).
This is the greatest melting pot of ethnic culture in the United States.
We have everybody from every community in the world. Now, with 
the School of Mines [Montana Tech], we have people from India. Up 
here in Walkerville was Irish, a few English, Italian and a few Slavs. In 
Centerville where I live, were Irish and English. In McQueen and 
Meaderville were Italian. East Main and Granite are Finnlanders.
People lived where they worked. People in Walkerville worked at 
the Mountain Con, the Lex, or Badger. Neighborhoods developed 
around the mines. On the lower side of Park, the big shots lived.
A lot of people on the east side worked at the Belmont and the 
Emma. Everybody worked around the mines. I worked with guys 
from Norway. When 1 started, it was just me and another Irishman; 
all the rest were Swedes and Norwegians. 1 belonged to the Iron 
Workers' Union. We had Italians, Irish, Englishmen, Finnlanders at 
lunch. Most guys could say hello in a half dozen languages. If you 
were Irish and lived in Finntown, you could talk Finnish. All the kids 
were taught to talk the language of the neighborhoods. Most 
everybody in Butte could talk at least two languages. Everybody in 
Butte knew how to swear in five or ten languages (Shea, 10/24/95).
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It's a concrete example of feminist rhetoric. An ideal working class 
culture that has created such a nurturing place for women and 
daughters. All they have to do is come to Butte. 1 raised two daughters 
as a single mom. I have absolute confidence, believe if something 
happened to me, 1 have no doubt that the women of Butte would have 
cared for them, and taken good care of them. It goes on in Butte all the 
time, caring (Maney, 9/22/95).
The history of Butte that is so interwoven into the present is not an 
abstraction; it is an emotional reality, a terrain bounded by resistance and loss, 
a proud inheritance to be claimed by survivors. In a letter to the local 
newspaper, written to support the preservation of the remaining gallows 
frames on Butte Hill, Nicholas J. Bedovenac wrote:
Most of them [the miners] died at very young ages, like my dad who 
went to work in the mines at the age of 16 and died at the age of 40 in 
the county hospital.
...These gallows frames are not only a picture of history, but are also 
memorials. 1 am positive they are tombstones.
1 do believe that to even think of destroying them for a profit is 
totally sacrilegious (Montana Standard,91 111 92).
Although large numbers of Butte residents have not been involved in the 
preservation of Butte’s history, they are passionately attached to it. Mark 
Reavis says:
I've never seen so many amateur historians in my life. You just ask a 
question and off they go.
People call me and want me to talk about family histories and 
dates. But I'm an architect. I'm dealing with the importance of the 
structures and the way they tell the story of the factory, the working 
man (Reavis, 11/29/95).
Anyone who spends any time at the Butte-Silver Bow Archives in the old 
fire station on Quartz Street can confirm Reavis' assessment of the
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importance of the local history. Here, surrounded by bound copies of 
newspapers dating back a hundred years, coroners' records, birth records, it is 
possible to look out the large windows down Butte Hill and imagine an older 
Butte. On any given day there is a constant stream of traffic, quiet 
conversations between people searching through old newspapers for 
references to family members, writers researching events and details to add 
"local color" in the form of descriptive passages in planned papers and books. 
People are lined up waiting for help from the friendly staff. The quiet of the 
place is frequently broken by muted exclamations of delight when a reference 
to a family member or event is located, bringing smiles to fellow researchers 
and staff.
Archives Director Ellen Crain reports that the dem and for archival 
services has increased dramatically. Time was when Butte's harsh winters 
kept visitors away; now increased numbers of visitors are hunched over 
records year-round. And written requests for information have doubled. But 
the budget, hard-fought every year, has not increased and Crain is seeking 
grant money to organize the material, much of which is still unsorted and 
uncatalogued, in the boxes that are piled from floor to ceiling in the vast cold 
basement that used to house fire department trucks and apparatus. Local 
politicians have little interest in the archives; even a 1995 national labor 
history award did not attract their attention, never mind an offer of 
additional funding from the county (Crain, 9/21/95).
Because this history was such hard-fought terrain, this love of local history 
entails more than a simple recounting of past events — it is also a form of 
resistance, a telling of a story very different than that told by the Anaconda 
Company, local, state, and federal government the captive press, and the toxic
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label represented by Superfimd. In this context, Butte’s history may be seen as 
a geneaology of intransigience which may be difficult for outsiders to 
understand. Butte may also be hard to comprehend for someone who was 
not brought up working class. "If you're not bom  in Butte it’s hard to 
understand the community,” George Waring (10/21/95), who grew up in a 
’lower m iddle class individualistic community," notes.
Different constructions of the physical landscape continually surface in the 
descriptions of Butte and the telÜng and meaning of its history. Non-natives 
tend to describe Butte in physical terms. Waring, who has lived in Butte for 
28 years, tells of first fully experiencing Butte:
It was the second or third year I was here. The first few years I lived in 
a residence hall, in walking distance of Tech. I didn't have a car. One 
night someone took me to see them working on the Berkeley Pit...
There was always noise -  in the day it was background; at night it 
seemed much louder. It came to me that Butte was really a outdoor 
factory. You can go from one machine to another but there's no roof.
All the debris is scattered everywhere. We were living in an outdoor 
factory -  slag heaps, discarded machinery, mini dumps. It was never 
picked up at that time (Waring, 10/21/95).
I tell him that he is the first person I have interviewed who was not bom  
and brought up in Butte and that he is also the first who described the place in 
physical terms. He replies, "My use of physical description reveals how 
alienated I still am from this community." Mark Reavis, another non-native, 
agrees with Waring's factory metaphor:
It really is a big machine. And you have the conscious knowledge 
there are all these tunnels under you. There were the sounds, the 
lights. People miss that level of activity here -  that’s what they mean 
when they say it’s dead. People hear the pit [the East Continental Pit]
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trucks still — it's a pleasant little growl, but it's not the same (Reavis, 
11/29/95).
Is it possible that Butte natives may not really see the physical landscape 
unless they leave for a while? Not necessarily, Sara Weinstock says. "Maybe 
you don't have to leave to see it, but just be educated to a different point of 
view, another way of thinking (Weinstock, 7/31/95)."
Some non-natives see Butte very differently than natives. Twenty years 
in Butte notwithstanding, John Ray has not been charmed by Butte.
Physically, it's one of the ugliest towns I've ever been in. It reminded 
me of some of the coal mining towns in Pennsylvania. Politically, it 
reminds me of the South, where I grew up, because we had one party 
based on personality. Being psychologically macho was compensation.
A lot of people here feel second-rate. There’s a proclivity to boosterism 
to compensate. The Democratic politicians play into that to motivate 
Butte's voters to vote for them. Critically and sociologically, it's sort of 
an ossified turn of the 19th century into the 20th century (Ray,
10/24/95).
Certainly the architecture, economic and political structures are 
reminiscent of the turn of the century when Butte came into its own; 
however, there are very contemporary aspects to Butte operating in the cracks 
in the structure, such as groups like the Butte Community Union, Marilyn 
Maney s work with the AFL-CIO, and CTEC. The issue here is that the 
structure constrains these groups to the perimeter.
Non-natives stress aspects from the history that are very different than the 
working class culture and ethnic mix which are stressed by natives.
There's a level of distrust against government. It's [the local 
Democratic party] a Jacksonian, small businessmen, protection of 
laissez faire, rather than a New Deal kind of party. Government was
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seen as belonging to the Company and the laws were a foreign 
language of those occupying Butte (Waring, 10/21/95).
Reavis (11/29/95), a self-described "new immigrant" of 15 years, reports his 
first response was:
What the hell happened here? The stunted junipers, the environment, 
the dryness... This is a hard place -  the weather and family ties. You’ll 
always be a new immigrant... They ask you if you were born in Butte. 
They need to know if you lived through it. Do you understand?
But Butte is extremely diverse and so tolerant.... You’re tolerated 
here if you’re a decent human being (Reavis, 11/29/95).
However, the outside world has far less tolerance for Butte than Butte has 
for outsiders. Butte, America is the dark side, the "other" in the eyes of 
outsiders, both in Montana and beyond, who do not understand. Weinstock 
(7/31/95), who lived with her son for 10 years in Helena before returning to 
Butte, reports when she and her son were preparing to move to Butte "the 
kids in school told him he’d be beat up. ” Others report:
There is antipathy toward Butte. People don’t even want to come to 
Butte. When we were moving here a professor at Madison who grew 
up in Great Falls said, "Why do you want to move to Butte? It’s the 
arm pit of Montana (Ray, 10/24/95)?"
I grew up  in Washington state. Sight unseen I moved here. People 
said, "You're moving to Butte?" They knew about it in Washington... 
Nobody from Bozeman, at the architectural school, wanted to come 
here. I moved here in 1981 during the economic decline (Reavis, 
11/29/95).
Mary Kay Craig, a self-described "Butte kid ” who left Butte for 27 years.
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says that Butte's poor image is the result of the degraded landscape, of the 
stigma of being a contaminated community.
...the moonscape when you fly into Butte. It's hard to attract 
professionals. I think Butte should be as attractive an area as Bozeman 
and KalispeU, the Bitterroot -  all the places that people are moving to. 
Why don't they want to move to Butte? Just look at it. If you remove 
the contamination and make it a healthy place it will automatically 
become a pretty place and people won’t be afraid to move here (Craig, 
7/30/95).
Mark Reavis, like Marilyn Maney, believes that Butte as history — its 100 
years of raw, sometimes violent, labor strife — is the real Butte, the Butte that 
must be preserved. That Butte was never pretty -  to sanitize the history, and 
the landscape that embodies that history, would trivialize the lives of those 
who paid the price for living it. It is out of fear of gentrification, of the 
"prettying up" of the raw mining city, that Reavis fought for the ERA and 
ARCO to comply with the National Historic Preservation Act. In 1962 six 
square miles of Butte containing roughly 4,000 buildings and numerous mine 
workings were designated a National Historic Landmark. (See map of 
National Historic District in the appendix.) As a result, any federal 
government agency must approach any structure older than 50 years as a 
potential "resource. " The conflict between history and cleanup surfaced about 
mine dum ps and slag heaps.
The EPA said "We're worried about kids dying," but we have to look 
at the whole picture, it's much more complicated than that. It was 
balanced out. The National Preservation Act says you must consider 
history, even the piles of dirt in the National Historic Landmark 
district [most of Uptown Butte]. They have something to do with the 
development of the industrial revolution (Reavis, 11/29/95).
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Reavis knows he cannot save it all:
We’re destroying the way this place looks. We've acknowledged 
certain sites to preserve it, but the whole thing was important. Our 
losses are defined in mitigation [remediation of contaminated sites]. 
The whole basis was on the regional preservation plan.
It was an amazingly long process. We started cranking out concepts 
and things in 1991. The Granite Mountain Overlook [the scene of the 
Speculator Mine Disaster of 1917] is a process we started. The EPA was 
supposed to put up signs and do the photo documentation. The county 
got a grant for a major memorial to disaster. But the EPA screwed up 
and I blew the whistle -  they'd signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding....
You just can't do a standard process in Butte, Montana. The photo 
just laid on the shelf. This formed my philosophy -  let's start w ith a 
new concept, just fund the signage and interpretation. 1 got a VISTA 
volunteer. The EPA funded the plaques. We are almost there (Reavis, 
11/29/95).
Funds to construct and maintain the memorial will come from the sale of 
bricks which will make up the floor of the memorial, the sale of artwork 
related to the site, and fundraising, as well as grants. Reavis says:
By autonomously going for grants, working with the agency, and 
fundraising, we got it going. This is a life's work. When an 
opportunity shows up, I draw  pictures and convince people. We've got 
a A00,000 grant to fix up the Belmont [mine] to use if for a senior 
citizen center (Reavis, 11/29/95).
Under the historic Programmatic Agreement, Butte-Silver Bow struck 
with the EPA, Anaconda-Deer Lodge, ARCO, and Walkerville, ARCO 
supplied $175,000 which was used to construct the Visitor Center. Although 
he can count on some Butte natives to turn out to fight for preservation of 
specific buildings, the more general attitude toward what he is doing is one of
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"that’s nice" and well-wishing (Reavis, 11/29/95). Reavis attributes the 
passivity toward preservation to an overall lack of self esteem. The Company 
used that lack of self-esteem to its benefit when it developed the Berkeley Pit 
— it was not difficult to get people to move to the Flat, Reavis says:
There was a perception that you were poor white trash if you couldn’t 
move off the Hill. But, still, some people kept their family houses and 
have been proud of it.
They're seeing a little more that they should be proud; not ashamed 
(Reavis, 11/29/95).
Reavis set out to develop a regional historic preservation plan, which 
would include Anaconda, home of the Company’s smelter operations.
Reavis (11/29/95) describes Anaconda as "the closest thing to a sibling. It’s 
probably a sister -  it’s a little cleaner and more organized because it was 
supposed to be the state capitol ” The plan was established with five key 
gateway interpretive sites which will be ultimately connected by a railroad 
line: 1. The American Indians and early settlers, including buffalo kill sites, 
transport routes, and camps.; 2. The period of gold and silver; 3. The Richest 
Hill on Earth, mining operations in Butte; 4. The smelting of the ore in 
Anaconda; and 5. The reclamation and ongoing technology (Reavis, 11/29/95) 
The community is pushing for a national historical designation, hoping to 
attract tourists and the revenues they bring — something akin to mining the 
history. Under the programmatic agreement, open space will include (Butte- 
Silver Bow, 1992):
1. Parks, improved open space with grass and trees. Uses may include 
parks, parkways, tot lots and recreational facilities such as tennis courts, ball
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fields, golf courses, skating rinks, municipal swimming pools and picnic 
areas.
2. Arid landscapes, naturally occurring open areas that may include 
vegetation but require little or no maintenance.
3. Historic mining landscapes, including non-vegetated landscapes as well 
as those that are reclaimed.
4. Wetlands, both existing and improved areas.
5. Heritage Rail trails, which will run beside active rail lines.
6. Neighborhood buffer trails which will separate neighborhoods from 
congestion in historic and park areas.
7. Controlled trails, where access and usage will be monitored.
8. Drainage control trails, which will run parallel to drainage troughs and 
provide recreational and interpretive experiences as well as access for 
drainage maintenance (Butte-Silver Bow, 1992).
Most of the support of ongoing preservation efforts comes from the "new 
immigrants," but they appear to love a more gentrified Butte (Reavis, 
11/29/95).
They want to preserve what’s nice about the history. Maybe it relates to 
past experience they liked growing up. But I don’t want to sanitize it. 
That really scares me.
You can be more responsible but how can you criticize or condemn 
or want to cover it up (Reavis, 11/29/95)?
The problem that the EPA and CTEC saw was that, especially in heavy 
spring rains, unvegetated contaminated soil, also known as historic mining 
waste, will run off down the steep slops of Butte Hill toward Silver Bow 
Creek, depositing contaminated soil in yards and the creek, thus spreading the
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contamination. Reavis disagrees (11/29/95). The lead program, which will be 
adm inistered as part of the Institutional Controls by Butte-Silver Bow officials 
and be overseen by ARCO and the EPA, will protect the public. Reavis says. 
With the lead program  now in place, the EPA now agrees that the conflict 
between history and cleanup has been resolved. Sara Weinstock says:
There are other yards with a potential to be contaminated. But Butte- 
Silver Bow will continue to track the contamination through testing of 
kids (Weinstock, 7/31/95).
ECONOMICS
Others are not so sure that institutional controls will protect public health. 
The Clark Fork Coalition charged that preservation of "historic mining 
landscapes" would limit the cleanup of Butte. It is difficult to cleanly separate 
the historical importance of preservation from the economics and politics of 
the cleanup, activists say (Craig, 7 / / 30/95; Waring, 10/21/95). They question if 
implementation of the controls will allow ARCO to fund a lesser cleanup 
effort. And they have little faith in the local government which will 
implement the controls in perpetuity.
The further removed from local government, the better off you are.
I've see the local government here blackmailed. The economy’s so 
vulnerable to blackmail (Waring, 10/21/95).
In terms of the EPA, they are trying to do the right thing. They are 
constrained by the law. The state people in the trenches are good 
people too, but you run into problems with political appointees. I’ve 
no confidence in the local government, elected or appointed. (Ray, 
10/24/95)
...They have a love/hate relationship with ARCO. It’s 0/10, 
heaven/hell, b inge/purge (Ray, 10/24/95).
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Faith in the judgment of local officials was likely further eroded when 
zoning was downgraded from residential to commercial at the Montana Pole 
site which led to a lesser cleanup of water than would have been required if 
the original residential zoning had been kept (Curran, 1994). In her 
comments to Jeff Merrifield, counsel to the federal Subcommittee on 
Superfund, Waste Control and Risk Assessment in Washington, D C., Craig 
(7/9/95:2) wrote:
Here, in exchange for ARCO-promises of ballparks, RV parking 
facilities and an industrial park, etc. over the top of contaminants, local 
government has changed a zoning provision from residential to 
industrial thereby decreasing degree of cleanup of PCPs at the Montana 
Pole Treatment Plant. To appease a local employer PRP [potentially 
responsible party], local government has ignored a petition signed by 
over 10 % [sic] of the population asking that the volume of 
contamination at Butte’s Berkeley Pit not be allowed to double. Instead 
local government voted to put off real cleanup for 30 years. For a Jack 
Nicklaus golf course over the top of the toxics, 100% of contamination 
has been allowed to remain in the floodplain in Anaconda. Other 
examples of local government being coopted toward perpetual 
management of wastes — not cleanup — can be cited in parallel w ith 
their contracts to PRPs for creation of Institutional Controls.
We have even seen the very people [Jon Sesso] who exclude our 
EPA grant-funded citizen group form involvement in local 
government Superfund meetings receive an award from the EPA for 
creating "consensus among diverse groups." As PRPs and local 
government officials in  this area know well, consensus can always be 
obtained w hen those who m ight disagree are not allowed to participate. 
Boldface type is Craig's.
Ray expressed his concern about local officials' relationship with, and trust 
in, ARCO, in a letter about the lead study sponsored by ARCO:
...I am concerned about the relationship of the Health Department and 
ARCO. The Health Department has embraced the results of this study 
w ith unquestioned enthusiasm. Yet, the Health Departm ent should
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remember that any corporation such as ARCO protects the corporate 
interest. The two interests are often in conflict. Consider: The quality 
of any study depends on quality data and quality analysis of that data. If 
the data or analysis is faulty, the results are faulty. In assessing the 
analysis and evaluation of data, questions of source willingness to 
report and interpret a situation accurately must be considered. If there 
is a potential bias on the part of the source or the source's sponsor, 
independent corroboration must be sought. In this light the following 
questions must be asked: What is the nature and extent of the 
relationship between the University of Cincinnati's Institute of 
Environmental Health, which conducted the study, and ARCO?
ARCO paid for the study. Was any information processed through 
ARCO? Did ARCO have any influence on the conduct of the study or 
the release of results? How do the findings of the study relate to 
ARCO's possible Superfund responsibility? These questions have yet 
to be answered satisfactorily. 1 am not accusing or implying that 
anyone deliberately falsified information. Nor am I questioning 
anyone's competence or integrity. I am saying that we need 
independent verification of this study before we assume there is only a 
negligible lead problem in Butte. The lead exposure study must be 
scrutinized by the EPA as well as by independent peer reviewers with 
no industrial bias {Montana Standard, 5/15/91).
In light of complaints that the agency historically left the testing that 
determ ined the extent and composition of contamination to the corporations 
responsible for the pollution (Barnett, 1994), it is difficult to understand why 
the agency initially left the study to ARCO. Although the EPA later refused to 
accept the lead program the county and ARCO developed from the study, 
there was no indication that peer review was ever
accomplished. However, as Weinstock (1996) notes, testing was done and a 
baseline risk assessment will be issued.
CTEC members have also questioned the county-ARCO institutional 
controls proposal which, its authors maintain, will protect Butte people from 
the contamination that will remain after the cleanup efforts are completed 
(Craig, 7/30/95). What ARCO, local officials and EPA refer to as institutional
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controls are generally referred to by planners as land and resource 
management — zoning, subdivision control, wetlands and aquifer protection. 
Clearly, some institutional controls will be necessary in Butte, which is 
honeycombed by mines, has buildings built on tailings, and is ravaged by 
mining waste — it is not possible to completely clean the mining waste. The 
state's Natural Resource Damage Program maintains, even under the best 
remediation alternative, baseline conditions will not be restored for a few 
thousand years (Montana NRDP, 1994).
The ARCO/Butte-Silver Bow Planning Department institutional control 
proposal has identified seven areas, with the possibility of additional controls 
to be added at a later date, as critical to monitoring hazardous waste that will 
remain after cleanup of Superfund sites in Butte (ARCO/ Butte-Silver Bow,
1993). The seven areas are: surface and groundwater controls; development 
standards; lead poisoning/abatem ent program; historic preservation; waste 
repository; operation and maintenance of reclaim ed/restricted sites; and a 
Geographic Information System to monitor the other six controls 
(ARCO/Butte-Silver Bow, 1993). The use of institutional controls raises two 
important questions: 1. Will they be used to minimize the amount of 
cleanup that ARCO will have to provide; and 2. Will they adequately protect 
public health?
Sara Weinstock (7/31/95) believes the institutional controls will work 
well:
...W ere looking at ARCO versus Butte-Silver Bow as the contractor. 
Therefore they [ARCO employees] will always be overseeing at Butte- 
Silver Bow. We can rest assured that the money will be spent the way 
we want it. EPA has a five-year review forever on this. We'll review
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every five years... EPA will continue to pressure ARCO to get the job 
completed (Weinstock, 7 /31 / 95).
Although the local environmentalists concerned w ith the Superfund site 
are not sure the EPA review will be sufficient, some natives do not judge 
local government as harshly; others point to the various levels of 
government that are working together as a positive.
1 believe you should let the people in Butte with ideas do it with 
ARCO...You shouldn’t have people from Missoula or Helena. It's [the 
contamination] been here for 100 years. The ARCO retirees believe the 
same way. Keep the state out of here. Keep it local and keep it simple 
(Shea, 10/24/95).
They [federal, state and local government officials] work so 
cooperatively. They’re working as a team which is a good approach. It 
will give us the best overall solutions to these problems (Crain, 
9/21/95).
Public health Director Dan Dennehey points to differences both in the 
roles of levels of government and in resources the levels can bring to the 
cleanup. He, also, believes the tiered levels involved in the cleanup will offer 
more protection to the people of Butte.
I have faith in the EPA, the state and us. If you look at EPA from the 
street, they’re seen as rigid. If you ask about us, people will say free 
immunizations, family planning, water quality district, air quality. We 
aren’t one-dimensional. We wear so many hats here -  it's 
management by crisis...
I don’t want to spend 90 percent of my time on Superfund. We 
should be the Superfund Department. But I don't think Superfund 
was on anyone's mind when they created health departments. We re 
sewers, food quality....
From the industrial revolution on there will be a whole lot of 
problems. EPA's huge. We re fortunate enough to get grants to hire
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
278
people. What if you're in a community w ithout a health department? 
(Dennehey, 9/21/95)
Weinstock says Superfund works in Butte because the parties involved 
cooperate:
Here we re all equal partners. The lead abatement program was 
developed by Butte-Silver Bow. We attended the meetings and helped 
them with information, but it was them who said this is what we can 
live with.
Things will happen here that wouldn't happen anywhere else. Not 
just the feds, but the PRP [ARCO] who will do some work, and we 
allowed state and local government participation. If you don't have 
local government at the table you might as well forget it. That’s 
another reason Superfund works here. Many of the people who work 
with the federal government will help you get through the mess. We 
have credibility in Butte (7/31/95).
Given ARCO's lawsuits and challenges, Weinstock's definition of 
cooperation may be questionable, and best understood in her role as mediator, 
as the person who casts oil upon troubled waters. In her role as the local EPA 
remedial project manager, Weinstock becomes the locus of all disputes, a 
tense and tiring job. Although the CTEC activists disagree with EPA's failure 
to seek permanent solutions as manifested in the institutional controls, they 
give the agency and the state far higher marks than local government. They 
complain of being excluded from local government meetings with ARCO and 
representatives of former county chief executive Don People's company, 
Merdi. (See the anonymous cartoon that this incident precipitated in the 
appendix.) Craig says:
I had to advise CTEC to crash the meeting... A government person 
became so concerned that Merdi was meeting with agencies and local 
officials and would be negotiating on Silver Bow Creek without
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
279
anyone knowing that I was called and told to go to the meeting and 
bring the media with me. I thought it out and thought why escalate? 
What I want is to be part of things (Craig, 7/30/95).
Dennehey counters that it's difficult to understand the process. He also 
stresses the importance of local government involvement.
We thought the public comment on it [the Merdi Green way proposal 
for Silver Bow Creek cleanup] would come later. The Superfund 
coordinating committee complained they weren't at the table.
If we put it on a referendum it would probably be okay. There has to be 
some catalyst, so local government's had to be the catalyst to get both 
to the table — the environmentalists and those concerned with 
aesthetics. We can reach a compromise as we did with the lead 
(9/21/95).
But CTEC members question the need to compromise and fear that the 
Butte-Silver Bow government will not push too hard for a stringent cleanup 
because because it, too, is a potentially responsible party party (PRP) and hopes 
to avoid cleanup costs. Thus, there is a sizable financial incentive for the 
county to go along with ARCO's attempts to reduce the scale of cleanup, 
activists charge. The problematic economics of Butte add to their concern.
Beyond loss of revenue from mining taxes, future economic development 
is an issue because of the lack of buildable land in the Uptown area. 
Unemployment, is high -  9.7 percent, about three points higher than the state 
average of 7.0 (U.S. Dept, of the Census, 1990). Reavis points to buildings in 
the Uptown — wonderful examples of stone and brick architecture.
Although the first floors of many buildings have been restored and are used 
by small businesses, most of the upper floors are decaying (Reavis, 11/29/95).
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However, as difficult as Butte's economics are, the community has been 
spared the depreciation of property value that is often experienced by 
contaminated communities (Edelstein, 1988). Because Butte was always "the 
other and often shunned by outsiders long before the Superfund designation 
(Emmons, 1990), its property values were judged by different standards, which 
were established by those who lived in the community. Homeowners 
interviewed said they had not experienced a loss of property value.
... [my home has] increased value. Realtors have told me that sites that 
are cleaned up or don't have liability are worth more. (Ray, 10/24/95)
We lived in Walkerville and sold our house there and it d idn’t reduce 
the value of our property (Crain, 9/21/95).
People who have bought property in Butte are doing it to be in close 
proximity to their job. I never looked at that property as having value 
beyond that. The values of Montana property are not associated with 
the value of property in Butte. It has to be south of Butte. The people 
on the Hill want to be close to work or participate in Butte's historic 
ethos. I wasn’t investing; never considered the house important to the 
quality of life (Waring, 10/21/95).
Ironically, the lack of buildable land on Butte Hill, where blocks were 
rezoned to open space and commercial, has created a seller’s market for 
homes under $100,000 in Butte. One realtor claims if he "had the land, ” he 
could sell 10 homes under $100,000 "in 10 days (Montana Standard, 6/15/95).’’ 
The costlier homes are not selling as quickly, the realtor added (Montana 
S ta ndard, 6 /15/ 95).
HEALTH
Even if financial concerns do not color the local government agenda, the 
lack of specialized professional staff occasionally creates a problem, as it did
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with the original lead agreement between the local government and ARCO. 
The lead strategy came under criticism from both environmental advocates 
and the EPA.
In Butte there are a minimum of 36 identified sites of significant lead 
contamination. Even low levels of lead exposure can cause metabolic 
problems, neuropathy, reduced growth and intellectual development, 
increased hypertension, blood disorders, and possible cancer. Children 
are particularly susceptible to lead's toxicity. Harmful health effects 
from lead and other heavy metal contaminants are a health disaster 
waiting to happen in Butte.
As indicated by their comments on ARCO's lead study, our County 
Health Department officials have apparently decided to intervene only 
after health problems develop as a result of exposure to heavy metal 
contamination. Prevention of health problems from heavy metal 
contamination before they occur should be the goal and emphasis of 
the Health Department, not intervention after the fact. Once people 
show the effects of lead poisoning, it is too late....
Another shortcoming of the lead study is that this study does not 
adequately cover the synergistic/cumulative health effects of exposure 
to lead along with other heavy metals in Butte soils... (Ray, Montana  
Standard,5/15/91).
The EPA monitored development of the county/ARCO plan, refusing to 
accept the plan's original use of the term "trigger " levels, which require 
further investigation, rather than " action " levels which require immediate 
removal of the contaminant (Montana Standard, 1/17/90). Six months later, 
the EPA declared the county/ARCO plan inadequate on four counts 
(Montana Standard,? / A /93). The county/ARCO plan was based on a 
m isunderstanding of statistical probability: under the county’s plan, less than 
five percent of children in Butte would be exposed to risk; the EPA 
requirement was that each child in Butte have less than a five percent chance 
of exposure (Montana Standard, 7/4/93). The county/ARCO plan would
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have possibly put five percent of Butte children at risk. The EPA also noted 
the plan allowed almost twice the amount of lead to remain in Butte soils, 
failed to develop a schedule for cleaning yards, and did not provide for future 
cleanup of yards if children moved into homes with lead-soaked soil 
(Montana Standard,71Af93).
Craig asks:
Why are we negotiating with ARCO who's arguing for less cleanup?
When you've got the Butte local government called a PRP they're not 
looking out for the health of the people. The health department just 
hired a new Superfund hydrologist — he's not a hydrologist. He's an 
industrial hygienist who worked as a contractor to ARCO with his 
office in the ARCO building in Anaconda. Earlier, I spoke up against 
his appointment to the board of health because of conflict of interest.
There were qualified people for the hydrologist position...(Craig,
7/30/95).
Dennehey says local officials struggle with differences of opinion and 
ARCO's clout but maintains that his staff is competent:
There's a diversity of opinions in the community. We re mediating 
differences. ARCO has a huge staff and purse; we don't. We have an 
environmental health director, a chemist on water quality, an 
environmental engineer and soils person. We work as a team. We got 
some money from the EPA for lead and ARCO for [lead] screening and 
abatement. There's no federal money and no state involvement.
ARCO calls on hydrologists, geohydrologists.
It's important we continue to look at what will be environmentally 
feasible, what public health concerns will be addressed on scientific 
information, and done in my lifetime. We've had an operable unit for 
streamside tailings since 1983 and now we re ... bickering about what 
could be done — there's ARCO, the state, the EPA. We want to get 
things done. They [the public] say, 'Quit studying and move some dirt.' 
People get upset and cynical. We try to get involved and they say we're 
in the pockets of ARCO because we get money from ARCO...
(Dennehey, 9 / 21 / 95).
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The cumbersome Superfund process came under criticism by 1990. Four 
years after the Superfund designation, Montana Senator Conrad Bums 
criticized the length of time EPA spent on studies and praised ARCO's 
willingness to begin the cleanup. John Wardell, EPA head, said the agency 
was under pressure from "civic groups, sportsmen, senators and others... to 
accept ARCO’s Colorado Tailings plan without going through public 
meetings (Montana Standard, 3/8/90)." Peter Nielson, director of the Clark 
Fork Coalition in 1990, also complained that ARCO was attempting to "force" 
its remedial proposal through "without public participation (Montana 
Standard, 2/18/90)." Nielson said the public has the incorrect perception that 
the state Department of Health and Environmental Science and the EPA are 
responsible for causing cleanup delays.
ARCO's strategy is to wear the public down and wear the agencies 
down to where we accept the first thing — the public will become so 
frustrated they will accept anything that comes along (Montana 
Standard,1! \S! 90).
Nielson added that he did not blame ARCO because it was understandable 
that the corporation wanted to minimize costs (Montana Standard,!!ISf90). 
Nor did he begrudge ARCO's pitches for its proposal to groups and politicians 
before the EPA actually asked for formal plans (Montana Standard,!! 18190). 
But, Nelson questioned the fact that many people, including Senator Conrad 
Bums, were treating ARCO's proposal as the reclamation plan and urging its 
adoption (Montana Standard,!! 18!90).
Issues of cooperation versus cynicism, ARCO's machinations and the slow
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pace of cleanup notwithstanding, the county/ARCO planned institutional 
controls, which include the lead program, have serious shortcomings related 
to issues involving accountability, staffing, and jurisdiction (Curran, 1994).
To accommodate the controls, the county revised the Master Plan, rezoning 
over 78 city blocks. This has a major impact on the amount of cleanup 
because under state law the new zoning classifications — public/open space 
and commercial — require less stringent water quality standards than the 
former residential classification. This greatly reduces the amount of cleanup 
required by ARCO and runs the risk, in heavy spring rains of moving 
contamination about on Butte Hill. The zoning downgrade of 
land from residential to public/open space also reduces the municipality's 
future tax revenues because the land is precluded from development. More 
serious than economic losses is that the rezoned areas have not been 
designated as Superfund districts (Curran, 1994).
Given the need for controls in perpetuity and routine employee turnover, 
failure to clearly tie rezoning, new bylaws, and operations to contaminated 
sites is problematic because there is nothing to ensure future employees 
understand the reason for strict enforcement of controls (Curran, 1994). Also 
missing from the institutional controls agreement are (Curran, 1994):
1. enforcement policy communicated clearly to and then implemented by 
every county board involved in maintenance and enforcement of the 
controls;
2. specific written guidelines and published operating procedures related 
to monitoring and enforcement; and
3. specific chains of command to establish a clear line of accountability, 
with the identification of the position or positions ultimately responsible for
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ensuring both monitoring and enforcement.
If the EPA monitoring is not adequate, and reports cited in an earlier 
section indicate that this is a distinct possibility, the state is not likely to pick 
up the slack as there are additional enforcement problems on the state level. 
As indicated by the Legislative Auditor's 1994 performance audit of the 
enforcement of the state's Water Quality and Public Drinking Water Supply 
Acts, a law or ordinance on the books is no guarantee of enforcement 
(Montana Office of the Legislative Auditor, 1994). The audit identifies 
accountability, staffing, and jurisdictional issues as impediments to 
enforcement. These are the same issues that have not been addressed in the 
Butte-Silver Bow Planning Departm ent/ARCO institutional controls 
(Curran, 1994). And they are the same issues that led to the state’s cessation of 
mine capping work in Butte in 1991 {Montana Standard, 10/2/1991).
New federal regulations prohibit the state from sealing off abandoned 
mines in Butte, including new shafts created by collapsing tunnels (Montana 
Standard, 10/2/1991). There are 4,000 known shafts, ranging from 20 to 2,000 
feet deep in need of work in the Uptown section of Butte — shafts above the 
water line will deteriorate as a result of exposure to the air (Montana 
Standard, 10/2/1991). I don't think we have any answers as to who's going 
to correct this problem, " Sara Weinstock has said (Montana Standard, 
(10/2/1991).
Further, pollution related to mining is not restricted to Butte. A report 
prepared by the Western Interstate Energy Board for the Western Governors’ 
Association stated that the state of Montana has more than 20,000 inactive 
and abandoned non-coal mines that have damaged 153,800 acres and 1,118 
miles of stream (Montana Standard, 11/7/1991). The cleanup costs are
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estimated at $912 million (Montana Standard, 11/7/1991). Montana's 
inventory included 19,757 mine sites, 1,057 smelters, 14,038 acres of mine 
dumps, 20,862 acres of disturbed land, 466 miles of high walls (in open pit or 
strip mines), 4,868 mine openings, 1,845 acres over shallow mine workings, 
and 1,747 hazardous structures (Montana Standard, 11/7/1991). Also listed 
were, 147,150 acres affected by exploratory drill holes, five mining-related EPA 
Superfund sites, and acres of contaminated streambank sediments and soil 
contamination from smelter emissions (Montana Standard,lll7ll991).
Staffing is also an issue for the state's Hard Rock Mining Board which 
helps communities analyze the adequacy of mining impact plans (Montana 
Standard, 1/16/90). A Montana Mining Association report identified staffing 
as the "single greatest problem facing the Department of State Lands Hard 
Rock Mining Board. According to the report, the board does "not have 
enough people to do its job, cannot recruit new employees because of low 
wages, and cannot retain current employees (Montana Standard,? 111190).''
As a result, the report concluded that the remaining departm ent employees 
are often not competent to regulate mining (Montana Standard,? 111190).
The state waste bureau is also understaffed, with just 2.5 employees to travel 
the state to monitor landfills (Montana Standard, 1/17/90). The state has 112 
dum ps and seven of the seven landfills that are regularly monitored are 
leaking (Montana Standard,!I\? 190).
So, both in Butte and in the entire state, there is a substantial margin for 
error in the form of what sociologist William Freudenburg refers to as 
"recreancy^," the possibility that the intricate division of labor in technically- 
oriented bureaucracies may lead to situations in which duties are not carried
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out properly and "important responsibilities may fall through the 
institutional cracks (Freudenburg, 1993:915)." In Butte, the institutional 
cracks could well be threats to public health.
Often, in fact, the most significant failings are not so much those of 
individuals or organizations... The key question is simply whether 
experience shows that the behaviors of specialized individuals and 
institutions can be counted on (Freudenburg, 1993:917).
When the notion of recreancy is factored into the equation, the complaints 
of technocrats about public irrationality "could be seen as efforts to divert 
attention away from institutional failings, doing so in part by calling into 
question the legitimacy of citizen concerns about these failings (Freudenburg, 
1993:917)." Because "government inactivity or failure is an important form of 
recreancy," (Freudenburg, 1993:926) there is a "need to examine the 
assum ption that the only serious' risks are the ones having immediate 
implications for physical health (Freudenburg, 1993:927). " There are many 
potential institutional cracks in the controls planned to minimize exposure to 
contaminants that remain in Butte. However, there is little common ground 
on whether the EPA-designated contaminants are serious threats to public 
health.
Most natives interviewed expressed no fear that the Superfund 
designation has affected their quality of life or poses a serious health hazard, 
and have not warned their children away from Superfund areas.
...My girls and I spent practically every Saturday and Sunday roaming 
around the St. Lawrence and Granite M ountain Mines. I'm more 
concerned about the history (Maney, 9/22/95).
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No. [They were] warned only where active mining [was ongoing], 
where trains or trucks may have posed a threat, not from any inactive 
site. The fact is that children have frequently played on many of the 
mine dumps (Lynch, 10/25/95).
MINING
W ithout information to the contrary, — information that has not been 
forthcoming from the EPA, ATSDR, or the local newspaper — it is 
difficult to believe that a landscape so familiar to generations of Butte 
families is dangerous. It is equally difficult to consider the Mining City 
without mining operations. If not mining, what is Butte’s identity? If not 
a diverse mixture of ethnic neighborhoods held together by shared risks 
and a sense that no one outside could possibly understand their world, 
what is Butte? Is more mining desirable, or possible? Some favor new 
mining because the industry has been associated with higher-paying jobs 
that are desperately needed by the community.
I would be absolutely delighted if a mine opened here, if I could take 
my 230 displaced workers from Rhone Poulenc [the closure of this 
plant is discussed later in this section] and they could continue to make 
a living wage (Maney, 9/22/95).
Others point both to the economic importance of mining historically and 
to the state's historic role as a resource colony. Although he has warned that 
the poisoned water in the Berkeley Pit will contaminate Butte groundwater, 
former Representative Fritz Daily says:
I'm pro-mining. It was the lifeblood of the state and will be the 
economic lifeblood of the state again. Montana is a natural resource 
state. For us to survive and function we have to use those natural 
resources... (Daily, 12/8/95).
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When asked if he worries that the current MRI operation in the East 
Continental Pit could become another Berkeley Pit, Daily (12/8/95) say s ,
"I like mining. I don't want to think about that. "
Health Director Dan Dennehey believes Butte is "mined as much as we 
can be mined, " but believes that technological advances may ensure that 
mining has a place in the state's economy:
I think we can manage it environmentally but I don't think we can 
afford any more fiascos like Anaconda. MRI's an opportunity. We 
have a petrie dish incubator, a scientific lab here in Butte. It's looking 
at issues concerning heavy metal soils. We're emphasizing how to get 
technologies here to deal w ith environmental issues. If we got the 
technology there may be room for additional mining here.
It's a huge state. There's room for more mining. Crown Butte's 
[mining operations proposed in eastern Montana where 
environmentalists charge it would damage Yellowstone National Park] 
problematic, it could damage "the last best place." In an area where 
there's low environmental impacts to the community and landscape, I 
think there's a possibility. If technology can make strip mines look 
better, it should be done. It's a siting issue. I don't want to see 
wilderness areas succumb to mining. I don't want tailings where I 
hunt or fish. I think there's a happy medium between tourism and 
mining, concerning money and environmental impacts (Dennehey, 
9/21/05).
The "happy medium " may be very difficult to located in a state which has 
not yet decided if it is 'The Treasure State" or "The Last Best Place. " In the 
1980s, in efforts to attract tourists to the state, it billed itself as "The Last Best 
Place," a title immortalized in an anthology of literature from and about 
Montana edited by William Kittredge and Annick Smith. The "Last Best 
Place" is a romanticized version of wilderness studded w ith cozy rural 
communities filled w ith resourceful, and often, exceptional, people. But the 
lack of staffing of state agencies and enforcement of state environmental laws
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make it look as if the ’Treasure State " is being resurrected. Nowhere is the 
tension between the "Last Best Place"" and the "Treasure State" more apparent 
than in the battle over the state’s water quality laws. In 1995 the state 
Legislature passed, and the governor signed into law, several bills that 
changed the state's water quality laws significantly, allowing more pollutants 
in Montana’s waters {Missoulian, 8/13/95). The changes increased the 
previous standard for each of the more than 100 carcinogens, except arsenic, 
monitored by state regulators from a one in one million risk of cancer for 
people drinking the untreated water over a lifetime to one in 100,000 
(Missoulian, 8/13/95). The new standard for arsenic has been relaxed to a 
cancer risk level of one in 1,000 (Missoulian, 8/13/95). Some find the 
statistical risk of possible death by cancer an affront. Lois Gibbs says:
"Would you let me shoot into a crowd of one hundred thousand 
people and kill one of them, " Gibbs asked. "No? Well, how come Dow 
Chemical can do it? It's okay for the corporations to do it, but the little 
guy with the gun goes to jail... (Greider, 1992:56)."
The changes in Montana's water law also allow more nitrates in the 
groundwater, which has been a problem in Butte, as discussed in the previous 
section; narrowed the definition of high quality water, waters which cannot 
be degraded with state authorization after regulatory review; eased 
restrictions on placing waste next to streams; and limited challenges to the 
issuance of discharge permits (Missoulian, 8/13/95). Prior to the revised law 
regulating challenges to the issuance of discharge permits, anyone who 
submitted an official comment during a hearing on the discharge permit was 
allowed to appeal the issuance; the revised law allows appeals only by
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someone with a property interest, water right, or a direct economic interest in 
the perm it decision (Missoulian,S113195).
The vision of the "Last Best Place" is operative in an initiative campaign 
conducted by a grassroots coalition that includes business people, 
conservationists, water quality specialists and others, to strengthen water 
quality laws by requiring new metal mines, expansions of existing mines 
which use cyanide leaching processes, and metal mine exploration activities 
to treat their waste water before it is discharged to surface or groundwater 
(Bachman, 1996). The change proposed by this coalition, Montanans for 
Clean Water, would affect mines that do not have permits by November 1996 
— likely including Noranda's New World Mine near Yellowstone National 
Park, Phelps Dodge's McDonald project on the Blackfoot River near Lincoln 
and ASARCO’s Rock Creek Mine near Noxon (Bachman, 1996). Mines 
considering expansion that would be affected include Pegasus’
Zortm an/ Landusky complex near the Fort Belknap reservation and the 
Golden Sunlight Mine near Whitehall (Bachman, 1996).
Mining companies are "all but claiming the end of mining in Montana" if 
the initiative is passed (Bachman, 1996:1). However, even if the initiative 
were passed, small mines which disturb less than five acres or move less than 
36,500 tons a year, will be exempted, and some of the state's largest mining 
operations — including Stillwater's platinum mine near Nye and its 
proposed East Boulder Mine near Big Timber, MRI's copper/m olybdenum  
mine in Butte, and Pegasus's Montana Tunnels gold mine near Clancy — 
would be unaffected (Bachman, 1996).
The non-natives, who arguably have less invested in the history of Butte
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and mining, are less convinced than Dennehey that technology is sufficient to 
protect the state from further mining-associated pollution.
I would support any mining activity conducted in an environmentally 
sensitive manner. From what I’ve seen that's rare. None of the 
proposed mines are conducted in an environmentally sensitive 
manner. Mining engineers are not trained to worry about 
environmental concerns. "If you can't grow it, you've got to mine it " 
is a bumper sticker at Tech.
In principle I'm not opposed but since mining companies do such a 
terrible job at protecting the environment... One of the biggest 
problems with gold mining is the cyanide leaching (Ray, 10/24/95).
No, definitely not. Because I've worked for 28 years with mining 
engineers and they'd strip mine the planet if they could and feel 
perfectly justified doing it (Waring, 10/21/95).
Although he would support more mining in Butte and the rest of the 
state. Lynch (10/25/95) says the community is looking "to expand our 
economy, diversify our economic base, and introduce or reintroduce a 
number of good-paying blue collar jobs ... through a strong economic 
developm ent program. "
Obviously, Butte-Silver Bow has, through the substantial downsizing 
of mining and other changes in our basic economy, lost a significant 
number of well-paying blue collar jobs. We need to reestablish these 
jobs and I think that overall would provide a greater benefit to people 
in our community (Lynch, 10/25/95).
MORE ECONOMICS 
In June 1995, Rhone Poulenc Basic Chemicals Co. announced it would 
stop production at its Silver Bow phosphorous plant and lay off all but 50 of 
200 employees by early 1996 (Montana Standard: 6/15/95). The plant's 
average payroll was about $10 million a year -  the average worker's wage and
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benefit package amounted to roughly $50,000 a year (Montana Standard:
6/15/95). The result will be a further erosion of Butte’s working class 
population because most of these workers will have to relocate to receive 
retraining and find new jobsiMontana Standard: 6/15/95). From 1980 to 1992, 
Butte’s population dropped 9.8 percent, a loss of 3,650 people (U.S. Census,
1994)
With federal and state government assistance, local government has 
sought high technology companies which employ highly educated well-paid 
specialists, and simultaneously, through local tax incentives, companies 
which will provide large numbers of lower-paid production-type jobs which 
do not require specialized education. But, critics note, this approach ensures 
the continuation of the past history of wealth in the hands of a few and 
financial uncertainty for many, in the form of lower paid jobs, which are 
always subject to elimination as technology develops. Marilyn Maney 
questions officials’ search for $6-an-hour jobs, the salary offered by the pasta 
plant which officials unsuccessfully spent more than $100,000 trying to lure to 
Butte in 1995 (Maney, 9/22/95). She agrees that jobs are important, but insists 
the jobs must provide adequate salaries.
.... we re [labor organizations] involved in the creation of a family 
wage, decent jobs -  not $6-a-hour crap. We’re certainly concerned with 
the political climate, the whole economic war on the working class, 
and reclaiming our heritage and our right to speak for ourselves...
We re concerned not only about a family wage, but the kind of jobs that 
males in our class can work and regain their sense of dignity, their 
sense of having worth...(Maney, 9/22/95).
In their willingness to provide concessions to any company that will
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employ large numbers of Butte's people, even when salaries are low, Butte 
officials may well be acting from lessons learned from the history of 
interaction with the Anaconda Company. Sociologist William Freudenburg 
(1992) notes that resource dependent communities have:
...a tendency for local leaders to represent a growth machine 
orientation, working vigorously to attract increased employment, 
business, and real estate development., in ...isolated, resource 
dependent regions... these tendencies tend to be amplified, if not raised 
to a level of desperation. While the desperation needs to be seen as 
understandable, however, it does not need to be treated as inevitable... 
(Freudenburg, 1992:329).
Additionally, traditional local attempts to improve their business climates 
-  tax cuts, weakened regulations and incentives -  have had no or a negative 
effect on the communities that undertake such efforts. This may well be a 
manifestation of a more global economy an d /o r an indication of the 
relatively small percentage of the total cost of doing business represented by 
any community (Freudenburg, 1992). Although, in the past, extraction of raw 
materials was a viable path to economic development;
... societal relationships with environment and technology have 
changed so fundamentally that extractive industries today appear more 
likely to lead rural regions to economic addiction (Freudenburg,
1992:305).
The change is the result of increased costs of extraction and downward 
trends in global commodity prices in tandem with the geographic isolation of 
extractive communities, their lack of power vis a vis that of the extractive 
industry, and the lack of realistic alternatives for other development paths
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which would provide more community independence (Freudenburg, 1992). 
There are three basic reasons that the volatile market for extractive products 
will encourage economic addiction:
1. Frequent and dramatic price swings may mask the long-term, 
downward trend in commodity prices (Freudenburg, 1992). As was the case in 
Butte, the community and workers, accustomed to the rise and fall of copper 
prices, may grant concessions when prices are low, assuming that they will 
benefit when prices rise again.
2. The instability of world markets may increase the marginalization and 
exploitation of workers and host communities (Freudenburg, 1992). The 
Anaconda Company was able to wrest concessions from both Butte and 
Chilean employees, playing one group against the other (Finn, 1995).
3. The volatility of extractive commodity price trends, which are both 
interm ittent and irregular, function to encourage resource-dependent 
workers and communities to gamble on the payoff by overadapting to the 
needs of the extractive industry (Freudenburg, 1992). This seemed to be the 
case when Butte residents relocated to make room for the Berkeley Pit.
...when seen in this context, a dependence on resource extraction 
resembles nothing so much as the (other) forms of gambling that are 
officially recognized.... W hether the relatively random  positive 
reinforcement comes from the slot machines or the commodity 
markets, the payoffs tend to come just often enough to keep substantial 
numbers of social actors hooked in gambles for new riches 
(Freudenburg, 1992:320).
Once the industry is established, as in the case of Butte, to maintain or at 
least minimize the decreasing employment base, the community tends to
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overadapt to the industry, investing community resources into facilities and 
support services that have value only to the extractive industry 
(Freudenburg, 1992; Norgaard, 1984). That overadaption has led to the loss of 
tax revenues which are now desperately needed in Butte. Further, this 
overadaption extends to the state level. In November, the state Department 
of Environmental Quality granted Pegasus Gold, Inc., operator of the Beal 
Mountain Mine, a new water discharge permit that will allow groundwater 
from an area under the mine's open pit to be discharged and released into 
German Gulch. The gold mine employs about 120 workers, and has a payroll 
of more than $6.3 million. The permit, which will allow the mine to 
continue operation for another, is possible only because of the previously 
mentioned downgrade of water quality criteria {Montana Standard, 11/14/95). 
The end result of overadaption to an extractive industry, given any 
community's limited financial and physical resources, is that other 
alternatives are excluded, making other forms of development unlikely or, 
especially in instances of environmental degradation, sometimes close to 
impossible (Norgaard, 1984). However, Freudenburg (1992) points to three 
other characteristics of addiction that are equally serious.
First, because many extractive industries pay higher salaries in terms of 
the communities in which they locate, there is little incentive for local youth 
to develop "entrepreneurial skills." Yet these are the skills necessary to 
respond to the traditional warning that communities avoid overdependence 
on one enterprise by focusing "heavily on the development of local 
enterprises (Freudenburg, 1992:322-23)."
Second, the relatively high pay can subvert "the typical economic reward
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structure for education" because, in the short-term, "high school dropouts can 
often earn more through extractive jobs" than many of the best-educated 
people in the community (Freudenburg, 1992:323).
Third, worker protections and benefits can work to increase addiction 
because the most senior workers learn to remain passively in the community 
to wait for the return of the good times.
Ironically, each time this logic works, its apparent validity increases, 
while the long-term downward trend in prices may mean that the real 
validity gets shakier each time, up to the point where the shut-down 
proves in fact to have been permanent (Freudenburg, 1992:323).
Disagreements about the future of mining in Butte notwithstanding, some 
are concerned that worried that local officials will seek another relationship 
similar to that which the community had w ith the Anaconda Company (Ray, 
10/24/95; Waring, 10/21/95). The distrust of local government and fear of 
government collusion with ARGO recalls the history of local government's 
ties to the Anaconda Company. The suspicion runs through the political 
landscape like a fault line under Butte Hill. It is noteworthy that everyone 
interviewed believes it is possible to change Butte for the better; no one has 
given up. But there are differences of opinion about what might improve the 
quality of lives of people in Butte.
Ellen Crain (9/21/95) maintains the answer is "education, education 
education." Although they differ about the types of jobs that are needed. 
Lynch (10/25/95) and Maney (9/22/95) see jobs as the solution. John T. Shea 
agrees that jobs are needed but thinks children in Butte need more 
community activities, too:
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And something for the youth of today to do. When I was a kid 
everyone learned to skate, sledded on Big Butte, walked to the creek to 
go fishing, would have a bologna sandwich on the top of Big Butte.
Every kid in Butte climbed up the East Ridge, played baseball, marbles, 
entered soapbox derbies on West Park Street... (Shea, 10/24/95).
Mary Kay Craig (7/30/95) and George Waring (10/21/95) believe a good 
cleanup is the answer. Waring adds that a renewed connection with nature 
might be the best improvement:
Coming from Seattle — so many parks, a sense that nature should be 
protected and people deserve to recreate. Wouldn’t it be great to have a 
stream with trees to give you a sense of place and increase your own 
sense of worth? I thought, "We don’t need urban revitalization but 
nature brought back into the city to restore human dignity."
I had spent summers in Oxford. When you go through the gate out 
of the city you're in the gardens with a wonderful 18th and 19th 
century village. It really influenced my view on what this city needed. 
There, on bus tours, even gasoline stations are buffered and thatched.
It’s very pleasing.
Dennehey says his departm ent’s focus on public health, incorporated into 
institutional controls, will improve residents' lives:
We re coming up  with ideas and public policy to: first, remove public 
health threats and we’ve created new lead screening and abatement 
programs to take care of children and remove lead from homes; and, 
second, the water quality district. Improved enforcement of water 
quality problems deter people from drilling into Superfund sites 
(Dennehey, 9/21/95).
It is not surprising that the visions of an improved Butte are based in 
history, economics, and health — since the smelter smoke first masked the 
physical landscape and Butte’s miners fought to stay alive in the threatening
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tunnels under Butte Hill, the physical landscape of Butte has been obscured 
above ground and a threat below ground. Because of the Anaconda 
Company's dominance in Butte and the state of Montana, economic security 
has always been the issue in Butte. Given the centrality of the notion of 
development in Western thought, it is likely that economic themes will 
continue to play a dominant part in the reconstruction of Butte.
The Western, modernist discursive formation, formulated during 
momentous changes in global power relations, in control over nature, 
and in science and technology, has as its dynamic theme the core 
concept of "development (Feet and Watts, 1993:231).
On the local level, awareness of the human interrelationship with the 
land, in particular, health impacts, has been subverted by government 
officials’ attempts to balance economic development and cleanup and by 
ARCO's legal obstructionism. The inadequate and uncritical newspaper 
coverage has further constrained local activists. Terms of participation have 
alienated Butte's people, keeping local public health knowledge under the 
surface.
The conflict is not geographically contained in Butte. ARCO's 
maneuverings are also below the surface, conducted in underground tunnels 
throughout Butte Hill to Washington D.C. and corporate headquarters in 
California. The state of Montana and federal government are also deeply 
involved. Given the scale of contamination and costs of cleanup, the stakes 
are high — socially, as well as financially. The possibilities of social change in 
Butte are considered in the next, and concluding, section.
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1 Foucault defined subjugated knowledges as "those blocs of historical 
knowledge which were present but disguised within the body of functionalist 
and systematizing theory and which criticism... has been able to reveal," as 
well as "a set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their 
task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the 
hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity..."
(1994:203)
2 For a full treatment of class in Butte, see Finn.
3 Freudenburg writes that his use of the word "recreancy" is "intended to 
provide an affectively neutral reference to behaviors of persons and/or 
institutions that hold positions of trust, agency, responsibility, or fiduciary or 
other forms of broadly expected obligations to the collectivity, but that behave 
in a manner that fails to fulfill the obligations or merit the trust." (1993:916- 
17)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CONCLUSION 
Renegotiating Community, Landscapes of Sodal Change
Although Butte bears strong similarities to sociological studies of 
contaminated communities, Butte has its own particularities which may 
provide both impetus for and constraints on the opportunities for social 
change that researchers have noted in other Superfund communities (Couch 
and Kroll-Smith, 1991a). Butte is subject to the same structural issues 
embedded in the federal Superfund law (Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Greider, 
1992) and environmental protection in general (Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994; 
Peet and Watts, 1993) as were other communities studied. Issues related to 
institutionalized practices of government technocracies (Weber, 1996; Barnett, 
1994; Yeager, 1991; Greider, 1992; Lupton, 1993; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Kroll- 
Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Edelstein, 1988; Freudenburg, 1993; Brown, 
1991; Fiorino, 1990), discursive practices (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Connolly, 
1993; Milbum, 1994; Edelman, 1964; Greider, 1992; Greenough and Tsing, 1991; 
Brown, 1991), and public health issues related to contarnination (Lappé, 1991; 
Cortese, 1993; Hu and Kim, 1993; Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Castleman and 
Ziem, 1988; Bates, 1994) are also similar.
However, the community's experience with corporate practices over a 
hundred years differs from that of some other contaminated communities by 
dint of the Anaconda Mining Company's economic and political power in 
both Butte and the state of Montana (Malone, 1995; Malone et al, 1993; Toole, 
1959, 1972; Emmons, 1990; Firm, 1996; Gunther, 1947). Company tactics often 
entailed brute force, as was the case with its hiring of goons to infiltrate and 
spy upon union memberships and thugs to break strikes (Malone, 1995;
301
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
302
Toole, 1959, 1972; Emmons, 1990). Challenges to the Company’s autonomy 
were dangerous business. In Butte, there is still an undercurrent of 
retribution exacted from those who challenge the powers that be. Marilyn 
Maney (3/19/96) teUs of a member of the Women’s Protective Union who 
lived with the anxiety that the Anaconda Company would realize that she 
was the little girl holding her mother's hand in a well-known picture of the 
m urdered Wobbly Frank Little's funeral.
Even up to the time of her death at 82, she was afraid of retaliation on 
her and her family if the Company knew she was that little girl. That 
speaks volumes about what their [the workers’] relation was to the 
Company. Although they d idn’t have that fear in a group in the 
parade... [there was throughout the] 40s, 50s, 60s, still that fear if the 
Company knew she was actually that little girl there would be 
retaliation for her, her family, and her union (Maney, 3/19/1996).
The retribution continues. CTEC learned in March 1996 that the group’s 
arrangement for office space and accounting with Montana Tech would not 
be renewed. There are silences here, the result of domination and the 
exercise of power as "repressed ideas (Peet and Watts, 1994:230). ” Speculations 
persist that, in light of the press coverage and statewide participation in the 
snow geese memorial, CTEC is being punished for taking an activist role. The 
intimidation that results from the exercise of power may be the greatest 
detrim ent to collective action in Butte.
Additionally, the notion of stigma (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991;
Edelstein, 1988) is important. For a hundred years Butte was the other, a 
mining community in a largely rural Western state, and, as such, was 
stigmatized both by its physical appearance and the "spooky" (Emmons,
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1990:62) nature of thousands of men burrowing under Butte Hill. Further, 
that otherness, in tandem with an immigrant population, and the 
occupational danger of mining led to the creation of a culture that both 
internalized and celebrated risk that is different from some other well-studied 
contaminated communities in the East, such as Love Canal (Greider, 1992) 
and Wobum, Mass. (DiPema, 1985; Brown, 1991). It is possible that 
communities founded on extraction of natural resources, especially those that 
have lasted for a great many years, have very different dynamics than those 
which were not reliant upon such extraction. Further, there may be 
differences in communities with different types of extractive practices. 
Although logging communities also lived with great occupational risk 
(Dietrich, 1992) and were subject to radical union activity (Toole, 1959, 1972; 
Emmons, 1990; Malone et al, 1993), mining communities may differ from 
logging communities in that loggers, working above ground, were more 
connected to the landscape than were miners, burrowing below ground or 
carving out huge open pits. Mining may have alienated communities from 
the natural world more than other extractive activities.
...Well, these loggers live in the woods and work in the woods and play 
in the woods. They are out in the chill rain and the hot sun. They see 
deer while driving to the logging job in the morning and eagles on the 
way home. The fish, they hunt, they hike. These forests are to them a 
mosaic of memory a city dweller can’t imagine, a hundred places cut 
and regrown. To them, a clearcut isn't an end. It is a beginning 
(Dietrich, 1992:45).
Another difference between Butte and other contaminated communities, 
such as Love Canal and Woburn, Mass., is related to the activity of the press.
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Love Canal became a subject of investigation for the national press which 
activists, such as Lois Gibbs, quickly learned could help them publicize their 
struggle (Greider, 1992). In Woburn, a small weekly newspaper uncovered 
and published a story about the extent of the contamination (DiPerna, 1985). 
The people of Butte do not have that asset. There is no indication that the 
Montana Standard will suddenly undergo a transformation which would 
result in the practice of responsible journalism, which is both critical and 
educational.
Much of the research in contaminated communities indicates that 
discovery of contamination in soil, air or water offers an opportunity to 
challenge the existing power structure, as expressed in government agency 
and corporate action.
...The point is that in reacting to what is seen as inadequate behavior by 
large-scale organizations in relation to technological hazards, 
adversarial groups may emerge which challenge the actions, and even 
the legitimacy, of these organizations. In adapting to hum an caused 
hazards, these groups may alter the power relationships within 
communities, as well as between communities, corporations and 
governments (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991a:314-315).
The notion of recreancy (Freudenburg, 1993) is particularly helpful because 
the keystone of the adversarial groups' challenges are generally based on the 
disillusionment that sets in when victims of pollution decide that large-scale 
organizations are reacting inadequately in relation to technological hazards 
(Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991a, 1991b, Edelstein, 1988, Brown, 1991). There is 
a great deal of uncertainty associated with contaminated communities — "It 
can't be that dangerous. I'm not sick " as opposed to The risk is likely worse
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than officials say, look at how many people I know are Ul." In the face of 
uncertainty:
...individuals are apparently not content to rely solely on their 
perceptions of risk. Social factors frequently provide a framework for 
selective perceptions and judgments about the hazard. People will seek 
out others to confirm their assessments of danger....
Several studies of technological crises found a direct relationship 
between the construction of shared beliefs about danger and the 
emergence of citizens' groups. These groups organized around 
something more than the mere perception of risk. A shared set of 
ideas about threat, accountability, and the necessity for immediate 
remedial action served as the basis for group legitimation and 
membership, setting the believers apart from the non-believers. From 
a sociological point of view, beliefs more profoundly influence the 
believer than perceptions influence the perceiver. This is largely 
because belief systems are socially constructed, socially inherited, and 
exercise considerably more control over the appraisal of events than 
perceptions do... (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991a:306-307).
However, for this challenge to materialize, there must be a sufficient 
number of disillusioned victims who have reached some consensus on the 
nature both of the threat and of their grievances. This has not been the case 
in Butte where few local activists struggle against the combined weight of an 
historically- and economically-shaped landscape of beliefs, as well as the 
contamination that is the real legacy of the exploitation of Butte’s people and 
the land. However, this is changing — a cluster of miners sat quietly together 
at the snow geese memorial, a possible expression of the beginning of a wave 
of concern flowing through the community like the groundwater under 
Butte Hill. It is possible that public awareness of Moore and Luoma’s study 
could initiate a groundswell of concern. It is crucial that this information be 
disseminated in Butte.
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Although his work has been performed in the context of "natural 
disasters," such as earthquakes and floods, sociologist Dennis E. Wenger's 
notions of the internal and external ties of organizations that constitute the 
community's structural relationships are helpful in considering the 
possibility for social change in Butte. Wenger (1978:21) defines internal ties as 
those that "include the various institutionalized patterns of relationships 
between local organizations operating at the local level." External ties, which 
reach beyond local boundaries, can be hierarchical, with layered tiers of 
authority, one higher than the next, or horizontal, with equal authority 
(Wenger, 1978). Butte's external hierarchical ties included Eastern 
corporations and banks which supplied capital (Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone et 
al, 1993; Malone, 1995), the Anaconda Company which controlled the state 
political apparatus (Toole, 1959,1972; Malone et al, 1993; Malone, 1995), the 
union's ties w ith regional and national organizations (Emmons, 1990) and 
and national organizations (Emmons, 1990), and the federal government 
which had an interest, especially in wartime, in keeping the mines open 
(Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone et al, 1993; Malone, 1995; Emmons, 1990). During 
the traumatic years from the late 1970s when mining operations were 
discontinued, until the early 1980s when the federal government became 
involved on an environmental basis, the most important external ties were, 
for the most part, ties to ARGO and state government. With designation of 
Butte as a Superfund site, the external hierarchical ties to the federal 
government became became paramount. The resulting conflict between 
federal Superfund law, state government and ARCO then took center stage, 
directing local response. However, even without the Superfund status, the 
trend is toward a predominance of external hierarchical ties:
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...external-hierarchical relationships are becoming increasingly more 
extensive and intensive in contemporary society. Conversely, internal 
ties, the integrative mechanisms of exchange and coordination at the 
local level, are becoming weakened (Wenger, 1978:34).
In Butte, these new external hierarchical ties also include the influx of 
professionals and outside environmentalists w ith different value systems 
than those of the community. The professionals, who work within the 
parameters of technocracy, are oriented to a more individualistic culture, and 
the outside environmentalists tend to impose visions of a healthy landscape 
divorced from the history of the place. These responses of organizations with 
external-hierarchical ties to biospheric contamination, usually in the form of 
"social, technological and legal responses," tend to produce "secondary 
impacts," which often include social isolation and stigma, in the 
contaminated community (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991:303). Because of its 
differences with the rest of the state, Butte’s history is of one of chronic 
"secondary impacts." Yet, although the combined authority of the Anaconda 
Company and federal, state, and local governments was often brought to bear 
against Butte's people, the control over their political desires and interests " 
(Wolensky, 1991) was never complete (Finn, 1995). This analysis has pointed 
to varying forms of resistance, including both miners' union and the 
Women's Protective Union activities, struggles to save the uptow n from the 
expanding Berkeley Pit, the creation of the Butte Community Union and the 
Coalition for Benefits which was formed to pressure ARCO for decent 
treatment of laid-off workers, the construction of Our Lady of the Rockies, 
and citizen takeover of CTEC. Further, the analysis has indicated that the 
failure of many Butte people to participate on the county's and EPA’s terms
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
308
in cleanup efforts may be in part explained as a boycott, another form of 
resistance. Butte has a history of both public and private resistance (Finn, 
1995) that local activists can tap into. What is needed, is creativity:
...communities must rely on organizational resilience or innovation 
to bounce back from the insult of contamination. Such creative ability 
to recover from unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest 
may be present in structural arrangements designed for management 
of non-emergency conditions, but it would surprise us it is was. The 
teleological nature of community social structures, their manifest 
design and purpose, their customary and methodical arrangements are 
more suited to anticipation than resihence. Thus, faced w ith the 
dangers of environmental contaminants, but without the benefit of an 
anticipatory organization response, local community organizations are 
apt to be perceived by victims as inadequate to respond in a timely and 
effective manner... successful adaptation to extreme uncertainty 
dem ands mitigative adjustments that are likely to be inconsistent with 
routine social arrangements (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991b:309).
It is important to keep in mind that strain and conflict are the norm in any 
local structure, however, integrative mechanisms, e.g., the normative 
structure, tend to mediate the conflict (Wenger, 1978). In Butte the normative 
structure, the community-sanctioned guidelines for behavior which are 
embedded in the community's value and belief systems, is working class. 
People in Butte judge people on their "work ethic, ability to be honest and 
willingness to commit to the community (Crain, 3/19/95)." These are very 
different values than those of the technocracy which is now working in Butte 
and making decisions that will have a major impact on the community’s 
future. Yet, despite historical and current power imbalances Butte has a 
powerful history of asserting community values, of working in the interstices 
of power relations to create space for community. However, in the past, the
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spaces may have been more comfortable because they were familiar and 
patterns of assertion were well established in com munity/corporate 
relationships. Also, the community values were derived, to a great extent, 
from the relationship with the Company, in which the Company dominated 
and set the norms for allowable action (Finn, 1995). Those norms, and the 
price of challenge, were well understood. The world that faces the people of 
Butte in 1996 is not as clearly defined or obvious, which may explain some of 
the nostalgia that pervades the town. Because of this lack of definition, it may 
be difficult to discern where the values should be brought to bear, where and 
how the resistance should be conducted.
A necessary first step in the renegotiation of community and the gathering 
of resources to fight to maintain that renegotiated community entails a search 
for some common understanding of the origins and meanings of the 
contamination. This analysis argues that the origins are not simply the result 
of mining, but of structural inequalities and a worldview that does not take 
the land into account. The land is further distanced by the influx of 
professionals who treat the pollutants as a marketable commodity out of 
social context, and, because of the difference in values, pose another kind of 
threat to the working class culture. Additionally, members of the community 
must decide to what extent its history becomes a commodity. These are far 
more subtle and murky issues than those that the community has 
traditionally faced.
The ecological-symbolic perspective joins environmental sociology’s 
assumption that biospheres and social structures are interdependent 
w ith a key assumption of symbolic interaction that people act on the 
basis of the meanings they attribute to events and conditions. From 
this perspective, social responses to hazards and disasters are affected by
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both the nature of the disruption in hum an/ environmental 
relationships and the appraisals people make of those disruptions 
(Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1994:28).
Their appraisals are made within context of belief systems, both collective 
and individual. Because their voices are yet to be heard, the meaning of the 
contamination to the people of Butte is not yet clear. However, changes in 
belief systems are slow because there is a narrow latitude in which messages 
divergent to a person's beliefs may actually act to alter those beliefs. The 
more strongly held the belief the narrower the latitude of acceptance for 
divergent messages (Milbum, 1991). Further, if people are disinterested or 
not knowledgeable about an issue, the only possible way to change beliefs or 
attitudes is a peripheral route, rather than a direct challenge. Some have 
charged Butte's people with disinterest (Weinstock, 7/31/95; Kirkpatrick, 
7/31/91; Dennehey, 9/21/95). This analysis argues that resident disinterest is 
not the sole issue; instead, there are structural reasons that Butte's people 
have not been adequately informed, or, possibly protected, and that the 
process of renegotiation is occurring within structural constraints, both 
historic and present. Further, because the community's history and identity 
are so strongly tied to mining, the contamination and cleanup, as presented 
by the EPA and mainstream environmental groups like the Clark Fork 
Coalition, represent a real threat to strongly held beliefs about the meaning of 
their family histories and struggles. The technocratic approach to 
contamination is that it is a technical problem that has occurred and will be 
cleaned up completely out of social context. By this definition of 
contamination, the Butte people who are so actively engaged with their 
mining history and way of life are apathetic or ignorant.
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Because the technocratic approach screens out social context, the linkage 
between the ruthless exploitation of the land and of Butte's people has not 
been made in EPA documents or in the local newspaper coverage. The 
extraction process, which was early intensified with financing provided by 
Eastern and West Coast capitalists, typified the functioning of what 
Schnaiberg and Gould (1993) refer to as the "treadmill of production" — 
accumulated wealth produced by extractive activities led to 
development of technology to extract resources more rapidly and replace 
labor w ith machinery. Government support for the extractive industry was 
essential to maintain tax revenues to fund national development and social 
welfare programs (Schnaiberg and Gould, 1993). As extraction intensified in 
Butte, the resource base was depleted and the environment became more 
degraded, which, in turn created socioeconomic disorganization (Schnaiberg 
and Gould, 1993) as miners were laid off and the mines began to close.
To forestall the inevitable, to keep the mines operating, the political and 
social system made the necessary concessions to the Company and, later, 
ARCO. All of Butte's systems were oriented to supporting mining, leaving 
few resources available for alternative use after mining ceased. As the land 
became more marginalized (less resources and more degradation), Butte's 
people became more economically marginalized (poorer) and politically 
marginalized. Within this context, the contamination is a social problem: 
the extent of the contamination can be directly correlated to the inequities of 
power between the actors involved, in this case, the Company, local, state and 
federal governments, and the people of Butte. As a rule, the greater the 
differences in power, the more contamination or environmental degradation 
(Boyce, 1994).
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So, when the EPA or environmental groups treat contamination as a 
technical problem only, they are treating a symptom, rather than the disease. 
Further, the technical approach denies the people of Butte a real voice in the 
process by relegating local knowledge to unprovable superstition. And, even 
worse, the technocratic ahistorical approach implicitly blames the victims for 
their plight — after all, the argument goes, they were the miners who made 
the mess, they profited from it. This argument completely denies the 
structural inequalities that always existed in Butte. Thus, the situation is 
polarized and the people of Butte who are denied a place in the present, and 
uncertain of the future, are left with a past that is denigrated. In situations 
like this, belief systems will be adhered to more rigidly, (Edelstein, 1988; Kroll- 
Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b) thus leaving less latitude for change.
The less latitude, the more need for the use of peripheral routes to get 
across a divergent message, e.g. the cleanup planned may not be sufficient to 
protect public health in Butte, or public health is a valid concern and should 
be investigated. Peripheral routes are commonly used by advertisers, e.g, the 
use of well-like experts of popular figures an d /o r pleasant background music 
while the message is delivered (Milburn, 1991). The idea is that if the 
person's thoughts are positive during the message, the person’s attitudes will 
tend to shift toward agreement w ith the message. However, the attitude 
change in response to messages delivered through a peripheral route tends to 
be temporary (Milburn, 1991). Peripheral routes are more successful if the 
messages are presented with more powerful positive emotional images that 
deal with the substantive issue (Milburn, 1991), in this case, the need for a 
more stringent cleanup, or health studies.
The approach planned by Citizens for Labor and Environmental Justice
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may work on a peripheral level by turning the remediation into a positive, in 
the form of well-paying jobs. The new group has forged an alliance with state 
labor groups to press for the hiring of union members on the many cleanup 
projects that are planned (Ray, 10/24/95; Hadley, 10/5/95). Kathy Hadley, with 
John Ray and others, have been involved w ith the Clark Fork Superfund 
sites since the toxins were first discovered. (CTEC president Mary Kay Craig 
and activist George Waring are also active and involved members of the new 
group.) Because the EPA had neglected to include the Clark Fork River in the 
constellation of Superfund sites, Hadley and others formed the Clark Fork 
Coalition to fight for the river's inclusion. (See map of streamside tailings in 
the appendix.)
My interest was Superfund. The river wasn't in the Superfund site; it 
was just Silver Bow Creek to Warm Springs Ponds... The river 
transports all the tailings down the river.
Lots of times people join groups because they have a problem they 
want to solve... It was the Clark Fork Coalition that got the river into 
the Superfund sites. It took meeting after meeting. We even went to a 
meeting in D.C. I took my sister [Lois Gibbs^] with me. I think they 
[government officials] were scared. Shortly after that they included it 
(Hadley, 10/5/95).
Since its founding the Clark Fork Coalition has actively pressed for a 
stringent permanent cleanup and supported the state’s Natural Resource 
Damage claim. In the early 1990s the Coalition funded a Butte office and 
hired Mary Kay Craig as the Upper Clark Fork Coalition representative to 
organize Butte residents to support the cleanup. But Craig's activities were 
circumscribed threefold: by the Coalition's insistence she work part time 
only; its organizing style which stressed fisheries and aesthetics which are 
more middle- than working-class concerns; and its organizational orientation
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toward technocracy. This orientation applies standard operating procedures 
uniformly, disregarding particularities, which is problematic because Butte is 
particular. So, given the Coalition's failure to design a campaign that took 
into account Butte's identity as the "Mining City " and its working class ethos, 
it would have been surprising if the Coalition’s organizing approach had 
been effective. Additionally, the more institutionalized the approach, the less 
likely it is to change social relations in a community.
We propose that adaptive responses that are emergent, less- 
institutionalized and exist for extended periods of time are more likely 
to be incompatible with preexisting patterns of social life. What was 
structural, in other words, what routinely acted to constrain and limit, 
ceases to be so, becoming instead subject to human agency in the form 
of alternative leadership, emergent groups, beliefs, and so on (Couch 
and Kroll-Smith, 1991b:299).
To engage people in Butte, Hadley and Ray are trying a more specific 
strategy, oriented toward the community's working class history, a strategy 
that offers a challenge to the status quo:
Everybody has different ideas about environmental justice. To me, the 
cleanup is a tremendous opportunity for jobs. The cleanup will take 10 
years and produce thousands of jobs — not $6-an-hour jobs. But the 
state can't require the jobs here to go to local people.
Originally we wanted to do a job analysis for the cleanup but 
couldn't get it done in time. The EPA doesn’t look at economic 
impacts. We were working with union groups and had to do it [the job 
analysis] in a 60-day period.... Some [grant organizations] were 
interested in it but even when we were asking for emergency money 
they couldn't work that fast (Hadley, 10/5/95).
Members of the environmental justice group had hoped that the job 
analysis would generate some press coverage, and, that the ensuing publicity
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about the possibility of well-paying jobs, would motivate people to press for a 
better cleanup (Hadley, 10/5/95). Additionally, workers on the cleanup would 
receive the equivalent of on-the-job training about environmental hazards. 
But because the federal Superfund law is not designed to consider economic 
impacts, it does not address the issue that Citizens for Environmental Justice 
group has identified. Under the federal law there is no allowance for issues 
that the public identifies and, further, public participation is constrained as 
the ability to respond to an official definition of the problem and officially 
designed solutions to that definition of a problem only.
Additionally, there are high transaction costs in the Superfund 
information-driven process. The 60-day comment period is often difficult for 
activists to meet because most work fuU time while raising families, and 
many require assistance to translate the technical jargon used in government 
reports. Unlike corporations which have the money to hire full-time 
employees to prepare comments, citizens frequently have to seek grant 
money to hire experts. So activists must seek grant money to fund their 
efforts. However, even in emergency situations, the time period involved in 
seeking grant money is longer than the public comment period allowed 
under the federal Superfund law.
Although Citizens for Labor and Environmental Justice found potential 
grant support from labor organizations, the group ran out of time — the 
comment period expired before they could complete the grant application. 
Hadley says:
We learned our lesson, learned at least the state labor organizations 
were interested. They put staff time into it. We should be able to do
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this for the next comment period. But it’s too late for Butte (Hadley, 
10/5/95).
It's too late in the sense that many of the cleanup plans for Butte have 
already been formulated; the cleanup of Silver Bow Creek, called streamside 
tailings, remains to be determined. And, the EPA is reconsidering its plans 
for the Berkeley Pit in light of the deaths of the snow geese. However, 
through a job analysis and press coverage, it may be possible to develop 
support to employ the people of Butte (and Anaconda) in the remediation of 
the creek — this would help to reduce local unemployment rates while 
providing a minimal environmental education. Also, a more 
environmentally-aware base of support could be used to encourage residents 
to scrutinize the effectiveness of planned institutional controls, which will 
include the siting of one or more waste repositories for mining waste that 
will be run  by local officials. Unlike situations of existing contamination 
which divide a community, siting issues often bring the community together 
(Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1994).
If Citizens for Environmental Justice can obtain a grant from labor 
organizations, they may avoid some of the other constraints associated with 
both government and private foundation grant money^. As members of 
CTEC discovered, there are often strings attached to grant money, as is the 
case with the EPA’s Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs). The end result is an 
officially limited scope of participation which can leave activists vulnerable to 
charges of advocacy beyond the allowed parameters, as was the case when a 
Montana Standard editorial inaccurately charged CTEC with overstepping 
EPA boundaries. So, funding from labor organizations may allow Citizens for
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Environmental Justice a broader area in which to work. And the group’s 
"back door" approach — using the cleanup as a way to provide needed well- 
paying jobs — should be more effective than direct confrontation with 
operative beliefs which are often difficult to change.
The connections between CTEC and the Citizens for Labor and 
Environmental Justice should also be helpful. Research indicates that 
collective action in rural communities and regions is often dependent on the 
nature of strong and weak tie networks, which are necessary for "effective 
community response and development (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1994:28)." 
The strong tie usually consists of "an interactional resource based on 
familiarity, emotional intensity, repeated face-to-face contact, and the 
reciprocal exchange of services (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1994:28)." In Butte, 
where people often belong to the same associational or social groups, there is 
much face-to-face contact on a daily basis. It is here that the links with labor, 
history, economics, and cleanup must be made for any kind of agreement to 
occur.
The weak tie is often a bridge between strong-tie groups, e.g. a person who 
belongs in two unaffiliated groups who provides opportunities for mutual 
exchange between them (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1994). In a rural 
community, the weak ties would supply "important links in the relationship 
between the local setting and extra-local aid and assistance (Couch and Kroll- 
Smith, 1994:29)." These ties may be individuals or groups, such as John Ray 
who is also a board member of the Montana Environmental Information 
Council and Citizens for Labor and Environmental Justice, which link the 
local community to regional or national organizations (Couch and Kroll- 
Smith, 1994). Research indicates a strong tie community group becomes
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particularly important if it can establish a weak tie between local groups and 
cosmopolitan resources because this enhances "the adaptive capacity of the 
local community (Couch and KroU-Smith, 1994:29)." However, because of the 
uncertainty inherent in contamination cases, several strong-tie groups with 
different interpretations of risk associated w ith the contamination are likely 
to form regarding the environmental risks of local pollution (Couch and 
Kroll-Smith, 1994). The local lead committee’s ties to ARCO, the 
EPA and county government represents another strong tie group in Butte.
The external strong tie groups should be chosen carefully. Although local 
environmental activists need support, there is a suspicion of 
environmentalists in Butte, largely the result of the class difference between 
the predominantly m iddle class membership of many environmental groups 
and the people of Butte. The m iddle class wilderness orientation of some 
environmentalists is denigrated in Butte by the epithet ’Trustifarian,"
(Reavis, 11/29/95) which wittily connotes a preachy activist who has never 
had to work a day in his or her life, but is, instead, supported by a trust fund. 
The implication is that environmentalists don’t have to pay the price for 
their principles. Although this is not always the case, given the 
environmental movement’s historic lack of understanding of the social 
repercussions of the policies they espouse, the criticism is reasonably well- 
founded.
References are often made to the women's leadership of the toxic 
grassroots movement (Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992) which is 
composed of local groups working in their own, often poor or blue-collar, 
communities. Typical members of grassroots groups are "wary of elections 
and formal politics, and even large civic organizations, cynical about
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government at all levels. Instead of political activism...they normally 
concentrate their energies on nurturing and defending their own small 
private spaces — family or church or immediate neighborhood (Greider, 
1992:214)."
In contrast, the members of the national environmental organizations are 
"the offspring of the affluent managerial class, people who will feel at ease in 
the higher realms of politics and skilled at the rationalistic policy analysis. 
Many are idealistic professionals, committed to large intellectual conceptions 
of the environmental problem but not personally confronted by the risks of 
poisonous industrial pollution (Greider, 1992:214)."
In attempt to bridge the gulf in priorities between grassroots and more 
traditional national environmentalists, Lois Gibbs tried to bring both 
together.
"It was hilarious...People from the grassroots movement were at one 
end of the room, drinking Budweiser and smoking, while the 
environmentalists were at the other end of the room eating yogurt.
We wanted to talk about victim compensation. They wanted to talk 
about ten parts per billion benzene and scientific uncertainty. A couple 
of times, it was almost war.
"We were hoping that, by seeing these local folks, the people from 
the Big Ten would be more apt to support the grassroots position, but it 
didn't work that way. They went right on with the status quo position.
The Big Ten approach is to ask: What can we support to achieve a 
legislative victory? Our approach is to ask: What is morally correct?
We can't support something in order to win if we think it is morally 
wrong (Greider, 1992:214)."
The bottom line is that there is little incentive for Butte people to 
participate in the cleanup as participation is structured by the EPA and local 
government. Some working class communities created their own notions of
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participation. They have mobilized the citizenry around conducting their 
own health studies. This approach, generally referred to as lay or popular 
epidemiology, serves four purposes simultaneously: it accomplishes needed 
research; educates; mobilizes the public; and challenges authority (Brown, 
1991). It is interesting that official efforts to correct, at least partially, the abuse 
of the land does not extend to that which may have been done to people.
Although the degradation of the land has been well-chronicled by the 
state's Natural Resource Damage Program there has been no such tallying of 
human cost. Nor is any such tallying, in the form of health studies, planned. 
As indicated earlier, this official oversight, combined with the failure of the 
local press to pursue health issues, is significant:
...such studies [epidemiological] are vitally important. They provide 
information on the scope of the problem, and they serve to educate 
communities about the hazards and the possible (if not exact) risks. 
Moreover, methods of exposure assessment and outcome 
ascertainment are constantly improving, as is demonstrated by a recent 
study in which slight but significant increases in malformation rates 
were associated with residential proximity to hazardous-waste sites in 
New York State (Hu and Kim, 1993:43).
Given official failure to investigate, popular epidemiology, "the process by 
which laypeople involve themselves in detection of and action on 
environmental health risks and diseases," (Brown, 1991:134) may be the only 
alternative to determine if, in actuality, Butte's people have been and 
continue to be, at risk from exposure to contaminants in soil, air, and water. 
The most important precedent is the work done by W obum residents in 
collaboration w ith sympathetic professionals (Brown, 1991). Research 
conducted by the lay public tends to be more inclusive than that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
321
done by professional scientists, sociologist Phil Brown (1991) reports:
Popular epidemiology takes into account social structural factors, 
involves social movements, utilizes political and judicial approaches 
to remedies, and challenges basic assumptions of traditional 
epidemiology, risk assessment, and environmental regulation.
Lay observations are crucial components for the general society's 
awareness of health and environmental risks. Quite simply, people 
know of data concerning their daily lives that may be inaccessible to 
scientists. Lay observation has been largely responsible for the major 
gains made in community and workplace hazard identification.
Scientific and government sources have largely failed in this area, due 
to uncertainty and controversy surrounding new frontiers of 
knowledge, and to corporate and governmental resistance to threats to 
private enterprise and government bureaucracy (Brown, 1991:135).
In many communities — among them, Pittsfield and Woburn, MA; 
Yellow Creek, KY; Love Canal, NY; and South Brunswick, NJ — residents 
pinpointed important information before health problems were evident 
(Brown, 1991). People use "their observations to develop "common- sense 
epidemiology," attributing "disease to pollution (Brown, 1991:135)."
W oburn residents, like those in other contaminated communities, 
quickly found that professional epidemiology was in fact a value-laden 
endeavor. Government agencies sometimes hid data, and other times 
failed to report it to relevant parties in a timely fashion. In addition, 
government opposition to community involvement has sometimes 
led to disciplinary action against scientists who aid citizen initiatives 
(Brown, 1991:144).
'The movement is outside the system." [Lois} Gibbs explained,
"because that’s the way to win. If you work within the established 
system, doing the right thing, more often than not you will lose. The 
system is put together by the powers that be so they will win. To be 
outside means not to accept that we will lose (Greider, 1992:168)."
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Popular epidemiology, the outsider of the medical establishment, poses a 
direct challenge to professional control over environmental health 
information and to professional standards of proof necessary before action is 
taken (Brown, 1991). Lay people argue that public health, rather than 
statistical significance should trigger action (Brown, 1991). Scientific 
insistence upon statistical significance and fear of uncertainty, combined with 
the social aspects of contamination, pose serious barriers to public 
participation (Brown, 1991). In the process of confrontmg their own political 
agendas, lay epidemiologists also challenge scientists to admit that they too 
have agendas, "even if covert, unconscious, or unrecognized (Brown, 
1991:148)." Fortunately, there are scientists like Mary O'Brien (1993), who 
maintain that scientists should take not be "afraid to stand beside those who 
knew far less... as they worked to halt toxic assaults on the world."
Popular epidemiology is an important part of environmental activism 
because it is empowering (Brown, 1991).
This challenge to traditional science is particularly significant since the 
toxic waste movement is a new type of social movement, unlike even 
the older environmentalist movement. In contrast to the largely 
middle-class and upper middle-class composition of older 
environmental groups, toxic waste groups are typically composed of 
lower middle-class to middle-class members. They  are less educated 
than members of most other social movements, and are largely led and 
populated by women...(Brown, 1991:149).
Mary Kay Craig, CTEC president, has proposed to research health issues 
through the Montana Technical Undergraduate Research Program to 
determine if illness has lessened w ith the closing of the mines (Craig, 
3/26/96). In her proposal she notes that the federal Agency for Toxic
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Substance Disease Registry has never been funded sufficiently to carry out its 
mandate, however a toxicologist as the Denver ATSDR office has agreed to 
oversee her research to ensure "scientific objectivity (4)." This may be a start.
Craig indicates an employee of ATSDR has indicated her research may 
possibly enable the agency "to conduct a more in-depth epidemiologic 
research on human health problems in Butte (6-7)." However, it is difficult to 
comprehend how, if the agency has been insufficiently unfunded, any 
additional health information would result in additional funding, especially 
in light of Congressional cuts to environmental agencies. Additionally, 
because there is a very fundamental difference between epidemiology as 
practiced by government agencies and lay or popular epidemiology, the 
question of the intent of the research needs to be addressed because the intent 
will determine the study's structure. Unlike governmental epidemiology, 
which is conducted by epidemiologists considering only narrow statistical 
determinations of cause and effect, lay epidemiology is designed to be both 
broader in scope and to be conducted by members of the community. In the 
case of Woburn, residents used the results of the research to buttress their 
lawsuit for payment of future medical costs (Brown, 1991; DiPema, 1985), 
rather than as a means to pressure government agencies. The health survey 
questions, which I had compiled in 1995, which Craig has proposed to submit 
for consideration to ATSDR, are designed broadly to encourage both 
participants and respondents to think historically as well as in the present, 
which goes back to the educational and empowering nature of lay 
epidemiology. This is a very different orientation than the agency’s.
Also problematic is that Craig has received a only $500 grant. Given that 
the Woburn study operated on a $10,000 grant, obtained by the medical
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researchers, Craig may find it very difficult to accomplish sufficient research 
with such a small grant. The W obum study was conducted under the 
supervision of a full-time person selected by the medical personnel (Brown, 
1991; DiPema, 1985), so, unless a qualified person volunteers his or her time 
to Craig's research, her grant money will not be sufficient. However, these 
questions notwithstanding, Craig's proposal may be an important beginning.
Throughout its history, which has for the most been part been recorded as 
the struggle of immigrant risk-taking male miners against capital, the state 
and federal government, and the land itself (Malone, 1995; Malone et al, 1993; 
Toole, 1959, 1972; Emmons, 1990), Butte has always relied upon its women 
(Finn, 1995, 1996; Maney, 1996; Crain, 1996). In the background of these 
histories, Butte's women "crafted the everyday (Finn, 1996)," creating the 
comfort of a routine in a place where the routine was often dramatically 
altered every three years when union contracts ran out. The members of the 
Women's Protective Union set the tone for the community (Maney, 1996).
My interpretation of their history is they saw themselves less as 
feminists as we use the word today, but as working class in a social 
structure that tried to deny basic human dignity to this particular group 
of people. They were very comfortable with the word class. Most of us 
are not comfortable with class today. They talked about their allegiance 
to other working class members, they were comfortable with that 
relationship (Maney, 1996).
These are the operable values in Butte today, the values discussed by Finn, 
Maney and Crain (1996). In her membership in community groups, such as 
the Ladies Ancient Order of Hibernians, Craig (3/26/95) is an active volunteer 
in this tradition. These are also the characteristics of the toxic waste
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movement. However, there are differences at work, the toxic waste 
movement stresses its working class nature and this is undercut by terms 
established by the EPA and ATSDR. which ignore class issues, social context, 
and are not designed to empower. Those differences may be very important 
in a place like Butte.
Although there are organizations, such as Lois Gibb s National Toxics 
Campaign, which assist local groups, there are no national membership 
organizations like the large middle-class groups, e.g. the Sierra Club,
Audubon. The toxic waste movement is grassroots because this is the way 
that communities can retain their identities. The working class toxic waste 
groups "are part of a social trend which considers that science and technology 
cannot be viewed as automatically beneficial and omniscient... (Brown, 
1991:150)." Their challenge to science reaches out to include regulatory 
agencies, "since these agencies represent a collaboration of government, 
science, and industry in defense of the status quo (Brown, 1991:150)." The 
status quo may not be conducive to maintaining the values of Butte — it may 
be a threat both culturally and physically.
There are also interesting gender issues in contaminated communities.
The Big Ten’s rationalistic or technocratic approach has been characterized as 
the "male" position by feminists who question them (Griffin, 1978; 
Plumwood, 1993); the grassroots' insistence upon values, the devalued 
female (Griffin, 1978; Plumwood, 1993; Greider, 1992). These male/female, 
objective/subjective, status quo/change dualities are also deeply embedded in 
Western culture (Griffin, 1978; Plumwood, 1993).
It is ironic that the traditionally female role of cleanup (Griffin, 1978; 
Plumwood, 1993) has, in contaminated communities, been usurped by the
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"male" discourse (Griffin, 1978; Plumwood, 1993) of clean as defined by 
technocratic rationality. Although somewhat simplistic a metaphor, the 
female notion of clean, as expressed by female-led grassroots groups, entails a 
"cleaning" that extends to moving furniture, clearing out closets and attics, 
and then moving out in the neighborhood itself; the male notion, as 
expressed by technocrats, entails what women often refer to as "a lick and a 
promise," a speedy wiping of cloth across table. The female cleaning 
challenges the arrangements of the status quo; the male cleaning merely 
polishes the surface.
Although they are more concerned with the environmental quality of the 
Clark Fork River than the future of Butte, the environmentalists 
downstream know that the fate of Butte also has a direct impact on them. As 
Hadley (10/24/95) points out, the contaminants flow down Butte HiU, into 
Silver Bow Creek where they reach the Clark Fork River and back up at the 
Milltown Dam, a dam  with a crack, just east of Missoula. (See map of the 
Milltown Reservoir in the appendix.) The fears of downstreamers, who have 
warned of the threat that the arsenic-laden sediments piled up at the 
Milltown Dam, pose to Missoula's water supply, were given credence in 
February 1996 when the Milltown reservoir was draw n down because of 
flooding and ice jams, leading to violations of state water quality standards 
dow nriver (Missoulian, 3 /1 /96). Ice jams are not uncommon in cold 
climates, such as Montana's. The EPA has proposed that the contaminated 
sediments be left in place, rather than removed or disinfected {Missoulian, 
3/1/96).
As a result of the February drawdown, samples taken downriver from the 
dam, showed: copper levels of 630 to 770 parts per billion (ppb), compared
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with a state standard of 18 ppb; zinc levels of 1,140 to 1,310 ppb, compared to a 
state aquatic life standard of 120 ppb; and 97 ppb arsenic, compared to the 
state's newly increased 18 ppb human life standard iMissoul ian,3lII96). 
Drawdowns can and will happen again, Russ Forba, the EPA Milltown site 
manager, said (Missoulian,3HI96).
"We realize that if you have an episode where there is scouring like 
this, there can be a release of metals that pulses down the stream,"
Forba said. "We realize that can happen. But we don't think the 
releases are going to accumulate in places that will cause threats to 
ground water or long-term threats to aquatic life (M issou/ian, 3/1/96)."
Clark Fork-Pend Oreille Coalition scientist Geoff Smith challenged Forba’s 
statement, charging that the "toxic sediments behind Milltown Dam pose a 
direct and long-term threat to the biological integrity of the Clark Fork and 
the safety of Missoula's aquifer {Missoulian, 3/1/96)." Given the review of 
EPA records of decision that indicates the agency's tendency toward partial or 
ineffective treatment remedies, the Coalition and environmental activists 
may have a tough fight on their hands to alter the agency's stance at 
Milltown. Also troubling are the numbers of abandoned mines in the state 
{Montana Standard, 10/2/1991) and problems with state enforcement of water 
quality laws (Montana Office of the Legislative Auditor, 1994). Further, the 
ongoing battle over Superfund reauthorization, which, environmentalists 
charge, could result in the weakening of the law, is a real concern for people 
in Butte and downstreamers as well.
Also problematic are Republican plans to cut the EPA budget by one-third 
and cut its enforcement budget by $130 million {Missoulian, 7/17/1995). Ellen 
Crain (9/21/95) summed the concern up neatly: "The government's shutting
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dow n Superfnnd. This is a huge economic and major health problem. " 
County Chief Executive Jack Lynch (10/25/95) worries about the state's claim 
for damages:
My biggest concern right now as it relates to Superfund is on a national 
level while reauthorization is uncertain, the opportunity for natural 
resource claims is threatened and there is clearly no defined directive 
as to how this very critical national program will continue in the 
future.
Equally important is that Montana does not exist as an isolated state; it is 
part of a national and global economy which has historically been dependent 
upon commodity and capital markets located beyond state boundaries (Toole, 
1959,1972; Malone et al, 1993; Malone, 1995; Kemmis, 1991; W. Robbins, 1994). 
Butte, as a small Western town, is not alone in its struggle to redefine its 
economic base.
What appears to be changing in the post-cold war era, then, is a new 
West, a region characterized by dramatic demographic movement, the 
persistent restructuring of local economics, and a future that promises 
more of the same.
But that emerging new West is at one with the past. Success and 
failure, prosperity and misfortune, expansion and decline, boom and 
bust, after all, were components of the broader development and 
evolution of capitalism at the local and regional, national, and global 
levels. To grasp the essence of the transformation of the American 
West during the last century and a half therefore, one must look to the 
mainstays of material relations in the region: the perpetually 
changing, even revolutionary character of its political and economic 
culture; the inherent instability of its resource sector and its relation to 
larger centers of capitalist decisionmaking; the dynamic and always- 
changing dialectic over time between country and city; and the larger 
mosaic of global conditions and circumstances (W. Robbins, 1994: 189- 
90).
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Inherent in the tension between the "Treasure State" and the "Last Best 
Place" is the notion of industrial salaries versus lower service-oriented eco- 
tourism-type wages as well as the notion of mining dumps, slag heaps and 
clear cuts versus more natural open areas. Montana, like other resource 
dependent areas of the West, relied upon those higher salaries and the tax 
revenues from resource exploiting corporations which were capitalized 
outside of the West. With the exception of San Francisco, the centers of 
capital, are still in the East and in large international metropolitan centers 
(Robbins, W., 1994). In other words, the West is still as vulnerable to 
exploitation as it was in the 1860s.
The influx of capital that is triggering the creation of the New West is 
also leaving in its wake a two-tiered society: (1) on one level the 
"equity refugees" or "equity bandits," well-to-do- newcomers with 
sizable capital savings or independent sources of income: and (2) on the 
other, low-wage service workers and longtime residents dependent on 
relatively fixed incomes. The juxtaposition of new money and dying 
industries on such a scale is relatively new to the West, but it is a 
specter that will probably continue to haunt smaller communities. In 
terms of real income, service sector jobs bring a poor return in 
comparison with older forms of industrial work. The consequence is a 
sharpening of class divisions on a scale never witnessed in the old, 
more traditional West with its agricultural and industrial base (W.
Robbins, 1994:194)
This description is strikingly similar to what world systems theorists, 
working in the Third World, refer to as disarticulated economies," 
peripheral economies characterized by low-skill production and export of 
primary goods reliant upon the core economies which control the flow of 
capital and development of technology. Although world systems theorists 
posit a core and periphery, there are peripheries within the northern core
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
330
itself. This analysis presents Butte and the American West (W. Robbins, 1994) 
as a periphery within the core. The result of the periphery's dependence 
upon the core is a disarticulated economy, which relies upon low-cost labor 
combined with a modern technological industrial base, and suppresses 
development of local internal markets, depresses local consumption 
standards, and orients the most "dynamic sectors" of the local economy to 
export production (Moberg, 1992:6), such as timber, wheat, beef, and ore in the 
case of Montana.
This economic imbalance is mirrored by political imbalances which makes 
it very difficult for community and state officials to wrest concessions from 
those with capital, thus swinging the balance back to the Treasure State.
These imbalances are played out in a number of ways: Eastern 
capital/W estern resources; state governm ent/national government; 
workers/capital; foreign interests/dom estic among them. So, faced with the 
possibility of new proposed large-scale mining operations, it is unlikely that 
the localities selected or the state of Montana will be able to negotiate terms 
favorable to the community (W. Robbins, 1994; Freudenburg, 1992), such as 
diverting some of the capital flow back into the community to buffer the 
inevitable booms and busts of global competition, or mandating procedures to 
protect the environmental and public health. It is worth noting that mining 
companies make gross profits of 47 percent and net profits of 26 percent, that 
of the 34 largest Western metals mines, located on public land or land 
acquired under the 1872 Mining Law, over 30 percent are foreign owned, and 
that 60 percent of the largest gold mines in the United States are foreign 
owned (Montana Standard, 4 /6/94). Neither Butte, the state of Montana nor 
the West has the resources to mitigate against current global terms of trade.
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With a relatively low tax base and a work force marginalized as a result of 
the decline in industrial jobs, rural areas are providing unique opportunities 
for mobile, capital intensive, computer-age companies (W. Robbins, 1994). 
Historian William Robbins recounts the story of a development engineering 
company that relocated from Californian to Montana where the owner noted 
a "certain lack of business drive in the local work force, a strong work ethic 
and a lack of hustle ethic,’ he calls it." (1994:195) The owner, who hopes to 
"help reverse the flow of jobs and capital to Latin American counties and 
assist in the rebuilding of the American West, " (W. Robbins, 1994:195) says 
his company is "promoting Montana as the newest North American 
emerging nation." Emerging from the yoke of colonization, like the Latin 
and Central American countries to which capital has been fleeing? Emerging 
as a peripheral economy, subject to the terms of trade and vagaries of global 
capitalism on the same ground as the Third World? If this is, indeed, the 
ground that Montana now occupies, it is very difficult to conceive that Butte- 
Silver Bow officials or state officials can turn the economy around.
Despite the popularity in recent years of policies that, in effect, call for 
rural communities to lift themselves by their own bootstraps, evidence 
to date suggests that, in reality, such a feat may be as unlikely in 
community affairs as in physical ones. Increasingly the forces that 
buffet rural communities are far broader than those that originate 
within or can be controlled by the communities themselves. In one 
sense, the most im portant policy implications are for decisions made 
not just at the local or state level but also at the national or 
international level. To prescribe local solutions for such structural 
problems may be simply the community-level analogue of ineffective 
arguments that those who are addicted to drugs should "just say no."... 
Anything less than a comprehensive rural development approach that 
addresses both local and extra-local dimensions of their resource 
dependency cycle will inevitably fail (Freudenburg, 1992:328).
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Butte, like the rest of the West, has always faced these structural 
constraints but, against all odds, the people of Butte have created and 
maintained a culture that has survived the corporation that formed it 
(Finn, 1995). Their culture, constructed about a working class core, was built 
in the periphery, in the shadow of the Company. What is important, and 
ignored by technocrats and many environmentalists, is that the culture was 
the result of interactions with their landscape as embodied in historical and 
social relations. Once this accepted, it is clear that any cleanup of the 
landscape that does not include the social landscapes of Butte is "irrelevant 
(Maney, 9/22/95)." As problematic as the lack of information given to Butte's 
people is that the full range of social landscapes has not been explored.
Further, those landscapes that emerged during the interviews for this analysis 
are as fractured and stratified as the rock formations that underlay Butte.
TERRAINS OF ACTION 
Given the number of Buttes, no one plan of action could possibly address 
them all. A necessary first step, then, must include a dialogue designed to put 
forth information, making connections between what has been presented as 
disassociated facts, and to listen, consider and seek common threads of 
experience. Given the failure of journalism in Butte, the dialogue will have 
to take place in other arenas. This may well be a positive.
Strange as it may seem to an era governed by mass-market politics, 
democracy begins in hum an conversation. The simplest, least 
threatening investment any citizen may make in democratic renewal is 
to begin talking with other people about these questions, as though the 
answers matter to them. Harmless talk around a kitchen table or in a 
church basement will not affect anyone but themselves, unless they
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decide that it ought to. When the circle is enlarged to include others, 
they will be embarking on the fertile terrain of politics that now seems 
so barren (Greider, 1992:411).
Clearly there is a need for a number of dialogues to occur simultaneously. 
Citizens for Labor and Environmental Justice can bring a connection to state 
labor organizations but, at the same time, local labor leaders such as Marilyn 
Maney and former union workers who have lost their jobs must be involved 
as equals. CTEC, which has developed the expertise to speak with federal and 
state agencies must continue its struggles for a more stringent cleanup, 
however, because CTEC is constrained by its reliance upon an EPA grant 
which defines the terms of the debate, grassroots support from Butte is 
essential to address the social aspects of contamination. Because that support 
did not spring into being, as was the case in Love Canal and Wobum, Mass. 
some organizational skill will be necessary both to identify and mobilize 
possible grassroots support, and to work with Citizens for Labor and 
Environmental Justice and CTEC. Equally important is that participants 
understand that some conflict is inevitable because "Change means 
movement. Movement means friction (Alinsky, 1989:21)." At stake is the 
empowerment of the only people who can legitimately decide the future of 
Butte — the people of Butte.
Because of this, although I think of myself as an environmentalist, I 
would argue that any action plan for Butte must be based on Saul Alinsky's 
principle of organizing rather than that typically employed by the mainstream 
environmental movement. Alinsky recognized that the ultimate goal of 
organizing must be to empower those organized to make their own decisions.
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We leam, when we respect the dignity of the people, that they cannot 
be denied the elementary right to participate fully in the solutions to 
their own problems. Self-respect arises only out of people who play an 
active role in solving their own crises and who are not helpless, 
passive, puppet-like recipients of private or public services (Alinsky,
1989:123).
In situations where corporations and government have systematically 
denied that right to participate, people must relearn their rights to demand 
participation on equal terms, which includes the right to define the problem 
they are addressing. The only proper role of an organizer is to facilitate the 
relearning process. This type of facilitation takes time, likely years. The goal 
of this facilitation is to "convert the plight into a problem (Alinsky,
1989:119)," a problem that people can attempt to solve on their own terms. 
This means that the plight cannot be presented as something determined by 
power imbalances but as injustices that can be addressed in political action 
defined by members of the community. This was the program  of the Butte 
Com munity Union.
Given the history of Butte and the unrecognized contributions of its 
women, an organizer might start with conversations about how women have 
survived the boom and bust of Butte, and about the skills they developed 
during those times, skills of which women are often unaware because their 
skills have been so undervalued in the popular culture (Plumwood, 1993; 
Griffin, 1978). An organizer might seek women involved with social 
services, public health, education, history and labor and talk with them about 
their histories, about their own and their families' health, of the Moore- 
Luoma study, and of the connections between the exploitation of the land and 
people in Butte. Additionally, an organizer might seek out epidemiologists
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and other medical professionals who have expressed concern about 
environmental illnesses in the hopes of interesting them in conducting lay, 
rather than traditional, epidemiological studies in Butte because lay studies 
engage and empower.
Equally importantly, an organizer in Butte might act on two of Alinsky's 
fundamental beliefs. The first, 'that you don't communicate with anyone 
purely on the rational facts or ethics of an issue...It is only when the other 
party is concerned or feels threatened that he will listen.. (1989:89)." Second, 
tactics must be carefully planned, not responses to the powers that be.
Throughout my year and a half in Butte's unfamiliar landscape my own 
vision of the landscape has changed. 1 find myself seeking the right light to 
photograph the ever-changing Montana sky at different times of the day 
through the metal structures of the gallows frames on Butte Hill. 1 marvel at 
the view of Butte from Walkerville and imagine Christmases past when the 
entire hill was covered in gallows frames strung with Christmas lights. 1 
think this is not nostalgia but rather a recognition of and respect for the 
history that the people of Butte have survived and for their human spirit that 
found space to celebrate in such a harsh demanding place.
1 have found myself enraged at the affronts committed upon Butte's 
people and the land, and impatient with environmentalists whose 
romanticized landscape seems to be devoid of humans. I have delighted in 
the black humor and wit of Butte, a humor bom  of a wisdom and struggle 
that the middle and upper classes have not shared. 1 find myself worrying if 
the community can retain its working class ethos and standards while 
transforming itself into an economically and physically healthy place. Of far 
greater value than the copper under Butte Hill are the people who
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tenaciously clung to life above and below ground, creating a vibrant culture 
in the process. Butte's greatest resource has always been its people — tough, 
determined, risk takers, survivors. In a more just world, they would beat the 
odds again.
FUTURE STUDY TOPICS 
A study of the correlation of suicide and busts in Butte, Montana and other 
mining towns might be useful to convey the human costs of exploitation. 
Also, although issues related to mining and the health of miners in Butte are 
being explored, there is a real need for a retrospective study of the health of 
women and children and a fuU health study today. And, on the local level, 
the functioning of the institutional controls should be investigated over time 
and state enforcement of water quality control laws and mining reclamation 
should be monitored as well.
Additionally, on the local level, a study of the community response, with 
emphasis on both strong and weak tie groups, to the siting of the waste 
repository would be useful to compare with community response to the 
existence of contamination. And, research into the role of the Catholic 
Church, especially as manifested from parish to parish, historically in Butte, 
and a study of how the children in Butte understand the history and its 
relevance to their constructions of landscape would be of great interest.
On the state level, a study that integrated data from federal and state 
Superfund sites, w ith contamination from landfills, municipal wastewater 
treatment facilities, ongoing industrial operations, and private wells, would 
be helpful to determine exactly how much of the state has been degraded.
On the federal level, an updated investigation into EPA records of
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decisions, w ith particular control on impermanent solutions and the use of 
institutional controls is needed. Additionally, a study of the actual 
functioning of institutional controls in operation more than five years might 
be enlightening. And, perhaps most important, would be an analysis of the 
number and location of aquifers the EPA has written off to date on a national 
basis.
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1 Gibbs became a national figure for her activism at Love Canal, the site that 
precipitated passage of the federal Superfund law, and later as the founder of 
Citizens’ Clearinghouse on Hazardous Waste.
2 The strings are often even more tightly drawn with grants from non­
governmental organizations, such as foundations. William Greider 
attributes these restraints to the federal tax code which allows tax 
deductions for wealthy corporations and individuals to conduct "activities 
that are really self-interested expression." "Under the federal tax code, tax- 
exempt grants are fully deductible for the donors only if the recipients stay 
clear of partisan politics, and many organizations accept these limitations 
on their politics. They may develop ’educational issues’ or create ’civic 
projects’ for citizens but they cannot take these concerns into the arena of 
accountability that matters most to those in power — elections.
"... Every organization that relies on tax exempt contributions lives 
constantly with the complications of what it can or cannot do; many flirt at 
the edges of what the Internal Revenue Service would allow.
"The tax-exempt financing provices still another means by which wealth — 
including corporate wealth — defines the political agenda for others. In 
the arena of public affairs, private wealth exerts enormous scope and 
direction and defines the political agendas of others. In the arena of public 
affairs, private wealth exerts enormous scope and direction of what citizens 
will undertake, because the defining is conditioned by the givers' own 
sense of what is an appropriate political cause... The overall effect of 
political charity, as one might expect, is mostly conservative — guaranteed 
to preserve the status quo. Charity is another form of political power." 
(Greider, 1992:220-221)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF CHEMICALS AND ASSOCIATED ILLNESS 
at the Mine Flooding Operable Unit (Berkeley Pit), Lower Area One, 
Area One and Montana Pole Site
ACENAPTHTHENE — (COG) at Montana Pole Site 
ACENAPHTHYLENE — Montana Pole Site 
ACIDITY — Berkeley Pit
ALUMINUM — Berkeley Pit, Montana Pole Site — bladder cancer in 
workplace exposures, teratogenic; association w ith the "tangles" in the 
brains of Alzheimer’s patients (Lappé, 1991)
ANTHRACENE — (COC) at Montana Pole Site 
ANTIMONY — Montana Pole Site
ARSENIC* — Berkeley Pit, Montana Pole Site — Cancers of the 
bladder, lung, liver, kidney, skin, and colon (USEPA, 12/15/93); 
Porphyrinogenic which can have a variety of organ system effects 
ranging from the central nervous system and gastrointestinal to 
cardiac, lung, kidney and liver effects (Duehring, 1996); Nasal, throat, 
lung, skin, respiratory and gastrointestinal mucosa irritation; abnormal 
decrease in white blood cells, altered electrocardiograms; anemia; 
anxiety; birth defects; blackfoot disease (loss of circulation in fingers and 
toes; brain dysfunction; bronchitis; skin and lung cancer; cardiac 
arrhythmias; cardiopulmonary collapse; chromosomal aberrations; 
coma; confusion; contact dermatitis; convulsions; cyanosis; death; 
dehydration; depression; depression of red or white blood cells; 
dermatitis; destruction of red blood cells’ diarrhea; distal axon 
degeneration; elevated serum enzyme levels; emotional lability; 
fatigue; garlic breath; hallucinations; headaches; heart rate over 100 
beats per minute; hoarseness; hyperpigmentation of skin with 
interspersed spots of hypopigmentation; impaired memory; impaired 
respiratory function; insomnia; irritability; kidney inflammation; 
lassitude; loss of reflexes; low birth weight; metal fume fever; metallic 
taste; nasal mucosa inflammation; nausea; nervousness; numbness in 
hands and feet; numbness, tingling, or prickling sensation; 
overgrowths of the skin; painful 'pins and needles' sensation; 
paralysis; peripheral ventricular contractions; pulmonary edema and 
hemorrhagic lesions; Raynaud's disease; removes the myelin sheath 
from nerves; sexual disorders; shock; skin disease and lesions; 
spontaneous abortions; swollen and tender liver; tissue damage; 
ulceration of nasal septum; vascular lesions; vomiting; weakness; wrist 
or ankle drop (Chemical Injury Information Network, 1996); 
miscarriages, teratogenic (Lappé, 1991)
BARIUM — Montana Pole Site 
BENZO(a)ANTHRACENE* — Montana Pole Site 
BENZO(a)PYRENE* — Montana Pole Site — the risk of this chemical 
in particulate form is frequently overlooked, can reach the human
339
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embryo and fetus transplacentally (Lappé, 1991) 
BENZO(b)FLUORANTHENE* — Montana Pole Site 
BENZO(ghi)PERYLENE* — Montana Pole Site 
BENZO(k)FLUORANTHENE* — Montana Pole Site 
BERYLLIUM — Montana Pole Site
CADMIUM — Berkeley Pit, Montana Pole Site— Lung cancer (USEPA, 
12/15/93); Porphyrinogenic which can have a variety of organ system 
effects ranging from the central nervous system and gastrointestinal to 
cardiac, lung, kidney and liver effects (Duehring, 1996); evidence of 
carcinogenicity, adverse reproductive effects, neurotoxicity or other 
chronic effects, birth defects (Chemical Injury Information Network, 
1996); testicular cancer; teratogenic; low birth weights; at low levels, 
cadmium functions as a behavioral teratogen, at low levels causes bone 
marrow damage, but this can be reduced with simultaneous exposure 
to zinc (Lappé, 1991)
CALCIUM — Berkeley Pit, Montana Pole Site 
CARBAZOLE — Montana Pole Site 
CARBON DISULFIDE — Montana Pole Site
CHLORIDE — Berkeley Pit —linked with Epstein-Barr activation and 
higher incidence of liver disease which increased in relation to number 
of years of exposure (Environmental Access Research Network, 1996) 
4-CHLORO-3-METHYLPHENOL — (COC) at Montana Pole Site 
2-CHLORONAPHTHALENE — Montana Pole Site 
2-CHLOROPHENOL — (COC) at Montana Pole Site 
CHROMIUM (COC)— Montana Pole Site — Toxic effects to respiratory 
tract and lung after inhalation, hypersensitivity skin reactions 
following dermal exposure (USEPA, 2/10/93); suspected of causing 
human cancer (Lappé, 1991)
CHRYSENE* — Montana Pole Site 
COBALT — Montana Pole Site
COPPER — Berkeley Pit, (COC) at Montana Pole Site —
Porphyrinogenic which can have a variety of organ system effects 
ranging from the central nervous system and gastrointestinal to 
cardiac, lung, kidney and liver effects (Duehring, 1996); short term 
effects to 30 ppm  in water include vomiting, diarrhea, stomach cramps 
and long-term exposure to 3 ppm  in water causes Ever damage in 
infants (ATSDR)
DIBENZO(a,h)ANTHRACENE* — Montana Pole Site 
DIBENZO(k)FLUORANTHENE* — Montana Pole Site
2.4-DICHLOROPHENOL — (COC) at Montana Pole Site
2.4-DICHLOROPHENOL — Montana Pole Site
2.4-DIMETHYLPHENOL — Montana Pole Site
2.4-DINTTROPHENOL — (COC) at Montanan Pole Site
2.4-DINITROTOLUENE — (COC) at Montana Pole Site 
DIOXINS/FURANS* — Montana Pole Site — imm une-suppressive
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effects at low-level chronic inhalation exposures (Environmental 
Access Research Network, 1996)
FLUORANTHENE — (COC) at Montana Pole Site
FLUORENE — Montana Pole Site
FLUORIDE — Berkeley Pit
INDENO(l,2,3-cd)PYRENE* — Montana Pole Site
IRON — Berkeley Pit, Montana Pole Site — Porphyrinogenic which
can have a variety of organ system effects ranging from the central
nervous system and gastrointestinal to cardiac, lung, kidney and liver
effects (Duehring, 1996)
LEAD — Berkeley Pit, (COC) at Montzma Pole Site — Impaired or 
delayed mental and physical development, impaired heme 
biosynthesis, decreased serum vitamin D levels (EPA, 2/11/94); 
impaired hearing or learning (EPA, March 1994); evidence of 
carcinogenicity, adverse reproductive effects, neurotoxicity or other 
chronic effects, birth defects (Chemical Injury Information Network, 
1996); can cause deficiencies in essential metals, calcium, iron, and zinc, 
severe lead intoxication is associated with sterihty, abortion, stillbirths, 
and neonatal morbidity and mortality from exposure in utero (Coyer, 
1993); testicular cancer; teratogenic; low birth weights; at low levels 
causes bone marrow damage, but this can be reduced with 
simultaneous exposure to zinc (Lappé, 1991)
MAGNESIUM — Berkeley Pit, Montana Pole Site 
MANGANESE — Berkeley Pit, (COC) at Montana Pole Site 
2-METHYLNAPHTHALENE — (COC) at Montana Pole Site 
2-METHYL-4,6-DINITROPHENOL — (COC) at Montana Pole Site 
NAPHTHALENE — (COC) at Montana Pole Site 
NICKEL — Montana Pole Site — Porphyrinogenic which can have a 
variety of organ system effects ranging from the central nervous system 
and gastrointestinal to cardiac, lung, kidney and liver effects (Duehring, 
1996)
NITRATE — Berkeley Pit
2-NirROPHENOL — Montana Pole Site
4-NITROPHENOL — Montana Pole Site
PAH (Total non-carcinogen)(a) — Montana Pole Site
PENTACHLOROPHENOL* — Montana Pole Site — soft tissue
sarcomas and colon cancer (Lappé, 1991)
PHENANTHRENE — (COC) at Montana Pole Site
PHENOL — Montana Pole Site
POTASSIUM — Berkeley Pit, Montana Pole Site
PYRENE — (COC) at Montana Pole Site
SELENIUM — Lower Area One — teratogenic; at low levels
dramatically activates defensive proteins such as metallothioneins
(Lappé, 1991)
SILICONE — Berkeley Pit — in particulate form exposure causes
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silicosis which has been linked with rheumatoid arthritis and, with 
some coal miners, scleroderma (Lappé, 1991)
SILVER — Montana Pole Site
SODIUM — Berkeley Pit, Montana Pole Site
SULFATE — Zinc, severe diarrhea (USEPA, 12/15/93) Berkeley Pit
2.3.5.6-TETRACHLOROPHENOL — (COC) at Montana Pole Site — 
Decreased body weights, increased kidney and liver weights, and 
centrilobular hypertrophy in livers (USEPA, 2/10/93) 
2,3,7,8-TETRACHLORODIBENZO - P - DIOXIN* — Montana Pole Site 
THALLIUM — Lower Area One
TOLUENE — Montana Pole Site — Potentially toxic (Chemical Injury 
Network, 1996)
2.4.6-TRICHLOROPHENOL* — Montana Pole Site 
VANADIUM — Montana Pole Site
XYLENE — Montana Pole Site — Potentially toxic (Chemical Injury 
Network, 1996)
ZINC — Berkeley Pit, (COC) at Montana Pole Site — Porphyrinogenic 
which can have a variety of organ system effects ranging from the 
central nervous system and gastrointestinal to cardiac, lung, kidney 
and liver effects (Duehring, 1996); metal fume fever which is 
characterized by difficulty in breathing and flu-like symptoms in 
exposures at 600 m g /m  for 10 minutes and digestive problems with 80 
ppm  in food for six weeks, decreased serum HDL-cholesterol levels 
w ith 90 ppm  in food for five weeks, altered immune system and 
anemia at 153 pp, in food for six weeks(ATSDR)
* indicates EPA-designated carcinogenic
(COC) indicates EPA-designated Chemical of Concern
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